101S 


THEISM 


BY 

BORDEN   P.    BOWNE 

PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY  IN  BOSTON   UNIVKRSITT 


COMPRISING   THE  DEEMS  LECTURES  FOR  1902 


NEW  YORK.:- CINCINNATI.:.  CHICAGO 

AMERICAN    BOOK    COMPANY 


COPYKIGHT,   1887,    BT 

HARPER  AND  BROTHERS. 

COPTKIGHT,    1902,    BT 

BORDEN   P.   BOWNE. 
Entered  at  Stationbes'  Hall,  London. 

THE  IBM. 
W  P.   I. 


PREFACE 

This  work  is  a  revision  and  extension  of  my  previous 
work,  "  Philosophy  of  Theism."  An  invitation  to  deliver 
the  Deems  lectures  before  the  New  York  University  gave 
a  welcome  opportunity  for  revision.  In  the  earlier  work 
the  argument  was  somewhat  meagerly  presented,  and  the 
arguments  from  epistemology  and  metaphysics  were  only 
hinted  at.  This  shortcoming  I  have  sought  to  remedy. 
The  work  has  been  largely  rewritten,  and  about  fifty  per 
cent  of  new  matter  has  been  added.  In  all  this,  however, 
I  have  confined  myself  to  my  original  plan  of  giving  the 
essential  argument,  so  that  the  reader  might  discern  its 
true  nature  and  be  enabled  to  estimate  its  rational  value. 
To  do  this  is  more  important  at  present  than  to  make 
collections  of  facts  and  illustrations,  however  bulky,  which 
decide  nothing,  so  long  as  the  logical  principles  of  the 
discussion  are  not  cleared  up  and  agreed  upon.  The 
point  at  issue  among  thinkers  concerns  the  nature  and 
value  of  theistic  logic ;  and  this  cannot  be  settled  by  elo- 
quence, or  by  question-begging  illustrations.  From  this 
point  of  view  the  work  might  be  called  The  Logic  of 
Theism. 

Kant  pointed  out  that  the  ontological  argument  prop- 
erly proves  nothing,  and  that  the  cosmological  and  the 


iv  PREFACE 

design  argument  depend  on  the  ontological.  The  argu- 
ment, then,  is  not  demonstrative,  and  rests  finally  on  the 
assumed  existence  of  a  perfect  being.  In  a  different  form 
I  have  maintained  the  same  position  ;  but  so  far  from 
concluding  that  theistic  faith  is  baseless,  I  have  sought 
to  show  that  essentially  the  same  postulate  underlies  our 
entire  mental  life.  There  is  an  element  of  faith  and  voli- 
tion latent  in  all  our  theorizing.  Where  we  cannot  prove, 
we  believe.  Where  we  cannot  demonstrate,  we  choose 
sides.  This  element  of  faith  cannot  be  escaped  in  any 
field  of  thought,  and  without  it  the  mind  is  helpless  and 
dumb.  Oversight  of  this  fact  has  led  to  boundless  verbal 
haggling  and  barren  logic  chopping,  in  which  it  would  be 
hard  to  say  whether  the  affirmative  or  the  negative  be  the 
more  confused.  Absurd  demands  for  "  proof  "  have  been 
met  with  absurd  "proofs."  The  argument  has  thus  been 
transferred  from  the  field  of  life  and  action,  where  it 
mainly  belongs,  to  the  arid  wastes  of  formal  logic,  where 
it  has  fared  scarcely  better  than  the  man  who  journeyed 
to  Jericho  from  Jerusalem.  In  opposition  to  this  error  I 
have  sought  to  show  the  practical  and  vital  basis  of  belief, 
and  have  pointed  out  that  logic  has  only  a  regulative 
function  with  respect  to  the  great  beliefs  by  which  men 
and  nations  live.  These  beliefs  are  formulations  and 
expressions  of  life,  rather  than  syllogistic  and  academic 
inferences ;  and  they  depend  for  their  force  on  the  energy 
of  the  life  that  produces  them.  The  conclusion  is  that 
theism  is  the  fundamental  postulate  of  our  total  life.  It 
cannot,  indeed,  be  demonstrated  without  assumption,  but 
it  cannot  be  denied  without  wrecking  all  our  interests. 


PREFACE  V 

This  claim  has  been  especially  emphasized  in  considering 
the  bearing  of  theism  upon  the  problem  of  knowledge.  I 
have  sought  to  show  that  our  cognitive  and  speculative 
interests,  as  well  as  our  moral  and  religious  interests,  are 
so  bound  up  with  theism  as  to  stand  or  fall  with  it.  If 
we  say,  then,  that  theism  is  strictly  proved  by  nothing, 
we  must  also  admit  that  it  is  implicit  in  everything. 
Anti-theistic  schemes  are  generally  in  the  instinctive  stage 
of  thought,  where  knowledge  constitutes  no  problem  and 
is  taken  for  granted.  In  this  stage  any  theory  whatever 
may  be  held,  however  self-destructive ;  and  when  its  sui- 
cidal implications  are  pointed  out,  the  theorist  falls  back 
on  unreasoned  common  sense,  and  repudiates,  not  his  own 
theory,  which  is  the  real  offender,  but  the  critic.  He  sets 
up  natural  selection  as  the  determining  principle  of  belief, 
and  then  repudiates  the  great  catholic  convictions  of  the 
race.  He  shows  how  the  survival  of  the  fittest  must 
bring  thought  and  thing  into  accord,  and  then  rejects  the 
beliefs  which  survive.  He  defines  mind  as  an  adjustment 
of  inner  relations  to  outer  relations,  and  forthwith  drifts 
off  into  nescience.  He  presents  the  Unknown  Cause  as 
the  source  of  all  beliefs,  and  then  rules  out  most  of  them 
as  invalid,  and,  at  times,  declares  them  all  worthless. 
And  this  compound  of  instinct  and  reflection,  in  which 
each  element  destroys  the  other,  is  mistaken  by  many  for 
the  last  profundity  in  science  and  philosophy.  But  this 
kind  of  thing  is  fast  passing  away,  as  the  insight  becomes 
general  that  knowledge  is  one  of  the  chief  problems  of 
tjpeculation,  and  that  every  theory  must  be  judged  by  its 
doctrine  of  knowledge.     When  this  insight  is  reached. 


vi  PREFACE 

atheism  and  all  mechanical  schemes  of  the  necessitarian 
type  appear  as  philosophically  illiterate  and  belated. 

And  as  epistemology  reveals  the  suicidal  nature  of 
atheistic  thought,  so  metaphysical  criticism  shows  the 
baselessness  of  its  metaphysics.  The  crude  realism  of 
popular  thought,  when  joined  with  the  notion  of  me- 
chanical necessity,  furnishes  excellent  soil  for  an  atheistic 
growth.  This  realism  in  its  popular  form  may  be  re- 
garded as  finally  set  aside,  and  also  the  mechanical  natu- 
ralism based  upon  it.  Philosophy  is  coming  to  see  the 
emptiness  of  all  philosophizing  on  the  mechanical  and 
impersonal  plane;  so  that  the  choice  for  both  science  and 
philosophy  is  either  a  theistic  foundation  or  none.  Both 
the  abstractions  of  mechanical  theory  and  the  impersonal 
categories  of  philosophical  dogmatism  are  found  to  cancel 
themselves  when  taken  apart  from  living  and  self-conscious 
intelligence,  in  which  alone  they  have  either  existence  or 
meaning. 

Upon  the  whole  the  theistic  outlook  is  most  encourag- 
ing. The  atheistic  gust  of  the  last  generation  has  about 
blown  over.  It  was  largely  a  misunderstanding  due  to 
the  superficial  philosophy  of  the  time.  But  we  have 
analyzed  our  problems  and  improved  our  criticism  since 
then,  and  now  understand  ourselves  and  our  problems 
much  better.  Science  and  philosophy,  through  a  wise 
division  of  labor  or  just  partition  of  territory,  have  come 
to  dwell  together  in  friendship;  and  confl.icts  of  science 
and  religion,  which  were  at  one  time  a  standing  order  of 
the  day,  have  almost  entirely  vanished.  The  triumphs 
and  panics  of  that  time  were  alike  baseless,  and  closely 


PREFACE  vii 

resembled  scuffles  between  blind  men.  The  air  has 
cleared.  Fundamental  problems  are  seen  to  remain  about 
what  they  always  were.  A  better  epistemology  has  shown 
the  suicidal  nature  of  atheistic  thought.  A  better  meta- 
physics is  curing  the  naturalistic  obsession.  A  proper 
division  of  labor  has  secured  to  science  and  philosophy 
their  appropriate  fields  and  inalienable  rights,  while  theism 
more  and  more  appears  as  the  supreme  condition  of  both 
thought  and  life. 

BORDEN  P.  BOWNE. 


CONTENTS 

PA6K 

Introduction 1 

Religion  a  Fact,  1.  Origin  of  Religion,  2.  Theories  of 
Origin  Ambiguous,  4.  They  are  never  Explanations  of  the 
Religious  Fact,  but  Descriptions  of  its  Temporal  Develop- 
ment, 5.  History  of  Religion,  10.  Rational  Basis  of  Re- 
ligion, 11.  Logical  Method,  15.  Method  of  Rigor  and 
Vigor,  16.  Practical  and  Teleological  Basis  of  Belief,  20. 
Function  of  Logic,  30.  Logic  Regulative,  not  Constitutive, 
31.  Theism  and  Atheism  alike  Hypotheses  to  be  tested  by 
their  Positive  Adequacy  to  the  Facts,  41. 

CHAPTER  I 

The  Unity  of  the  World-ground  .  .  .  .  .44 
Kant's  Criticism  of  the  Theistic  Arguments,  44.  The 
Traditional  Classification  of  the  Arguments  abandoned  and 
a  Starting  Point  found  in  the  Fact  of  Interaction,  51. 
Verbal  Explanations  of  Interaction,  54.  Interaction  be- 
tween Independent  Things  a  Contradiction,  56.  The 
Fundamental  Reality  must  be  One,  59. 

CHAPTER   II 

The  World-ground  as  Intelligent 64 

Two  Classes  of  Arguments,  Inductive  and  Speculative,  65. 
Argument  from  Order,  67.     Theism  the  only  Explanation 


X  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

of  Order,  70.  Source  of  the  Plausibility  of  the  Atheistic 
Explauation  of  Order,  70.  The  Argument  from  Teleology, 
75.  Points  to  be  noted  in  studying  the  Argument,  77. 
Atheistic  Objections,  89.  Mechanical  Explanation  shown 
to  be  Empty,  89.  Source  of  the  Illusion,  93.  Evolution, 
103.  Ambiguity  of  the  Doctrine,  104.  Evolution  as  Phe- 
nomenal, 107.  The  "As-If"  Objection,  110.  The  Argu- 
ment which  disproves  Mind  in  Nature  disproves  Mind  also 
in  Man,  114.  The  Argument  from  Finite  Intelligence,  119. 
The  Argument  from  Epistemology,  123.  Suicidal  Charac- 
ter of  All  Mechanical  Doctrines  of  Knowledge,  124.  The 
Basal  Certainties  of  Knowledge  are  not  Things,  but  Persons 
and  Experience,  127.  Knowledge  implies  Identity  of  the 
Laws  of  Thought  and  the  Laws  of  Things,  130.  A  Knowa- 
ble  World  necessarily  a  Thought  World,  134.  The  Meta- 
physical Argument,  134.  Idealistic  Theism  the  only  Solu- 
tion of  the  Problems  of  Thought,  145. 

CHAPTER   III 

The  World-ground  as  Personal 150 

Agnostic  Objections,  151.  Imi^ersonal  Intelligence,  155. 
Alleged  Contradiction  in  Infinite  Intelligence,  160.  The 
Contradiction  is  Verbal,  163.  Psychological  Objections, 
164.  Complete  Personality  possible  only  to  the  Absolute, 
167.     The  Truth  in  the  Objections,  169. 

CHAPTER  IV 

The  Metaphysical  Attributes  of  the  World-ground     .     172 
Unity,  173.     Unity  possible  only  on  the  Personal  Plane, 
174.      Unchangeability,   177.      The   Self-identity  and  Self- 
equality  of  Intelligence  the  only  Unchangeable,  179.     Om- 


CONTENTS  ki 

PAGE 

nipresence,  179.  Impossible  under  the  Space  Form,  180. 
Eternity,  181.  Relation  of  the  World-grouud  to  Time,  184. 
Omniscience,  186.  Possibility  of  Foreknowledge,  188.  Om- 
nipotence, 190.  Relation  of  God  to  Truth,  191.  The  Divine 
Will  and  the  Divine  Existence,  197. 

CHAPTER  V 

God  and  the  World 199 

Pantheism,  199.  Quantitative  Pantheism  Untenable,  200. 
Two  Conceptions  of  the  Finite,  203.  Spirits  created,  206. 
Untenability  of  All  Forms  of  Pantheism,  209.  Reality  of 
the  Finite  Spirit,  214.  Theistic  Conception,  218.  Creation 
Temporal  or  Eternal  V  220.  Present  Relation  of  the  World 
to  God,  226.  God  as  Ruler  of  the  World,  230.  Man's  Re- 
lation to  Nature,  234.  Naturalism  and  Siipernaturalism, 
244.     God  as  Immanent  and  Transcendent,  246. 


CHAPTER   VI 

The  Wokld-ground  as  Ethical 248 

Distinction  of  Metaphysical  and  Moral  Attributes,  249. 
The  Empirical  Argument,  250.  Argument  from  the  Moral 
Nature,  251.  Argument  from  History  and  Social  Structure, 
254.  Logic  and  Life,  258.  Optimism  and  Pessimism,  263. 
Both  Optimist  and  Pessimist  fall  a  Prey  to  Abstractions,  264. 
Apriori  Discussion  Futile,  271.  Unpermissible  Anthropo- 
morphism, 275.  Laws  of  the  System  Good,  277.  Man's 
Worst  Woes  of  his  own  Making,  278.  Only  a  Practical 
Solution  Possible,  282.  Evil  in  the  Animal  World,  285. 
Ethics  and  the  Absolute,  287.  Can  the  Absolute  be 
Ethical?  287. 


xii  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER   VII 


FAOE 


Theism  and  Life 291 

Practical  Argument  for  Theism  explained,  291.  Atheism 
and  Duties,  294.  Atheism  and  the  Moral  Judgment,  295. 
Consistent  Atheism  cannot  defend  itseK  against  Ethical 
Skepticism,  298.  Dependence  of  Ethics  on  our  General 
Theory  of  the  Universe  and  Life,  299.  Atheism  and  the 
Moral  Ideal,  302.  Atheism  and  Moral  Inspiration,  304. 
Position  of  the  Religious  Nature  in  Modern  Atheism,  312. 


Conclusion 


315 


THEISM 


INTRODUCTION 

Man  is  religious.  However  it  came  about,  and 
whether  we  like  it  or  not,  man  is  religious.  A  de- 
scriptive inventory  of  our  human  life  and  tendencies 
that  omitted  religion  would  be  lamentably  imperfect. 
A  history  of  humanity  that  overlooked  its  religious 
tendencies  and  activities  would  miss  one  of  its  most 
significant  manifestations.  The  most  irreligious 
statesman  would  admit  that  religion  must  be 
reckoned  with  as  a  fact,  however  baseless  or  patho- 
logical he  might  deem  it.  The  most  unbelieving  his- 
torian must  recognize,  with  whatever  vexation,  the 
tremendous  part  religion  has  played.  And  from  the 
economical  and  financial  standpoint,  the  religious 
budget  appears  as  one  of  the  great  items  in  our  total 
expense.  For  good  or  ill,  the  earth  is  full  of  religion ; 
and  life  and  thought,  art  and  literature,  are  moulded 
by  it.  As  our  earth  moves  under  the  influence  of 
forces  lying  beyond  itself,  so  our  human  life  is  mov- 
ino;  under  the  influence  of  ideas  that  have  their 
roots  in  the  invisible.  There  are  powers,  we  think, 
beyond  seeing  and  hearing,  on  whom  we  depend,  to 
whom  we  owe  various  duties,  and  who  take  note  of 

1 


2  INTRODUCTION 

our  life  and  conduct ;  and  our  relation  to  these 
powers  is  the  deepest  and  highest  and  most  solemn 
element  in  our  existence.  Religion  may  be  a  mistake, 
an  illusion,  a  superstition,  but  as  an  historical  fact  it 
is  undeniable;  and  no  exorcism  has  yet  been  found 
potent  enough  permanently  to  exorcise  the  evil  spirit. 
The  fact  being  thus  indisputable,  three  questions 
arise.  These  concern  respectively  the  source  of  reli- 
gion, the  history  of  religion,  and  the  rational  founda- 
tion or  warrant  of  religion. 

Origin  of  Religion 

To  the  question  concerning  the  source  of  religion 
various  answers  have  been  given.  Some  have  been 
content  to  view  religion  as  a  device  of  state,  and 
priestcraft;  but  this  view  has  long  been  obsolete. 
The  impossibility  of  long  imposing  purely  adventi- 
tious and  fictitious  ideas  upon  the  mind  by  external 
authority  makes  it  necessary  to  look  for  the  source  of 
religion  within  the  mind  itself.  Such  source  was 
found  at  a  very  early  date  in  fear.  Man,  being  timid 
and  helpless,  feigns  gods  partly  to  help  himself  and 
partly  as  projections  of  his  fears.  This  view,  which 
finds  full  expression  by  Lucretius,  has  been  extended 
by  Hume,  who  traces  religious  ideas  to  the  personify- 
ing tendency  of  the  mind.  Man  projects  his  own 
life  into  all  his  objects,  and  thus  surrounds  himself 
with  a  world  of  invisible  beings.  Others  have  held 
that  the  idea  of  an  invisible  world  first  got  afloat 
through  dreams,  trances,  fits,  etc.,  and  once  afloat,  it 
took  possession  of  the  human  mind  in  general,  with 
the  exception  always  of  a  few  choice  spirits  of  rare 


ORIGIN  OF  RELIGION  3 

insight ;  and    from   this  unseemly  origin   the  whole 
system  of  religious  thought  has  been  developed. 

Suggestions  of  this  kind  are  numberless  and  unedi- 
fying.  In  the  first  place,  the  alleged  facts  are  open 
to  doubt.  For  a  good  while  the  anthropologists  re- 
garded some  animistic  or  ghostly  origin  of  religion 
as  finally  established ;  but  further  and  deeper  acquaint- 
ance with  the  religious  phenomena  and  beliefs  of  the 
lower  races  has  seriously  shaken  this  confidence.  Rela- 
tively high  and  pure  conceptions  are  found  cropping  out 
among  uncivilized  peoples,  and  often  antedating  their 
more  earthly  and  sensuous  aberrations.  Popular  an- 
thropology has  been  very  superficial  and  unsympathetic 
in  its  study  of  religious  phenomena.  A  good  deal 
of  the  work  has  been  done  under  the  influence  of  a 
speculative  theory,  or  in  the  conviction  that  religion 
is  a  delusion  or  a  disease.  In  the  former  case  the 
facts  have  been  selected  that  support  the  theory.  In 
the  latter,  mechanical  collections  have  been  made  of 
stories  of  religious  and  subreligious  crudities  and 
horrors ;  and  these  have  often  been  put  forth  as  the 
true  essence  and  original  of  religion.  As  Mr.  Lang 
says,  "  Anthropology  has  mainly  kept  her  eyes  fixed 
on  .  .  .  the  lusts,  the  mummeries,  conjurings,  and 
frauds  of  priesthoods,  while  relatively,  or  altogether, 
neglecting  what  is  honest  and  of  good  report."  ^ 
Such  methods  are  not  likely  to  lead  to  impartial  in- 
vestigation, or  to  any  deep  insight  into  the  facts. 
These  need  a  finer  sympathy  with  humanity  and  a 
deeper  sense  of  historical  reality.  The  faith  that 
finds  a  sufficient  account  of  the  great  religious  de- 
velopments of  the  civilized  nations  in  the  dreams  and 

1 "  Making  of  Religion,"  p.  198. 


4  INTRODUCTION 

fancies  of  savages  is  certainly  beyond  anything  in 
Israel. 

But  however  this  may  be,  the  historical  problem  is 
seen  to  be  not  so  simple  as  has  been  supposed ;  and 
no  single  and  compendious  formula  seems  possible. 
Moreover,  apart  from  any  question  as  to  the  facts, 
our  popular  anthropological  accounts  of  the  source  of 
religion  generally  suffer  from  a  thoroughgoing  ambi- 
guity. It  is  not  clear  whether  they  are  offered  as 
explanations  of  religious  phenomena,  or  only  as 
descriptions  of  the  order  of  their  historical  appear- 
ance,—  two  things  widely  different. 

As  explanations  these  accounts  are  failures.  They 
are  mainly  an  extension  of  the  sensational  philosophy 
into  the  realm  of  religion.  As  that  philosophy  seeks 
to  reduce  the  rational  factors  of  intellect  to  sensation, 
and  ethical  elements  to  non-ethical,  so  also  it  seeks  to 
reduce  the  religious  nature  to  something  non-religious. 
But  in  all  of  these  attempts  it  succeeds  only  by  tacitly 
begging  the  question.  If  we  take  a  mind  whose  full 
nature  is  expressed  in  a  certain  quality  A,  it  will  be 
forever  impossible  to  develop  anything  but  A  out  of 
it.  Or  if  we  assume  a  mind  which  by  its  nature  is 
limited  to  a  certain  plane  A,  again  it  will  be  impos- 
sible to  transcend  the  A  with  which  we  start.  In 
order  to  move  at  all  the  A  must  be  more  than  A  ;  it 
must  have  some  implicit  potentiality  in  it  which  is  the 
real  ground  of  the  movement.  Thus  a  being  whose 
nature  is  exhausted  in  sense  objects  can  never  tran- 
scend them.  Everything  must  be  to  him  what  it 
seems.  The  stick  must  be  a  stick,  not  a  fetish.  The 
sun  and  moon  must  be  lighted  disks,  not  gods.  To 
get  such  a  being  beyond  the  sense  object  to  a  religious 


ORIGIN   OF   RELIGION  5 

object  we  must  endow  him  with,  more  than  the  A  of 
sensation,  or  the  B  of  animal  fear.  The  cattle  have 
both ;  but  only  some  very  hopeful  evolutionists  have 
discovered  any  traces  of  religion  among  them ;  and  if 
it  should  turn  out  that  these  traces  are  not  mislead- 
ing, it  would  not  prove  that  simple  sensations  can 
become  religious  ideas,  but  that  the  animal  mind  is 
more  and  better  than  we  have  been  accustomed  to 
think. 

When  thought  is  clear,  these  accounts  of  the  origin 
and  source  of  religion  can  never  be  more  than  descrip- 
tions of  the  order  of  religious  ideas  in  their  temporal 
development.  They  simply  recite  the  crude  concep- 
tions with  which  men  began  in  religion  and  describe 
the  long,  slow  process  by  which  they  passed  from  those 
raw  beginnings  to  the  more  adequate  conceptions  of 
to-day.  In  such  description  all  that  the  critic  cares 
to  insist  on  is  that  the  facts  shall  have  been  as 
reported,  and  that  no  fashionable  speculation  or  pre- 
conceived theory  shall  be  allowed  to  improvise  history. 
The  fact  in  religion  is  the  same  as  in  science  and 
social  order.  Men  began  with  very  crude  notions, 
and  by  long  experience  and  much  reflection,  and 
through  a  deal  of  error,  only  slowly  found  their  way. 
The  fact  has  equal  theoretical  significance  in  each 
case.  There  is  no  simple  something,  religion  or  sci- 
ence or  government,  of  which  the  first  forms  were  the 
essential  reality,  and  which  then  developed  themselves, 
yet  in  such  a  way  as  never  to  get  beyond  their  primi- 
tive form.  This  notion,  which  underlies  much  of 
what  the  anthropologists  have  said  about  the  origin 
of  religion,  is  full-blown  illusion.  This  fancy  would 
make  the  essence  of  chemistry  alchemy,  or  the  essence 


6  INTRODUCTION 

of  astronomy  astrology,  just  as  certainly  as  it  makes 
the  essence  of  religion  animism.  The  concrete,  his- 
torical fact  in  all  these  cases  is  men  trying  to  find  their 
way,  and  gradually  exchanging  low  and  inadequate 
conceptions  for  higher  and  more  adequate  ones,  as  life 
unfolds,  and  experience  accumulates,  and  reflective 
thought  deepens  and  clarifies  itself.  There  is  nothing 
in  such  a  development  at  which  thought  should  take 
offense ;  least  of  all  is  there  anything  in  it  which 
degrades  the  later  conceptions  by  identifying  them  in 
essence  with  earlier  and  cruder  ones.  This  is  the 
naive  misunderstanding  of  a  blind  sensationalism 
which  has  lost  itself  in  verbal  identities.  Wherever 
there  is  real  development,  the  meaning  of  the  earlier 
is  revealed  only  in  the  later.  The  true  nature  and 
potentialities  of  the  acorn  are  seen  only  in  the  oak. 
The  true  nature  of  mind  is  seen  only  in  its  mature 
manifestation.  If  we  would  see  what  the  mind  is  in 
respect  to  its  cognitive  powers,  we  must  study  the 
highest  unfoldings  of  thought.  In  like  manner,  if  we 
would  know  what  the  mind  is  in  respect  to  religion, 
we  must  study  the  highest  religious  manifestations  of 
humanity.  This,  which  is  plain  upon  inspection,  is 
overlooked  by  the  popular  anthropologist,  who  can 
see  nothing  in  religion  but  fetishes,  and  totems,  etc., 
to  the  total  neglect  of  the  great  religious  leaders  and 
teachers  of  the  race.  This  is  as  shortsighted  as  it 
would  be  to  find  a  complete  account  of  science  in  a 
collection  of  stories  about  the  crude  notions  of  the 
earliest  men,  while  entirely  ignoring  the  masters  and 
marvels  of  a  later  day.  Anthropology,  we  said,  is 
open  to  criticism  for  its  imperfect  induction  of  facts ; 
it  is  equally  open  to  criticism  on  account  of  its  failure 


ORIGIN  OF   RELIGION  7 

to  master  its  own  logic.  The  logic  would  bid  us  look 
to  the  future  for  the  highest  and  truest  expression  of 
things ;  but  the  speculator,  under  the  influence  of 
certain  illusions  of  uncritical  thought,  gropes  among 
the  raw  beginnings  of  things  for  their  true  and  essen- 
tial nature. 

It  may  be,  then,  that  early  religious  conceptions 
were  molded  by  dreams,  trances,  and  various  mysteri- 
ous phenomena ;  but  we  must  note  two  facts.  First, 
these  things  are  by  no  means  the  sum  of  religious 
phenomena;  this  sum  includes  the  whole  religious 
life  of  humanity.  Secondly,  we  cannot  get  from 
these  dreams,  etc.,  to  anything  religious  without  positr 
ing  a  religious  factor  in  human  nature  itself ;  just  as 
we  cannot  get  from  the  fancies  of  childhood  to  the 
clearer  thought  of  maturity  without  positing  a 
rational  nature  of  which  the  fancies  were  only  the 
first  manifestation,  and  not  the  final  expression.  A 
developing  being  can  never  be  defined  by  its  present ; 
account  must  also  be  taken  of  all  which  it  is  to 
become ;  and  these  potentialities  must  be  founded  in 
the  nature  of  the  being. 

Another  view  of  the  origin  of  religious  ideas  is 
that  they  are  the  product  of  reflective  thought.  This 
view  is  disproved  by  experience.  Man  was  religious 
before  he  became  a  philosopher.  Speculative  thought 
has  had  the  fimction  of  criticising  and  clarifying 
religious  ideas,  but  never  of  originating  them  ;  and 
often  they  have  been  much  more  confidently  held 
without  its  aid  than  with  it.  On  this  account  many 
have  viewed  speculative  thought  in  its  religious 
efforts  as  a  kind  of  inverted  Jacob's  ladder. 

On  the   other   hand,  it   has   been   suggested  that 


8  INTRODUCTION 

religious  ideas  are  innate.  This  could  only  mean 
that  the  human  mind  is  such  as  to  develop  religious 
sentiments  and  ideas  under  the  stimulus  of  our  total 
experience.  But  experience  shows  such  difference  of 
religious  thought  that  the  contents  of  this  religious 
intuition  could  hardly  be  more  than  a  vague  sense  of 
an  invisible  and  supernatural  existence.  Besides,  the 
phrase,  innate  ideas,  has  so  many  misleading  sugges- 
tions that  we  had  better  avoid  it. 

In  the  same  line  it  has  been  held  that  the  soul  has 
a  special  organ  or  faculty  for  the  reception  of  religious 
truth  ;  and  the  state  of  this  faculty  has  even  been 
made  a  ground  for  important  theological  distinctions. 
Sometimes  it  has  been  called  faith,  sometimes  feeling, 
and  sometimes  the  "  God-consciousness."  But  psy- 
chology long  ago  discovered  that  nothing  is  explained 
by  reference  to  a  faculty,  since  the  faculty  itself  is 
always  and  only  an  abstraction  from  the  facts  for 
whose  explanation  it  is  invoked  or  invented.  The 
faculty  that  explains  language  is  the  language  faculty ; 
the  faculty  that  explains  vision  is  the  visual  faculty. 
We  do  not  get  the  language  or  the  vision  from  the 
faculty,  but  we  affirm  the  faculty  because  of  the  lan- 
guage or  the  vision ;  and  the  affirmation  at  bottom 
consists  in  saying  that  we  must  be  able  to  speak  or 
see  because  we  do  speak  or  see.  There  is  probably  no 
question  more  utterly  arid  and  barren  than  the  search 
for  the  faculty  from  which  religion  springs.  Fortu- 
nately, the  question  is  fast  becoming  antiquated. 

The  conclusion  as  to  the  source  of  religion  is  this : 
no  external  action  can  develop  into  anything  an 
empty  mind,  which  has  no  law,  nature,  or  direction. 
This  would  be  to  act  upon  the  void.     Psychology  also 


ORIGIN  OF  RELIGION  9 

shows  that  nothing  can  be  imported  into  the  mind 
from  without  in  any  case.  All  external  things  and 
influences  of  whatever  sort  only  furnish  the  occasion 
for  a  manifestation  of  the  soul's  own  nature.  Hence 
it  is  hopeless  to  look  for  the  source  of  religious  ideas 
in  external  experience  alone.  We  must  assume  that 
religion  is  founded  in  human  nature  as  one  of  its 
essential  needs  and  constitutional  tendencies.  At 
the  same  time  it  must  be  said  that  the  religious 
impulse  or  instinct  alone  is  not  self-sufficient  and 
does  not  move  unerringly  to  its  goal.  Unless  under 
the  guidance  of  intellect  and  conscience,  religion  may 
take  on  grotesque  or  terrible  forms.  It  always  re- 
flects the  stage  of  mental  and  moral  development 
reached  by  the  individual  or  the  community,  and 
varies  with  it.     It  is  a  function  of  the  entire  man. 

The  stimulus  to  religious  unfolding  is  no  simple  or 
single  thing,  but  is  as  manifold  as  life  itself.  Schlei- 
ermacher  found  it  in  the  sense  of  dependence.  This 
is  without  doubt  a  potent  factor  in  awakening  men 
to  a  sense  of  religious  need.  It  is  easy  to  conceive 
a  worldly  life  so  comfortable  and  undisturbed  that 
nothing  more  would  be  desired.  An  ancient  writer, 
speaking  of  persons  living  such  a  life,  said,  "  Because 
they  have  no  changes  therefore  they  fear  not  God  "  ; 
and  Mr.  Lowell  has  spoken  of  persons  "who  have 
had  the  idea  of  God  fattened  out  of  them."  But  this 
is  only  one  factor  of  many.  The  needs  of  the  intellect, 
the  demands  and  forebodings  of  conscience,  the  crav- 
ings of  the  affections,  the  impulses  of  the  aesthetic 
nature,  and  the  ideals  of  the  will,  —  all  enter  into  the 
problem,  apart  from  words  of  revelation,  or  any 
direct  influence  of  God  on  the  soul. 


10  INTRODUCTION 


History  of  Religion 

So  much  on  the  origm  of  reUgion.  Similar  consid- 
erations apply  to  its  history.  It  is  referred  to  because 
there  is  a  fancy  that  the  truth  of  religion  can  be 
xested  by  studying  its  development,  either  in  the 
individual  or  in  the  history  of  the  race.  But  a  little 
reflection  shows  that  the  psychological  and  temporal 
emergence  of  an  idea  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  its 
philosophical  worth  and  validity.  When  the  latter 
question  is  up,  the  former  is  quite  irrelevant,  unless 
it  be  shown  that  philosophical  value  is  compatible 
with  only  one  form  of  psychological  genesis  and  his- 
tory. This  showing  has  never  been  made.  Mean- 
while the  rational  worth  of  religion  can  be  determined 
only  by  considering  its  contents  and  the  reasons  which 
may  be  offered  for  it. 

After  this  confusion  of  genesis  and  history  with 
rational  worth  and  validity  has  been  warded  off,  no 
inquirer  can  have  any  interest  in  rejecting  anything 
that  sober  investigation  may  reveal  concerning  the 
early  forms  of  religious  thought  and  practice.  One's 
only  interest  is  in  having  the  history  as  it  was,  and 
not  as  some  current  speculation  has  decided  it  must 
have  been.  The  attempt  to  stigmatize  later  concep- 
tions because  of  the  crudities  of  earlier  ones  is  due  to 
those  verbal  identifications  into  which  untrained  and 
superficial  thought  is  sure  to  fall.  The  illusion  van- 
ishes when  we  remember  that  the  objective  fact  is  not 
lower  ideas  evolving  higher  ideas,  but  living  men 
thinking  and  gradually  adjusting  and  enlarging  their 
ideas  as  experience  broadens  and  thought  grows  clear. 


RATIONAL  BASIS  OF   RELIGION  11 

In  one  sense  only  does  the  history  of  religion  have 
any  bearing  on  the  question  of  its  truth.  When  we 
study  the  entire  religious  movement  of  humanity, 
noting  not  only  the  crude  forms  in  which  it  began, 
but  also  the  higher  forms  to  which  it  grew,  we  may 
get  a  deeper  sense  of  the  universality  and  ineradica- 
bility  of  the  religious  element,  and  also  a  valuable 
hint  of  the  direction  in  which  its  normal  development 
lies.  Such  a  historical  fact  would  be  a  revelation  of 
the  nature  of  things,  and  would  have  the  significance 
of  any  great  cosmic  manifestation  and  product.  Such 
a  fact  would  also  be  an  argument.  It  would  con- 
stitute a  weighty  presumption  in  favor  of  the  objective 
truth  of  religion.  To  set  it  aside  as  sheer  illusion 
would  be  an  act  of  skeptical  violence  that  would  go 
far  toward  shattering  reason  itself. 

Rational  Basis  of  Religion 

But  our  present  concern  is  with  neither  the  source 
nor  the  genesis  and  history  of  religion,  but  rather 
with  its  rational  foundation,  and  more  particularly 
with  the  rational  foundation  of  the  theistic  idea, 
which  is  the  central  and  basal  element  of  religion. 
We  set  aside,  therefore,  all  inquiry  into  the  origin 
and  development  of  religious  ideas,  and  inquire  rather 
whether  they  have  any  rational  warrant,  now  that 
they  are  here.  *  And  we  do  this  with  all  the  more 
confidence  because,  on  any  theory  of  knowledge,  our 
cognitive  and  critical  insight  is  more  trustworthy  in 
its  mature  and  developed  forms,  than  in  its  crude  and 
elementary  stages.  If  experience  be  the  source  of 
knowledge,  the  longer  and  broader  the  experience,  the 


12  INTRODUCTION 

more  certain  its  indications.  If  evolution  and  natural 
selection  are  developing  faculty  and  insight,  then  our 
present  faculties  must  be  more  trustworthy  than  those 
of  previous  generations.  As  no  one  would  think  of 
trusting  the  insight  of  the  child  against  that  of  the 
man,  so  no  one  should  think  of  going  back  to  the 
childhood  of  the  race  for  a  standard  of  truth.  As 
Bacon  said,  we  are  the  true  ancients ;  that  is,  we  have 
the  longest  experience,  and  we  have  been  longest  ex- 
posed to  the  drill  of  natural  selection  whose  sifting  action 
is  supposed  to  bring  about  the  survival  of  the  fittest, 
in  thought  as  well  as  elsewhere.  It  is  plain  that  we  have 
to  use  such  faculties  as  we  have  in  any  case ;  and  now 
it  is  clear  in  logic  that  we  may  confidently  begin  with 
our  present  faculties  and  attainments,  and  seek  to  deter- 
mine their  rational  value,  without  much  concerning 
ourselves  as  to  what  our  earliest  hiunan  or  sub-human 
ancestors  may  have  thought  on  religious  matters. 
They  were  badly  astray  on  most  things ;  and  there 
is  no  good  reason  for  making  them  authorities  in 
religion.  By  continual  trial  and  rejection  men  have 
slowly  emerged  from  primitive  confusion  and  error 
respecting  material  things,  and  we  ought  not  to  be 
surprised  to  find  the  same  order  in  spiritual  things. 

And  as  every  one  can  see  the  absurdity  of  making 
primitive  scientific  conceptions  the  standard  of  scien- 
tific truth,  so  we  may  hope  that  gradually  we  may 
attain  to  the  insight  that  primitive  religious  concep- 
tions have  no  better  right  to  be  the  standard  of 
religious  truth.  In  both  cases  there  is  a  human  in- 
terest in  knowing  the  history  of  the  ideas,  but  their 
truth  is  to  be  determined  in  another  way. 

We   take,  then,  what   may  be  called  the  theistic 


RATIONAL   BASIS   OF   RELIGION  13 

consciousness  of  the  race  as  the  text  for  a  critical  exe- 
gesis, with  the  aim  of  fixing  its  contents  and  philo- 
sophical worth.  We  do  not  aim  at  a  philosophical 
deduction  or  speculative  construction  of  religion;  we 
aim  only  to  analyze  and  understand  the  essential 
data  and  implications  of  the  religious  consciousness. 
The  outcome  of  this  inquiry  might  conceivably  be 
threefold.  The  theistic  idea  might  be  found  to  be 
absurd  or  contradictory.  Or  it  might  appear  as  an 
implication  of  the  religious  sentiment  only,  and  with- 
out any  significance  for  pure  intellect.  Or  it  might 
appear  as  a  demand  of  our  entire  nature,  intellectual, 
moral,  aesthetic,  and  religious ;  so  that  the  true  and 
the  beautiful  and  the  good  alike  would  find  in  it 
their  root  and  spring.  In  the  first  case  theistic  faith 
would  have  to  be  abandoned.  In  the  second  case  it 
would  be  a  fact  of  which  no  further  account  could  be 
given  than  that  the  religious  nature  implies  it,  but  it 
need  not  be  rejected  because  of  the  lack  of  specula- 
tive reasons.  In  the  last  case  theism  would  appear 
as  the  implication  of  all  our  faculties,  and  would  have 
the  warrant  of  the  entire  soul.  How  this  may  be, 
the  course  of  our  study  must  show. 

The  function  of  the  theistic  idea  in  human  thought 
as  a  whole  is  very  complex.  First,  theism  may  be 
advanced  as  an  hypothesis  for  the  explanation  of  phe- 
nomena. As  such  it  has  no  religious  function  at  all, 
but  solely  a  logical  and  metaphysical  one.  The  ques- 
tion is  considered  under  the  law  of  the  sufficient  rea- 
son ;  and  the  aim  is  to  find  an  adequate  explanation  of 
phenomena,  especially  those  of  the  external  world. 
Most  theistic  argument  has  been  carried  on  upon  this 
basis.     The  facts  of  the  outer  world  have  been  ap- 


14  INTRODUCTION 

pealed  to,  especially  those  which  show  adaptation  and 
adjustment  to  ends ;  and  the  claim  has  been  set  up 
that  only  intelligence  could  account  for  them.  These 
facts  have  been  supplemented  with  various  metaphysi- 
cal considerations  concerning  the  absolute  and  the 
relative,  the  infinite  and  the  finite,  the  necessary  and 
the  contingent,  the  self-moving  and  the  moved ;  and 
the  work  was  done.  How  far  this  comes  from  satisfy- 
ing the  religious  nature  is  evident. 

Secondly,  theism  may  be  held  as  the  implication 
and  satisfaction  of  our  entire  nature,  intellectual, 
emotional,  aesthetic,  ethical,  and  religious.  These 
elements  reach  out  after  God  so  naturally  and,  when 
developed,  almost  so  necessarily,  that  they  have 
always  constituted  the  chief  actual  grounds  of  theistic 
belief.  Accordingly  the  human  mind  has  always 
adjusted  its  conception  of  God  with  reference  less  to 
external  nature  than  to  its  own  internal  needs  and 
aspirations.  It  has  gathered  its  ideals  of  truth  and 
beauty  and  goodness,  and  united  them  into  the 
thought  of  the  one  Perfect  Being,  the  ideal  of  ideals, 
God  over  all  and  blessed  forever.  A  purely  getio- 
logical  contemplation  of  the  world  and  life  with  the 
sole  aim  of  finding  an  adequate  cause  according  to 
the  law  of  the  sufficient  reason  would  give  us  an 
altogether  different  idea  of  God  from  that  which  we 
possess. 

Hence  it  has  been  frequently  maintained,  even 
among  theologians,  that  arguments  for  theism  are 
worthless.  They  may  produce  some  assent,  l^ut  no 
living  conviction ;  and  when  they  are  strictly  logical 
they  reach  only  barren  results  which  are  religiously 
worthless.      These   sterilities    are    transformed    into 


LOGICAL  METHOD  15 

fruitfulness  only  by  implicitly  falling  back  on  the  liv- 
ing religious  consciousness ;  and  this  might  as  well  be 
done  openly  and  at  the  start. 

This  contention  is  partly  true  and  partly  false.  It 
is  true  that  purely  setiological  arguments,  like  that 
from  design,  are  inadequate,  but  they  may  be  good  as 
far  as  they  go.  It  is  also  true  that  purely  metaphys- 
ical arguments  concerning  the  absolute,  or  uncondi- 
tioned, do  not  bring  us  in  sight  of  living  religious 
sentiment,  but  they  have  their  value  nevertheless. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  a  grave  oversight  to  suppose 
that  such  considerations  alone  can  give  the  full 
religious  conception  of  God.  The  actual  grounds  of 
theistic  belief  are  manifold,  being  intellectual,  emo- 
tional, aesthetic,  and  ethical;  and  no  one  can  under- 
stand the  history  of  the  belief  without  taking  all  of 
these  into  account. 

But  here  the  very  grave  doubt  meets  us  whether 
most  of  these  elements  are  proper  grounds  of  belief, 
and  whether  theistic  argument  does  not  confessedly 
proceed  by  a  much  looser  logic  than  obtains  in  our 
mental  procedure  elsewhere.  This  compels  us  to 
take  a  short  survey  of  mental  method  in  general.  A 
very  large  part  of  our  difficulties  arise  from  a  false 
conception  of  method  which  leads  to  baseless  expecta- 
tions with  resulting  failure  and  disappointment. 

Logical  Method 

It  is  a  traditional  superstition  of  intellect  that 
nothing  is  to  be  accepted  which  is  not  either  self- 
evident  or  demonstrated.  The  corresponding  con- 
ception of  method  is   this :  Let   us   first   find    some 


16  mTRODUCTION 

invincible  fact  or  principle,  something  which  cannot 
be  doubted  or  denied  without  absurdity,  and  from 
this  let  us  deduce  by  cogent  logic  whatever  it  may 
warrant.  When  we  reach  the  end  of  our  logic  let 
us  stop.  In  other  words,  admit  nothing  that  can 
be  doubted.  Make  no  assumptions,  and  take  no  step 
which  is  not  compelled  by  rigorous  logic.  And, 
above  all,  let  no  feeling  or  sentiment  or  desire  have 
any  voice  in  determining  belief.  If  we  follow  this 
rule,  we  shall  never  be  confounded,  and  knowledge 
will  progress. 

Opposed  to  this  conception  of  method  is  another, 
as  follows :  Instead  of  doubting  everything  that  can 
be  doubted,  let  us  rather  doubt  nothing  except  for 
reasons.  Let  us  assume  that  everything  is  what  it 
reports  itself  rmtil  some  grounds  for  doubt  appear. 
In  society  we  get  on  better  by  assuming  that  men  are 
truthful,  and  by  doubting  only  for  special  reasons, 
than  we  should  if  we  assumed  that  all  men  are  liars, 
and  believed  them  only  when  compelled.  So  in  all 
investigation  we  make  more  progress  if  we  assume 
the  truthfulness  of  the  universe  and  of  our  own 
nature  than  we  should  if  we  doubted  both. 

Such  are  the  two  methods.  The  former  assumes 
everything  to  be  false  until  proved  true;  the  latter 
takes  things  at  their  own  report,  or  as  they  seem, 
until  proved  false.  All  fruitful  work  proceeds  on 
the  latter  method ;  most  speculative  criticism  and 
closet  philosophy  proceed  on  the  former.  Hence 
their  perennial  barrenness. 

The  first  method,  which  may  be  called  the  method 
of  rigor  and  vigor,  is  always  attractive  to  beginners. 
The  developing  intellect  in  the  self-sufficiency  of  its 


LOGICAL   METHOD  17 

dawning  majority  is  pretty  sure  to  admire  this 
method  for  a  time.  And  if  there  were  any  beings 
who  had  nothing  to  do  but  to  syllogize  and  for  whom 
belief  had  no  practical  bearing,  they  might  safely 
adopt  the  method.  But  for  us  human  beings  rigor 
and  vigor  apply  only  to  mathematics,  which  is  a 
purely  formal  and  subjective  science.  When  we 
come  to  deal  with  reality,  the  method  brings  thought 
to  a  standstill.  At  the  beginning  of  the  modern  era, 
Descartes  pretended  to  doubt  everything,  and  found 
only  one  unshakable  fact  —  "I  think  ;  therefore,  I  am." 
But  from  this  he  could  deduce  nothing.  The  bare 
fact,  "I  think,"  is  philosophically  insignificant.  What 
I  think,  or  how  I  think,  whether  rightly  or  wrongly, 
is  the  important  matter.  But  from  the  bare  "  I 
think"  Descartes  could  reach  neither  the  world  of 
things,  nor  the  world  of  persons,  nor  the  world  of 
laws.  The  method  was  so  rigorous  as  to  leave 
thought  without  an  object.  And  in  general,  if  we 
should  begin  by  doubting  everything  that  can  be 
doubted,  and  by  settling  all  questions  in  advance,  we 
should  never  get  under  way.  There  are  questions  in 
logical  theory,  in  the  theory  of  knowledge,  and  in 
metaphysics,  which  even  yet  are  keenly  debated. 
The  skeptic  and  agnostic  and  idealist  are  still  abroad. 
If,  then,  man  were  only  an  abstract  speculator, 
this  method  of  doubting  everything  which  cannot 
be  demonstrated  would  condemn  the  mind  to  a  barren 
subjectivity.  But  man  is  not  only,  or  chiefly,  an 
abstract  speculator,  he  is  also  a  living  being,  with 
practical  interests  and  necessities,  to  which  he  must 
adjust  himself  in  order  to  live  at  all.  It  has  been 
one  of  the  perennial  shortcomings  of  intellectualism 


18  INTRODUCTION 

that  man  has  been  considered  solely  as  an  intellect  or 
understanding ;  whereas,  he  is  a  great  deal  more. 
Man  is  will,  conscience,  emotion,  aspiration ;  and 
these  are  far  more  powerful  factors  than  the  logical 
intellect.  Hence,  in  its  practical  unfolding  the  mind 
makes  a  great  variety  of  practical  postulates  and 
assumptions  which  are  not  logical  deductions  or 
speculative  necessities,  but  a  kind  of  modus  vivendi 
with  the  universe.  They  represent  the  conditions 
of  our  fullest  life ;  and  are  at  bottom  expressions  of 
our  practical  and  ideal  interests  or  necessities.  And 
these  are  reached  as  articulate  principles,  not  by 
speculative  construction,  but  by  analysis  of  practical 
life.  Life  is  richer  and  deeper  than  speculation,  and 
contains  implicitly  the  principles  by  which  we  live. 
The  law  the  logician  lays  down  is  this:  Nothing 
may  be  believed  which  is  not  proved.  The  law  the 
mind  actually  follows  is  this :  Whatever  the  mind 
demands  for  the  satisfaction  of  its  subjective  inter- 
ests and  tendencies  may  be  assumed  as  real  in  default 
of  positive  disproof.  We  propose  to  trace  this  prin- 
ciple in  the  realm  of  cognition  as  being  the  realm 
which  is  commonly  supposed  to  be  free  from  all  sub- 
jective elements. 

As  cognitive  beings  we  desire  to  know.  But  real- 
ity as  it  is  given  to  us  in  immediate  experience  is  not 
adapted  to  the  needs  of  our  intelligence,  and  we  pro- 
ceed to  work  it  over  so  as  to  make  it  amenable  to  our 
mental  necessities.  This  working  over  constitutes 
what  we  call  theoretical  science.  To  do  it  we  tacitly 
assume  that  the  vast  collection  of  things  and  events 
fall  into  fixed  classes,  are  subject  to  fixed  laws,  and 


LOGICAL  METHOD  19 

are  bound  up  into  a  rational  system.  We  assume, 
further,  the  essential  truthfulness  of  nature,  so  that 
the  indications  of  all  clearly  determined  facts  can  be 
trusted.  We  assume,  once  more,  that  nature  is  not 
only  essentially  comprehensible,  but  that  it  is  com- 
prehensible by  us ;  so  that  what  our  nature  calls  for 
to  make  the  facts  intelligible  to  us  is  necessary  to  the 
facts  themselves.  For,  after  all,  our  explanation  of 
facts  always  consists  in  saying  that  if  we  may  assume 
certain  facts  we  can  imderstand  the  actual  facts. 
Thus  back  of  the  real  universe  of  experience  we 
construct  an  ideal  universe  of  the  intellect,  and  we 
understand  the  former  through  the  latter.  In  this 
way  we  reach  two  entirely  different  conceptions  of 
things.  One  is  furnished  by  the  senses  ;  the  other  is 
reached  by  thought.  The  former  represents  reality 
as  it  reports  itself  ;  the  latter  represents  reality  as 
made  over  by  the  mind. 

And  this  is  not  all.  For  soon  the  ideal  universe 
passes  for  the  real,  while  the  real  universe  of  experi- 
ence is  degraded  into  a  phenomenon  or  appearance. 
Nothing  is  allowed  to  be  what  it  reports  itself.  All 
the  senses  are  flouted.  The  reports  of  the  unsophisti- 
cated consciousness  are  derided.  Numberless  worlds 
are  invented ;  a  whole  family  of  ethers  is  generated ; 
and  the  oddest  things  are  said  about  everything,  as  if 
our  aim  were  to  give  the  lie  direct  to  every  sponta- 
neous conviction  of  common-sense.  The  doctrines  of 
astronomy,  and  the  current  theories  of  heat,  light, 
sound,  and  matter,  are  examples.  All  of  these  things 
are,  without  exception,  a  series  of  ideal  constructions 
by  which  we  seek  to  interpret  the  reality  of  experience 
and  make  it  amenable  to  our  intelligence. 


20  INTRODUCTION 

If  now  we  ask  for  the  source  and  warrant  of  this 
theoretic  activity,  we  must  finally  find  it  in  the  living 
interests  of  our  cognitive  nature.  The  facts  them- 
selves are  indifferent  alike  to  comprehension  and  non- 
comprehension.  But  we  seek  to  comprehend  as  a 
matter  of  course,  and  take  for  granted  that  we  have  a 
right  to  comprehend,  that  the  universe  is  comprehen- 
sible, and  that  we  are  able  to  comprehend  it.  The  as- 
sumptions we  make  are  so  natural  that  they  even  seem 
necessary  truths  at  times ;  but  in  fact  they  are  primarily 
but  projections  upon  reality  of  our  mental  nature  and 
our  subjective  interests.  That  conception  of  a  crystal- 
line system  of  law  is  purely  a  subjective  ideal  and  is  not 
known  to  be  an  objective  fact.  The  comprehensible 
universe  is  as  pure  an  assumption  as  the  religious  and 
moral  universe.  Moreover,  the  actual  universe,  that  is, 
the  universe  as  given  in  experience,  is  not  intelligible ; 
it  is  that  other  assumed  ideal  universe,  which  we 
have  put  behind  the  real  universe,  that  is  intelligible. 
From  a  strictly  logical  and  critical  standpoint  the 
intelligible  universe  is  purely  an  idol  of  the  human 
tribe;  nevertheless  we  insist  upon  its  reality  because 
the  admission  of  an  essentially  irrational  and  incogi- 
table  world  violates  our  cognitive  instincts,  throws  the 
mind  back  upon  itself  without  an  object  and  without 
meaning,  and  leaves  it  a  prey  to  skepticism  and 
despair. 

The  existence  of  this  assumptive  element  may  be 
further  shown  by  adopting  a  suggestion  of  Arthur 
Balfour  in  his  "Defence  of  Philosophic  Doubt,"  and 
constructing  a  refutation  of  science  on  the  model  of 
the  familiar  refutation  of  religion.  We  need  only 
demand  that  the  scientist   prove  his  postulates  and 


LOGICAL   METHOD  21 

demonstrate  his  assumptions  to  put  him  in  a  sad 
pUght.  Let  him  settle  with  the  philosophic  skeptic. 
Let  him  rout  the  agnostic.  Let  him  put  the  idealist 
to  flight.  Let  him  prove  that  a  system  of  law  exists 
in  objective  fact.  Let  him  show  that  what  he  needs 
to  comprehend  the  facts  is  necessary  to  the  facts 
themselves.  Let  him  clear  up  the  difficulties  in  his 
own  metaphysics.  Action  at  a  distance,  the  nature 
of  the  ether,  and  the  relations  of  matter  and  force 
would  be  good  points  to  begin  with.  Let  him  show 
that  our  desire  to  have  the  universe  comprehensible 
proves  that  it  is  so,  or  that  our  unwillingness  to 
admit  an  irrational  reality  is  an  argument  against  it. 
Let  him  remember  that  the  scientific  interest  which 
is  so  strong  in  him  is  very  limited  indeed,  so  that  it 
must  seem  like  extreme  arrogance  on  his  part  to  seek 
to  impose  the  tenets  of  his  little  sect  upon  the  uni- 
verse of  necessary  laws  of  the  same. 

When  all  these  demands  have  been  met,  there  can 
be  some  talk  about  science,  but  not  before.  As  long 
as  the  skeptic  and  agnostic  are  abroad,  there  is 
no  security  that  science  is  not  sheer  fiction.  As  long 
as  the  idealist  is  not  silenced,  it  is  doubtful  whether 
even  the  objects  of  science  exist.  If  the  system  of 
law  is  not  proved  to  exist,  the  deductions  from  it  are 
worthless.  Until  we  prove  that  what  we  need  to 
understand  the  facts  is  necessary  to  the  facts  them- 
selves, our  theorizing  may  be  only  a  projection  upon 
the  outer  world  of  our  mental  nature,  and  in  no  way 
an  apprehension  of  objective  reality.  As  to  the 
metaphysics  of  science,  it  is  well  known  to  contain 
difficulties  equal  to  any  in  theology.  So  far  from 
answering  these  questions  the  average  scientist  has 

THEISM  3 


22  INTRODUCTION 

never  heard  of  them,  and  yet  they  seem  to  concern 
the  life  of  science  itself.  The  truth  is,  we  meet  here 
the  opposition  of  method  to  which  we  referred  at  the 
start.  The  critic  affects  to  doubt  whatever  cannot 
be  proved,  while  the  scientist  takes  for  granted  what 
every  one  admits. 

The  way  of  rigor  and  vigor  would  be  hard  even 
for  the  matm-e  speculator.  He  would  find  himself 
in  the  presence  of  insoluble  problems,  and  would  have 
either  to  abandon  them,  or  seek  some  more  excellent 
way.  Of  course  the  great  majority  of  men  must 
follow  some  other  road.  It  would  be  overwhelmingly 
ludicrous  to  require  the  mass  of  men  to  think  for 
themselves.  In  the  nature  of  the  case  they  must  live 
by  hearsay  and  imitation  and  intellectual  contagion. 
The  intellect  of  the  community  is  the  only  safe  stand- 
ard for  them  to  follow ;  for  however  the  community 
intellect  may  fall  short  of  perfection,  it  is  commonly 
far  wiser  than  the  intellect  of  the  individual. 

The  sum  is  this :  The  mind  is  not  a  disinterested 
logic-machine,  but  a  living  organism,  with  manifold 
interests  and  tendencies.  These  outline  its  develop- 
ment, and  furnish  the  driving  power.  The  implicit 
aim  in  mental  development  is  to  recognize  these 
interests,  and  make  room  for  them,  so  that  each  shall 
have  its  proper  field  and  object.  In  this  way  a  series 
of  ideals  arise  in  our  mental  life.  As  cognitive,  we 
assume  that  the  universe  is  rational.  Many  of  its 
elements  are  opaque,  and  utterly  unmanageable  by 
us  at  present,  but  we  assume  spontaneously  and  un- 
consciously that  at  the  center  all  is  order,  and  that 
there  all  is  crystalline  and  transparent  to  intelligence. 
Thus  there  arises  in  our  thought  the  conception  of 


LOGICAL  METHOD  23 

a  system  in  which  all  is  light,  a  system  whose  founda- 
tions are  laid  in  harmony,  and  whose  structure  is 
rational  law,  a  system  every  part  of  which  is  produced 
and  maintained  and  illumined  by  the  majestic  and 
eternal  Reason.  But  this  is  only  a  cognitive  ideal, 
to  which  experience  yields  little  support ;  yet  we 
hold  fast  the  ideal  and  set  aside  the  facts  which  make 
against  it  as  something  not  yet  comprehended. 

But  we  are  moral  beings  also,  and  our  moral 
interests  must  be  recognized.  Hence  arises  a  moral 
ideal,  which  we  join  to  the  cognitive.  The  universe 
must  be  not  only  rational,  but  righteous  at  its  root. 
Here,  too,  we  set  aside  the  facts  that  make  against 
our  faith  as  something  not  yet  understood.  This  is 
especially  the  case  in  dealing  with  the  problem  of 
evil.  Here  we  are  never  content  with  finding  a  cause 
for  the  good  and  evil  in  experience ;  we  insist  upon 
an  explanation  which  shall  save  the  assumed  goodness 
at  the  heart  of  things. 

Finally,  we  are  religious,  and  our  entire  nature 
works  together  to  construct  the  religious  ideal.  The 
intellect  brings  its  ideal ;  and  the  conscience  brings 
its  ideal ;  and  the  affections  bring  their  ideal ;  and 
these,  together  with  whatever  other  thought  of  per- 
fection we  may  have,  are  united  into  the  thought  of 
the  one  Perfect  Being,  the  ideal  of  ideals,  the  supreme 
and  complete,  to  whom  heart,  will,  conscience,  and 
intellect  alike  may  come  and  say,  "Thy  kingdom 
come ;  thy  will  be  done."  Here,  as  in  the  previous 
cases,  we  do  not  ignore  the  facts  which  make  against 
the  view ;  but  we  set  them  aside  as  things  to  be  ex- 
plained, yet  which  must  not  in  any  way  be  allowed 
to  weaken  our  faith. 


24  INTRODUCTION 

All  of  these  ideals  are,  primarily,  alike  subjective. 
They  are  produced,  indeed,  under  the  stress  of  experi- 
ence, but  they  are  not  transcripts  of  any  possible  ex- 
perience. That  transparent  universe  of  the  reason  is 
as  purely  a  mental  product  as  that  righteous  universe 
of  the  conscience,  or  as  the  supreme  perfection  of 
religion.  In  each  of  these  cases  the  mind  appears 
with  its  subjective  ideals,  and  demands  that  reality 
shall  recognize  them ;  and  in  all  alike  reality  recog- 
nizes them  only  imperfectly.  To  some  extent  the 
universe  is  intelligible.  To  some  extent  the  power 
not  ourselves  makes  for  righteousness.  To  some 
extent  God  is  revealed.  But  in  all  these  cases  a 
purely  logical  and  objective  contemplation  of  the 
known  facts  would  leave  us  in  great  uncertainty. 
The  assured  conviction  we  have  rests  upon  no  logical 
deduction  from  experience,  but  upon  the  optimistic 
assumption  that  the  mind  has  a  right  to  itself,  and  is 
at  home  in  the  universe.  The  mind  will  not  consent 
to  abandon  its  nature  and  resign  itself  to  utter  mental 
and  moral  confusion.  This  is,  to  be  sure,  an  act  of 
pure  faith,  but  it  is  an  act  upon  which  our  entire 
mental  life  depends.  A  purely  speculative  knowledge 
of  reality,  which  shall  be  strictly  deductive  and  free 
from  assumption,  is  impossible. 

This  result  will  not  at  once  commend  itself  to  the 
rationalizer,  whether  religious  or  irreligious.  The 
religious  rationalizer  will  see  in  it  an  attempt  to  found 
religion  on  something  less  and  lower  than  reason, 
which  he  views  as  a  degradation  of  religion.  The 
irreligious  rationalizer  will  see  in  it  an  attempt  to 
palm  off  religion  on  an  illogical  basis  of  feeling,  in- 


LOGICAL   METHOD  25 

stead  of  the  sure  foundation  of  reason ;  and  he  may 
even  be  moved  to  write  an  essay  on  the  crime  of 
easy  behef,  in  which  he  will  deal  most  condignly 
with  the  iniquity  of  believing  anything  that  is  not 
proved.  Neither  party  very  clearly  conceives  what 
is  meant  by  reason,  but  both  tend  to  limit  it  to  formal 
ratiocination  of  the  syllogistic  type.  For  their  sake, 
therefore,  we  put  the  matter  already  given  in  a  dif- 
ferent form. 

The  test  of  formal  truth  and  error  is  the  law  of 
contradiction.  Propositions  of  which  the  mind  can 
conceive  the  contradiction  are  not  founded  in  the  nature 
of  the  logical  understanding.  The  test  of  concrete 
truth  and  error  is  practical  absurdity.  Solipsism 
involves  no  contradiction  and  is  easily  conceivable,  so 
far  as  logic  goes.  The  irrationality  and  uninterpreta- 
bility  and  badness  of  natiure  are  by  no  means  difficult 
conceptions.  The  absurdity  that  emerges  is  practical, 
rather  than  speculative.  Life  is  crippled.  Thought 
has  no  object,  action  no  aim.  There  is  a  practical 
contradiction  of  our  nature  and  interests,  but  there 
is  no  formal  contradiction  of  the  laws  of  thought. 
The  test  is  aesthetic,  ethical,  practical,  teleological, 
not  theoretical.  The  argument  in  such  cases  consists 
entirely  in  analyzing  and  setting  forth  the  feelings 
and  interests  involved,  and  in  pointing  out  the  sesthetic 
and  practical  bearings  of  the  question.  Such  argu- 
ment has  cogency  only  for  one  who  has  the  appropriate 
sentiments  and  interests.  And  when  persons  who  do 
not  understand  this  matter  nevertheless  attempt  to 
deal  with  it,  they  are  apt  to  estimate  their  own  argu- 
ments very  highly,  calling  them  proofs  and  demon- 
strations, without  ever  suspecting  that  the  reasoning 


26  INTRODUCTION 

gets  all  its  force  from  something  deeper  than  itself. 
Meanwhile  an  opponent,  with  a  different  set  of  inter- 
ests, finds  no  force  in  it  whatever,  and  rejects  it  as  a 
begging  of  the  question.  We  must,  then,  keep  these 
two  tests  of  truth  distinct,  if  we  would  understand 
the  procedure  of  the  living  mind.  Of  course  if  we 
sum  up  all  the  interests  and  intuitions  of  the  soul 
in  the  term  "reason,"  we  may  make  reason  cover  the 
whole  field  of  conviction  and  insight ;  but  reason  as 
the  faculty  of  inference  through  argument  is  second 
and  not  first ;  for  it  presupposes  premises. 

But  is  not  this  equivalent  to  saying  that  we 
believe  things  because  we  wish  to,  and  can  there  be 
any  greater  logical  iniquity  than  this  ?  In  reply  we 
may  say  that  private  prejudices,  whims,  and  desires 
can  never  be  any  proper  ground  for  belief,  but  the 
great  catholic  interests  and  tendencies  of  the  race 
may  well  be  a  good  ground  for  belief ;  for  these 
reveal  the  essential  structure  and  needs  of  the  mind, 
and  have  all  the  logical  significance  of  any  great  cos- 
mic product.  They  are  made  for  us  rather  than  by 
us,  and  they  cannot  be  discredited  without  involving 
our  whole  system  of  knowledge  in  disaster.  Any 
evolutionary  doctrine  of  knowledge  must  find  deep 
significance  in  the  great  organized  interests,  emotions, 
and  beliefs  of  humanity.  They  are  a  product  for 
which  the  power  not  ourselves  is  far  more  responsible 
than  we  are.  Of  course  in  any  theistic  scheme  their 
teleological  nature  is  manifest.  For  we  must  remember 
that  these  feelings  and  beliefs  are  only  to  a  slight 
extent  the  product  of  reflective  logical  processes  ;  they 
are  rather  expressions  of  life  and  history  and  all  the 
complex  interactions  of  men  with  nature  and  with 


LOGICAL  METHOD  27 

one  another.  They  are  growths  rather  than  deduc- 
tions. They  are  lines  of  least  resistance  along  which 
life  moves ;  and  as  thus  viewed  they  belong  to  the 
nature  of  things  as  much  as  the  law  of  gravitation 
itself.  They  are  the  principles  by  which  men  live 
and  without  which  men  cannot  live  their  best  life. 
There  is  no  surer  test  of  reality  than  this.  We  can 
object  to  it  only  as  we  assume  that  the  sensuously 
presentable  alone  is  real ;  and  this  view  is  even  in- 
telligible only  because  it  is  false. 

All  hope  of  deduction  and  logical  demonstration, 
then,  must  be  given  up ;  all  that  thought,  scientific  or 
religious,  can  hope  to  do  is  to  interpret  experience. 
It  seeks  to  explain  or  clarify  or  systematize  the  matter 
given  in  experience.  But  this  matter  itself  has  to  be 
taken  for  granted.  It  is  not  to  be  deduced,  but 
accepted.  Without  it  the  mind  is  a  vacuum.  All 
science  that  understands  itself  assumes  the  truth  of 
experience,  and  then  seeks  to  interpret  it.  So  all 
religious  thought  that  understands  itself  knows  that 
its  only  function  is  not  to  demonstrate  abstract  the- 
orems, but  to  interpret  man's  religious  experience. 
It  has  not  to  produce  the  experience  but  to  under- 
stand it  and  trace  its  implications.  And  in  both 
cases  our  final  trust  in  the  results  reached  rests  on 
the  mind's  basal  faith  in  the  essential  truthfulness  of 
life  and  reality.  Neither  has  any  superiority  in  logic 
over  the  other. 

Thus  we  see  that  all  our  thinking  rests  on  a  teleo- 
logical  foundation.  The  mind  is  not  driven  by  any 
compulsion  of  objective  facts,  but  rather  by  the  sub- 
jective necessity  of  self-realization  and  self-preserva- 
tion.    We  need  to  bear  this  fact  in  mind  if  we  would 


28  INTRODUCTION 

escape  the  illusions  of  rigor  and  vigor,  and  also  that 
naive  dogmatism  of  naturalistic  thinking  which  crudely 
fancies  that  science  has  a  speculative  foundation  apart 
from  all  subjective  interests,  and  one  quite  superior  to 
that  of  religion. 

Reflection,  however,  shows  that  the  teleology  of 
self-realization  and  self-preservation  is  immanent  in 
our  entire  system  of  thought ;  and  the  history  of 
thought  shows  the  same  fact.  The  fundamental 
interests  of  the  mind  have  always,  sooner  or  later, 
vindicated  themselves  and  secured  recognition.  From 
the  beginning,  the  philosophic  skeptics  liaA^e  raged 
and  have  imagined  many  bright  and  more  vain 
things ;  but  the  burden  of  their  cry  has  always  been, 
"  You  cannot  prove  that  you  have  a  right  to  do  what 
you  are  doing."  But  this  barren  doubt  has  been 
ignored,  practically  by  common  sense,  and  theoreti- 
cally by  earnest  thinkers,  who,  having  once  admitted 
that  it  is  always  abstractly  possible,  and  having  seen 
that  it  is  eternally  empty,  imitate  priest  and  Levite, 
and  pass  by  on  the  other  side.  The  mind  is  sure  to 
conceive  the  universe  so  as  to  provide  for  its  own 
interests.  So  long  as  any  fundamental  interest  is 
overlooked  or  ignored,  there  can  be  no  peace.  Some- 
times the  intellect  has  been  too  hasty,  and  has  satis- 
fied itself  with  simple  and  compendious  explanations, 
which  left  no  place  for  heart  and  conscience,  and  ran 
off  into  dry  and  barren  atheisms  and  materialisms. 
But  before  long  the  rising  tides  of  life  and  feeling 
compelled  it  to  try  again.  On  the  other  hand,  religion 
has  often  made  the  mistake  of  denying  intellect  and 
conscience  their  full  rights ;  and  forthwith  they  began 
their  crusade  for  recognition.     Conscience  alone  has 


LOGICAL  METHOD  29 

proved  a  sturdy  disturber  in  theological  systems  ;  and 
one  great  source  and  spring  of  theological  progress  has 
been  the  need  of  finding  a  conception  of  God  which 
the  moral  nature  could  accept.  The  necessity  of 
moralizing  theology  has  produced  vast  changes  in  that 
field ;  and  the  end  is  not  yet.  And  in  all  fields,  as  the 
inner  life  has  grown  more  complex  in  manifestation 
and  richer  in  content,  the  system  of  conceptions  has 
progressed  to  correspond.  It  is  by  this  contact  with 
life  and  reahty  that  thought  grows,  and  not  by  a 
barren  logic-chopping  or  verbal  haggling  about  proof. 
Thus  science,  ethics,  and  religion  grow  ;  and  the  mind, 
in  its  increasing  sense  of  self-possession  and  of  har- 
mony with  the  reality  of  things,  becomes  more  and 
more  indifferent  to  the  objections  of  the  skeptic,  and 
works  with  ever  growing  faith  to  build  up  the  temple 
of  science,  of  conscience,  and  of  God. 

What,then,  of  skepticism?  Nothing.  Specific  doubt 
founded  on  specific  reasons  is  always  respectable, 
being  but  a  case  of  rational  criticism ;  but  any  other 
kind  of  skepticism  must  be  left  to  itself.  So  far  as  it 
is  founded  on  the  method  of  rigor  and  vigor,  it  results 
from  an  ignorance  of  human  conditions ;  so  far  as  it 
rests  on  the  abstract  possibility  of  doubting  without 
reasons,  it  is  forever  possible  and  forever  irrational. 
It  appeals  from  reason  and  life  rather  than  to  them ; 
and  there  is  no  court  left  in  which  the  appeal  can  be 
tried.  Such  skepticism  may  do  damage  to  individuals 
who  are  mentally  debilitated,  but  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  race  it  is  of  no  importance.  Skepticism 
of  this  type  must  not  be  flattered  by  being  too  much 
noticed,  but  should  be  left  to  the  sobering  influence 
of  real  experience.     Finally,  universal  skepticism  is 


30  INTRODUCTION 

no  skepticism ;  for,  being  impartially  distributed  over 
all  our  faculties,  it  leaves  everything  where  it  was 
before ;  and  by  discrediting  everything  it  practically 
discredits  nothing.  Such  skepticism  has  only  academic 
or  polemic  existence  j  it  is  meaningless  in  practice. 
Academic  doubt  is  always  possible  about  the  uni- 
formity of  nature  or  the  existence  of  our  neighbors. 
Religious  doubt  based  on  similar  principles  ought  not 
to  have  any  more  influence. 

It  is,  too,  a  strategic  error  for  the  theist  to 
attempt  to  solve  all  the  puzzles  of  epistemology  and 
metaphysics.  Owing  to  the  brevity  of  life,  and  for 
other  equally  good  reasons,  the  theist  may  well  begin 
with  the  faith  in  the  trustworthiness  of  our  faculties 
which  is  common  to  all  investigators.  It  is  manifest 
that  all  we  can  do  in  this  or  any  other  field  which 
lies  beyond  the  senses  is  to  inquire  how  we  must 
think  in  the  case.  And  this  can  be  decided  only  by 
analyzing  and  reflecting  upon  our  experience.  If  in 
this  way  we  come  to  some  clear  indications  of  reason, 
we  shall  have  the  only  possible  warrant  for  conviction. 
As  just  said,  general  doubts  about  the  competency  of 
reason  and  the  validity  of  knowledge  have  no  prac- 
tical influence,  except  with  persons  who  are  satisfied 
with  pretexts.  The  only  dangerous  doubt  is  that 
arising  from  discrediting  the  higher  nature  in  the 
interest  of  the  lower ;  but  doubt  in  general,  which  is 
always  formally  possible,  is  harmless. 

Function  of  Logic 

To  adjust  ourselves  to  the  universe,  and  the  uni- 
verse to  ourselves,  so  that  each  shall  correspond  to 


FUNCTION   OF   LOGIC  31 

the  other,  we  have  said,  is  the  implicit  aim  of  mental 
development ;  and  the  law  that  the  mind  implicitly 
follows  is  this:  Whatever  our  total  natm:e  calls  for 
may  be  assumed  as  real  in  default  of  positive  dis- 
proof. This  gives  rise,  we  have  seen,  to  a  variety  of 
practical  postulates,  which  are  born  of  life  and  not 
of  speculation. 

What,  now,  is  the  function  of  logic  with  regard 
to  these  postulates  ?  Plainly  not  to  prove  them,  but 
to  bring  them  and  their  implications  out  into  clear 
consciousness,  and  to  keep  them  from  losing  their 
way.  The  function  is  not  constitutive  but  regulative. 
These  postulates  themselves  are  not  primarily  known 
as  such,  but  exist  rather  as  implicit  tendencies  than 
as  clearly  defined  principles.  In  this  state  they 
readily  miss  their  proper  aim.  Thus  the  scientific  or 
cognitive  consciousness  is  a  comparatively  recent  de- 
velopment ;  and  its  implications  are  very  imperfectly 
understood.  What  is  involved  in  the  assumed  possi- 
bility of  objectively  valid  knowledge  is  a  question 
rarely  asked,  and  still  more  rarely  answered.  Hence, 
by  the  grace  of  ignorance,  many  a  theory  lives  along 
in  good  and  regular  speculative  standing  which,  if 
understood,  would  be  seen  to  destroy  knowledge 
altogether.  The  farce  in  such  cases  is  as  if  one 
should  regard  himself  as  the  only  existence,  and 
should  insist  on  proving  it  to  his  neighbors.  The 
ethical  consciousness,  in  like  manner,  is  rarely  in  full 
possession  of  itself,  and  consequently  many  ethical 
theories  acquire  currency,  which,  if  developed  into 
their  consequences,  would  prove  fatal  to  all  ethics. 
The  religious  nature  also  is  developed  into  self-posses- 
sion   only  by  a  long   mental   labor   and   experience 


32  INTRODUCTION 

extending  over  centuries.  Left  to  itself  it  may  fail 
utterly  of  comprehending  its  own  implications,  and 
may  even  lose  itself  in  irreligious  assumptions. 

In  every  field  of  thought,  then,  there  is  need  of  a 
critical  procedure  which  shall  aim  to  secure  consistency 
in  the  development  of  our  postulates,  and  to  adjust 
their  mutual  relations.  The  justification  of  life  must 
come  from  life  itself,  but  the  formulation  of  life  is 
a  matter  for  logic.  Hence,  if  we  assume  a  rational 
and  righteous  universe,  we  must  first  know  what  we 
mean,  and  what  is  implied ;  and  we  must  make  no 
assumptions  incompatible  therewith.  In  particular, 
such  a  critical  procedure  is  needed  to  restrain  the 
insolence  and  fanaticism  of  the  rmderstanding  itself. 
This  faculty,  unless  chastened  by  criticism,  tends  to 
become  hasty,  impatient,  and  overbearing.  It  dislikes 
to  leave  questions  open,  and  often  gets  through  too 
soon.  If  it  makes  the  motions  of  explanation,  it 
ignores  the  fact  that  sometimes  there  is  no  real  prog- 
ress. When  the  virtue  of  mental  integrity  is  not 
strongly  developed,  it  will  even  ignore  or  distort  facts 
in  order  to  have  a  theory.  In  this  way  rationalism 
has  become  a  synonym  for  all  that  is  most  superficial 
and  purblind  in  speculation.  Here,  then,  is  a  field 
and  most  important  function  for  logic  ;  and  here  logic 
has  its  inalienable  rights.  And  in  this  process  of 
inner  development,  adjustment,  and  rectification,  logic 
is  equally  the  servant  of  cognition,  of  ethics,  and  of 
religion ;  while  all  alike  are  fundamentally  the  out- 
growths and  expressions  of  our  subjective  needs  and 
tendencies  as  evoked  by  our  total  experience.  In  all 
alike  humanity  is  realizing  and  expressing  itself. 

It  would,  then,  be  a  complete  misunderstanding  of 


FUNCTION  OF  LOGIC  33 

our  aim  to  suppose  that  we  are  engaging  in  a  polemic 
against  logic  and  metaphysics.  That  they  are  not 
positively  sufficient  to  give  us  the  principles  of  prac- 
tical life  is  clear,  but  they  do  not  forbid  us  to  make 
practical  postulates,  provided  we  recognize  them  in 
their  practical  character,  and  do  not  proclaim  them  as 
demonstrated.  But  nothing  can  warrant  us  in  con- 
tradicting logic  and  metaphysics,  and  no  such  contra- 
diction can  escape  final  destruction.  The  lack  of 
proof  may  be  atoned  for  by  practical  necessity,  but 
disproof  can  never  be  ignored  or  set  aside  by  any  sen- 
timent. Such  a  difficulty  arises  in  the  field  of  the 
logical  understanding,  and  there  only  can  it  be  met. 
The  failure  to  distinguish  the  lack  of  proof  from  dis- 
proof has  led  to  many  vmwise  utterances  on  the  part 
of  some  religious  teachers.  They  have  proclaimed  an 
independence  of  both  logic  and  metaphysics,  and  a 
complete  indifference  to  their  conclusions.  Sometimes 
they  have  even  proclaimed  a  contradiction  between 
speculation  and  religion,  apparent^  to  show  the 
strength  of  their  own  faith.  Such  a  view  must  lead 
either  to  complete  speculative  skepticism,  or  to  a  civil 
war  among  the  faculties  of  the  soul;  and  in  either 
case  the  result  would  not  be  religiously  desirable. 

To  ward  off  this  misunderstanding  the  following  dis- 
tinction is  useful.  A  mental  inventory  reveals  several 
classes  of  propositions  :  some  which  we  must  believe, 
some  which  we  must  not  believe,  and  some  which  we 
may  believe  or  assume.  The  first  two  classes  rest 
npon  the  essential  structure  of  intelligence ;  and  what- 
ever conflicts  with  them  will,  sooner  or  later,  be  aban- 
doned. The  third  class  belongs  to  the  realm  of  practice 
and  probability,  where  most  of  what  is  valuable  in  life 


34  INTRODUCTION 

and  conduct  lies.  It  is  only  in  this  class  that  our 
interests  or  desires  can  have  a  vote,  or  that  the  "  will 
to  believe  "  has  a  permissible  function.  In  most  prac- 
tical matters  a  purely  logical  contemplation  would 
leave  us  in  uncertainty,  and  the  will  to  believe,  be- 
cause of  the  necessity  of  doing  something,  comes  in 
to  overturn  the  equilibrium  and  precipitate  a  conclu- 
sion. But  such  beliefs  must  never  be  spoken  of  as 
proved ;  they  are  of  the  nature  of  choices.  They  rep- 
resent the  man's  assumptions,  or  postulates,  or  practi- 
cal platform,  or  the  things  for  which  he  stands.  Thus 
the  belief  becomes  personal  and  moral.  And  logic 
never  objects  to  beliefs  of  this  sort,  provided  they  are 
not  set  forth  as  demonstrations,  and  are  seen  in  their 
practical  characters  as  personal  decisions  and  moral 
ventures. 

Let  us  further  admit,  or  rather  affirm,  that  the 
necessity  of  passing  over  difficulties,  and  taking  so 
much  for  granted,  is  not  the  final  cognitive  ideal. 
That  ideal  no  doubt  involves  the  speculative  solution 
of  all  problems,  so  that  our  entire  thought  system  may 
be  perfectly  transparent  to  intelligence.  But  this 
ideal  is  unattainable  at  present,  owing  to  our  limita- 
tions. In  every  department  our  knowledge  is  patch- 
work, and  rests  on  assumption.  And,  since  this  is  so, 
it  is  well  to  recognize  it,  in  order  that  we  may  not 
delude  ourselves  with  a  false  show  of  logical  rigor,  or 
do  injustice  to  the  demands  of  practical  life. 

We  have  made  this  long  digression  on  method,  of 
set  purpose,  because  many  of  our  difficulties  arise  from 
a  false  method.  Persons  untrained  in  criticism  never 
suspect  that  logic  depends  on  experience  for  its  prem- 


FUNCTION  OF  LOGIC  36 

ises  in  concrete  matter,  that  experience  stands  in  its 
own  right,  and  that  the  premises  are  often  simply  the 
vital  instincts  of  the  mind  thrown  into  propositional 
form.  Hence  such  persons  have  a  pathetic  faith  in 
formal  reasoning,  and  in  rigor  and  vigor  in  general. 
And  when  this  method  is  applied  to  religious  matter, 
the  absence  of  demonstration  at  once  appears ;  and 
this  is  supposed  to  prohibit  faith.  It  was,  therefore, 
not  only  worth  while,  but  even  pedagogically  neces- 
sary, to  point  out  the  inapplicability  of  this  method 
to  any  concrete  matter.  It  is  as  fatal  to  science  as  to 
religion.  Any  method  to  be  obligatory  must  be  one  we 
can  apply.  In  the  concrete  realm  we  can  deduce  noth- 
ing, we  can  only  take  our  experience  as  a  datum,  at 
once  indeducible  and  undeniable,  and  seek  to  interpret 
it  for  our  own  rational  peace  and  satisfaction.  From 
this  point  of  view  the  problem  has  a  new  aspect.  We 
have  no  longer  to  seek  for  an  impossible  demonstra- 
tion, but  only  for  a  rational  interpretation. 

These  facts  in  the  natural  history  of  belief  must 
be  borne  in  mind  if  we  would  understand  our  mental 
procedure  and  development.  They  explain  how  it  is 
that  we  have  many  beliefs  which  are  not  held  because 
we  have  proved  them,  but  which  we  try  to  prove 
because  we  hold  them,  and  which  we  insist  on  hold- 
ing whether  we  can  prove  them  or  not.  Such  a  fact 
is  a  terrible  scandal  to  the  disciple  of  rigor  and  vigor, 
but  it  is  a  self-evident  result  of  the  form  of  human 
development  and  of  the  way  in  which  beliefs  grow. 
The  same  facts  further  explain  the  barrenness  of 
purely  logical  criticism.  Faiths  that  are  rooted  in 
life  were  not  given  by  logic,  and  logic  cannot  take 
them  away.     Further,  these  facts  throw  light  on  the 


36  INTRODUCTION 

peculiar  variations  of  belief  to  which  all  are  subject. 
Since  the  roots  of  belief  often  lie  in  the  sublogical 
realm  of  emotion,  sentiment,  aspiration,  our  convic- 
tion will  vary  as  the  tides  of  life  and  feeling  rise  and 
fall.  Since  the  belief  expresses  the  life,  it  must  vary 
with  it.  Finally,  these  facts  explain  the  peculiar 
moral  quality  that  attaches  to  certain  beliefs.  It 
would  be  quite  absurd  to  hold  one  responsible  for 
belief,  if  it  were  always  the  passionless  conclusion  of 
a  syllogism.  But  some  beliefs  express  the  believer 
himself,  what  he  loves,  what  he  stands  for,  what  he 
desires  to  be.  Such  beliefs  have  personal  and  moral 
quality. 

Further,  it  is  plain  that  all  thought  of  strict 
demonstration  must  be  given  up.  Demonstration  is 
necessarily  confined  to  the  subjective  and  logical 
relations  of  ideas,  and  can  never  attach  to  reality 
without  some  element  of  assumption.  But  this  is  as 
true  for  physical  science  as  it  is  for  religion.  And, 
in  any  case,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  objective 
and  self-sufficient  demonstration.  Truth,  as  such,  is 
not  dependent  on  demonstration,  but  exists  eternally 
in  its  own  right.  Demonstration  is  only  a  makeshift 
for  helping  ignorance  to  insight.  It  is  a  stimulus  to 
the  mind  of  the  learner  to  think  in  certain  ways 
which  shall  lead  him,  at  last,  to  see  the  truth  pro- 
posed. But  such  demonstration  is  conditioned,  not 
only  by  the  nature  of  the  stimulus,  but  also  and 
especially  by  the  development  of  the  mind  to  which 
it  is  addressed.  And  when  we  come  to  an  argument 
in  which  the  whole  nature  is  addressed,  the  argument 
must  seem  weak  or  strong  according  as  the  nature  is 
feebly,  or  fully,  developed.     The  moral  argument  for 


FUNCTION  OF  LOGIC  37 

theism  cannot  seem  strong  to  one  without  a  con- 
science. The  argument  from  cognitive  interests  will 
be  empty  when  there  is  no  cognitive  interest.  Inter- 
pretations of  experience  must  seem  empty  or  baseless 
when  there  is  no  experience.  Little  souls  find  very 
little  that  calls  for  explanation  or  that  excites  sur- 
prise ;  and  they  are  satisfied  with  a  correspondingly 
small  view  of  life  and  existence.  In  such  a  case  we 
cannot  hope  for  universal  agreement.  We  can  only 
proclaim  the  faith  that  is  in  us,  and  the  reasons  for 
it,  in  the  hope  that  reality  may  not  utterly  reject  it, 
and  that  the  faith  in  question  may  not  be  without 
some  response  in  other  minds  and  hearts.  Faith  and 
unfaith  alike  can  do  no  more ;  and  the  survival  of 
the  fittest  must  decide  between  them. 

This  renunciation  of  demonstration  has  been  dis- 
tasteful to  many,  but  needlessly  so.  In  any  case  it  has 
to  be  made.  We  cannot  make  an  argument  a  demon- 
stration by  calling  it  such  ;  and,  besides,  the  force  of 
an  argument  in  no  way  depends  on  its  name,  but  on 
its  logic.  But  the  chief  ground  of  trouble  seems  to 
lie  in  a  psychological  oversight.  If  a  proposition  is 
not  demonstrated,  then  it  is  at  best  only  probable, 
and,  if  probable,  then  uncertain.  Hence,  to  renounce 
demonstration  is  to  hand  the  subject  over  to  uncer- 
tainty, and  who  can  live  on  uncertainties?  The  next 
thing  is  to  call  God  a  ''  perhaps,"  and  the  shortcom- 
ings of  natural  theology  stand  revealed.  This  is 
rigor  and  vigor  again.  Such  utterances  tacitly  as- 
sume that  belief  is  always  the  product  of  logic.  But 
life  abounds  in  practical  certainties  for  which  no  very 
cogent  reasons  can  be  given,  but  which  are  neverthe- 
less the  foundation  of  daily  life.     Our  practical  trust 

THEISM 4 


38  INTRODUCTION 

in  the  uniformity  of  nature,  in  one  another,  in  the 
affection  of  friends,  in  the  senses,  etc.,  are  examples. 
Numberless  logical  objections  could  be  raised  which 
reduce  all  of  these  to  matters  of  probability  ;  but 
none  of  these  things  move  us.  The  things  which  we 
hold,  or  rather  which  hold  us,  with  deepest  conviction 
are  not  the  certainties  of  logic,  but  of  life. 

Theistic  discussion  has  been  largely  confined  to  the 
one  question  of  the  divine  intelligence.  The  narrow- 
ness of  such  a  view  and  its  sure  failure  to  reach  a 
properly  religious  conception  are  already  apparent. 
This  limitation  of  the  argument  has  several  grounds : 

First,  the  question  of  intelligence  is  basal,  and 
everything  else  stands  or  falls  with  it.  Hence,  the 
question  between  theism  and  atheism  has  been  gen- 
erally conceived  as  a  question  between  intelligence 
and  non-intelligence  as  the  ground  of  the  universe. 

Secondly,  this  question  can  be  debated  largely  on 
the  basis  of  objective  facts.  It  seems,  therefore,  to 
involve  fewer  subjective  elements,  such  as  appeals  to 
conscience  and  feeling,  and  hence  it  furnishes  more 
common  ground  for  the  disputants  than  the  other 
arguments. 

Thirdly,  the  argument  has  seemed  religiously  ade- 
quate, because  the  theist  has  generally  had  the  Chris- 
tian conception  of  God  in  his  mind ;  and  hence  when 
some  degree  of  skill  and  contrivance  was  shown  in 
the  world  about  us,  this  conception,  together  with  the 
ideal  tendency  of  the  soul,  at  once  came  in  to  expand 
this  poor  result  into 'the  ideal  religious  form.  Thus, 
it  is  no  uncommon  thing  to  find  fervid  theistic  writers 
claiming  that  the  eye  of  a  fly  proves  the  existence  of 


TRADITIONAL   ERRORS  39 

God.  Of  course,  all  it  would  prove  in  any  case  would 
be  the  existence  of  a  fly-maker ;  and  this  certainly  is 
not  logically  coincident  with  the  idea  of  God.  Such 
writers  confound  the  illustration  of  a  faith  they 
already  possess  with  its  adequate  demonstration. 

But,  in  spite  of  the  previous  strictures,  most  of  our 
time  will  be  devoted  to  discussing  the  question  of 
intelligence  versus  non-intelligence.  The  idea  of  God 
may  be  treated  from  a  double  standpoint,  meta- 
physical and  religious.  In  the  former,  God  appears 
as  the  principle  of  knowing  and  explanation.  In  the 
latter,  he  is  the  implication  of  the  religious  conscious- 
ness, or  that  without  which  that  consciousness  would 
fall  into  discord  with  itself.  The  former  view  does 
not  attain  to  any  distinctly  religious  conception,  but 
it  furnishes  elements  which  must  enter  into  every 
religious  conception.  Hence,  in  any  study  of  the 
subject,  it  can  never  be  needless,  though  it  may  be 
incomplete.  Opposing  errors  are  traditional  here. 
On  the  one  hand,  mere  reasoning  has  been  made  all- 
sufficient,  and  a  very  dry  and  barren  rationalism  has 
been  the  result.  On  the  other  hand,  feeling  has  been 
made  supreme,  and  the  just  claims  of  intellect  have 
been  ignored.  This  has  often  gone  to  the  extent  of 
basing  religion  on  speculative  skepticism.  But  though 
the  lion  and  the  lamb  have  been  induced  to  lie  to- 
gether for  a  while,  it  has  always  ended  in  the  lion's 
making  way  with  the  lamb.  On  a  subject  of  such 
importance  we  cannot  have  too  many  allies.  It  does 
not  weaken  the  argument  from  feeling  and  aspiration 
to  show  that  the  pure  intellect  also  demands  and 
implies  God.  Our  preliminary  work  will  deal  chiefly 
with  the  intellectual  aspects  of  the  question,  though 


40  INTRODUCTION 

we  reserve  the  right  to  appeal  to  the  emotional  nature 
upon  occasion. 

From  the  side  of  pure  intellect,  also,  the  theistic 
question  can  take  on  two  forms.  We  can  seek  to 
show  that  the  order  of  the  world  cannot  be  understood 
without  intelligence  as  its  cause,  and  that  reason  itself 
falls  into  discord  and  despair  without  God.  In  the 
former  case  God  appears  as  a  necessary  hypothesis 
for  the  understanding  of  the  facts  ;  in  the  latter  case 
God  appears  as  a  necessary  implication  of  the  rational 
life.  Of  course  such  an  aim  implies  that  the  laws  of 
thought  are  objectively  valid ;  that  over  against  the 
subjective  necessities  of  thought  are  corresponding 
objective  necessities  of  being ;  but  this  assumption 
underlies  the  whole  system  of  objective  knowledge, 
and  is  not  peculiar  to  theism.  The  only  rational  aim 
must  be  to  show  that  the  mind  being  as  it  is,  and 
experience  being  as  it  is,  the  belief  in  God  is  a  neces- 
sary implication  of  both.  If  this  aim  should  be 
attained,  then  every  one  would  have  to  decide  for 
himself  whether  to  accept  his  nature  with  its  implica- 
tions and  indications,  or  to  abandon  it  arbitrarily  and 
capriciously.  If,  however,  any  one  does  choose  the 
part  of  the  irrationalist,  his  manifest  duty  is  silence. 
No  one  has  a  right  to  be  heard  who  has  renounced 
the  conventions  of  our  common  intelligence. 

Finally,  a  word  of  a  pedagogical  character  must 
be  allowed.  Owing  to  certain  instinctive  prejudices 
of  common  sense,  theism  is  often  unfairly  dealt  with. 
In  particular  it  is  often  tacitly  assumed  that  matter 
and  force,  and  with  them  atheism,  have  the  field,  and 
must  be  allowed  to  remain  in  possession  until  they 
are  driven  off.    Thus  theism  is  branded  as  an  hypoth- 


TKADITIONAL   ERRORS  41 

esis,  and  is  called  upon  to  prove  a  negative ;  while 
atheism  is  supposed  to  express  the  fact  of  experience, 
and  to  need  no  further  proof.  Hence  the  failure  of 
theism  to  demonstrate  its  position  is  oddly  enough 
regarded  as  establishing  atheism.  Every  one  ac- 
quainted with  atheistic  treatises  will  recognize  that 
their  chief  force  has  been  in  picking  flaws  in  the 
theistic  argument.  There  has  been  comparatively 
little  effort  to  show  any  positive  sufficiency  of  atheism 
to  give  a  rational  account  of  the  facts. 

Such  a  position  is  infantile  in  the  extreme ;  it 
properly  belongs  to  the  palaeontological  period  of 
speculation.  The  nature  of  reality  is  a  thought  prob- 
lem ;  and  our  thought  of  reality  is  the  solution  of 
that  problem.  Whether  we  think  of  it  as  one  or 
many,  material  or  immaterial,  the  theory  is  equally 
speculative  in  each  case ;  its  value  must  be  decided 
by  its  adequacy  to  the  facts.  If  theism  is  an  hypothe- 
sis, atheism  is  no  less  so.  If  theism  is  a  theory  or 
speculation,  atheism  is  equally  so.  The  candid  mind 
must  seek  to  judge  between  them.  This  can  be  done 
only  as  we  put  both  views  alongside  of  the  facts  and 
of  each  other,  and  choose  the  simpler  and  more 
rational.  No  theory  can  be  judged  by  its  ability  to 
make  grimaces  at  opposing  views,  but  only  by  its 
own  positive  adequacy  to  the  facts.  The  theistic 
theory,  with  all  its  difficulties,  must  be  put  alongside 
of  the  atheistic  theory  with  all  its  difficulties.  When 
this  is  done  the  theist  will  have  little  cause  to  blush 
for  his  credulity,  or  to  be  ashamed  of  his  faith. 

Another  common  error  must  be  noted.  When  we 
come  to  the  deepest  questions  of  thought  we  always 
come  upon  impenetrable  mystery.    We  have  to  affirm 


42  INTRODUCTION 

facts  whose  possibility  we  cannot  construe.  We  have 
to  make  admissions  which  we  cannot  further  deduce 
nor  comprehend.  In  unclear  and  untaught  minds  this 
is  often  made  a  stumbling-block ;  and  the  fancy  gets 
abroad  that  theism  is  an  especially  difficult  doctrine. 
In  truth,  all  science  and  all  thought  are  full  of  what 
has  been  called  limit-notions ;  that  is,  notions  which 
the  facts  force  upon  us,  and  which  are  perfectly  clear 
from  the  side  of  the  facts,  but  which  from  the  farther 
side  are  lost  in  difficulty  and  mystery.  They  express 
an  ultimate  affirmation  along  a  given  line  of  thought, 
and  can  never  be  grasped  from  the  farther  side.  When 
we  take  them  out  of  their  relations,  or  when  we  seek 
to  comprehend  them  without  remembering  the  law  of 
their  formation,  nothing  is  easier  than  to  make  them 
seem  contradictory  or  absmd.  But  theism  must  not  be 
held  responsible  for  all  the  difficulties  of  metaphysics  ; 
and  in  particular  we  must  be  careful  in  escaping  one 
difficulty  that  we  do  not  fall  into  a  greater.  The 
notion  of  an  eternal  person,  an  unbegun  conscious- 
ness, is  at  least  no  more  difficult  than  the  alternative 
notion  of  eternal  matter  and  unbegun  motion.  It  is 
not  the  mark  of  a  high  grade  of  intelligence  to  take 
offense  at  the  difficulties  of  a  given  view,  and  end  by 
adopting  another  still  more  obnoxious  to  criticism. 
In  these  matters  it  is  never  a  question  of  finding  a 
line  of  no  resistance  for  thought,  but  the  line  of  least 
resistance.  Only  a  very  ignorant  or  very  superficial 
person  would  dream  of  finding  a  line  of  no  resistance. 

This  long  introduction  seemed  necessary  to  get  the 
problem  and  the  method  of  treatment  clearly  before  us. 
Theistic  speculation  has  suffered  greatly  in  the  past 


TRADITIONAL   ERRORS  43 

from  failm'e  to  understand  its  own  problem,  and  from 
having  no  just  conception  of  philosophic  method.  In 
this  way  it  has  exposed  itself  to  criticism,  partly 
sound  and  partly  quibbling,  and  has  undertaken  im- 
possible tasks.  It  is  a  step  forward  to  see  that  the 
question  is  not  one  of  syllogistic  rationalizing  alone, 
but  also  and  more  profoundly  one  of  life  and  hu- 
manity and  its  history.  We  do  not  purpose  then  to 
prove  the  divine  existence,  but  rather  to  propose  a 
solution  of  the  problem  which  the  world  and  life 
force  upon  us,  or  to  offer  an  interpretation  of  expe- 
rience in  which  the  soul  can  rest.  We  have  no 
expectation  of  clearing  up  all  the  puzzles  of  meta- 
physics. We  simply  hope  to  show  that  without  a 
theistic  faith  we  must  stand  as  dumb  and  helpless 
before  the  deeper  questions  of  thought  and  life  as  a 
Papuan  or  a  Patagonian  before  an  eclipse. 


CHAPTER   I 

THE  UNITY  OF  THE  WORLD-GROUND 

It  cannot  be  the  function  of  philosophy  to  produce, 
or  deduce,  the  idea  of  God.  This  idea  is  slowly  de- 
veloped in  the  unfolding  life  of  the  race.  Moreover, 
men  were  religious  before  they  became  philosophers ; 
and  when  philosophy  began,  religion  had  the  field. 
But  philosophy  has  the  important  function  of  clarify- 
ing and  rectifying  the  ideas  that  spring  up  thus 
spontaneously  in  the  religious  field,  and  of  showing 
their  rational  foundation.  In  this  way  arise  the  vari- 
ous arguments  for  the  existence  of  God.  These  have 
seldom  been  the  source  of  theistic  faith  ;  they  are 
rather  the  justifications  of  a  belief  already  existing. 

Kant  has  grouped  the  leading  theistic  arguments 
into  three :  ontological,  cosmological,  and  physico- 
theological,  and  has  made  each  the  subject  of  a 
special  criticism.  In  this,  along  with  much  that  is 
incisive  and  final,  there  is  also  much  that  is  arbitrary 
and  verbal.  His  discussion,  as  a  whole,  is  somewhat 
antiquated,  and  is  conducted  throughout  on  Kantian 
principles.  The  argument  from  design,  he  holds, 
fails  to  reach  the  full  idea  of  God ;  and  the  notion  of 
a  necessary  and  perfect  being  upon  which  the  other 
arguments  depend  is  a  subjective  ideal  of  the  reason. 

His  criticism  rests  on  two  pillars.  The  first  is  the 
traditional  prejudice  of  intellectualism,  that  demon- 

44 


THE   UNITY   OF   THE   WORLD-GROUND  46 

stration  is  necessary  to  belief.  In  the  realm  of 
science,  in  the  Kantian  sense,  as  in  mathematics,  we 
must  have  demonstration  or  nothing.  And  as  there 
is  no  apodictic  demonstration  of  theism,  it  can  have 
no  properly  scientific  standing.  At  the  same  time  it 
is  an  implication  of  reason  and  a  demand  of  practical 
life ;  and  on  this  account  it  may  be  held,  not  as  a 
speculative,  but  as  a  practical  truth.  Atheism,  on 
the  other  hand,  has  no  standing  whatever,  either 
speculative  or  practical. 

The  second  pillar  of  Kant's  criticism  is  his  general 
principle  that  the  forms  and  ideals  of  the  reason 
have  no  objective  significance.  They  are  valid  only 
in  the  field  of  experience,  and  do  not  apply  to  reality. 

Both  of  these  Kantian  claims  have  been  outgrown. 
Few  theists  certainly  w^ould  now  expect  mathematical 
strictness  of  demonstration  in  matters  of  theistic 
faith.  Since  technical  probability  is  quite  compatible 
with  the  highest  practical  certainty,  they  are  not 
concerned  at  finding  theistic  faith,  like  scientific 
faith,  a  matter  of  probable,  rather  than  of  demon- 
strative, argument. 

As  to  the  Kantian  subjectivity,  it  has  long  been 
evident  that  Kant  himself  never  thought  the  subject 
through.  In  some  sense  all  knowledge  is  necessarily 
subjective  and  individual.  In  no  way  can  any  mind 
get  outside  of  itself  and  be  the  thing,  or  grasp  the 
thing,  otherwise  than  through  the  conceptions  which 
its  nature  allows  it  to  form.  In  its  psychological 
origin,  then,  knowledge  is  both  subjective  and  indi- 
vidual. But  this  fact  in  no  way  decides  whether  the 
knowledge  thus  arising  as  a  special  experience  of  the 
individual  may  not  have  validity  beyond  himself  for 


46  THE   UNITY   OF   THE   WORLD-GROUND 

other  individuals  and  for  the  system  of  objects. 
This  question  is  purely  one  of  fact,  and  can  be 
answered  only  by  consulting  experience.  A  thorough- 
going subjectivity  would  shut  us  up  in  solipsistic 
individualism,  and  deny  the  world  of  persons  and 
objects  together,  except  as  a  set  of  individual  fancies 
or  dreams.  To  this  extreme  no  one  would  venture 
to  go.  It  follows  that  in  spite  of  ourselves  w^e  are 
compelled  to  attribute  objective  validity  or  univer- 
sality to  some  of  our  thoughts,  and  that  fruitful  criti- 
cism must  be  restricted  to  inquiring  which  of  our 
thoughts  are  thus  valid.  How  must  we  think  about 
reality  when  thought  becomes  critical  and  reflective  ? 
This  is  the  only  question  which  thought  can  profit- 
ably raise,  and  this  question  can  be  answered  only 
by  thought  itself.  When  we  have  found  what  the 
essential  utterances  of  thought  are,  each  one  must 
decide  for  himself  whether  to  accept  them.  Kant 
himself  labored  under  the  delusion  that  a  system  of 
extra-mental  things  in  themselves  exists  to  which  our 
faculties  are  so  related,  or  rather  unrelated,  that  we 
can  never  grasp  it  in  its  true  nature.  This  fiction 
later  thought  has  successfully  banished  by  the  dis- 
covery that  there  are  no  things  except  those  which 
thought  affirms,  and  that  there  is  no  objectivity  in 
things  except  their  validity  for  thought  itself,  that  is, 
for  experience. 

How  must  we  think  about  things  ?  Our  present 
answer  is  that  when  thought  is  clear  and  self- 
conscious  we  must  think  theistically,  but  in  discuss- 
ing this  question  regard  must  be  had  not  merely  to 
logical  theory,  but  also  to  psychological  conditions. 
Many  arguments  which  may  be  logically  good  are  not 


THE  ONTOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT         47 

adjusted  to  the  pedagogical  situation.  And  since  our 
aim  must  be  to  produce  conviction,  it  is  important, 
first,  to  find  some  admitted  fact  or  principle  as  a 
point  of  departure,  and,  secondly,  not  to  attempt  to 
do  too  much  at  once.  Such  a  point  is  not  furnished 
by  either  the  ontological  or  the  design  argument. 

The  ontological  argument  in  its  common  form  rests 
on  the  notion  of  the  perfect  being.  The  idea  of  the 
perfect  necessarily  includes  the  idea  of  existence,  and 
would  be  a  contradiction  without  it.  Hence  it  has 
been  concluded  that  the  perfect  exists.  There  is  not 
a  shadow  of  cogency  in  this  reasoning.  It  only 
points  out  that  the  idea  of  the  perfect  must  include 
the  idea  of  existence;  but  there  is  nothing  to  show 
that  the  self -consistent  idea  represents  an  objective 
reality.  Hence  Descartes  sought  to  supplement  the 
argument  by  showing  that  only  the  perfect  can  be 
the  source  of  the  idea;  but  this  did  not  much  help 
the  matter.  In  fact,  the  argument  is  nothing  but  the 
expression  of  the  gesthetic  and  ethical  conviction  that 
the  true,  the  beautiful,  and  the  good,  which  alone 
have  value  in  the  universe,  cannot  be  foreign  to  the 
universe.  The  mind  will  not  consent  to  abandon  its 
ideals.  The  ontological  argument  owes  all  its  force 
to  this  immediate  faith  in  the  ideal.  Its  technical 
expression  is  due  to  the  desire  to  give  this  faith  a 
demonstrative  logical  form.  The  result  is  to  weaken 
rather  than  strengthen  it. 

This  faith,  when  abstractly  stated  and  logically 
tested,  seems  to  be  not  only  baseless  but  even  non- 
existent. We  accost  it  skeptically,  and  it  vanishes 
like  a  fading  gleam.  It  reveals  itself  in  its  work 
rather  than  in  any  conscious  manifestation.     But  its 


48  THE  UNITY  OF  THE   WORLD-GROUND 

work  is  everywhere  manifest.  When  the  cosmo- 
logical  argument  has  convinced  us  that  a  first  cause 
must  be  affirmed,  it  is  the  faith  in  the  perfect  ideal 
which  transforms  this  non-religious,  speculative  ab- 
straction into  the  idea  of  God.  When  the  design 
argument  has  affirmed  a  contriver  of  the  adaptations 
revealed  in  experience,  it  is  the  same  faith  that 
passes  from  this  not  very  great  result  to  the  idea  of 
the  infinite  and  perfect  God.  And  as  we  have  seen 
in  the  Introduction,  this  faith  is  the  implicit  major 
premise  of  the  soul's  life.  While  not  demonstrated 
or  demonstrable  by  anything,  it  is  really  imphcit  in 
everything. 

The  teleological  or  design  argument  is  based  upon 
the  purpose-like  adaptations  that  are  found,  espe- 
cially in  the  organic  world.  This  has  always  been  a 
favorite  with  the  Anglo-Saxon  mind ;  and  Kant  men- 
tions it  with  great  respect.  Whatever  its  logical 
faults  and  speculative  shortcomings,  it  is  better 
adapted  to  convince  common  sense  than  the  more 
speculative  arguments.  Still,  when  taken  strictly, 
it  is  open  to  so  many  critical  objections,  and  the 
affirmed  design  in  nature  is  so  much  in  dispute, 
especially  in  these  days  of  evolution,  that,  in  the 
present  state  of  thought,  it  does  not  offer  the  best 
starting  point  for  the  discussion.  Thus  the  great 
mass  of  natural  products  look  more  like  effects  than 
purposes.  In  the  complex  disposition  of  natural 
agents,  of  land  and  water,  of  mountain  and  plain, 
etc.,  there  may  be  purpose ;  but  to  observation  these 
things  seem  to  be  simple  facts  from  which  certain 
results  follow.  Again,  in  the  relation  of  the  organic 
and  the  inorganic,  there  may  be  purpose ;  but  the  fact 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT  49 

of  observation  is  that  the  latter  is  usable  by  the 
former,  not  that  it  was  made  for  it.  If  the  intel- 
ligence of  the  world-ground  were  otherwise  and  else- 
where demonstrated,  there  is  much  in  the  relation  of 
these  two  worlds  which  would  illustrate  that  intel- 
ligence ;  but  there  is  not  much  that  can  be  used  as 
original  proof.  It  is  in  the  organic  world  that  we 
find  unambiguous  marks  of  adaptation ;  yet  even  here, 
unfortimately,  the  most  of  the  ends  realized  do  not 
seem  worth  realizing.  They  have  no  manifest  value 
or  reason,  but  are  just  such  meaningless  things  as  we 
should  expect  if  an  irrational  power  were  at  work. 
Had  not  our  idea  of  God  been  otherwise  determined, 
these  things  would  prove  less  a  help  than  an  em- 
barrassment. Again,  allowing  the  existence  of  design 
in  nature,  this  argument  by  no  means  justifies  us  in 
affirming  a  single  cause  of  the  world.  A  polytheistic 
conception  remains  possible ;  and,  considering  the 
antitheses  of  good  and  evil,  of  sense  and  nonsense,  in 
nature,  such  a  view  would  accord  only  too  well  with 
experience.  Christianity  has  accustomed  us  to  mon- 
otheism, but  in  strict  logic  the  design  argument,  on 
the  basis  of  experience,  would  have  difficulty  in  mak- 
ing it  out.  The  argument  seems  sufficient  because, 
in  its  common  use,  it  is  not  a  deduction  of  the  theistic 
idea,  but  only  an  illustration  of  the  theistic  faith 
that  we  already  possess. 

Neither  of  these  arguments  furnishes  a  satisfactory 
starting  point.  The  same  is  true  of  the  cosmological 
argument  in  its  traditional  forms.  It  speaks  a  strange 
language  which  is  not  adapted  to  produce  conviction, 
until  translated  into  the  speech  of  to-day.  The  aim 
in  this  argument  is  to  pass  from  the  cosmos  as  a  con- 


50  THE   UNITY   OF   THE   WORLD-GROUND 

tingent  and  conditioned  existence  to  the  affirmation 
of  a  necessary  and  unconditioned  existence.  The 
form  of  the  argument  has  been  various.  Sometimes 
the  argument  has  been  from  motion  to  an  unmoved 
prime  mover ;  sometimes  from  secondary  causes  to 
an  uncaused  first  cause;  sometimes  from  contingent 
existence  to  necessary  existence,  or  from  dependent 
existence  to  independent  existence.  In  its  traditional 
forms  the  argument  is  open  to  many  objections. 

It  seems  well,  then,  to  abandon  the  traditional 
classification  of  arguments  as  unedifying  in  any  case ; 
since  the  value  of  an  argument  depends  on  its  matter 
and  not  on  its  name.  Concrete  problems  may  be  so 
abstractly  treated  that  no  one  exactly  knows  just 
what  is  going  on.  We  purpose,  therefore,  to  work 
our  way  into  the  problem  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
thought  of  to-day  ;  and  instead  of  seeking  to  establish 
the  full  religious  conception  of  God  at  once,  we  con- 
tent ourselves  with  the  humbler  aim  of  showing  that 
the  ground  of  all  reality,  or  the  fundamental  reality, 
or  the  world-ground,  must  be  one  and  not  many. 

In  this  claim  we  are  in  harmony  with  the  great 
majority  of  thinkers,  both  of  ancient  and  modern 
times.  Even  theistic  and  non-theistic  thinkers  have 
agreed  in  rejecting  a  fundamental  pluralism  in  favor 
of  a  basal  monism.  The  most  pronounced  non- 
theistic  and  atheistic  schemes  of  our  time  label  them- 
selves monism,  although  not  always  showing  the 
clearest  appreciation  of  what  true  monism  means  and 
requires.  Even  Kant,  who  will  not  allow  any 
objective  validity  to  knowledge,  insists  that  monism 
is  the  deepest  demand  of  the  reason.  For  the  en- 
couragement of  timid  souls,  and  because  monism  has 


INTERACTION  51 

kept  bad  company  at  times,  we  point  out  that  in  this 
discussion  it  does  not  mean  pantheism  or  materialism, 
but  the  substantial  unity  of  the  world-ground. 

But  while  there  is  agreement  in  the  fact,  there  is 
much  diversity  in  the  modes  of  reaching  it.  And  here 
it  is  that  we  need  to  find  the  best  point  of  departure, 
and  one  which  will  command  universal  assent.  This 
is  found  in  the  postulates  of  objective  cognition. 

That  things  form  a  system,  and  that  this  system 
is  one,  is  the  deepest  conviction  of  reflective  intelli- 
gence and  the  supreme  presupposition  of  organized 
knowledge.  Within  this  system  all  things  are  deter- 
mined in  mutual  relations,  so  that  each  thing  is 
where  and  as  it  is  because  of  its  relations  to  the 
whole.  This  system  is  not  revealed  in  experience 
but  is  an  implication  of  cognition.  Primarily  it  is  a 
reflection  of  the  imitary  nature  of  the  reason,  but 
analysis  shows  that  it  is  implicit  in  any  scheme  of 
objective  knowledge.  The  assumption  of  system 
clearly  appears  in  such  expressions  as  the  world,  the 
universe,  the  cosmos,  the  system  of  things. 

But  while  reason  is  unitary  and  systematic,  sense 
experience  is  manifold  and  pluralistic.  Hence  arises 
a  need  for  mediating  between  the  rational  demand 
for  imity  and  the  experienced  fact  of  plurality.  The 
current  solution  of  this  problem,  both  for  science  and 
common  sense,  consists  in  positing  a  dynamic  inter- 
action among  things  whereby  the  many  are  united 
into  one  system,  and  their  logical  relations  are  set  in 
real  existence. 

Without  raising  any  question  at  present  as  to  the 
fact  of  interaction,  we  proceed  to  show  that  such  an 
interacting  system  is  impossible  without  a  coordinat- 


52  THE   UNITY  OF   THE   WORLD-GROUND 

ing  one.  Let  our  first  question  be,  What  is  involved 
in  an  interaction  which  will  serve  the  purposes  of 
cognition  ? 

The  first  implication  is  that  things  mutually  affect 
or  determine  one  another.  Without  this  assumption 
any  event  would  be  an  absolute  and  unrelated 
beginning.  The  universe  would  fall  asunder  into 
unconnected  and  uncaused  units,  and  the  individual 
consciousness  would  be  shut  up  within  itself.  Again, 
it  implies  that  all  things  interact ;  for  if  there  were 
anything  out  of  all  relations  of  causation,  it  would  be 
for  us  a  figment  of  the  imagination. 

But  interaction  at  random  would  not  meet  the  de- 
mands of  cognition.  For  this  we  must  next  add  the 
idea  of  law  and  uniformity,  or  that  under  the  same 
circumstances  the  same  thing  occurs.  And  this  im- 
plies further  a  universal  adjustment  of  everything  to 
every  other,  such  that  for  a  given  state  of  one  there 
can  be  only  a  given  state  of  the  rest  fixed  both  in 
kind  and  degree.  Without  this  assumption  unlike 
causes  might  have  like  effects,  and  like  causes 
might  have  imlike  effects,  and  there  could  be  no 
thought  of  theoretical  cognition.  There  must  be, 
then,  interaction  and  law  among  things ;  and  these 
things  cannot  be  and  do  what  they  choose,  but  all 
must  be  bound  up  in  a  common  scheme ;  that  is, 
there  must  be  system.  And  in  so  far  as  there  is  sys- 
tem, everything  must  be  related  to  every  other  in  an 
exact  and  all-embracing  adjustment. 

Reserving  the  right  to  interpret  interaction  among 
the  many  as  really  immanent  action  in  the  One,  we 
may  say  that  these  postulates  command  universal 
assent  as  the  basis  of  all  objective  cognition.     They 


INTERACTION  53 

are  not  doubted  like  the  assumption  of  design,  but 
are  implied  in  the  very  structure  of  knowledge.  The 
specific  nature  of  the  laws  and  the  system  is,  indeed, 
a  problem  for  solution ;  but  the  existence  of  rational 
law  and  system  is  implicitly  assumed. 

Our  starting  point,  then,  is  the  conception  of  things 
interacting  according  to  law,  and  forming  an  intelli- 
gible system.  The  advantage,  however,  lies  in  its 
general  acceptance,  and  not  in  its  being  speculatively 
demonstrated.  Critically  considered,  the  universe,  or 
nature,  as  system  is  an  ideal  of  the  cognitive  nature, 
as  God  is  an  ideal  of  the  religious  nature,  while  nei- 
ther admits  of  proper  demonstration.  But  for  one 
reason  or  another,  cognitive  ideals  are  more  easily  ac- 
cepted than  religious  ideals,  and  hence  we  start  wdtli 
the  former,  and  proceed  to  develop  their  implications. 

Our  first  question  concerned  the  implications  of 
interaction  ;  the  second  concerns  its  possibility.  How 
is  a  unitary  system  of  interacting  members  possible  ? 
This  is  the  problem.  Only  through  a  unitary  being 
which  posits  and  maintains  them  in  their  mutual 
relations.  This  is  the  solution.  We  borrow  from 
metaphysics  an  outline  of  the  argument. 

Spontaneous  thought  posits  all  its  objects  as  real, 
and  finds  no  reason  for  not  thinking  them  mutually 
independent.  They  all  seem  to  exist  together  in 
space,  and  no  one  seems  to  imply  any  other.  In  this 
stage  of  thought  it  is  easy  to  believe  that  things  are 
mutually  indiiferent  and  independent,  so  that  any 
one  would  continue  to  exist  if  all  the  rest  should  fall 
away.  Then  the  attempt  is  made  to  bring  these 
mutually  indiiferent  things  together  by  having  them 
act  upon  one  another. 


54  THE   UNITY   OF   THE   WORLD-GROUND 

The  attempts  to  explain  interaction  are  manifold, 
but  they  all  fail  so  long  as  the  things  are  left  inde- 
pendent. Most  of  the  attempts,  indeed,  are  only 
figures  of  speech  or  products  of  the  imagination.  For 
instance,  a  thing  is  said  to  transfer  its  state  or  condi- 
tion to  the  thing  acted  upon ;  and  this  transference 
is  the  act.  Here  action  is  conceived  as  a  thing  which 
may  be  passed  along  from  one  thing  to  another. 
This  fancy  meets  at  once  the  fatal  objection  that 
states  or  conditions  are  adjectival  in  their  nature  and 
cannot  exist  apart  from  a  subject.  The  facts  which 
have  led  to  this  notion  of  transferred  conditions  are 
chiefly  those  of  transmitted  heat  and  motion  ;  but 
even  here  the  phrase  is  only  an  inexact  description 
of  the  fact,  for  what  is  really  given  is  propagation 
rather  than  transmission.  The  necessarily  adjectival 
nature  of  states,  qualities,  conditions,  vacates  all  notions 
of  transference. 

A  similar  verbal  explanation  is  found  in  the  notion 
of  a  passing  influence  which,  by  passing,  affects  the 
object.  This  is  open  to  the  same  objections  as  the 
preceding  view.  If  by  influence  we  mean  only  an 
effect,  we  have  simply  renamed  the  problem  ;  and  if 
we  mean  anything  more,  we  make  the  influence  into 
a  sort  of  thing,  thus  increasing  our  difficulties  with- 
out gaining  any  insight.  For  now  we  must  tell  what 
this  new  thing  which  passes  between  things  is,  in 
what  it  differs  from  the  other  things,  what  the  rela- 
tion of  the  passing  thing  is  to  the  things  between 
which  it  passes,  where  the  acting  thing  gets  the  store 
of  things  it  emits,  and  how  the  passing  thing  could 
do  any  more  than  the  thing  from  which  it  comes. 
An  attempt  to  answer  those  questions  will  convince 


INTERACTION  55 

one  of  the  purely  verbal  character  of  this  explanation. 
Its  origin  in  the  imagination  is  manifest.  Things 
are  conceived  as  separated  in  space,  and  the  imagina- 
tion plays  between  them  and  calls  this  interaction. 

Akin  to  this  view  is  that  current  among  physi- 
cists, according  to  which  forces  play  between  things 
and  produce  effects.  But  this  view  also  is  a  device 
of  the  imagination,  and  solves  nothing.  Forces  are 
only  abstractions  from  the  activities  of  things,  and 
are  nothing  between  things  or  apart  from  them.  If 
they  were  things,  all  the  questions  asked  about  the 
influence  would  return.  If  they  are  not  things,  then 
we  only  rename  the  problem  without  solving  it. 

The  difficulty  of  these  notions  has  led  some  to 
dispense  with  force  and  occult  influences  altogether, 
and  explain  all  interaction  as  the  result  of  impact, 
as  if  action  at  a  distance  were  the  grieat  difficulty. 
This  view  limits  the  problem  to  the  physical  field, 
and  is  a  double  failure  even  there. 

First,  the  theory  of  impact  cannot  be  carried 
through  in  physical  science ;  and  secondly,  action  by 
impact  is  no  more  intelligible  between  independent 
things  than  action  at  a  distance.  The  separation  in 
space  does  not  make  the  difficulty,  but  only  enables 
the  imagination  to  grasp  it.  But  if  things  be  inde- 
pendent, that  is,  be  what  they  are  without  reference 
to  anything  else,  there  is  no  reason  why  one  thing 
should  in  any  way  be  affected  by  any  other.  Such 
beings,  if  in  space,  would  be  as  indifferent  when  in 
the  same  point  as  when  separated  by  the  infinite  void. 
There  is  nothing  in  spatial  contact  to  explain  the 
results  of  impact,  unless  there  be  a  deeper  meta- 
physical relation  between  the  bodies,  which  generates 


56  THE   UNITY   OF   THE   WORLD-GROUND 

repulsion  between  them.  For  reason,  the  difficulty  is 
not  to  act  across  empty  space  but  to  act  across  the 
separateness  of  mutually  independent  individuals ; 
and  this  difficulty  would  remain  if  there  were  no 
spatial  world  whatever,  but  only  a  society  of  personal 
spirits. 

Possibly  some  reader,  unpracticed  in  speculation, 
may  be  weary  and  impatient  by  this  time,  and  say 
that  we  know  that  there  is  interaction,  whatever 
puzzles  may  be  raised  about  it.  In  that  case  we 
should  have  to  remind  him,  first,  that  interaction  is 
really  no  fact  of  experience.  The  fact  of  observation 
is  simply  concomitant  variation  among  things.  When 
A  changes,  B,  C,  etc.,  change  in  definite  order  and  de- 
gree. This  order  of  reciprocal  change  exhausts  the 
fact  of  observation  and  of  science  itself.  To  explain 
this  fact  we  posit  forces,  but  this  is  an  addition  to  the 
fact,  not  the  fact  itself.  Moreover,  the  forces  of 
d3rQamical  reasoning  are  purely  equational  relations, 
and  have  nothing  causal  in  them. 

"We  should  have  next  to  remind  the  objector  that 
the  certainty  that  causality  is  in  play  by  no  means 
decides  the  form  under  which  it  is  to  be  thought. 
Without  doubt,  the  system  of  reciprocal  changes 
among  things  demands  a  causal  explanation,  but  this 
does  not  decide  that  the  causality  is  to  be  parceled 
out  among  many  mutually  independent  things.  It 
may  be  that  this  view  is  essentially  impossible,  and 
that  we  shall  have  to  replace  it  by  another. 

And  this  is  the  case.     A  necessary  interaction  of, 
mutually  independent  things  is  a  contradiction.     We 
have  before  pointed  out  the  exact  and  detailed  adjust- 
ment of  every  member  of  an  interacting  system  so 


INTERACTION  57 

far  as  interacting.  Such  things  have  not  their  prop- 
erties or  powers  absolutely  and  in  themselves,  but 
only  in  their  relations  or  as  members  of  the  system. 
The  causality  of  each  is  relative  to  the  causality  of 
all.  The  law  for  the  activity  of  any  one  must  be 
given  in  terms  of  the  activities  of  all  the  rest.  But 
this  implies  that  the  being  of  each  is  relative  to  the 
being  of  all,  for  the  being  itself  is  implicated  in  the 
activity.  Hence,  in  addition  to  saying  that  things  do 
what  they  do  because  other  things  do  what  they  do, 
we  must  say  that  things  are  what  they  are  because 
other  things  are  what  they  are.  Both  the  being  and 
the  activity  are  implicated  in  the  relation  ;  and  it 
would  be  impossible  to  define  the  being  except  in 
terms  of  the  relation.  Such  being  is  necessarily  rela- 
tive. It  does  not  contain  the  grounds  of  its  deter- 
mination in  itself  alone,  but  also  in  others.  And  this 
must  be  the  case  with  all  things  which  are  included 
in  a  scheme  of  necessary  interaction.  Each  is  a 
function  of  all  and  all  are  functions  of  each,  as  in  an 
algebraic  equation.  Mutually  independent  quantities 
are  equally  absurd  in  both  cases. 

Thus  we  see  the  contradiction  in  the  notion  of  the 
necessary  interaction  of  mutually  independent  things. 
The  notion  of  interaction  implies  that  a  thing  is  de- 
termined by  others,  and  hence  that  it  cannot  be  all 
that  it  is  apart  from  all  others.  If  all  its  activities 
and  properties  are  conditioned,  it  implies  that  the 
thing  cannot  exist  at  all  out  of  its  relations.  Its 
existence  is  involved  in  its  relations,  and  would  van- 
ish with  them.  The  notion  of  independence,  on  the 
other  hand,  implies  that  the  thing  is  not  determined 
by  others,  but  has  the  ground  of  all  its  determinations 


68  THE   UNITY   OF   THE   WORLD-GROUND 

in  itself.  These  two  notions  are  distinct  contradic- 
tions. No  passage  of  influences  or  forces  will  avail 
to  bridge  the  gulf  as  long  as  the  things  are  regarded 
as  independent.  The  farthest  we  could  possibly  go  in 
affirming  their  independence  would  be  to  maintain 
their  mutual  independence,  while  they  all  depend  on 
a  higher  reality,  which  is  the  ground  both  of  their 
existence  and  of  their  harmonious  coordination.  This 
is  the  view  of  Leibnitz  as  expressed  in  his  monadology 
and  preestablished  harmony  ;  and  this  view  rejects 
both  fundamental  pluralism  and  the  reality  of  inter- 
action. 

And,  on  the  other  hand,  if  w^e  assume  that  things 
are  really  comprised  in  an  order  of  interaction  or 
reciprocal  determination,  we  cannot  allow  that  they 
are  absolutely  or  mutually  independent.  The  popular 
view,  in  which  things  exist  in  a  hard  and  fast  self- 
identity  and  self-sufficiency,  must  be  given  up.  Such 
things  exist  only  in  relation  to  one  another  within 
the  system.  They  are  relative  and  dependent  exist- 
ences. What  then  is  independent?  A  dependent 
which  depends  on  nothing  is  a  contradiction ;  and 
equally  so  is  an  independent  made  up  of  a  sum  of 
dependents,  li  A,  B,  C,  I)  are  severally  depend- 
ent, then  A  +  B  +  C+  D  are  likewise  dependent. 
There  is  nothing  in  the  sign  of  addition  which  can 
turn  dependence  into  independence. 

A  first  thought  w^ould  likely  be  that  the  system 
itself  is  independent.  Though  the  members  depend 
on  each  other  within  the  system,  the  system  itself  de- 
pends on  nothing.  But  this  is  only  a  logical  illusion 
so  long  as  A,  B,  C,  D  are  supposed  to  be  the  only 
substantial  existences.     In  that  case  the  system  would 


INTERACTION  59 

be  only  a  sum  or  conceptual  product,  and  would  be 
ontologically  nothing.  And  such  it  would  remain 
unless  we  reversed  the  order,  and,  instead  of  trying 
to  construct  the  system  from  things  as  true  units  of 
being,  rather  constructed  things  from  the  system  as 
their  source  and  ground.  In  that  case  the  system 
would  be  the  true  ontological  fact,  and  things  would 
be  only  its  dependent  products  or  implications.  The 
seK-centered,  the  true  ontological  fact  would  be  the 
system ;  and  all  else  would  depend  upon  it.  But  sys- 
tem is  not  a  good  term  for  this  conception.  The  idea 
is  that  of  a  basal  reality  which  only  is  truly  self- 
existent,  and  in  and  through  which  all  other  things 
have  their  being. 

The  reciprocal  and  concomitant  changes  in  what 
we  call  things  are  the  fact  of  experience.  The 
explanation  of  these  changes  is  a  speculative  problem 
whose  solution  is  not  immediately  obvious.  But  one 
thing  is  clear.  We  cannot  explain  them  by  the 
things  alone.  In  order  to  escape  the  contradiction 
involved  in  the  necessary  interaction  of  mutually 
independent  things,  and  also  that  involved  in  reach- 
ing an  independent  being  by  summing  up  dependent 
things,  we  must  transcend  the  realm  of  the  relative 
and  dependent,  and  affirm  a  fimdamental  reality 
which  is  absolute  and  independent,  and  in  the  unity 
of  whose  existence  the  possibility  of  what  we  call 
interaction  finds  its  ultimate  explanation.  The  inter- 
action of  the  many  is  possible  only  through  the 
unity  of  an  all-embracing  One,  which  either  coor- 
dinates and  mediates  their  interaction,  or  of  which 
they  are  in  some  sense  phases  or  modifications. 

Thus   the    pluralism    of   spontaneous    thought   is 


60  THE  UNITY  OF  THE  WORLD-GROUND 

replaced  by  a  fundamental  monism ;  and  the  popular 
conception  of  interaction  is  transformed.  The  de- 
mand for  a  causal  ground  for  the  mutual  changes  of 
things  is  entirely  justified,  but  the  conception  which 
finds  that  ground  in  interaction,  or  the  transitive 
causality  of  independent  things,  is  untenable.  We 
replace  the  transitive  causality  playing  between  things 
by  an  immanent  causality  in  an  all-embracing,  unitary 
being. 

Of  the  general  relation  of  the  many  to  the  basal 
One,  two  conceptions  are  possible.  We  may  think  of 
the  many  as  dependent  on  the  One,  which,  however,  is 
distinct  from  them,  and  coordinates  them,  and  medi- 
ates their  reciprocal  relations  or  interaction.  The 
real  ground  of  their  coordination  is  not  anything 
which  the  many  themselves  do,  but  rather  that  which 
is  done  for  them  and  with  them  by  the  coordinating 
One.  They  do  not  reciprocally  determine,  they  are 
reciprocally  determined.  Or  we  may  think  of  them, 
not  as  dependent  on  something  outside  of  them,  but 
on  some  one  being  in  them,  which  is  their  proper 
reality,  and  of  which  they  are  in  some  sense  but 
phases  or  modifications.  Things  in  the  common  use 
of  the  term  would  be  only  hypostasized  phenomena, 
and  would  have  only  such  thinghood  as  belongs  to 
grammatical  substantives.  The  decision  between 
these  two  views  must  be  left  for  future  study  ;  but 
both  alike  deny  the  self-sufficiency  of  things  and 
affirm  a  unitary  world-ground. 

This  being,  as  the  foundation  of  all  existence,  we 
call  the  basal  or  fundamental  reality.  As  self-suffi- 
cient, or  having  the  ground  of  its  determinations  in 
itself,  we  call  it  absolute  and  independent.     As  not 


INTERACTION  61 

limited  by  anything  beyond  itself,  we  call  it  infinite. 
As  the  explanation  of  the  world,  we  call  it  the  world- 
ground.  These  terms  are  not  to  be  taken  in  a 
dictionary  sense,  but  always  with  regard  to  the 
meaning  they  are  chosen  to  express.  The  infinite  is 
not  the  all,  but  the  independent  ground  of  the  finite. 
The  absolute  does  not  exclude  all  relation,  but  only 
all  restrictive  relations.  Relations  which  are  restric- 
tions imposed  from  without  contradict  absoluteness, 
but  relations  freely  posited  and  maintained  by  the 
absolute  do  not. 

The  argument  thus  outlined  is  open  to  many  scru- 
ples, but  to  no  valid  objection.  The  scruples  are 
largely  born  of  our  general  bondage  to  the  senses. 
For  one  who  supposes  that  the  senses  give  immediate 
and  final  metaphysical  insight,  the  argument  will 
have  no  force.  But  philosophy  is  not  the  affair  of 
such  a  person.  In  other  and  more  hopeful  cases, 
when  we  become  familiar  with  the  terms  and  their 
meaning,  and  also  with  the  inner  structure  of  reason, 
we  shall  see  that  the  mind  can  rest  in  no  other  con- 
clusion. The  idealist  also  may  object  that  no  true 
unity  can  be  found  in  this  way,  that  true  imity  is 
possible  only  in  thought  and  through  thought,  and 
that  these  dynamic  considerations  as  they  stand  do 
not  lead  us  to  unity.  With  this  we  largely  agree. 
Metaphysics  shows  that  ontological  unity  is  possible 
only  on  the  personal  plane,  and  that  no  regressive 
thought  according  to  the  law  of  the  sufficient  reason 
will  ever  pass  from  plurality  to  unity.  But  while  we 
admit  this,  we  still  maintain  that  our  argument  is 
good  so  far  as  it  goes.  We  have  shown  the  necessity 
of  affirming  unity,  but  we  have  not  decided  the  form 


62  THE   UNITY   OF   THE   WORLD-GROUND 

under  which  the  unity  must  be  thought.  Our  argu- 
ment has  been  doubly  hypothetical.  If  there  be 
things,  and  if  there  be  interaction,  we  argued,  we 
cannot  think  the  thought  through  on  a  pluralistic 
basis.  This  we  still  maintain ;  but  we  hope  to  make 
the  modifications  necessitated  by  a  more  idealistic  type 
of  thought  when  the  time  comes.  Not  everything 
can  be  said  at  once  ;  and  there  are  pedagogical  con- 
siderations that  may  not  be  ignored. 

We  replace,  then,  the  pluralism  of  spontaneous 
thought  by  a  basal  monism.  Of  course  this  view 
does  not  remove  all  difficulties,  nor  answer  all  ques- 
tions. On  the  contrary,  it  leaves  the  mystery  of 
being  as  dark  and  opaque  as  ever.  Its  only  value 
lies  in  giving  expression  to  the  mind's  demand  for 
ultimate  unity,  and  in  removing  the  contradiction 
that  lies  in  the  assumption  of  interaction  between 
independent  things.  But  we  cannot  pretend  to  pic- 
ture to  omrselves  the  relations  of  the  infinite  and  the 
finite,  nor  to  construe  the  possibility  of  the  finite. 
We  come  here  to  a  necessity  that  meets  us  every- 
where when  we  touch  the  frontiers  of  knowledge  — 
namely,  the  necessity  of  admitting  facts  which,  while 
they  must  be  recognized  and  admitted,  cannot  be 
deduced  or  comprehended. 

Of  the  nature  of  the  infinite  as  yet  we  know  only 
that  it  is  one,  and  metaphysics  compels  us  to  regard 
it  also  as  active.  But  this  is  so  far  from  being  the 
complete  idea  of  God  that  both  atheism  and  panthe- 
ism might  accept  it.  Still  we  have  made  some 
progress.  We  have  reached  a  point  to  which  the 
design  argument  alone  could  not  bring  us.  It  is 
plain  that  polytheism  is  untenable ;  and  that,  if  any 


INTERACTION  63 

kind  of  theism  is  to  be  affirmed,  it  must  be  monothe- 
ism. We  have  also  made  some  provision  for  the 
unity  of  nature,  which  has  become  an  article  of  sci- 
entific and  speculative  faith  without  any  very  satis- 
factory exhibition  of  its  speculative  warrant.  That 
warrant  is  found  in  the  substantial  unity  of  the 
ground  of  nature. 

We  next  attempt  some  further  determinations  of 
our  thought  of  this  fundamental  being.  We  hope  at 
least  to  be  allowed,  if  not  compelled,  to  identify  the 
One  of  speculation  with  the  God  of  religion. 


CHAPTER   II 

THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT 

Many  questions  might  fitly  be  raised  at  this  point, 
but  we  postpone  them  for  the  central  question  of 
theism  —  the  intelligence  of  the  world-ground.  Our 
present  aim  is  to  show  that  there  can  be  no  rational 
interpretation  of  experience  except  on  a  theistic  basis. 
We  promise,  however,  a  pair  of  principles  from  meta- 
physics :  — 

1.  This  world-ground,  by  its  independent  position, 
is  the  source  of  the  finite  and  of  all  its  determina- 
tions. Whether  we  view  it  as  blind  or  seeing,  ne- 
cessitated or  free,  none  the  less  must  we  hold  that 
no  finite  thing  has  any  ground  of  existence  in  itself, 
but  that  it  owes  its  existence,  nature,  and  history 
entirely  to  the  demands  which  the  world-ground  makes 
upon  it.  If  not  in  the  plan,  then  in  the  nature  of 
this  fundamental  reality,  we  must  seek  the  condition- 
ing ground  of  things. 

2.  This  world-ground  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  stuff 
or  raw  material,  but  as  cause  or  agent.  It  is  not 
something  out  of  which  the  world  is  made,  but  the 
agent  by  which  the  world  is  produced.  Metaphysics 
finds  the  essential  meaning  of  substantiality  not  in 
an  inert  and  resting  being,  but  in  active  causality. 
Causality  is  the  essence  of  substantiality. 

64 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT  65 

The  arguments  for  intelligence  in  the  world-ground 
fall  into  two  great  classes,  inductive  and  speculative. 
The  former  infer  intelligence  from  its  indications  in 
the  order  of  the  world,  in  the  combinations  of  natural 
processes  apparently  for  ends,  and  in  the  existence 
of  the  various  forms  of  finite  intelligence.  The  latter 
argue  from  the  structure  of  reason  itself,  from  the 
nature  and  implications  of  knowledge,  and  from  the 
results  of  metaphysical  criticism.  We  have,  then, 
the  inductive  argument  and  the  epistemological 
and  metaphysical  argument.  We  consider  them 
separately. 

The  inductive  argument  is  the  favorite  with 
popular  thought ;  indeed,  popular  thought  is  inaccess- 
ible to  any  other.  Arguments  drawn  from  epistemol- 
ogy  and  metaphysics  are  highly  abstract  and  demand 
some  measure  of  training  and  reflective  power  for 
their  comprehension.  Hence,  while  they  may  be  the 
most  satisfactory  of  all  from  a  logical  standpoint, 
they  will  never  be  popular.  The  leading  difficulties 
of  popular  thought  lie  in  the  inductive  field,  and 
concern  the  interpretation  of  what  is  there  found. 
In  the  conviction  that  these  difficulties  are  largely 
due  to  misunderstanding,  we  begin  with  the  induc- 
tive argument  and  reserve  the  more  metaphysical 
considerations  for  later  discussion.  Pedagogically, 
this  is  more  effective  than  a  more  abstract  and  specu- 
lative treatment. 

In  popular  thought  the  leading  motive  in  theistic 
argument  is  the  desire  for  explanation.  The  orderly 
movement  of  the  world,  the  purpose-like  products  in 
nature,  the  existence  of  finite  intelligence,  present 
themselves  as  facts  to  be  explained ;  and  the  conclu- 


66  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

sion  is  drawn  that  only  intelligence  in  the  world- 
ground  will  explain  them.  Or  perhaps  the  opposite 
conclusion  is  drawn,  that  the  mechanism  and  forces 
of  nature  serve  to  explain  them,  and  that  we  need 
not  go  behind  or  beyond'  them.  But  in  either  case 
the  thought  moves  within  the  sphere  of  explanation. 

And  here  we  borrow  from  logic  the  insight  that 
the  human  mind  has  only  two  principles  of  causal 
explanation,  mechanism  and  intelligence.  Verbal 
phrases  can  be  constructed  to  represent  other  prin- 
ciples, but  there  is  no  corresponding  thought.  Later 
reflection  may  convince  us  that  mechanism  can  never 
really  explain  anything ;  but  for  the  present  we 
accept  the  two  types  of  explanation,  that  by  neces- 
sary mechanical  agency  which  is  driven  from  behind, 
and  that  by  intelligence  which  foresees  the  future  and 
freely  realizes  its  purposes.  In  the  former  case  we 
explain  the  fact  by  exhibiting  it  as  the  necessary 
resultant  of  its  antecedents ;  in  the  latter  we  explain 
it  by  viewing  it  as  the  work  of  intelligence.  The 
question  then  becomes.  Which  of  these  two  principles 
offers  the  better  ultimate  explanation  of  the  world  and 
life,  man  being  included  ? 

The  inductive  argument  appeals  to  certain  prom- 
inent facts  as  the  warrant  for  a  theistic  conclusion. 
These  are  the  system  of  order,  the  purpose-like 
products  that  abound  in  nature,  and  the  existence 
of  finite  intelligence.  Each  of  these,  it  is  held, 
necessitates  the  affirmation  of  intelligence  in  the 
world-ground  as  its  only  sufficient  explanation.  To- 
gether they  constitute  a  cumulative  argument  which 
cannot  be  resisted.     We  pass  to  the  exposition. 


THE  AKGUMENT  FROM  ORDER         67 


The  Argument  from  Order 

This  argument  is  drawn  chiefly  from  the  physical 
system,  for  it  is  there  we  find  the  most  obvious  and 
impressive  illustrations  of  the  changeless  laws  of  the 
world.  To  many  this  argument  is  the  supreme  one. 
The  facts  of  design  are  minute  and  limited  to  a  rela- 
tively small  field,  and  are  by  no  means  unambiguous 
even  there,  but  the  steadfast  ordinances  of  the  world 
abide  unchanged  from  age  to  age.  Order,  then,  is 
the  great  mark  of  intelligence,  they  hold,  and  the 
one  fact  from  which  its  existence  may  be  safely 
inferred.     The  fact  itself  deserves  illustration. 

We  shall  see  hereafter  that  the  knowability  of  the 
world  implies  its  orderly,  rational,  and  systematic 
structure ;  here  we  content  ourselves  with  referring 
once  more  to  the  accmate  and  all-embracing  adjust- 
ment of  each  thing  to  every  other  involved  in  a  sys- 
tem of  interaction.  We  have  seen  that  a  real  system, 
in  order  to  be  anything  for  us,  must  be  a  system  of 
law,  so  that  definite  antecedents  shall  have  the  same 
definite  consequents,  and  this  in  turn  demands  an 
exact  adjustment  or  correspondence  of  each  of  the 
interacting  members  to  all  the  rest.  Otherwise  any- 
thing might  be  followed  by  everything  or  by  nothing. 
The  numerical  exactness  of  natural  processes  illus- 
trates the  wonder  of  this  adjustment.  The  heavens 
are  crystallized  mathematics.  All  the  laws  of  force 
are  numerical.  The  interchange  of  energy  and  chem- 
ical combination  are  equally  so.  Crystals  are  solid 
geometry.  Many  organic  products  show  similar 
mathematical  laws.     Indeed,  the  claim  is  often  made 


68  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

that  science  never  reaches  its  final  form  until  it  be- 
comes mathematical.  But  simple  existence  in  space 
does  not  imply  motion  in  mathematical  relations,  or 
existence  in  mathematical  forms.  Space  is  only  the 
formless  ground  of  form,  and  is  quite  compatible  with 
the  irregular  and  amorphous.  It  is  equally  compat- 
ible with  the  absence  of  numerical  law.  The  truly 
mathematical  is  the  work  of  the  spirit.  Hence  the 
wonder  that  mathematical  principles  should  be  so 
pervasive,  that  so  many  forms  and  processes  in  the 
system  represent  definite  mathematical  conceptions, 
and  that  they  should  be  so  accurately  weighed  and 
measured  by  number. 

If  the  cosmos  were  a  resting  existence,  we  might 
possibly  content  ourselves  by  saying  that  things  exist 
in  such  relations  once  for  all,  and  that  there  is  no 
going  behind  this  fact.  But  even  this  is  very  doubt- 
ful. For  similarity  and  equality  are  rational  rela- 
tions which  find  no  explanation  apart  from  intelligence. 
Accordingly  Clerk  Maxwell,  in  his  famous  "  Discourse 
on  Molecules,"  finds  in  the  equality  of  the  molecules 
and  their  properties  a  proof  that  they  are  "  manufac- 
tured articles  "  which  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  any 
natural  processes.  "  Each  molecule  therefore  bears 
impressed  upon  it  the  stamp  of  a  metric  system  as 
distinctly  as  does  the  meter  of  the  Archives  at  Paris 
or  the  double  royal  cubit  of  the  temple  of  Karnac." 
But  however  this  may  be,  the  cosmos  is  no  rigid 
and  unchanging  thing ;  it  is,  rather,  a  process  accord- 
ing to  intelligible  rules,  and  in  this  process  the 
rational  order  is  perpetually  maintained  or  restored. 
The  weighing  and  measuring  continually  go  on.  In 
each  chemical  change  just  so  much  of  one  element  is 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  ORDER         69 

combined  with  just  so  much  of  another.  In  each 
change  of  place  the  intensities  of  attraction  and 
repulsion  are  instantaneously  adjusted  to  correspond. 
Apart  from  any  question  of  design,  the  simple  fact  of 
qualitative  and  quantitative  adjustment  of  all  things 
according  to  fixed  law  is  a  fact  of  the  utmost  signifi- 
cance. The  world-ground  works  at  a  multitude  of 
points,  or  in  a  multitude  of  things  throughout  the  sys- 
tem, and  works  in  each  with  exact  reference  to  its 
activities  in  all  the  rest.  The  displacement  of  an 
atom  by  a  hair's  breadth  demands  a  corresponding 
readjustment  in  every  other  within  the  grip  of  gravi- 
tation. But  all  are  in  constant  movement,  and  hence 
readjustment  is  continuous  and  instantaneous.  The 
single  law  of  gravitation  contains  a  problem  of  such 
dizzy  vastness  that  our  minds  faint  in  the  attempt  to 
grasp  it ;  and  when  the  other  laws  of  force  are  added 
the  complexity  defies  all  understanding.  In  addition 
we  might  refer  to  the  building  processes  in  organic 
forms,  whereby  countless  structures  are  constantly 
produced  or  maintained,  and  always  with  regard  to 
the  typical  form  in  question.  But  there  is  no  need  to 
dwell  upon  this  point. 

Here,  then,  is  a  problem  which  is  a  perennial  won- 
der to  the  thoughtful.  The  power  that  founds  the 
world,  and  from  which  the  world  perpetually  proceeds, 
fainteth  not,  neither  is  weary ;  therefore  the  faithful 
ordinances  of  the  world  stand  fast.  And  for  the 
solution  of  the  problem  we  have  only  the  two  prin- 
ciples of  intelligence  and  non-intelligence,  of  self- 
directing  reason  and  blind  necessity.  The  former  is 
adequate,  and  is  not  far-fetched  and  violent.  It  as- 
similates the  facts  to  our  own  experience,  and  offers 


THEISM ( 


70  THE    WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

the  only  ground  of  order  of  which  that  experience 
furnishes  any  suggestion.  If  we  adopt  this  view,  all 
the  facts  become  luminous  and  consequent. 

If  we  take  the  other  view,  then  we  have  to  assume 
a  power  which  produces  the  intelligible  and  rational, 
without  being  itself  intelligent  and  rational.  It 
works  in  all  things,  and  in  each  with  exact  reference 
to  all,  yet  without  knowing  anything  of  itself  or  of 
the  rules  it  follows,  or  of  the  order  it  founds,  or  of 
the  myriad  products,  compact  of  seeming  purpose, 
which  it  incessantly  produces  and  maintains.  If  we 
ask  why  it  does  this,  we  must  answer,  Because  it 
must.  If  we  ask  how  we  know  that  it  must,  the 
answer  must  be.  By  h3;^othesis.  But  this  reduces  to 
saying  that  things  are  as  they  are  because  they  must 
be.  That  is,  the  problem  is  abandoned  altogether. 
The  facts  are  referred  to  an  opaque  hypothetical 
necessity,  and  this  turns  out,  upon  inquiry,  to  be  the 
problem  itself  in  another  form.  There  is  no  proper 
explanation  except  in  theism. 

It  IS  something  of  a  surprise  to  find  the  atheistic 
explanation  of  order  so  empty  upon  inspection.  The 
reason  is  found  in  crude  sense  metaphysics  and  corre- 
sponding logic,  which  will  be  more  fully  discussed 
later  on.  Meanwhile  we  point  out  two  causes  which 
have  served  to  conceal  the  weakness  of  the  atheistic 
claim. 

First,  we  fancy  that  we  see  causes,  and  especially 
that  we  see  matter  to  be  a  real  cause.  Spirit,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  a  purely  hypothetical  cause,  and  is 
assumed  only  to  explain  that  which  the  undoubted 
cause,  matter,  cannot  account  for.  Hence  theism  is 
presented  as  maintaining  a  hypothetical  cause,  God, 


THE  ARGUMENT   FROM  ORDER  71 

against  a  real  cause,  matter ;  and  as  matter  is  daily 
found  to  explain  more  and  more,  there  is  less  and  less 
need  of  God.  Here,  then,  necessity  and  non-intelli- 
gence are  manifestly  united  in  most  effective  causa- 
tion ;  and  who  can  set  bounds  to  their  possibilities  ? 

This  thought  was  a  leading  factor  in  the  atheistic 
renascence  of  the  last  generation.  The  answer  must 
be  that  it  is  an  echo  of  an  obsolete  theory  of  knowl- 
edge. We  know  directly  nothing  of  causes.  We 
experience  certain  effects,  which  we  refer  to  causes ; 
and  the  nature  of  the  causes  is  learned  by  inference 
from  the  effects.  Matter  is  not  seen  to  cause  an}^- 
thing ;  nor  is  spirit  seen  to  cause  anything.  The 
cause  of  cosmic  phenomena  is  hidden  from  observa- 
tion ;  and  the  only  question  possible  is,  How  must  we 
think  of  that  cause  ?  Our  answer  is  equally  specula- 
tive and  metaphysical  in  every  case.  The  theist, 
observing  the  law  and  order  among  the  phenomena, 
refers  them  ultimately  to  a  power  which  knows  itself 
and  what  it  is  doing.  The  atheist  refers  them  to  a 
power  which  knows  nothing  of  itself  or  of  what  it  is 
doing. 

The  second  cause  that  conceals  the  weakness  of 
this  position  is  found  in  the  notion  of  law.  The 
human  mind  is  especially  prone  to  hypostasize  ab- 
stractions, and  subject  things  to  them.  The  reign  of 
law  is  a  phrase  that  has  thus  acquired  a  purely 
factitious  significance.  Law  appears  as  something 
apart  from  things,  which  rules  over  them  and  deter- 
mines all  their  doings.  Thus  the  law  of  gravity  is 
conceived  of  as  something  separate  from  things,  and 
to  which  things  are  subject ;  and  the  mystery  of 
gravitation  is  removed  by  calling  it  a  law.     The  mis- 


72  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

take  is  palpable.  Laws  have  no  thing-like  existence, 
but  are  simply  general  expressions  either  of  fact,  or 
of  the  rule  according  to  which  some  agent  proceeds. 
Things  do  not  attract  one  another  because  the  law  of 
gravitation  calls  for  it ;  but  they  attract,  and  from  a 
comparison  of  many  cases  we  find  that  the  intensity 
of  this  attraction  varies  according  to  a  certain  rule. 
But  this  rule  does  not  found  the  fact ;  it  only 
expresses  it.  The  same  is  true  for  all  the  other  laws 
of  nature.  They  neither  found  nor  compel  the  facts, 
but  simply  express  them.  Yet,  misled  by  our  persist- 
ent tendency  to  mistake  abstractions  for  things,  we 
first  give  a  kind  of  substantive  character  to  the  laws, 
and  then  we  carry  them  behind  the  things  as  pre- 
existent  necessities,  which  explain  everything,  but 
which  themselves  are  in  no  more  need  of  explanation 
than  the  self-sufficient  and  eternal  truths  of  the  rea- 
son. The  untaught  mind  tends  to  think  under  the 
form  of  necessity ;  and  this  necessity,  which  is  but 
the  mind's  own  shadow,  forthwith  passes  for  an  ex- 
planation. Thus  we  reach  the  grotesque  inversion  of 
reason  which  makes  the  very  fact  of  rational  order  a 
ground  for  denying  a  controlling  reason. 

In  truth,  however,  the  laws  form  a  large  part  of 
the  problem.  When  we  have  said  that  the  world- 
ground  coordinates  things  by  fixed  rules  of  quantity 
and  quality,  and  with  perfect  adaptation  and  numer- 
ical adjustment,  we  have  but  stated  the  problem,  not 
solved  it.  That  the  adjustment  takes  place  with  con- 
sciousness is  not  seen ;  that  it  takes  place  by  neces- 
sity is  also  not  seen.  Both  the  consciousness  and 
the  necessity  are  added  to  the  observation.  Change 
according  to  rule  is  all  that  is  given.     If  we  ask  how 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM   ORDER  73 

this  can  be,  we  can  only  appeal  either  to  intelligence 
or  non-intelligence.  Comte  says  that  it  is  a  mark  of 
immaturity  to  raise  this  question ;  but  if  we  will  raise 
it,  theism  is  the  only  answer.  The  atheist  he  pro- 
nounces to  be  the  most  inconsequent  of  theologians, 
since  he  raises  theological  questions  and  rejects  the 
only  possible  way  of  dealing  with  them. 

The  passage  from  Comte  is  a  striking  one,  and 
worthy  of  quotation.     He  says  :  — 

"  If  we  insist  upon  penetrating  the  unattainable  mys- 
tery of  the  essential  Cause  that  produces  phenomena, 
there  is  no  hypothesis  more  satisfactory  than  that 
they  proceed  from  Wills  dwelling  in  them  or  outside 
them,  —  an  hypothesis  which  assimilates  them  to  the 
effect  produced  by  the  desires  which  exist  within  our- 
selves. Were  it  not  for  the  pride  induced  by  meta- 
physical and  scientific  studies,  it  would  be  inconceiv- 
able that  any  atheist,  modern  or  ancient,  should  have 
believed  that  his  vague  hypotheses  on  such  a  subject 
were  preferable  to  this  direct  mode  of  explanation. 
And  it  was  the  only  mode  which  really  satisfied  the 
reason,  until  men  began  to  see  the  utter  inanity  and 
inutility  of  all  search  for  absolute  truth.  The  Order 
of  Nature  is  doubtless  very  imperfect  in  every  respect ; 
but  its  production  is  far  more  compatible  with  the 
hypothesis  of  an  intelligent  Will  than  with  that  of  a 
blind  mechanism.  Persistent  atheists  therefore  would 
seem  to  be  the  most  illogical  of  theologists :  because 
they  occupy  themselves  with  theological  problems, 
and  yet  reject  the  only  appropriate  method  of  hand- 
ling them."  ^ 

The  only  thing  that  could  justify  us  in  adopting 

1  "  A  General  View  of  Positivism,"  p.  50. 


74  THE    WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

non-intelligence  as  the  ground  of  the  cosmic  order, 
would  be  to  show  that  the  system  and  all  its  laws 
and  members  are  rational  necessities,  or  implications 
of  the  basal  reality.  The  truths  of  mathematics  are 
implications  of  our  intuitions  of  space  and  number; 
and  for  these  truths  we  ask  no  ground,  they  being 
able  to  stand  alone.  It  is  conceivable  that  in  like 
manner  the  cosmos,  in  all  its  features,  should  be 
shown  to  be  an  implication  of  the  independent 
reality  which  underlies  ail.  In  that  case  teleology 
would  be  as  needless  in  physics  and  biology  as  it  is  in 
mathematics. 

This  was  once  a  dream  of  speculation,  and  the 
attempt  was  made  to  realize  it.  Of  course  it  failed. 
No  reflection  on  the  bare  notion  of  independent  being 
gives  any  insight  into  the  actual  order.  The  basal 
distinction  of  matter  and  spirit  we  discover,  not 
deduce.  The  modes  of  cosmic  activity  are  of  the 
same  kind.  Any  of  the  cosmic  laws,  from  gravita- 
tion on,  might  conceivably  have  been  lacking  or  alto- 
gether different.  And,  allowing  the  laws,  their 
outcome  might  have  been  in  all  respects  different. 
For  the  laws  alone  do  not  determine  the  result,  but 
only  when  taken  along  with  the  conditions  under 
which  they  work.  Had  the  conditions  been  different, 
the  same  laws  would  have  produced  other  results. 
The  laws  of  physics  and  chemistry  are  ever  the  same, 
but  their  resultants  vary  with  the  circumstances  of 
their  application.  But  these  circumstances  are  all 
contingent.  No  trace  of  necessity  can  be  found  in 
the  cosmos  or  its  laws.  They  are  simply  facts  which 
we  recognize  without  pretending  to  deduce.  Meta- 
physics might  also  try  to  show  that  this  notion  of 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM   TELEOLOGY  75 

necessity,  when  pushed  to  its  results,  would  cancel 
the  unity  of  the  basal  One,  and,  instead  of  landing  us 
on  the  solid  rock,  would  leave  us  in  the  abysses.  But 
we  rest  the  argument.  Here  is  a  power  which  works 
intelligibly  and  according  to  law,  by  which  everything 
is  adjusted  to  everything  else  with  nicest  balance  and 
adaptation,  and  by  which  this  balance  is  incessant!}^ 
reproduced.  The  theist  concludes  that  this  power  is 
intelligent,  the  atheist  concludes  that  it  is  not.  The 
theist  holds  that  the  rational  and  intelligible  work 
points  to  reason  and  intelligence.  The  atheist  con- 
cludes that  the  rational  and  intelligible  work  points 
to  unreason  and  non-intelligence.  Between  these  two 
views  each  must  decide  for  himself. 

Underlying  this  atheistic  reasoning  as  the  source, 
not  only  of  its  plausibility,  but  also  of  its  possibility, 
is  the  sense  realism  of  uncritical  thought.  Accord- 
ingly there  is  not  the  least  suspicion  that  this  solid- 
looking  world  of  matter,  force,  and  law  may  itself  be 
only  a  function  of  intelligence.  This  point  will 
come  up  further  on.  It  suffices  here  to  show  the 
emptiness  of  the  argument  on  its  own  principles. 

The  Argument  from  Teleology 

The  argument  from  order  is  cosmic ;  it  concerns 
the  structure  of  the  universe  in  itself.  But  the  laws 
of  the  system  bear  no  certain  marks  of  purpose.  If 
we  ask  how  they  can  be,  we  are  referred  to  intelli- 
gence as  their  explanation.  If  we  ask  what  they  are 
for,  the  answer  must  be  that  we  do  not  clearly  see 
that  they  are  for  anything.  Movement  and  com- 
bination according  to  rule  are  all  we  see.     But  this 


76  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

uncertainty  vanishes  when  we  come  to  the  organic 
world.  Here  we  find  not  only  activity  according  to 
rule,  but  activity  with  reference  to  future  ends.  In 
the  inorganic  world  we  deal  mainly  with  antecedents 
of  which  the  facts  are  resultants.  In  the  organic 
world  there  is  not  only  a  backward  but  also  a  for- 
ward look.  The  cosmic  activity  from  being  orderly 
becomes  also  teleological.  Here  results  are  not 
merely  products,  they  also  seem  to  be  purposes. 
Here  there  are  adjustments  that  look  like  contriv- 
ance, and  combinations  apparently  for  ends.  The 
backward  look  toward  antecedents  seems  adequately 
to  explain  the  rounded  stone  on  the  beach;  but  the 
egg  implies  a  forward  look  as  well.  These  facts  are 
the  data  of  the  teleological  or  design  argument,  the 
second  of  the  inductive  arguments. 

These  two  arguments  do  not  admit  of  sharp  separa- 
tion ;  and  a  perfect  knowledge  might  well  find  them 
one.  Certainly  if  there  be  a  supreme  intelligence  we 
cannot  suppose  that  the  laws  of  nature  and  its  ele- 
mentary factors  were  fixed  without  reference  to  the 
world  of  life,  and  that  the  organic  world  is  an  after- 
thought or  mere  appendix  to  the  inorganic  world, 
which  is  complete  in  itself.  If  there  be  any  purpose, 
it  must  embrace  both  realms.  A  theist  would  be  apt 
to  find  in  the  domestic  animals,  the  cereal  grains,  the 
metallic  ores,  and  the  coal  beds  a  provision  for  man 
and  civilization.  Kant  attempted  to  distinguish 
between  the  teleology  of  the  organism,  and  the  mere 
usableness  of  the  inorganic  world  ;  but  the  distinction 
cannot  be  rigorously  maintained  for  the  reason  just 
given.  From  the  inductive  standpoint,  however,  we 
find  sufficient  difference  to  warrant  separate  discus- 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM   TELEOLOGY  77 

sion.  We  find  the  most  striking  marks  of  design 
and  contrivance  in  the  organic  world  ;  and  the  reign 
of  law,  as  such,  does  not  imply  purpose-like  products. 
The  reign  of  law  is  as  absolute  in  the  amorphous 
rock  as  in  the  crystal  or  in  the  living  form.  It  is  as 
absolute  in  the  barren  desert  as  in  the  fertile  plain. 
But  the  results  differ  greatly  in  their  power  of 
suggesting  intelligence.  Finally,  the  argument  from 
order  has  even  been  opposed  to  that  from  design, 
many  fancying  that  the  existence  of  fixed  laws  ex- 
cludes the  possibility  of  specific  and  detailed  purposes. 
We  may,  then,  consider  the  argument  separately. 

The  design  argument  has  had  varying  fortunes. 
Verbal  inaccuracies  of  statement  have  made  room  for 
floods  of  verbal  criticism ;  and  it  has  at  times  fallen 
into  complete  speculative  disfavor.  Nevertheless  it 
will  always  be  a  great  favorite  with  common  sense. 
Kant  speaks  of  it  with  respect ;  and  Mr.  J.  S.  Mill 
regards  it  as  the  only  theistic  argument  of  any  force 
whatever.  It  has  been  over  and  under  estimated.  It 
does  not  give  us  the  full  idea  of  God ;  but  with  the 
non-speculative  mind  it  will  always  be  the  main 
argument  for  the  intelligence  of  the  First  Cause. 

In  studying  this  argument  the  following  points  are 
to  be  noted  :  — 

1.  The  argument  is  not :  Design  proves  a  designer. 
Here  is  design.  Hence  these  things  have  had  a  de- 
signer. This  would,  formally  at  least,  beg  the  ques- 
tion; for  the  very  point  is  to  know  whether  the 
minor  premise  be  true.  No  one  ever  doubted  that 
design  implies  a  designer ;  but  many  have  questioned 
whether  the  facts  referred  to  design  really  justify 
this  reference.     The  argument  rather  runs  :  Here  are 


78  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  INTELLIGENT 

facts  which  have  such  marks  of  design  and  contriv- 
ance that  we  cannot  explain  them  without  referring 
them  to  purpose.  The  point  is  to  solve  the  problem 
contained  in  the  purpose-like  adaptations  and  combi- 
nations found  in  the  system  ;  and  the  theist  refers 
them  to  design  or  purpose  as  the  only  adequate  solu- 
tion. And  whatever  the  verbal  failings  of  the  expo- 
sition may  have  been,  this  has  always  been  the  real 
meaning  of  the  argument.  The  aim  is  not  to  demon- 
strate a  speculative  theorem,  but  to  solve  a  concrete 
problem ;  and  the  value  of  the  argument  depends  on 
the  success  of  the  proposed  solution. 

2.  The  design  argument  need  assume  nothing  as 
to  the  way  in  which  effects  are  produced.  It  claims 
only  that  adaptation  in  a  complex  product  to  an  ideal 
end  points  to  design  somewhere.  Intellect  acts  for 
the  future ;  hence  its  causality  is  final  or  teleological, 
that  is,  purposive.  When,  then,  processes  are  found 
in  nature  which  apparently  look  toward  future  re- 
sults, those  results  are  viewed  as  ends,  and  the  activ- 
ity is  regarded  as  intellectual  and  purposive.  This 
is  all  that  is  essential  to  the  argument.  When  more 
is  brought  in,  it  is  a  piece  of  extraneous  metaphysics 
or  an  echo  of  popular  tradition. 

3.  Design  is  never  causal.  It  is  only  an  ideal  con- 
ception, and  demands  some  efficient  cause,  or  system 
of  efficient  causes,  for  its  realization.  If  the  stomach 
is  not  to  digest  itself,  there  must  be  some  provision 
for  protecting  it  against  the  gastric  fluid.  If  ice  is 
not  to  sink  and  freeze  out  life,  there  must  be  some 
molecular  structure  which  shall  make  its  bulk  greater 
than  that  of  an  equal  weight  of  water.  There  are 
two   quite  distinct   questions   which    may  be  raised 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  TELEOLOGY       79 

about  every  event.  We  may  ask  how  it  comes  about 
in  an  order  of  law ;  and  we  may  ask  what  it  means 
in  a  scheme  of  purpose.  In  the  former  case  we  seek 
to  trace  the  event  as  the  resultant  of  its  antecedents 
according  to  the  laws  which  govern  them ;  in  the 
latter  case  we  try  to  fix  its  teleological  significance. 
These  two  points  of  view  are  entirely  distinct  and 
should  never  be  confounded.  When  we  are  studying 
the  order  of  production,  we  must  not  expect  to  find 
the  design  as  an  agent  in  the  causal  series ;  and  con- 
versely, when  we  are  asking  for  the  purpose  of  an 
event,  it  is  quite  irrelevant  to  tell  us  how  it  is 
brought  about.  All  events  come  about  in  some  way 
in  accordance  with  an  order  of  law ;  and  we  may 
study  this  order  without  raising  any  other  questions. 
And  after  we  have  found  out  all  about  the  order  and 
form  of  occurrence,  it  is  still  permitted  to  believe  that 
the  movement  is  informed  with  purpose.  The  fact 
that  men  die  from  diseases  which  have  their  estab- 
lished course  does  not  forbid  us  to  think  that  God's 
will  is  being  done  at  the  same  time.  The  description, 
then,  of  the  event  as  an  occurrence  in  the  spatial  and 
temporal  order  is  quite  distinct  from  its  teleological 
interpretation.  The  difficulty  felt  at  this  point  is 
entirely  due  to  the  naive  realism  which  erects  nature 
into  a  rival  of  God. 

The  distinction  between  the  two  points  of  view 
contains  the  answer  to  the  objection  often  urged,  that 
design  is  not  a  scientific  hypothesis.  This  claim  is 
quite  true  if  we  restrict  science  to  the  study  of  the 
uniformities  of  coexistence  and  sequence  among  phe- 
nomena. It  is  equally  unimportant.  For  science  in 
that  case  limits  itself  to  a  single  aspect  of  experience, 


80  THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT 

and  says  nothing  respecting  other  matters.  It  neither 
affirms  nor  denies  design,  but  traces  the  general  laws 
of  phenomena  in  perfect  neutrality,  so  far  as  this 
question  is  concerned. 

4.  Hence,  the  study  of  the  order  of  production  can 
never  logically  conflict  with  the  belief  in  purpose. 
The  former  tells  us  how  an  effect  has  come  about,  and 
leaves  us  as  free  as  ever  to  believe  that  there  was  pur- 
pose in  the  doing.  This  is  self-evident  in  our  human 
activities.  The  two  points  of  view  just  discriminated 
are  never  confounded  in  the  human  sphere.  Human 
inventions  exist  only  as  the  design  is  realized  in  some 
physical  combination  which  by  its  essential  laws  pro- 
duces the  designed  effect.  In  the  working  of  an 
engine,  design  does  not  appear  at  all  in  the  causal 
series,  but  only  natural  laws  and  the  properties  of  the 
component  parts.  In  a  compensating  pendulum  the 
end  is  reached  through  the  expansion  and  contraction 
of  different  metals,  which  are  so  arranged  as  to  keep 
the  pendulum  at  a  constant  length.  Design  is  di- 
rectly responsible  only  for  the  combination  ;  but  it 
nowhere  appears  among  the  working  factors  of  the 
combination.  In  the  order  of  causation  everything  is 
effect  or  product ;  in  the  order  of  conception  that 
which  in  the  causal  series  appears  as  product  pre- 
existed as  the  idea  according  to  which  the  causal 
series  was  predetermined. 

In  our  human  teleology,  then,  efficient  and  final 
causes  are  so  far  from  being  mutually  exclusive  that 
final  causes  imply  efficient  causes  for  their  realization. 
And  in  cosmic  teleology,  if  efficient  causes  were  com- 
missioned to  realize  design,  or,  rather,  if  an  ideal  con- 
ception were  impressed  upon  a  system  of  efficient 


THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  TELEOLOGY      81 

causes,  so  that  the  latter  should  work  in  accordance 
with  the  former,  and  realize  the  former,  we  should 
expect  to  see  the  products  resulting  with  necessity 
from  the  nature  of  the  agents  at  work.  In  that  case 
we  should  have  mechanism  itself  working  as  the  serv- 
ant of  purpose,  and  in  forms  prescribed  by  purpose. 
If  metaphysics  suggests  that  there  are  no  mechanical 
efficient  causes,  we  reach  the  same  result  by  remark- 
ing that  the  order  of  production  is  distinct  from  the 
teleological  interpretation  of  the  thing  produced,  and 
that  the  two  are  so  far  from  incompatible  that  the 
latter  presupposes  the  former.  We  might,  then, 
allow  that  "  the  whole  course  of  Nature,  considered 
as  a  succession  of  phenomena,  is  conditioned  solely  by 
antecedent  causes  "  without  in  any  way  affecting  the 
teleological  conclusion.  No  one  will  find  any  diffi- 
culty in  recognizing  the  double  aspect  of  the  facts, 
except  those  who  have  taken  the  crude  metaphysics 
of  mechanical  thought  for  granted  and  have  naively 
transformed  the  assumed  mechanism  into  an  eternal 
and  self-sufficient  necessity.  But  this  is  less  a  logical 
than  a  pathological  procedure. 

5.  The  teleological  argument  has  often  been  con- 
ducted in  a  piecemeal  way.  This,  that,  and  the  other 
thing  have  been  specially  designed.  The  effect  of 
this  is  to  present  design  as  a  sporadic  thing  limited 
to  small  and  unimportant  matters.  Conducted  in 
this  way,  the  argument  can  hardly  fail  to  scandalize 
any  one  who  wishes  to  look  at  the  world  as  a  whole, 
and  who  must  therefore  find  intelligence  everywhere 
or  nowhere.  The  very  words,  design  and  contrivance, 
easily  lend  themselves  to  petty  and  unworthy  inter- 
pretation ;  and  when  they  are  pilloried  in  quotation 


82  THE   WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT 

marks  they  seem  especially  contemptible.  But  this 
also  is  no  essential  part  of  the  argument,  but  only  an 
accident  of  exposition,  or  of  mental  limitation,  or  a 
device  of  polemics.  The  essential  thing  is  the  for- 
ward look,  the  cooperant  toil,  whether  seen  in  special 
organic  details,  or  the  whole  biological  system,  or  the 
great  cosmic  movement  itself. 

Where  these  points  are  duly  regarded,  the  argument 
from  teleology  or  design  is  seen  to  be  by  no  means  the 
weak  thing  it  is  often  proclaimed  to  be.  And  yet, 
historically,  the  study  of  efficient  causes,  or  of  the 
order  of  production  in  space  and  time,  has  often  tended 
to  weaken  the  belief  in  purpose  or  final  causes.  This 
fact  has  many  grounds  :  anthropomorphic  interpreta- 
tions of  design,  unclear  notions  of  what  mechanism 
can  do,  crude  metaphysics  concerning  nature,  and 
logical  confusion  in  general.  A  few  specifications 
will  be  in  place  :  — 

The  design  argument  has  been  supposed  to  teach 
an  external  making,  and  not  an  immanent  guiding. 
Human  designs  are  external  to  the  material  on  which 
they  are  impressed  ;  but  this  externality  is  in  no  way 
essential  to  the  design.  If  the  human  maker,  instead 
of  adapting  his  plan  to  given  material,  could  create 
his  material  outright  and  impress  his  plan  upon  its 
very  being,  the  design  would  be  quite  as  real  and 
quite  as  apparent  as  it  is  now.  The  essential  thing, 
as  just  said,  is  the  forward  look,  the  "  toil  cooperant 
to  an  end  "  ;  and  this  is  quite  independent  of  the  ques- 
tion of  immanent  or  external  design. 

Under  the  influence  of  this  anthropomorphic  fancy, 
the  design  argument  has  been  much  belabored.  It 
has  been  called  the  carpenter  theory  —  a  phrase  which, 


THE  ARGUMENT   FROM   TELEOLOGY  83 

while  missing  the  true  nature  of  the  argument,  does 
most  happily  reveal  the  wooden  character  of  the  crit- 
icism. But  the  argument  itself  is  quite  compatible 
with  immanent  design,  with  design  legislated  into  the 
constitution  of  things,  so  that  in  their  fixed  order  cf 
unfolding  they  shall  realize  a  predetermined  plan  or 
purpose.  When  this  fact  is  borne  in  mind  one  can 
listen  without  dismay,  though  not  without  weariness, 
to  reflections  on  the  carpenter  theory.  Of  course 
such  reflections  are  entirely  in  place  when  design  is 
conceived  in  a  carpenter  fashion,  or  when  some 
anthropomorphic  accident  is  made  the  essence  of  the 
doctrine.  But  triumph  over  such  superficiality  or 
misunderstanding  has  no  attraction  for  persons  in 
earnest.  They  know,  as  Mr.  Mill  has  said,  that  no 
doctrine  is  overthrown  until  it  is  overthrown  in  its 
best  form. 

A  similar  anthropomorphic  difficulty  is  found  in 
our  doubt  respecting  purpose  when  it  is  slowly  real- 
ized. The  forward  look  of  purposive  activity  is  es- 
pecially revealed  in  the  convergence  of  various  factors 
toward  an  end ;  and  when  the  convergence  is  slow 
and  the  mental  range  is  limited,  the  end  is  apt  to  be 
missed.  In  our  human  activities  as  soon  as  the  pur- 
poses become  at  all  complex  or  take  on  the  character 
of  plans,  the  aim  can  be  discerned  only  from  a  com- 
prehensive survey  of  the  whole.  To  one  standing  in 
the  midst  of  the  work,  and  especially  in  its  chaotic 
beginnings,  or  to  one  studying  the  details  singly  and 
not  in  their  relations,  the  end  may  easily  be  missed 
altogether.  From  the  nature  of  the  case  we  must  be 
largely  in  this  position  with  regard  to  the  purpose  in 
nature.     Our  own  brevity  makes  it  hard  to  believe  in 


84  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

purpose  when  it  is  slowly  realized,  as  we  fail  in  such 
cases  to  get  any  vivid  impression  of  movement  con- 
verging toward  an  end.  The  distress  which  many 
theists  have  felt  at  the  doctrine  of  the  slow  develop- 
ment of  cosmic  forms  is  mainly  due  to  this  fact.  In 
the  same  way,  and  with  the  same  logic,  an  ephemeron 
would  miss,  and  might  deny,  the  piu^pose  in  the  mass 
of  human  activity,  because  its  range  of  knowledge 
and  rate  of  temporal  change  would  not  enable  it  to  get 
any  vivid  impression  of  movement  toward  an  end. 
Against  this  anthropomorphism  we  must  be  on  our 
guard.  Time  and  temporal  rate  have  naught  to  do 
with  the  pure  intellectual  relation  of  finality ;  but  if 
we  do  bring  them  into  connection,  the  purpose  which 
moves  steadily  across  ages  toward  its  realization  is 
more  impressive  than  the  purpose  of  a  day.  So  much 
for  anthropomorphic  confusion. 

The  result  of  the  error  about  external  design  is  a 
second,  namely,  the  fancy  that  whatever  can  be  ex- 
plained by  physical  laws  and  agents  is  thereby  res- 
cued from  the  control  of  mind.  Not  even  Kant  is 
free  from  this  confusion.  In  the  "  Critique  of  the 
Judgment "  he  suggests  that  the  notion  of  purpose 
may  have  only  a  regulative  value ;  and  that  possibly 
everything  may  have  a  mechanical  explanation.  Here 
he  falls  into  the  confusion  of  making  design  an 
efficient  cause  among  causes,  and  seems  to  think  that 
we  must  not  know  how  effects  are  produced  if  we 
are  to  believe  them  intended.  Many  have  openly 
espoused  this  notion.  The  discovery  that  the  stomach 
does  not  digest  itself,  because  its  walls  secrete  a  var- 
nish impervious  to  the  gastric  fluid,  would  be  held  to 
remove  all  wonder  from  the  fact.     Purpose  is  not 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM   TELEOLOGY  85 

supposed  to  be  purpose  when  it  works  through  an 
order  of  traceable  law. 

This  fancy,  which  recognizes  purpose  only  where 
causation  cannot  be  traced,  had  great  influence  in  the 
revival  of  atheism  in  the  generation  just  passed. 
Wherever  natural  laws  could  be  traced,  purpose  was 
ruled  out.  This  view  first  assumes  that  design  is  a 
cause,  and  then  attributes  to  the  elements  and  laws 
of  nature  a  metaphysical  self-sufficiency  which  excludes 
purpose.  Both  assumption  and  attribution  are  errors. 
As  we  have  already  seen,  design  is  no  factor  in  the 
productive  series,  but  rather  its  predetermining 
norm.  It  cannot  be  sensuously  presented  in  space 
and  time,  but  must  be  intellectually  perceived.  And 
we  have  further  seen  in  the  previous  chapter  that 
the  system  of  impersonal  things  represents  no  self- 
sufficient  existence,  but  only  the  way  in  which 
the  world-ground  proceeds.  Whether  there  be  any 
purpose  in  the  proceeding  can  be  known  only  by 
studying  the  outcome.  And  if  such  study  reveals  a 
forward  look  in  the  cosmic  processes,  it  is  pure  irrele- 
vance, to  say  the  least,  to  object  in  the  name  of  spa- 
tial and  temporal  laws.  We  must  not  expect  to  find 
purpose  doing  anything,  but  we  may  find  things  done 
according  to  purpose. 

The  chief  ground  for  distinguishing  between  the 
system  of  law  and  specific  design  lies  in  what  appears 
as  the  contrivances  of  nature.  Here  we  have  combi- 
nations of  laws  for  the  production  of  effects,  which 
the  laws  taken  singly  do  not  involve.  In  organic 
forms,  especially,  we  have  a  union  of  natural  processes 
which,  taken  singly,  would  destroy  the  organism,  but 
which   together  work  for   the   maintenance   of   the 

THEISM 7 


86  THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT 

whole.  This  class  of  facts  has  led  many  to  think  of 
design  as  something  interjected  into,  or  superinduced 
upon,  a  system  essentially  unrelated  to  it.  But  this 
fancy  is  reached  by  unlawful  abstraction.  It  is  in- 
deed conceivable  that  there  should  be  a  system  in 
which  the  elementary  physical  and  chemical  processes 
should  go  on  without  any  purpose -like  products  ;  but 
in  the  actual  system  they  are  not  thus  resultless. 
When,  then,  we  make  the  law  into  an  abstract  rule 
and  separate  it  from  its  actual  working  and  product, 
we  merely  analyze  the  complex  reality  into  several 
factors  for  the  convenience  of  our  understanding ; 
we  need  not  regard  them  as  in  any  way  representing 
the  constituent  factors  from  which  the  reality  was 
produced.  But  this  question  goes  too  deeply  into 
the  question  of  the  formal  and  the  objective  signifi- 
cation of  logical  method  to  be  discussed  to  advantage 
here. 

These  are  specimens  of  the  misunderstandings 
which  underlie  the  current  distrust  of  the  design 
argument.  But  there  is  danger  of  losing  sight  of 
the  argument  itself  through  occupation  with  these 
detailed  objections.  It  is  well  to  return  to  the  argu- 
ment again  for  a  new  departure. 

The  positive  argument  for  design  begins  by  show- 
ing that  many  processes  in  nature  are  determined  by 
ends.  The  aim  of  the  eye  is  vision,  that  of  the  ear 
is  hearing,  that  of  the  lungs  is  the  oxygenation  of  the 
blood,  that  of  the  manifold  generative  mechanisms  is 
the  reproduction  of  life.  In  all  of  these  cases  there 
is  concurrence  of  many  factors  in  a  common  result ; 
and  this  result,  toward  which  they  all  tend,  is  viewed 
as  the  final  cause  of  their  concurrence.     Here,  then. 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM   TELEOLOGY  87 

is  action  for  an  end.  But  an  end,  as  such,  cannot  act 
except  as  a  conception  in  the  consciousness  of  some 
agent  which  wills  that  end.  The  end,  as  result,  is 
effect,  not  cause.  Hence  activity  for  ends  demands  a 
preconceiving  intelligence  as  its  necessary  implication 
or  condition. 

This  argument  is  valid.  There  is  first  an  inductive 
inquiry  whether  there  be  activity  for  ends  in  nature,  and 
then  the  speculative  question  how  such  finality  is  to  be 
explained,  is  answered  by  referring  it  to  intelligence. 

There  is  no  need  to  adduce  instances  of  apparent 
finality.  They  may  be  found  in  endless  profusion  in 
the  various  works  on  the  subject.  Besides,  all  admit 
that  in  the  organic  realm  the  world-ground  proceeds 
as  if  it  had  plans  and  piu-poses.  It  is  well  known 
that  the  language  of  biology  is  prevailingly  teleo- 
logical,  even  when  the  speculator  denies  teleology. 
Thus  nature,  when  driven  out  with  a  fork,  ever  comes 
rimning  back.  The  great  mass  of  activities  within 
the  organism  are  teleological.  The  great  mass  of  the 
activities  of  living  individuals  in  their  interaction 
with  one  another  and  with  the  environment,  are  like- 
wise teleological.  There  is  no  possibility  of  under- 
standing them,  or  even  of  describuig  them,  without 
resorting  to  teleology.  Thus,  as  atheists,  we  have  to 
avail  ourselves  of  the  language  of  fiction  in  order  to 
express  the  truth.  We  condense  a  single  passage 
from  M.  Janet's  classical  work  on  "  Final  Causes  "  in 
illustration  of  finality  in  natural  processes  in  the 
building  of  the  organism  :  — 

"  In  the  mystery  and  night  of  incubation  or  gesta- 
tion by  the  collaboration  of  an  incredible  number  of 
causes,  a  living  machine  is  formed  which  is  absolutely 


88  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

separated  from  the  outer  world,  yet  accords  with  it, 
and  of  which  all  the  parts  respond  to  some  physical 
conditions  of  that  outer  world.  The  outer  world  and 
the  inner  laboratory  of  the  living  being  are  separated 
from  each  other  by  impenetrable  veils,  and  neverthe- 
less they  are  united  by  an  incredible  harmony.  With- 
out is  light,  within,  an  optical  machine  adapted  to 
it.  Without  is  sound,  within,  an  acoustic  mechanism. 
Without  is  food,  within  are  organs  of  assimilation. 
Without  are  earth,  air,  arid  water,  within  are  motor 
organs  adapted  to  them.  Imagine  a  blind  workman, 
confined  in  a  cellar,  who  simply  by  moving  his  limbs 
should  be  found  to  have  forged  a  key  adapted  to  the 
most  complex  lock.  That  is  what  nature  does  in 
making  the  living  being." 

Without  some  demurrer  of  extraordinary  force,  the 
conclusion  is  irresistible  that  here  is  activity  which 
looks  toward  the  future,  which  foresees  and  prepares, 
and  which  therefore  must  be  viewed  as  intelligent. 
Of  course  the  standing  answer  to  this  argument  is 
that  the  apparent  aims  are  not  real  ones ;  that  they 
result  from  their  antecedents  by  necessity,  and  were 
never  intended.  Eyes  were  not  made  for  seeing  ;  but 
we  have  eyes,  and  see  in  consequence.  The  propa- 
gation of  life  was  never  purposed;  but  reproductive 
processes  and  mechanisms  exist,  and  life  is  prop- 
agated. This  view,  in  this  naked  form,  has  always 
scandalized  the  unsophisticated  mind  as  a  pettifogg- 
ing affront  to  good  sense.  But  when  it  is  variously 
disguised  by  bad  metaphysics  and  confused  logic,  it 
sometimes  becomes  acceptable. 

The  theistic  conclusion  is  disputed  on  the  following 
grounds :  — 


MECHANICAL  EXPLANATION  89 

1.  The  mechanism  of  nature  explains  the  fact,  and 
we  need  not  go  behind  it. 

2.  The  fact  that  the  world-ground  works  as  if  it 
had  plans  does  not  prove  that  it  has  them. 

3.  There  is  no  analogy  between  human  activity 
and  cosmic  activity.  We  know  that  purpose  rules  in 
human  action,  but  we  have  no  experience  of  world- 
making,  and  can  conclude  nothing  concerning  cosmic 
action.  The  distance  is  too  great,  and  knowledge  is 
too  scant  to  allow  any  inference. 

All  atheistic  objections  fall  under  some  one  of  these 
heads.     We  consider  them  in  their  order. 

Mechanical  Explanation 

On  this  point  we  observe  that  the  mechanism  of 
nature  is  here  assumed  as  an  ontological  fact  about 
which  there  can  be  no  question.  There  is  no  sus- 
picion that  this  mechanical  ontology  is  open  to  the 
very  gravest  doubt ;  and  equally  no  suspicion  that  in 
any  case  this  mechanism  is  no  self-running  system, 
but  only  the  phenomenal  product  of  an  energy  not  its 
own.  But  we  postpone  these  considerations  for  the 
present  and  point  out  that  mechanism,  and  systems 
of  necessity  in  general,  can  never  explain  teleological 
problems.  These  can  find  a  real  explanation  only  in 
a  self-directing  intelligence.  All  other  explanations 
are  either  tautologies,  or  they  implicitly  abandon  the 
problem.  We  have  already  pointed  out  that  the  gen- 
eral laws  of  the  system  explain  no  specific  effect. 
Like  the  laws  of  motion,  they  apply  to  all  cases,  but 
account  for  none.  The  specific  effect  is  always  due 
to  the  peculiar  circumstances  under  which  the  laws 


90  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

work.  Hence,  in  order  to  explain  the  effect,  we  must 
account  for  not  only  the  general  laws,  but  also  the 
special  circumstances  which  form  the  arbitrary  con- 
stants of  the  equation.  But  these  cannot  be  explained 
by  any  and  every  antecedent,  but  only  by  such  as  contain 
implicitly  the  effect.  In  that  case  we  do  not  explain 
the  peculiar  nature  of  the  effect,  but  only  remove  it 
one  step  further  back.  By  the  law  of  the  sufficient 
reason,  when  we  pass  from  effects  to  causes,  we  have 
to  attribute  them,  not  to  any  and  every  cause,  but  to 
causes  that  implicitly  contain  all  the  mystery  and 
peculiarity  of  the  effects.  Thus  the  problem  ever  pre- 
cedes us.  We  refer  a  to  -a,  and  -a  is  referred  to  -2a, 
and  so  on  to  -na.  If  -na  is  given,  then  in  the  course 
of  time  a  will  appear ;  but  at  the  farthest  point,  -na, 
we  have  a  implicitly  and  necessarily  given.  In  such 
a  system  we  reach  no  resting-place  and  no  true  ex- 
planation. A  given  fact,  a,  is  because  -a  was ;  and 
-a  was  because  -la  went  before  ;  and  so  on  in  endless 
regress.  But  as  all  later  orders  and  collocations  were 
implicit  in  -na,  it  follows  that  we  deduce  the  present 
fact,  a,  from  its  antecedents  by  constructing  our 
thought  of  those  antecedents  so  as  to  contain  the 
fact  to  be  deduced.  Of  course  it  does  not  follow  that 
a  was  given  as  a,  but  only  in  those  antecedents  which 
must  lead  to  it ;  so  that  whoever  could  have  read  the 
system  at  any  point  in  the  past  would  have  seen  a  as 
a  necessary  implication.  In  a  system  of  necessity 
there  can  be  no  new  departures,  no  interjection  of 
new  features,  but  only  an  unfolding  of  the  necessary 
implications.  If  we  make  a  cross-section  of  such  a 
system  at  any  point,  we  find  everything  given  either 
actually  or  potentially,  and  when  an  apparently  new 


MECHANICAL  EXPLANATION  91 

fact  appears,  it  is  not  something  chanced  upon,  but 
something  that  always  must  have  been.  Arrivals 
and  non-arrivals,  survivals  and  non-survivals,  uni- 
formities and  new  departures,  heredities  and  varia- 
tions —  all  are  determined  from  everlasting.  In  such 
a  scheme  we  do  not  come  to  the  thought  of  a  begin- 
ning, but  of  a  self-centered  system,  or  world-order, 
which  rolls  on  forever,  infolding  and  unfolding  all. 
This  view  might  involve  us  in  sundry  very  grave 
metaphysical  difficulties,  but  w^e  pass  them  over. 
The  point  to  be  noticed  here  is  that  it  does  not 
solve,  but  only  postpones,  the  teleological  problem. 
If  the  facts  themselves  call  for  explanation,  just  as 
much  do  these  hypothetical  grounds  demand  it,  for 
we  have  simply  carried  the  facts  in  principle  into 
them.  But  we  conceal  the  fact  from  ourselves  by 
casting  the  shadow  of  necessity  over  the  whole,  and 
this  stifles  further  inquiry.  Reference  has  already 
been  made  to  the  grotesque  inversion  of  reason  which 
finds  in  the  rational  order  a  ground  for  denying  a 
basal  reason  ;  the  same  thing  meets  us  here.  We  con- 
struct our  thought  of  the  cosmic  mechanism  by  an 
inverted  teleology.  The  mechanism  is  simply  tele- 
ology read  backward.  But  the  notion  of  necessity 
so  blinds  us  that  the  cosmic  mechanism,  which  is  but 
an  incarnation  of  all  cosmic  products,  is  made  the 
ground  for  denying  pm^pose  therein. 

This  utter  barrenness  attaches  to  every  system  of 
explanation  of  a  mechanical  or  necessary  character, 
and  can  never  be  escaped.  In  all  inference  from  the 
present  to  the  past  we  are  bound  to  find  the  present 
in  the  past,  or  we  cannot  infer  it.  If  we  could  exhaus- 
tively think  the  past  without  finding  the  future  in  it, 


92  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

the  future  would  be  groundless  and  would  not  be  ex- 
plained by  the  past.  But  if  we  find  the  future  in  the 
past,  the  past  that  explains  the  future  is  one  that 
contains  the  future ;  and  there  is  no  logical  progress  or 
insight.  Likewise  in  all  inference  from  effect  to  cause, 
we  must  determine  the  thought  of  the  cause  by  the 
effect ;  and  we  can  infer  neither  more  nor  less  than 
the  cause  of  just  that  effect.  If  we  infer  more,  we  are 
guilty  of  illicit  process ;  if  we  infer  less,  the  effect  is 
unprovided  for.  The  A  which  explains  B  must  be 
so  related  to  B  that  the  exhaustive  thought  of  A  con- 
tains B.  The  explanation  consists  in  conceiving  events 
as  potential  in  their  causes ;  and  the  deduction  con- 
sists in  conceiving  these  potentials  as  passing  into 
realization.  As  we  go  backward,  we  potentialize  the 
actual ;  as  we  come  forward,  we  actualize  the  potential. 
Of  the  inner  nature  of  the  process  we  have  not  the 
slightest  conception  or  experience ;  we  have  only 
words  for  counters.  In  a  necessary  system  we  can 
never  escape  this  barren  verbalism. 

This  is  the  hopeless  deadlock  of  all  mechanical 
thinking.  The  necessary  logical  equivalence  of  cause 
and  effect  in  such  a  scheme  makes  escape  impossible. 
If  we  begin  with  the  simple,  we  never  reach  the  com- 
plex ;  if  we  begin  with  the  complex,  we  never  reach 
the  simple.  Necessity  contains  no  principle  of  progress 
or  differentiation.  Indeed,  simple  necessity  is  alto- 
gether motionless,  unless  we  surreptitiously  intro- 
duce change  into  it ;  and  then  the  notion  breaks 
up  into  a  plurality  of  necessities  whose  inner  rela- 
tions are  inscrutable.  But  not  to  press  this  point,  it 
is  plain  that  necessity,  if  it  exist,  can  only  unfold  its 
eternal  implications ;  it  can  reach  nothing  new,  nor 


MECHANICAL   EXPLANATION  93 

make  any  new  departure.  If  anything  apparently 
new  is  reached,  it  has  always  been  implied  in  the  sys- 
tem. If  any  differentiation  manifests  itself,  it  has 
always  been  implicit.  The  present  grows  out  of  the 
past  only  on  condition  of  being  in  the  past.  The 
high  emerges  from  the  low  only  as  it  is  implicit  in 
the  low.  The  homogeneous  that  is  to  develop  into  the 
heterogeneous  must  itself  be  unplicitly  heterogeneous 
from  the  start.  The  heterogeneity  that  appears  in 
the  development  is  nothing  essentially  new,  but  has 
always  been  at  least  potential. 

In  such  thinking  of  course  there  is  no  progress, 
even  if  its  fundamental  conceptions  were  not  other- 
wise obnoxious  to  criticism  —  which  is  far  from  being 
the  case. 

But  our  eyes  are  holden  in  this  matter  because  of 
certain  easy  oversights.  The  leading  one  is  the  mis- 
taking of  verbal  simplifications  for  simplifications  of 
things.  The  complexity,  plurality,  and  differences  of 
things  disappear  in  the  simplicity  and  identity  of  the 
class  term ;  and  then  we  fancy  that  the  things  them- 
selves have  been  simplified  and  unified.  In  this  way 
we  reach  the  abstractions  of  matter  and  force,  from 
which  all  the  peculiarities  and  differences  of  material 
things  and  their  energies  have  disappeared.  This 
gives  us  a  species  of  unity  and  simplicity  of  concep- 
tion which  is  forthwith  mistaken  for  a  unity  and  sim- 
plicity of  real  existence.  By  this  purely  verbal 
process  the  last  terms  of  logical  abstraction  are 
mistaken  for  the  first  and  essential  forms  of  real 
existence  ;  and  the  problem  receives  a  fictitious  sim- 
plification. Of  course  there  are  no  such  things  as 
matter  and  force,  simple    and  homogeneous,  but  if 


94  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  INTELLIGENT 

there  be  any  ontological  reality  in  the  case,  the  fact 
is  an  enormous  multitude  of  individuals,  each  with  its 
peculiar  powers,  laws,  and  relations,  and  each  such 
and  so  related  to  every  other  that  it  must  do  its  part 
in  the  tremendous  whole.  But  the  problem  being 
fictitiously  simplified  through  this  fallacy  of  classifi- 
cation, we  miss  its  wonder  altogether.  As  the  basal 
conceptions,  matter  and  force,  have  no  contents  be- 
yond bare  being  and  causality,  there  is  nothing  about 
them  to  start  questions  or  awaken  surprise.  Indeed, 
they  seem  well  fitted  to  get  on  by  themselves  ;  and 
when  we  duly  reflect  on  the  indestructibility  of  mat- 
ter and  energy,  it  becomes  doubtful  if  they  have  not 
always  got  on  by  themselves.  And  as  all  physical 
facts,  at  least,  are  only  specifications  of  matter  and 
force,  it  is  easy  to  mistake  this  logical  subordination 
for  ontological  implication. 

The  illusion  is  finally  completed  by  our  failure  to 
recognize  the  shorthand  character  of  language  in  gen- 
eral. We  think  in  symbols,  and  fill  out  the  thought 
only  so  far  as  may  be  necessary.  Hence  the  causes 
to  which  we  refer  effects  are  thought  only  in  a  vague 
way,  and  thus  we  overlook  the  fact  that  in  concrete  and 
complete  thinking,  in  distinction  from  shorthand  and 
symbolic  thinking,  we  can  never  escape  from  complex- 
ity into  simplicity,  or  pass  from  simplicity  into  com- 
plexity, or  reduce  our  problem  to  lower  terms  by 
logical  manipulation,  so  long  as  we  remain  on 
the  mechanical  and  necessary  plane.  The  peren- 
nial attempts  to  deduce  the  world  from  some  origi- 
nal state  of  simplicity  and  insignificance  all  rest  at 
bottom  on  these  oversights.  The  indefinite,  inco- 
herent, undifferentiated  homogeneity,  matter  or  what 


MECHANICAL   EXPLANATION  95 

not,   with  which  they  begin,  is  a  product  of  logical 
confusion. 

Yet  under  the  influence  of  this  confusion,  we  even 
claim  to  illustrate  the  process.  We  trace  the  outlines 
of  our  system  to  some  state  of  apparent  homogeneity, 
say  a  nebula ;  and  then  conclude  that  any  vague  and 
formless  matter  must  develop  into  fixed  and  definite 
purpose-like  products.  In  our  regress  we  forget  the 
definite  outcome,  and  thus  we  seem  to  reach  the 
indefinite  and  meaningless.  Then  in  our  progress  we 
remember  the  definite  outcome  again,  and  this  passes 
for  a  deduction.  Hence  the  nebular  theory  and  that 
of  natural  selection  have  been  often  adduced  as  show- 
ing how,  by  a  kind  of  mechanical  necessity  in  a  sys- 
tem of  trial  and  rejection,  purpose  must  result  from 
non-purposive  action.  But  here  we  fail  entirely  to  be 
true  to  the  principle  of  the  sufficient  reason,  and  mis- 
take indefiniteness  for  the  senses  for  indefiniteness 
for  the  reason.  Those  homogeneities  which  looked 
all  alike  were  very  far  from  being  all  alike.  The 
whole  system  of  difference  was  implicit  in  them. 
And  those  vague  and  formless  conditions  were  such 
only  to  sense  and  unagination.  For  the  understanding 
the  reign  of  law  was  as  universal  and  exact  then  as 
at  any  later  date.  But  atheistic  thought  has  always 
been  in  curious  oscillation  between  chance  and  neces- 
sity at  this  point.  At  times  everything  is  absolutely 
determined  ;  but  when  the  design  question  is  up,  an 
element  of  indeterminateness  appears.  Some  chaos, 
which  contained  nothing  worth  mentioning,  or  some 
raw  beginnings  of  existence,  which  were  so  low  as  to 
make  no  demand  for  an  intelligent  cause,  begin  to 
shuffle  into  the  argument.     Being  so  abject,  it  excites 


96  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

no  question  or  surprise.  Being  indeterminate,  it 
does  not  seem  to  beg  the  question  against  teleology 
by  implicitly  assuming  the  problem ;  and  then,  by  a 
wave  of  the  magic  wand  of  necessity,  together  with 
a  happy  forgetfulness  of  the  laws  of  mental  procedure, 
the  nothing  is  transformed  into  an  all-explaining 
something.  We  find  the  same  confusion  underlying 
the  argument  from  the  "  conditions  of  existence,"  and 
the  earlier  fancy  that,  as  in  infinite  time  all  possible 
combinations  must  be  exhausted,  the  actual  order 
must  be  hit  upon.  The  superficial  character  of 
these  notions  need  not  be  dwelt  upon,  as  the  very 
nature  of  scientific  method  has  rendered  them  obso- 
lete. They  must  be  looked  upon  as  survivals  of  a 
period  when  thought  was  groping  blindly  without  any 
knowledge  of  its  own  aims  and  methods.  In  a  nec- 
essary system  there  is  no  possible  beyond  the  actual 
and  its  necessary  implications.  All  else  is  the  im- 
possible. There  never  was,  then,  a  period  of  indefi- 
niteness  out  of  which  the  present  order  emerged  by  a 
happy  chance.  Notions  of  this  sort  are  finally  and 
forever  excluded  by  the  exact  determinism  on  which 
mechanical  reasoning  is  based.  As  soon  as  we  say 
mechanism,  our  original  data  imply  all  that  can  ever 
be.  Time,  however  long,  and  natural  selection  and 
the  survival  of  the  fittest,  can  produce  nothing  which 
was  not  already  fully  predetermined  in  the  earliest 
arrangement  of  things. 

These  illusive  simplifications  of  language  and  sym- 
bolic thinking  are  perpetually  thrusting  themselves  be- 
tween us  and  the  problem,  veiling  at  once  the  unman- 
ageable complexity  of  the  concrete  problem  and  the 
verbal  and   empty  nature  of  our  explanation.     We 


MECHANICAL  EXPLANATION  97 

refer  things  to  matter  and  force  in  a  general  way, 
without  troubling  ourselves  to  think  out  the  problem 
in  its  concrete  nature.  But  if  we  should  think  the 
matter  through,  we  should  see  not  only  the  tautolo- 
gous  and  unprogressive  character  of  our  theorizing, 
but  also  that  we  are  using  terms  for  which  there  are 
no  corresponding  conceptions.  When  we  think  con- 
cretely, matter  and  force,  if  anything  more  than  logi- 
cal counters,  become  only  formal  concepts,  of  which 
the  reality  is  the  multitudinous  elements  and  their  mul- 
titudinous activities,  comprehended  in  an  order  of  infi- 
nite complexity  of  relations.  And  these  elements, 
without  knowing  anything  of  themselves  or  of  one 
another  or  of  any  laws,  must  each  incessantly  respond 
to  changes  in  every  other  in  accordance  with  a  com- 
plicated system  of  physical,  chemical,  structural,  and 
organic  laws,  so  as  to  produce  and  maintain  the 
orderly  system  of  things  with  all  its  wonderful  variety 
and  essential  harmony.  Now  in  addition  to  the 
strictly  tautologous  character  of  this  performance,  we 
have  absolutely  no  means  of  representing  to  ourselves 
the  mechanical  possibility  of  all  this ;  and  when  we 
attempt  it,  we  merely  amuse  or  confuse  ourselves  with 
words  and  abstractions. 

This  is  shown  as  follows  :  In  our  mechanical  system, 
considered  as  dynamic,  we  have  two  factors,  —  the 
system  of  spatial  changes  and  combinations,  and  the 
dynamic  system  which  causes  them.  The  former  ex- 
plains nothing  ;  it  is  rather  the  problem  itself.  The 
latter  defies  all  representation  and  all  concrete  con- 
ception. If  the  elements  are  to  combine  organically, 
they  must  be  the  seat  of  organic  forces  with  all  the 
complexity  of  their  possible  combinations.     As  soon 


98  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  INTELLIGENT 

as  we  renounce  the  fallacy  of  the  universal  and  think 
concretely  and  completely,  the  problem  is  seen  in  its 
unmanageable  complexity  and  insolubility.  Spatial 
combination  we  can  picture ;  volitional  and  intellec- 
tual causality  we  experience ;  but  what  that  is  which 
is  more  than  the  former  and  less  than  the  latter,  is 
past  all  or  any  finding  out.  We  cannot  see  it  in 
space,  and  we  cannot  find  it  in  consciousness.  But 
such  a  thing  is  a  figment  of  abstraction  and  no  possi- 
ble reality.  We  merely  shuffle  the  abstract  category' 
of  cause  and  ground,  and  fail  to  note  that,  while  our 
thought  is  formally  correct,  it  is  really  moving  in  a 
vacuum.  We  have  the  well-founded  conviction  that 
there  must  be  a  sufficient  reason  for  the  spatial  group- 
ings and  changes,  and  without  further  ado  we  locate 
it  in  the  assumed  elements,  and  leave  it  to  find  out  for 
itself  how  to  be  sufficient.  And  all  this  is  perfectly 
clear,  because  we  tacitly  assume  that  there  is  nothing 
in  play  but  the  elements  in  space ;  and  there  is  noth- 
ing mysterious  about  them. 

If  we  were  planning  the  construction  of  a  locomo- 
tive which  should  run  without  an  engineer,  yet  should 
do  all  that  a  locomotive  does  under  an  engineer's  con- 
trol —  back  up  to  the  train,  ring  the  bell  for  starting, 
whistle  at  crossings,  put  on  the  breaks  on  down 
grades,  stop  at  scheduled  stations,  attend  to  signals, 
wait  on  sidings,  make  up  for  lost  time  —  it  would  not 
be  a  sufficient  solution  to  say  that  we  only  need  to 
make  the  locomotive  such,  that  all  this  would  follow. 
Formally,  indeed,  that  would  suffice ;  but  concretely 
we  should  have  to  inquire  what  kind  of  a  "  such  "  this 
would  be,  and  whether  we  could  form  the  slight- 
est notion  of  this  mechanical  such.     The  only  such 


MECHANICAL   EXPLANATION  99 

that  would  meet  this  case  would  be  an  engineer. 
And  if  a  locomotive  were  found  thus  running  without 
visible  direction,  it  would  be  no  answer  to  the  sugges- 
tion of  an  invisible  engineer  to  say  that  the  "  nature  " 
of  the  locomotive  explained  its  running  in  this  way ; 
for  we  should  be  equally  at  a  loss  to  form  any  concep- 
tion of  this  "  nature."  We  should  have  a  word,  but 
no  idea.  And  what  is  true  of  this  "  such,"  this 
"  nature,"  is  equally  true  of  the  dynamism  of  the 
physical  world,  so  far  as  any  positive  conception  is 
concerned.  It  is  purely  verbal,  having  a  certain 
formal  correctness,  but  empty  of  concrete  meaning. 
It  must  be  lifted  to  the  plane  of  volitional  causation, 
or  dismissed  altogether  as  fictitious. 

A  reference  to  Kant  will  help  to  make  the  meaning 
clear.  He  claimed  that  the  categories  have  no  appli- 
cation beyond  the  field  of  exj)erience,  actual  or  possi- 
ble, and  that  when  we  apply  them  beyond  this  field 
we  merely  shuffle  empty  abstractions.  In  this  respect 
they  are  like  the  grammatical  forms  of  subject  and 
predicate.  These  are  the  universal  forms  of  speech, 
but  of  themselves  they  say  nothing.  The  subject- 
matter  must  come  from  beyond  them.  When  experi- 
ence is  properly  defined  this  claim  is  strictly  true. 
Indeed,  the  meaning  of  the  categories,  as  metaphysics 
shows,  is  revealed  only  in  the  living  self-experience  of 
intelligence ;  and  here  their  only  concrete  reality  is 
found.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  the  dynamic 
category  of  causation.  It  is  easy  to  talk  about  it; 
and  because  the  category  is  formally  necessary  it  is 
easy  to  fancy  we  have  some  real  conception  in  the 
case.  But  when  we  enter  into  ourselves,  we  find  that 
the  conception  can  be  realized  only  under  the  voli- 


100  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  INTELLIGENT 

tional  form  in  which  we  experience  it.  Apart  from 
this  we  have  only  the  bare  form  of  thought  without  con- 
tents and  without  the  possibihty  of  contents.  We  may 
talk  as  we  will  of  the  "  unpicturable  notions  of  the 
understanding,"  it  still  remains  true  that  these  notions 
which  cannot  be  pictured  in  spatial  forms,  nor  realized 
in  self-experience,  are  simply  illusory  phantoms  and 
not  proper  notions  at  all.  Cause  and  ground  we  must 
have,  but  metaphysics  shows  that  only  active  intelli- 
gence can  be  a  real  cause  or  ground.  The  whole  sys- 
tem of  physical  dynamics,  except  as  a  set  of  formal 
mathematical  relations,  is  empty  of  any  positive  con- 
tent, and  is  pure  illusion.  As  a  consequence  of  this 
commonly  unsuspected  fact,  we  find  physical  specu- 
lators oscillating  between  the  formal  mathematical 
conception,  and  the  abandonment  of  the  whole  sub- 
ject of  physical  causation  as  unknowable. 

In  addition  to  these  logical  oversights  in  atheistic 
reasoning,  we  have  the  metaphysical  assumption 
referred  to  in  speaking  of  the  argument  from  order. 
It  is  tacitly  assumed  that  we  directly  and  undeniably 
know  the  proximate  causes  of  phenomena,  and  know 
them  to  be  material  and  unintelligent.  It  is  further 
assumed  that,  for  the  present  at  least,  these  causes 
run  of  themselves,  and  possibly  always  have  done  so. 
Hence  as  we  know  the  proximate  causes,  and  find 
them  daily  explaining  more  and  more,  when  we  come 
to  any  new  manifestation,  instead  of  going  outside  of 
them  for  a  cause  apart,  we  need  only  enlarge  our 
notion  of  these  causes  themselves.  Be  it  far  from  us 
to  tell  what  matter  can  or  cannot  do.  How  can  we 
learn  what  it  can  do  except  by  observing  what  it  does  ? 


MECHANICAL   EXPLANATION  101 

The  illusion  here  is  double.  We  assume,  first,  that 
we  know  causes  in  immediate  perception,  and,  sec- 
ondly, that  their  nature  is  at  once  mysterious  and 
known.  Mysterious,  because  we  are  going  to  de- 
termine it  by  studying  what  they  do ;  and  known, 
because  the  term  "  matter  "  carries  with  it  certain  im- 
plications which  exclude  intelligence.  Thus,  in  great 
humility  and  self-renunciation,  and  with  an  air  of 
extreme  logical  rigor,  we  build  up  a  scheme  of  thought 
around  a  materialistic  core,  and  fail  to  notice  the  trans- 
parent trick  we  are  playing  upon  ourselves. 

This  assumption  that  the  causes  of  phenomena  are 
immediately  given  we  have  seen  to  be  false.  Causes 
are  not  seen.  Their  nature  is  a  matter  of  specula- 
tive inference.  Again,  we  have  seen  that  even  if  we 
should  find  the  proximate  cause  in  material  elements, 
we  cannot  regard  them  as  independent,  but  must 
view  them  as  dependent  for  all  their  laws  and  prop- 
erties on  an  absolute  world-ground.  We  cannot  rest, 
then,  in  a  system  of  things  interacting  according  to 
mechanical  laws,  but  must  go  behind  the  system  to 
something  which  acts  through  it.  The  mechanical 
system  is  not  ultimate  and  self-sufficient.  It  repre- 
sents only  the  way  in  which  the  world-ground  acts 
or  determines  things  to  act.  If  we  ask  why  it  thus 
acts,  either  we  must  regard  it  as  a  self-directing  in- 
tellect, and  find  the  reason  in  purpose ;  or  we  must 
affirm  some  opaque  necessity  in  the  world-ground 
itself,  and  say,  It  does  what  it  does  because  it  must. 
Of  course  we  do  not  find  the  necessity  when  we  look 
for  it,  but  for  all  that  we  may  assume  it.  And  the 
assumed  necessity  will  of  course  be  adequate,  because 
it  is  the  necessity  of  the  facts  themselves.     We  de- 

THEISM 8 


102         THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

duce  nothing  from  necessity,  but  we  call   the  facts 
necessary ;  and  then  all  is  clear. 

Thus  we  have  illustrated  at  length  and  somewhat 
repetitiously  the  barrenness  and  tautology  of  all  me- 
chanical explanation  of  teleological  problems.     If  one 
should  say,  given  a  multitude  of  elements  of  various 
powers  and  in  complex  relations,  and  in  general  such 
that  they  imply  to  the  minutest  detail  all  they  will 
ever  do,  we  can  then  explain  whatever  they  do,  no 
one  would   think  it  a  very  edifying  or  progressive 
performance.     Similarly,  it  would  not  help  to  much 
insight  to  explain  the  order  of  the  world  by  assuming 
an  impersonal  being  of  such  a  sort  that  by  the  inner 
necessity  of  its  being,  of  which  necessity,  moreover, 
we  could  not  form  the  slightest  conception,  it  must 
do  what  it  does.     Yet  this  is  the  exact  nature  of  all 
mechanical  explanation   which  does   not   appeal   to 
mind.       The    explanation    consists    in    forming    a 
mechanism  to  fit  the  effects,  and  then  drawing  out 
what  we  put  in.     But  when  the  complexity  is  hidden 
by  the    simplicity    of   our   terms,    and   the    implicit 
implications   of   our  first    principles    are   overlooked 
through  the  deceit  of  the  universal,  and  the  vacuous 
nature  of  the  whole  performance  is  concealed  by  our 
uncritical  dogmatism,  then  we  advance  with  the  ut- 
most ease  from  an  indefinite,  incoherent  homogeneity 
to  any  deskable  definite,  coherent  heterogeneity  ac- 
cording to  the  familiar  formula,  —  itself  a  nest  of  con- 
tradictions. 

It  has  long  been  apparent  to  the  critical  reader 
that,  for  the  explanation  of  teleological  problems,  the 
alternative  is  intelligence  or  nothing ;  and  he  might 
well  have  a  feeling  of  impatience  at  a  proposition  to 


EVOLUTION  103 

show  that  the  current  doctrine  of  evolution  has  not 
in  the  least  affected  this  conclusion.  Nevertheless, 
while  this  is  true  in  logic,  it  is  not  the  case  in  popu- 
lar thought;  and  a  paragraph  may  be  devoted  to  this 
matter.  Here  as  elsewhere  confusion  has  been  the 
source  of  error. 

Evolution 

It  is  not  surprising  that  evolution  for  a  time  dis- 
turbed theistic  faith.  Uncritical  minds  tend  to  con- 
fuse a  doctrine  with  a  particular  mode  of  conceiving 
it;  and  when  a  new  conception  is  found  necessary, 
they  think  the  doctrine  itself  gone.  Time  and  further 
reflection  are  needed  to  disengage  the  essential  doc- 
trine from  the  traditional  conception,  to  see  that  a 
new  conception,  may  better  express  the  doctrine  than 
the  old  one,  and  to  adjust  oneself  to  the  new  way  of 
thinking.  All  of  this  found  illustration  in  the  case  of 
evolution.  It  necessitated  a  new  conception  of  the  way 
in  which  purpose  is  realized,  and  this  seemed  to  be  a 
denial  of  purpose.  Again,  as  it  indefinitely  lengthened 
the  time  of  natural  processes,  it  seemed  to  many  to  can- 
cel the  traditional  proofs  of  purpose  altogether :  for, 
as  we  have  already  said,  the  inductive  proofs  of  pur- 
pose consist  largely  in  the  convergence  of  many 
activities  and  agencies  to  a  common  end ;  and  when 
this  convergence  is  slow  and  complex,  we  often  fail 
to  get  any  clear  impression  of  purpose.  But  this  is  a 
result  of  the  brevity  of  life  and  our  short  mental  range. 
In  fact,  a  purpose  moving  faithfully  and  steadily  across 
ages  is  far  more  impressive  than  one  which  is  realized 
in  a  day ;  but  imcritical  thought  only  slowly  appre- 


104         THE  WORLD-GROUND   AS  INTELLIGENT 

ciates  this  fact,  and  hence  much  mental  uncertainty 
and  distress  arose.  In  addition,  the  doctrine  of  evohi- 
tion,  as  popularly  understood,  involved  a  deal  of  bad 
logic  and  metaphysics,  and  was  often  viewed  by  friend 
and  foe  alike  as  a  new  form  of  materialism  and  atheism. 
Fortunately  the  progress  of  reflective  thought  has 
changed  all  this,  and  has  taken  the  doctrine  out  of 
the  region  of  hysteria  and  misunderstanding.  First 
of  all,  it  is  seen  that  evolution  as  a  cosmic  formula  may 
have  two  distinct  meanings.  It  may  be  a  description 
of  the  genesis  and  history  of  the  facts  to  which  it  is 
applied,  and  it  may  be  such  a  description,  plus  a 
theory  of  their  causes.  In  other  words,  it  may  be  a 
description  of  the  order  of  phenomenal  origin  and 
development,  and  it  may  be  a  theory  of  the  meta- 
physical causes  that  underlie  that  development. 
The  former  is  evolution  in  a  scientific  sense;  the 
latter  is  a  metaphysical  doctrine.  In  the  scientific 
sense  evolution  is  neither  a  controlling  law  nor  a 
producing  cause,  but  simply  a  description  of  a  phe- 
nomenal order,  a  statement  of  what,  granting  the 
theory,  an  observer  might  have  seen  if  he  had  been  able 
to  inspect  the  cosmic  movement  from  its  simplest  stages 
until  now.  It  is  a  statement  of  method,  and  is  silent 
about  causation.  And  it  is  plain  that  there  might  be 
entire  unanimity  concerning  evolution  in  this  sense 
along  with  utter  disharmony  in  its  metaphysical 
interpretation.  In  such  cases  we  have,  at  bottom,  not 
a  scientific  difference  but  a  battle  of  philosophies. 
The  theorists  agree  on  the  facts,  but  interpret  them  by 
different  schemes  of  metaphysics.  This  is  the  reason 
why  some  thinkers  find  in  evolution  a  veritable  aid 
to  faith,  while  others  see  in  it  nothing  but  atheism. 


EVOLUTION  105 

In  cruder  thought  the  chief  source  of  confusion  in 
this  matter  was  the  fallacy  of  the  universal.  This 
led  to  all  those  fanciful  reductions  of  the  complex  to 
the  simple  and  evolutions  of  the  simple  into  the  com- 
plex, which  are  so  large  a  part  of  evolution  literature. 
In  the  biological  realm  the  fallacy  wrought  much 
picturesque  confusion.  Here  attention  was  fixed  on 
species  altogether ;  and  as  these  were  said  to  be  trans- 
formed, there  arose  the  fancy  that  earlier  and  lower 
species  produced  the  later  and  higher  ones.  But 
because  the  higher  were  produced  by  the  lower,  they 
were  really  not  higher  after  all,  but  were  essentially 
identical  with  the  lower.  Hence  though  man  came 
from  the  monkey  by  virtue  of  transformation  or 
evolution,  he  was  really  a  species  of  monkey  because 
of  his  simian  origm. 

In  all  this  the  verbal  illusion  is  manifest.  In 
reality  a  species  is  only  a  group  of  more  or  less  simi- 
lar individuals,  and  is  nothing  apart  from  them. 
The  transformation  of  a  species  could  only  mean  the 
production  of  dissimilar  individuals  along  lines  of 
genetic  descent,  thus  forming  a  new  group.  The  sole 
and  simple  fact  in  such  a  case  would  be  that  the 
power  which  produces  individuals  produces  them  in 
such  a  way  that  they  may  be  arranged  on  an  ascend- 
ing scale  of  growing  complexity  and  heterogeneity. 
But  there  would  be  nothing  in  such  a  fact  to  identify 
individuals,  or  higher  and  lower  forms;  it  would 
rather  suggest  the  relativity  of  our  systems  of  classifi- 
cation. Apart  from  our  logical  manipulation,  the 
fact  is  the  individuals  and  the  power  which  produces 
them,  through  the  processes  of  generation,  in  such  a 
way  that  they  admit  of  being  classed  according  to  an 


106         THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

ascending  scale.  All  else  is  the  shadow  of  our  own 
minds.  Metaphysics  locates  the  producing  power  in  the 
world-ground  itself  ;  and  epistemology  shows  that  our 
classifications  produce  nothing.  They  make  no  identi- 
ties and  abolish  no  differences.  To  keep  this  steadily 
in  view  would  reduce  the  doctrine  in  question  to  a  subor- 
dinate significance,  and  would  deprive  it  entu'ely  of  those 
fearful  implications  which  it  has  for  popular  thought. 
The  polemic  against  "  special  creation,"  which  one 
often  meets  in  this  discussion,  and  which  has  become 
a  standing  feature  of  the  debate,  has  its  main  root  in 
the  same  fallacy  of  the  universal.  All  concrete  ex- 
istence is,  and  must  be,  special ;  and  all  creation  of  the 
concrete  must  be  as  special  as  the  product.  Special 
facts  can  be  produced  only  by  correspondingly  special 
acts.  We  may  gather  them  up  in  a  single  class,  but 
they  remain  separate  and  distinct  as  ever.  This  is 
the  necessary  antithesis  of  the  individual  and  the  uni- 
versal. But  by  overlooking  it,  vast  confusion  has 
been  wrought  and  much  barren  polemic  occasioned. 
The  only  thing  which  clear  thought  abhors  is  illogical 
chaos,  things  unrelated,  or  produced  at  random  and 
without  subordination  to  any  plan  for  the  whole. 
Only  in  the  sense  of  the  unrelated  and  unassimilable 
is  thought  opposed  to  "  special  creation."  But  when 
it  comes  to  realizing  the  general  plan  in  a  multitude 
of  concrete  individuals,  coexistent  or  successive,  the 
work  is  possible  only  through  a  multitude  of  acts, 
each  as  specific  and  special  as  its  product.  In  this 
sense  all  individuals  are  special  creations.  A  little 
knowledge  of  the  debate  between  nominalism  and 
realism  would  have  reduced  the  evolution  discussion 
to  very  moderate  dimensions. 


EVOLUTIOX  107 

In  further  illustration  of  this  aspect  of  the  subject, 
consider  the  production  of  a  piece  of  music,  say  a 
symphony.  The  later  parts  are  neither  made  out  of 
the  earlier  parts  nor  produced  by  them ;  but  both 
earlier  and  later  parts  are  subject  to  a  common  musi- 
cal conception  and  law,  and  root  in  a  causality  beyond 
themselves.  If  now  we  should  ask  respecting  any 
particular  note  whether  it  be  a  special  creation  or  not, 
the  answer  must  be  both  yes  and  no,  according  to  the 
standpoint.  It  is  not  a  special  creation  in  the  sense 
of  being  unrelated  and  lawless,  for  each  note  is  sub- 
ject to  the  plan  of  the  whole.  It  is  a  special  creation 
in  the  sense  that,  without  a  purpose  and  activity  in- 
cluding the  special  note,  it  would  not  exist.  Again, 
in  such  a  production,  nothing  would  be  evolved  out  of 
anything,  but  a  musical  conception  would  be  succes- 
sively realized.  The  antecedent  notes  would  not 
imply  the  later  as  their  dynamic  resultants,  but  both 
antecedents  and  consequents  would  be  produced  by 
the  composer  and  player  in  accordance  with  the  idea. 
The  continuity  of  the  performance  would  be  only  in 
the  idea  and  the  will  and  purpose  of  the  performer. 
The  same  conclusions  hold  for  any  conception  of  the 
universe  as  phenomenal.  In  that  case  its  evolution  is 
but  the  successive  manifestation  of  the  causality  be- 
yond the  series  ;  and  the  phases  of  the  evolution  have 
no  dynamic  connection  among  themselves,  any  more 
than  the  successive  musical  notes.  Each,  however,  is, 
or  is  not,  a  special  creation,  according  to  the  stand- 
point. As  subject  to  the  law  of  the  whole,  it  is  not 
special.  As  a  specific  and  concrete  fact,  it  is  special. 
In  the  phenomenal  system,  nothing  is  really  evolved, 
but  an  idea  is  successively  manifested  by  the  succes- 


108  THE    WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

sive  production  of  phenomena  that  have  their  con- 
tinuity and  meaning  only  in  the  power  that  produces 
them. 

These  considerations  show  how  vague  and  uncer- 
tain popular  thought  is  on  this  subject,  and  how  am- 
biguous the  alleged  fact  of  evolution  is.  It  was 
assumed  as  a  matter  of  course  that  the  cosmic  causal- 
ity hes  within  the  cosmic  series,  so  that  the  tem- 
poral antecedent  dynamically  determines  and  produces 
the  temporal  consequent.  This  view  metaphysics 
definitely  sets  aside.  The  causality  of  the  series  lies 
beyond  it ;  and  the  relations  of  the  members  are  logi- 
cal and  teleological,  not  dynamic.  In  that  case  much 
evolution  argument  vanishes  of  itself.  Survivals, 
reversions,  atavisms,  and  that  sort  of  thing  become 
only  figures  of  speech,  which  are  never  to  be  literally 
taken.  In  a  phenomenal  system  these  tilings  can 
literally  exist  as  little  as  they  can  in  a  piece  of  music ; 
for  in  such  a  system  only  laws  and  ideas  abide.  We 
may  be  puzzled  by  them  when  we  attempt  to  classify 
things  to  our  satisfaction ;  but  we  are  not  permitted 
to  talk  nonsense  to  escape  being  puzzled. 

But  not  to  press  these  scruples,  the  important  point 
in  the  evolution  discussion  concerns  the  nature  of 
the  individuals  and  the  power  that  produces  them. 
Many  difficulties  vanish  as  soon  as  we  recall  the 
nominalism  of  the  doctrine.  Questions  concerning 
the  limits  of  evolution  lose  all  significance  when  we 
remember  that  in  any  case  evolution  does  nothing 
but  is  only  a  name  for  a  form  of  procedure.  To  make 
it  more  is  to  hypostasize  words  and  abstractions,  or 
to  mistake  the  order  of  doing  for  the  agent  itself. 

Returning  now  to  the  general  question,  it  is  mani- 


EVOLUTION  109 

fest  that  theism  has  no  interest  in  one  method  or 
order  of  production  rather  than  another,  provided 
always  the  facts  are  duly  regarded.  It  is  satisfied  to 
maintain  divine  causality  and  leave  experience  to  find 
the  method  of  procedure.  It  is  concerned,  therefore, 
not  with  evolution  in  the  scientific  sense,  but  only 
with  evolution  as  a  theory  of  causality.  In  this 
sense  evolution  is  simply  a  piece  of  bad  metaphysics 
produced  by  bad  logic.  All  that  we  have  said  about 
the  barrenness  of  mechanism  in  general  applies  here. 
We  can  reach  neither  the  one  from  the  many  nor  the 
many  from  the  one,  neither  the  high  from  the  low 
nor  the  low  from  the  high,  neither  the  indefinite  from 
the  definite  nor  the  definite  from  the  indefinite.  If 
we  seem  to  do  so,  we  merely  fall  a  prey  to  the  fallacy 
of  the  universal,  and  mistake  the  simplifications  of 
logical  manipulation  for  the  order  of  concrete  fact. 
Free  intelligence  is  the  condition  of  any  real  progress ; 
and  progress  itself,  if  it  be  anything  more  than  a 
meaningless  stir  of  the  world-substance,  cannot  be 
defined  without  reference  to  teleology.  Apart  from 
free  intelligence  as  the  source  of  the  world-movement, 
we  can  only  talk  cloudily  about  potentialities,  without 
any  possibility  of  concretely  representing  our  mean- 
ing. When  thought  is  clear,  it  is  plain  that  evolution, 
while  modifying  our  conceptions  of  the  method  and 
history  of  creation,  leaves  the  argument  for  purpose 
in  nature  just  where  and  what  it  always  has  been. 
Least  of  all  does  it  make  it  possible  to  equate  time, 
however  long,  with  intelligence.  The  complete  deter- 
mination of  every  thing  and  event  in  a  mechanical 
system,  and  the  necessary  logical  equivalence  of  cause 
and  effect  in  such  a  system,  forbid  this  notion  forever. 


110         THE   WORLD-GROUND  AS   INTELLIGENT 

Intelligence  is  still  the  only  explanation  of  the  appar- 
ent teleology  of  the  world.  Of  course  that  evolution 
of  popular  thought,  religious  and  irreligious  alike, 
according  to  which  something,  which  was  not  much 
of  anything,  began  to  evolve  through  differentiation 
and  integration,  etc.,  is  sheer  confusion  and  illiteracy. 
It  closely  resembles  reliance  on  "  that  blessed  word 
Mesopotamia." 

The  "  As  If  "  Objection 

The  second  general  objection  was,  that  the  fact 
that  the  world-ground  proceeds  as  if  it  had  aims  does 
not  prove  that  it  really  has  them.  We  have  in  this 
objection  a  relic  of  the  ancient  fancy  that  atheism  is 
sufficiently  established  by  disputing  theism.  Let  us 
allow  that  the  fact  that  the  world-ground  proceeds  as 
if  it  had  purposes  does  not  prove  that  it  really  has 
them ;  it  is  still  clear  that  this  fact  is  even  farther 
from  proving  that  it  does  not  have  them. 

To  the  general  objection  a  first  reply  must  be  that 
all  objective  knowledge  is  based  on  an  "  as  if."  Not 
to  refer  to  the  scruples  of  idealism  concerning  the  ob- 
jects of  perception,  the  whole  of  objective  science  is 
based  on  a  certain  assumed  truth  of  appearances.  We 
do  not  know  that  there  is  an  ether,  but  only  that 
optical  phenomena  look  as  if  there  were.  We  do  not 
know  that  atoms  exist,  but  only  that  material  phe- 
nomena look  as  if  they  did.  We  do  not  know  that  the 
fire  rocks  were  ever  molten,  but  only  that  they  look 
as  if  they  had  been.  We  do  not  know  that  the  sedi- 
mentary rocks  were  ever  deposited  from  water,  but 
only  that  they  look  so.     That  the  present  land  was 


THE   "AS   IF"   OBJECTION  111 

once  under  the  sea  is  not  known,  but  only  a  belief 
resting  on  certain  appearances.  But  none  of  these 
conclusions  could  stand  a  minute  if  the  principle  of 
this  objection  were  allowed.  If  the  nature  of  things 
can  produce  the  appearance  of  intelligence  without 
its  presence,  it  ought  to  be  able  to  mimic  igneous  and 
aqueous  action  without  the  aid  of  either  fire  or  water. 
If  the  hypothetical  necessity  of  the  system  is  compe- 
tent to  bring  organic  matter  into  a  living  form,  it 
could  certainly  produce  a  fossil  imitation  at  first  hand ; 
or,  better,  if  the  nature  of  things  includes  the  produc- 
tion of  living  forms,  it  might  also  include  the  direct 
production  of  fossils.  We  cannot,  then,  conclude 
anything  from  fossil  remains  concerning  the  past 
history  of  our  system ;  for  this  would  be  to  conclude 
from  an  "as  if " ;  and  this  is  forbidden.  If  one 
should  say,  "  Well,  how  did  they  get  there,  anyhow  ? " 
the  answer  would  be  that  they  are  there  because  they 
must  be  there,  and  that  no  more  can  be  said.  If  the 
questioner  persisted,  we  should  say  that  it  is  the  height 
of  absurdity  to  insist  that  things  can  be  explained  in 
only  one  way.  Possibilities  are  infinite ;  and  of  these 
we  can  conceive  only  one ;  but  it  must  be  viewed  as 
infinitely  improbable  that  our  little  way  of  accounting 
for  things  is  the  way  of  the  universe  itself.  It  is, 
then,  unspeakably  rash  to  infer  anything  beyond  what 
we  see.  It  is  curious  that  this  argument  should  seem 
so  profound,  so  judicious,  so  indicative  of  mental 
integrity  when  applied  to  theistic  problems,  and  so 
unsatisfactory  elsewhere.  Without  waiting  to  solve 
this  psychological  and  logical  puzzle,  we  point  out 
that  the  theistic  "  as  if  "  is  as  good  as  the  scientific  "  as 
if."     We  cannot  reject  the  one  and  retain  the  other. 


112  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  INTELLIGENT 

But  we  are  not  yet  clear  of  the  "  as  if."  In  general 
we  know  what  a  force  is  only  by  observing  what  it 
does.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  mind,  which 
is  never  seen  in  itself,  but  only  in  its  effects.  And 
this  is  true  not  only  of  the  divine  mind,  but  of  the 
human  mind  as  well.  A  mistake  that  flows  directly 
from  our  general  bondage  to  the  senses  leads  us  to 
fancy  that  we  see  our  neighbors'  minds ;  and  it  has 
generally  been  argued  against  theism  that  we  see 
mind  in  man,  but  none  in  nature.  This  claim  the 
rudiments  of  psychology  dispel.  We  know  that  our 
fellow-beings  have  minds  only  because  they  act  as  if 
they  had ;  that  is,  because  their  action  shows  order 
and  purpose.  In  short,  the  argument  for  objective 
intelligence  is  the  same  whether  for  man,  animals,  or 
God.  But  no  one  will  claim  that  the  system  of  things 
shows  less  order  and  purpose  than  human  action. 
If,  then,  we  deny  mind  in  nature  because  we  have 
only  an  "  as  if  "  to  reason  from,  we  must  deny  it  also 
in  man ;  for  an  "  as  if "  is  all  we  have  here.  And 
yet  we  are  wonderfully  ready  to  find  objective  intelli- 
gence, if  only  it  is  not  referred  to  God.  The  scantiest 
marks  prove  the  presence  of  intellect  in  man  and 
brute,  or  in  human  and  brute  action ;  but  nothing 
proves  intelligence  back  of  nature.  The  ground  of 
this  queer  logic  must  be  sought  in  a  profound  study 
of  the  philosophy  of  prejudice  and  confusion. 

The  point  just  dwelt  upon  deserves  further  notice. 
The  belief  in  personal  coexistence  has  never  been 
questioned  by  the  extremest  idealists  ;  and  we  find  it 
in  full  strength  in  our  earliest  years.  To  explain 
this  fact  some  have  called  it  an  instinct,  while  others 
have  preferred   the    more    distinguished  title  of  an 


THE   "AS   IF"   OBJECTION  113 

intuition.  And  there  are  the  best  of  reasons  why 
this  belief  should  be  made  an  absolute  certainty  in 
advance  of  all  argument,  and  even  against  it.  The 
certainty  of  personal  coexistence  constitutes  the  chief 
condition  of  a  moral  activity ;  and  if  it  were  in  any 
way  weakened,  the  most  hideous  results  might  fol- 
low. Nevertheless,  the  logical  ground  of  the  belief 
consists  entirely  in  the  fact  that  our  neighbors  act  as 
if  they  were  intelligent.  And  upon  reflection  one 
must  confess  that  the  activities  from  which  we 
infer  intelligence  are  not  very  striking,  but  rather 
such  as  the  organism  might  well  execute  of  itself. 
Human  movements  look  intelligent  only  because  we 
have  the  key  in  ourselves.  When  considered  in  ab- 
straction from  personality  they  seem  almost  grotesque 
in  their  insignificance.  And  in  all  of  these  cases, 
even  in  the  use  of  speech,  if  we  should  study  the 
effect,  which  is  always  some  form  of  ph3^sical  move- 
ment, we  should  doubtless  find  a  physical  explana- 
tion. In  the  case  of  speech  we  should  find  no  thought 
in  the  effect ;  that  would  be  an  addition  of  our  own. 
We  have  simply  vibrating  air,  which  can  be  traced 
to  vibrating  membranes,  which  in  turn  are  set  in 
motion  by  currents  of  air ;  and  these  are  forced  along 
by  the  contraction  of  muscles  producing  a  contraction 
of  the  thorax.  If  we  care  to  pursue  it  further,  we 
soon  lose  ourselves  in  the  mystery  of  nervous  cur- 
rents, and  the  subject  escapes  us.  Nowhere  in 
the  series  do  we  come  in  sight  of  a  mind.  We 
have,  to  be  sure,  an  outcome  which  happens  to  be 
intelligible ;  but  the  atheist  has  instructed  us  that 
intelligibility  in  the  outcome  is  far  enough  from  prov- 
ing an  intelligent  cause.     Besides,  the  outcome,  so 


114         THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT 

far  as  we  can  trace  it,  has  a  purely  mechanical  ex- 
planation, and  need  be  referred  to  no  mind.  It 
would  be  a  highly  suspicious  circumstance  and  a 
grave  infraction  of  the  law  of  continuity  to  conclude 
that  a  series  which  is  physical  so  far  as  we  can  trace 
it,  becomes  something  else  where  we  cannot  trace  it ! 
It  has  been  customary  to  say  that  we  know  that 
watches  are  designed,  but  not  that  eyes  are  designed. 
This  is  a  mistake.  In  the  case  of  a  watchmaker  we 
do  not  see  the  workman  any  more  than  in  the  case 
of  the  eye.  We  see  only  a  physical  organism  in  com- 
plex interaction  with  surrounding  matter,  and  we  see 
that  the  work  goes  on  as  if  for  an  end ;  but  we  see 
nothing  more.  The  living,  thinking  workman  is  an 
inference  from  an  "as  if."  But  in  nature,  too,  the 
work  goes  on  as  if  for  an  end ;  and  the  "  as-ifness  "  is 
at  least  as  marked  as  in  the  former  case.  If,  then, 
watches  point  to  an  unseen  workman  who  knows 
what  he  is  doing,  nature  also  points  to  an  unseen 
workman  who  knows  what  he  is  doing.  Any  doubt 
of  the  one  must  extend  to  the  other.  But  if  we  may 
be  practically  sure  of  our  neighbors'  intelligence,  and 
that  because  they  act  intelligently,  we  may  be  sure 
that  the  world-ground  is  intelligent  for  the  same 
reason. 

But  we  must  go  a  step  further.  The  last  para- 
graph showed  that  the  same  argument  which  dis- 
credits mind  in  nature  throws  equal  doubt  upon  mind 
in  man.  And  fm-ther  reflection  shows  that  if  there 
be  no  controlling  mind  in  nature  there  can  be  no  con- 
trolling mind  in  man.  For  if  the  basal  power  is 
blind  and  necessary,  all  that  depends  upon  it  is  neces- 
sitated also.     In  that  case  all  unfolding  is  driven  from 


THE   "  AS   IF  "   OBJECTION  116 

behind,  and  nothing  is  led  from  before.  Thought  and 
feeling  also  come  within  this  necessary  unfolding. 
As  such  they  are  products,  not  causes.  The  basal 
necessity  controls  them  in  every  respect,  yet  without 
being  in  any  sense  determined  by  them.  Thought 
as  thought  counts  for  nothing.  The  line  of  power  is 
through  the  mechanical  antecedents  that  condition 
thought,  and  not  through  the  thought  itself.  Hence 
any  fancy  of  self-control  we  may  have  must  be  dis- 
missed as  delusive.  Human  life  and  history,  then, 
express  no  mind  or  purpose,  but  only  the  process  of 
the  all-embracing  necessity.  Thought  and  purpose 
may  have  been  there  as  subjective  states ;  but  they 
must  be  put  outside  of  the  dynamic  sequence  of 
events,  and  be  made  a  kind  of  halo  which,  as  a 
shadow,  attends  without  affecting  the  cosmic  move- 
ment. Indeed,  so  far  from  solving,  thought  rather 
complicates  the  problem.  It  offers  no  guidance,  and 
is  so  much  more  to  be  accounted  for.  The  basal 
necessity  has  not  only  to  produce  the  physical  move- 
ments and  groupings  which  we  mistakenly  ascribe  to 
intelligence,  but  it  has  also  to  produce  the  illusion  of 
conscious  thought  and  self-control.  This  extremely 
difficult  and  delicate  task  is  escaped  by  denying  the 
human  mind  outright ;  and  this  is  not  difficult,  as  we 
affirm  objective  mind  only  from  the  conviction  that 
its  guidance  is  necessary.  When  this  conviction  is 
lacking,  there  is  no  ground  for  affirming  objective 
thought. 

The  claim,  then,  that  we  know  watches  are  de- 
signed, but  do  not  know  that  eyes  are  designed, 
appears  to  be  doubly  untenable.  First,  we  have  the 
same  proof  that  eyes  are  designed  that  we  have  that 


IIG         THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  INTELLIGENT 

watches  are  designed ;  and  second,  if  eyes  are  not 
designed,  then  watches  are  not  designed.  Both  alike 
result  from  necessity,  and  if  any  thought  attends  the 
process,  it  does  not  affect  it. 

The  truth  is,  the  design  argument  derives  its  force 
from  the  consciousness  of  our  own  free  effort.  We  find 
that  combinations  for  ends  arise  in  our  experience  only 
as  they  first  exist  in  conception,  and  are  then  made 
the  norms  of  our  action.  And  wherever  we  find 
combination  apparently  for  ends,  we  at  once  supply 
the  preexistent  conception  and  the  self-determination 
which  experience  has  shown  to  be  its  invariable  con- 
dition. We  have  already  seen  that  in  a  system  of 
necessity,  teleological  questions  can  never  be  answered ; 
it  is  further  plain  that  in  such  a  system  they  could 
never  logically  arise.  Such  questions  imply  that 
things  might  have  been  otherwise,  and  hence  involve 
a  denial  of  the  complete  determination  of  all  exist- 
ence. When  such  determination  is  consciously  af- 
firmed, to  ask  why  anything  is  as  it  is,  is  like  asking 
why  a  straight  line  is  the  shortest  distance  between 
two  points.  Spinoza  is  the  only  leading  necessitarian 
who  has  clearly  seen  the  opposition  between  necessity 
and  teleology.  Most  necessitarians  have  oscillated 
between  this  insight  and  attempts  at  mechanical  ex- 
planation which  should  satisfy  the  teleological  crav- 
ing. This  inconsequence  would  seem  to  show  that 
the  cosmic  necessity  itself  is  somewhat  illogical.  In 
treating  of  the  mechanical  objection  we  found  that  it 
is  barren  at  best  and  leads  to  no  insight.  We  now 
see  that  the  principles  of  this  argument  w^ien  carried 
out  end  in  skepticism  and  denial  of  the  human  mind 
as  well  as  of  the  divine  mind. 


THE   "AS  IF"   OBJECTION  117 

This  result  shows  once  more  the  superficiality  of 
the  whole  scheme  of  naturalistic  thought  on  which 
atheism  rests.  When  thought  is  shallow  and  criti- 
cism asleep,  it  is  easy  to  take  spatial  and  temporal 
phenomena  as  self-sufficient  facts  revealed  by  the 
senses  and  beyond  all  question.  Then  it  is  gravely 
announced  that  "  Nature "  knows  nothing  of  mind 
and  purpose,  and  goes  its  own  mechanical  way.  It 
somewhat  relieves  our  dismay  to  perceive  that 
"  Nature,"  in  this  sense,  knows  as  little  of  man  as  it 
does  of  God  —  a  fact  which  reduces  the  argument  to 
harmlessness,  except  in  cases  where  the  naturalistic 
obsession  has  made  critical  thought  impossible.  Our 
relief  is  completed  by  the  further  discovery  that  this 
"  Nature  "  itself  is  a  fiction,  an  idol  of  the  sense  den. 

The  third  general  objection,  that  the  difference 
between  human  action  and  cosmic  action  is  too  great 
to  allow  any  conclusion  from  one  to  the  other,  is  only 
a  verbal  intimidation.  All  knowing  presupposes  some- 
thing universal  in  human  intelligence,  and  the  validity 
of  the  laws  of  our  intelligence  for  all  cosmic  reality. 
But  it  is  easy  to  overlook  this  fact  and  to  seek  to 
measure  intellect  by  its  physical  attendants.  Of  course 
the  human  body  and  our  earth  itself  are  vanishing 
quantities  compared  with  the  great  stellar  masses,  and 
the  conclusion  is  drawn  that  the  mind  must  abandon 
its  rational  nature  in  the  face  of  physical  vastness. 
Only  passive  minds  will  be  affected  by  such  considera- 
tions. The  objection,  such  as  it  is,  lies  against  the 
theory  of  knowledge,  and  only  indirectly  against 
theism.  Epistemology,  when  it  understands  itself, 
must  assume  the  validity  of  thought  for  the  entire 


118         THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

universe,  and  theism  is  only  an  implication  of  this 
assmnption.  Theism  argues  from  intelligible  effects 
to  an  intelligent  cause.  The  rational  and  intelligible 
work  is  referred  to  reason  and  intelligence.  Size  has 
no  bearing  on  the  validity  of  this  inference.  Mere 
bigness  in  space  or  time  has  nothing  in  it  to  change 
the  laws  of  logic.  As  well  might  we  suppose  that  the 
laws  of  number  are  valid  for  small  numbers  but  are 
overawed  by  large  ones.  The  suggestion  that  we  have 
a  knowledge  in  objective  human  action  which  we  do 
not  have  in  cosmic  action  is  mistaken.  The  further 
demurrer  that  while  intelligibility  in  human  action 
points  to  intelligence,  intelligibility  in  cosmic  action 
does  not  point  to  intelligence,  is  an  act  of  caprice,  not 
of  reason.  If  it  be  further  suggested  that  there  may 
be  untold  transcendental  possibilities,  any  one  of  which 
might  produce  the  effects,  this  is  only  to  return  to  the 
unreason  of  abandoning  reason  in  order  to  revel  in 
inarticulate  imaginings,  none  of  which  can  be  con- 
structed in  thought. 

As  a  result  of  all  these  considerations,  we  hold  that 
the  design  argument,  when  the  unity  of  the  world- 
ground  is  given,  proves  far  more  conclusively  the 
existence  of  mind  in  natiu-e  than  it  does  the  existence 
of  mind  in  man.     The  two  stand  or  fall  together. 

Whether  the  purpose-like  combinations  and  proc- 
esses of  nature  constitute  a  problem  for  which  we 
are  justified  in  seeking  a  solution,  every  one  must 
decide  for  himself.  We  claim  only  that  if  we  are 
allowed  to  seek  a  solution  we  can  find  it  only  in  intel- 
ligence. The  appeal  to  chance  is  vacated  by  all  the 
principles  of  rational  thinking.  The  explanation  by 
law  and  mechanism  is  tautological.     The  atheistic 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM  FINITE   INTELLIGENCE      119 

solution  has  no  positive  value  whatever.  It  dis- 
appears into  nothingness  when  critically  examined,  as 
bubbles  when  they  are  touched.  The  only  possible 
question  concerns  the  source  of  the  illusion ;  and  this 
we  have  answered  already.  We  erect  matter  into 
something  self-sufficient.  We  next  furnish  it  with 
various  forces.  In  this  way  the  being  and  causality 
of  the  universe  are  provided  for.  We  next  find  a 
principle  of  order  in  the  notion  of  law,  and  nothing 
more  seems  needed.  By  the  help  of  the  fallacy  of 
the  universal  we  reduce  the  system  to  very  low  and 
simple  terms,  so  that  we  do  not  seem  to  be  assuming 
the  entire  problem  from  the  start ;  and  then,  by  turn- 
ing loose  the  terminology  of  evolution,  we  cause  the 
system  to  evolve  to  order.  Thus  the  reign  of  matter, 
force,  and  law,  is  set  in  antithesis  to  the  reign  of  mind ; 
^nd  the  realm  of  the  former  is  ever  growing.  Mind 
at  best  is  only  a  provisional  hypothesis  to  explain 
what  the  undoubted  reality,  matter  and  force,  does  not 
yet  account  for ;  and  as  it  daily  accounts  for  more  and 
more,  mind  is  less  and  less  necessary.  The  limit  of 
this  movement  must  be  to  make  matter  and  force  aU 
sufficient,  so  that  science  will  at  last  fulfill  Comte's 
prediction  and  conduct  God  to  the  frontier  and  bow 
him  out  with  thanks  for  his  provisional  services. 
This  is  the  natural  history  of  popular  atheism. 


The  Argument  feom  Finite  Intelligence 

The  third  inductive  argument  for  the  intelligence 
of  the  world-ground  is  based  on  the  existence  of 
finite  intelligence,   or,    more  specifically,  of    human 


120         THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  INTELLIGENT 

intelligence.      This  forms  an  additional  problem,  and 
there  is  no  solution  except  in  cosmic  intelligence. 

There  has  been  a  very  general  oversight  of  this 
problem  by  atheistic  reasoners,  or  at  least  a  failure 
to  discern  its  deep  significance.  The  speculator,  in 
curious  self-forgetfulness,  fixes  his  thought  on  the 
physical  system  and  forgets  himself.  He  assumes  a 
monopoly  of  intellect  in  the  universe  and  forgets  that 
this  rare  and  lonely  endowment  must  still  have  its 
roots  in  the  universe.  For  man  and  mind  are  a  part 
and  outcome  of  the  universe,  and  any  explanation 
which  left  them  out  would  miss  one  of  its  greatest 
wonders.  The  problem  then  arises  how  to  deduce 
the  conscious  from  the  unconscious,  the  intelligent 
from  the  non-intelligent,  the  piurposive  from  the  non- 
purposive,  and  freedom  from  necessity.  But  psy- 
chology shows  the  hopelessness  of  such  a  task.  There 
is  absolutely  no  thoroughfare  here  except  a  verbal  one, 
no  analysis  of  unconscious  things  or  processes  reveals 
that,  at  a  certain  point  or  phase  of  complication,  con- 
sciousness and  thought  must  emerge.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  more  clearly  we  conceive  physical  elements 
or  processes,  the  more  clearly  we  perceive  the  im- 
possibility of  such  a  transition.  This  insight  has  led 
to  the  modern  device  of  a  double-faced  substance. 
This  view,  while  stopping  short  of  affirming  an 
independent  creative  intelligence,  does  still  insist 
upon  intelligence  as  one  of  the  original  factors  of  the 
world-ground.  Both  the  metaphysics  and  logic  of 
this  view  are  somewhat  open  to  suspicion,  but  it  is 
correct  in  concluding  that  there  is  no  way  from  non- 
intelligence  to  intelligence.  Only  verbal  transits  are 
possible. 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM   FINITE   INTELLIGENCE      121 

And  this  is  only  the  beginning  of  the  difficulty. 
If  we  should  suppose  the  qualitative  gulf  between 
material  mechanism  and  mentality  transcended,  we 
should  still  have  to  provide  for  knowledge  and  its 
complex  processes.  We  should  have  to  produce  not 
merely  mental  states,  but  true  thoughts ;  that  is, 
thoughts  which  rightly  reproduce  the  physical  environ- 
ment; and  then,  in  addition,  we  should  have  the 
problem  of  error  on  our  hands.  So  far  as  atheistic 
reasoners  have  considered  this  subject  at  all,  they 
have  generally  been  content  with  affirming  some 
ground  for  sentiency  in  the  physical  system,  and 
falling  back  on  sensationalism  for  the  rest.  But  this 
is  worse  than  a  broken  reed ;  for  epistemology  shows 
that  sensationalism  is  inadequate  to  the  work  assigned 
it,  and  that  it  destroys  the  physical  foundations  of 
atheism  altogether.  For  the  present  we  forbear  to 
press  these  difficulties. 

Apart  from  the  impassable  gulf  between  the 
assumed  cause  and  the  alleged  effect  which  psychology 
reveals  at  this  point,  a  peculiar  logical  difficulty 
emerges  from  the  necessity  in  a  mechanical  system 
of  assimilating  either  the  effects  to  the  cause  or  the 
cause  to  the  effects ;  and  in  either  case  the  doctrine 
is  in  unstable  equilibrium.  For  if  everything  is  to 
be  mechanically  explained,  then  human  life,  thought, 
and  action  must  be  phases  of  the  all-embracing  ne- 
cessity. But  man  can  form  purposes  and  determine 
himself  accordingly.  Hence  it  follows  that  in  the 
department  of  human  life,  at  least,  the  cosmic  mech- 
anism does  form  purposes  and  execute  them.  Here 
design  actually  appears  as  real  and  controlling. 
Hence,  by  the  necessity  of   including   man,  we  are 


122         THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  INTELLIGENT 

forced  to  admit  that  the  cosmic  mechanism  is  not 
incompatible  with  purpose.  But  if  it  act  purposely 
in  the  human  realm,  there  is  no  theoretical  objection 
to  admitting  that  it  acts  purposely  in  the  physical 
realm  if  the  facts  call  for  it.  The  only  escape  from 
this  conclusion  is  to  deny  our  consciousness  that  pur- 
pose rules  at  all  in  our  mental  life.  But  as  long  as  this 
is  allowed,  the  so-called  cosmic  mechanism  must  be 
viewed  as  one  which  can  form  plans  and  determine 
itself  for  their  execution  ;  that  is,  it  must  be  what  we 
mean  by  mind.  The  alternative,  as  we  shall  see,  is 
to  wreck  knowledge  in  skepticism. 

The  problem  of  order  and  the  problem  of  teleology 
we  found  to  be  insoluble  on  atheistic  principles.  The 
problem  of  finite  intelligence  is  now  seen  to  be  equally 
insoluble  for  atheism. 

Popular  thought  about  theism,  we  have  said,  moves 
on  the  inductive  plane,  and  with  the  general  aim  of 
explanation.  That  is,  it  aims  to  give  some  rational  ac- 
count of  things  in  which  the  mind  can  rest.  Popular 
theism  maintains  that  the  facts  of  experience  cannot  be 
explained  without  affirming  intelligence  in  the  world- 
ground.  Popular  atheism,  on  the  other  hand,  main- 
tains that  the  facts  may  well  be  explained  otherwise. 
This  latter  claim  is  baseless.  It  rests  upon  verbal 
illusions  and  on  ignorance  both  of  logical  principles 
and  of  the  problems  to  be  solved.  When  the  questions 
are  cleared  up  so  as  to  be  seen  in  their  true  nature, 
the  atheistic  argument  vanishes  into  nothingness.  In 
so  far,  then,  as  the  discussion  aims  at  reaching  an  ex- 
planation of  the  world,  the  decision  must  be  in  favor 
of  theism. 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM   EPISTEMOLOGY  123 


The  Argument  from  Epistemology 

The  arguments  previously  outlined  proceed  on  the 
basis  of  common-sense  realism.  Knowledge  is  taken 
for  granted,  and  the  substantial  existence  of  a  system 
of  material  things  is  assumed  as  a  matter  of  course. 
There  is  no  knowledge  of  the  rational  implications 
of  epistemology,  and  no  suspicion  of  the  doubt  which 
metaphysics  throws  upon  the  very  existence  of  the 
things  upon  which  atheism  relies.  Popular  thought 
is  inaccessible  to  considerations  of  this  kind,  and 
hence  we  have  dealt  thus  far  with  the  more  familiar 
arguments.  But  from  a  logical  standpoint  the  most 
effective  theistic  argument  lies  in  this  more  abstract 
and  speculative  field.    We  proceed  to  its  development. 

And  first  we  call  attention  to  a  negative  aspect  of 
the  question,  the  suicidal  bearing  of  atheism  on  the 
problem  of  knowledge.  It  is  to  be  shown  that  athe- 
ism and  all  systems  of  necessity  destroy  the  trus1> 
worthiness  of  reason,  which  is  the  presupposition  of  all 
speculation,  and  are  hence  self -condemned.  We  argue 
as  follows  :  — 

Beliefs  can  be  viewed  in  two  ways  :  as  produced  by 
causes,  or  as  deduced  from  grounds.  That  is,  beliefs 
may  be  merely  mental  events  due  to  certain  psycho- 
logical antecedents,  or  they  may  be  logical  convic- 
tions which  rest  on  logical  grounds.  The  distinction 
of  rational  from  irrational  beliefs  is  that  the  former 
have  grounds  which  justify  them,  while  the  latter  are 
only  effects  in  us,  deposits  of  habit,  prejudice,  tradi- 
tion, caprice,  etc.  They  have  their  sufficient  psycho- 
logical causes,  but  have  no  justifying  rational  grounds. 


124  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  INTELLIGENT 

Now  every  system  of  necessity  cancels  this  distinction. 
It  gives  us  causes,  but  removes  the  grounds,  of  belief. 
The  proof  is  as  follows  :  — 

In  every  mechanical  doctrine  of  mbid  there  are  no 
mental  acts,  but  only  psychological  occurrences.  Even 
the  drawing  of  a  conclusion  is  not  an  act  of  the  mind, 
but  an  occurrence  in  the  mind.  The  conclusion  is 
not  justified  by  its  antecedent  reasons,  but  is  coerced 
by  its  psychological  antecedents.  If  we  deny  the 
substantiality  of  mind,  the  conclusion  is  only  the  men- 
tal symbol  of  a  certain  state  of  the  physical  mechan- 
ism. If  we  allow  the  mind  to  be  real,  but  subject  to 
necessity,  then  the  conclusion  is  but  the  resultant  of 
the  preceding  mental  states.  In  both  cases  we  must 
replace  the  free,  self-centered  activity  of  reason  by  a 
physical  or  mental  mechanism  which  determines  all 
our  ideas  and  their  conjunctions.  This  determination 
takes  on  in  consciousness  the  appearance  of  reflection, 
reasoning,  concluding,  etc.,  but  these  are  only  the 
illusive  symbols  in  consciousness  of  a  mechanical  pro- 
cess below  it.  Nothing,  then,  depends  on  reason,  but 
only  on  the  physical  or  mental  states ;  and  these,  for 
all  we  know,  might  become  anything  whatever  with 
the  result  of  changing  the  conclusion  to  any  other 
whatever.  But  this  view  is  the  extreme  of  skepticism. 
Beliefs  sink  into  effects  ;  and  one  is  as  good  as  an- 
other while  it  lasts.  The  coming  or  going  of  a  belief 
does  not  depend  upon  its  rationality,  but  only  on  the 
relative  strength  of  the  corresponding  antecedents. 
But  this  strength  is  a  fact,  not  a  truth.  When  a 
given  element  displaces  another  in  a  chemical  com- 
pound, it  is  not  truer  than  that  other,  but  stronger.  So 
when  a  psychical  element  displaces  another  in  a  men- 


THE  ARGUMENT   FROM   EPISTEMOLOGY  I'Jo 

tal  combination,  not  truth,  but  strength,  is  in  ques- 
tion. On  the  plane  of  cause  and  effect,  truth  and 
error  are  meaningless  distinctions.  Proper  rationality 
is  possible  only  to  freedom ;  and  here  truth  and  error 
first  acquire  significance.  The  rational  mind  must 
not  be  controlled  by  its  states,  but  must  control 
them.  It  must  be  able  to  stand  apart  from  its  ideas 
and  test  them.  It  must  be  able  to  resist  the  influ- 
ence of  habit  and  association,  and  to  undo  the  irra- 
tional conjunctions  of  custom.  It  must  also  be  able 
to  think  twice,  or  to  reserve  its  conclusion  until  the 
inner  order  of  reason  has  been  reached.  Unless  it 
can  do  this,  all  beliefs  sink  into  effects,  and  the  dis- 
tinction of  rational  and  irrational,  of  truth  and  error, 
vanishes. 

We  reach  the  same  conclusion  from  another  stand- 
point. No  system  of  necessity  has  any  standard  of 
distinction  between  truth  and  error.  If  all  beliefs  are 
not  true,  and  as  contradictory  they  cannot  be,  it  fol- 
lows that  error  is  a  fact.  But  how  can  error  be 
admitted  without  canceling  truth?  On  the  one 
hand,  we  must  admit  that  our  faculties  are  made  for 
truth,  and  that  we  cannot  by  volition  change  truth. 
On  the  other,  we  cannot  allow  that  we  are  shut  up  by 
necessity  to  error,  as  then  our  faculties  would  be  es- 
sentially untrustworthy.  This  difficulty  can  be 
resolved  only  in  the  notion  of  freedom.  If  we  have 
faculties  which  are  truthful,  but  which  may  be  care- 
lessly used  or  willfully  misused,  we  can  explain  error 
without  compromising  truth  ;  but  not  otherwise.  If 
truth  and  error  be  alike  necessary,  there  is  no  stand- 
ard of  truth  left.  If  we  make  the  majority  the 
standard,  what  shall  assure    us  that  the  majority  is 


126  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

right?  And  who  knows  that  the  majority  will  al- 
ways hold  the  same  views  ?  Opinions  have  changed 
in  the  past,  why  not  in  the  future  ?  There  is  no 
rational  standard  left,  and  no  power  to  use  it  if  there 
were.  We  cannot  determine  our  thoughts ;  they 
come  and  go  as  the  independent  necessity  determines. 
If  there  were  any  reason  left,  the  only  conclusion  it 
could  draw  would  be  that  knowledge  is  utterly  impos- 
sible, and  that  its  place  must  be  swallowed  up  by  an 
overwhelming  skepticism. 

The  bearing  of  this  upon  theism  is  plain.  There 
can  be  no  rationality,  and  hence  no  knowledge,  upon 
any  system  of  necessity.  Atheism  is  such  a  system, 
and  hence  is  suicidal.  It  must  flout  consciousness, 
discredit  reason,  and  end  by  dragging  the  whole 
structure  of  thought  and  life  down  into  hopeless  ruin. 
Rationality  demands  freedom  in  the  finite  knower; 
and  this,  in  turn,  is  incompatible  with  necessity  in  the 
world-ground.  This  freedom  does  not,  indeed,  imply 
the  power  on  the  part  of  the  mind  to  coerce  its 
conclusions,  but  only  to  rule  itself  according  to  pre- 
conceived standards.  Pure  arbitrariness  and  pure 
necessity  are  alike  incompatible  with  reason.  There 
must  be  a  law  of  reason  in  the  mind  with  which  voli- 
tion cannot  tamper ;  and  there  must  also  be  the  power 
to  determine  ourselves  accordingly.  Neither  can  dis- 
pense with  the  other.  The  law  of  reason  in  us  does 
not  compel  obedience,  else  error  would  be  impossible. 
Rationality  is  reached  only  as  the  mind  accepts  the 
law  and  determines  itself  accordingly. 

Thus  atheism  appears  as  a  mental  outlaw.  Instead 
of  being,  as  it  often  fondly  imagines,  the  last  and 
highest  result  of  reason  and  science,  it  is  rather  the 


THE   ARGUMENT  FROM  EPISTEMOLOGY  127 

renunciation  and  destruction  of  both.  We  pass  now 
to  the  positive  side  of  the  argument  from  episte- 
mology. 

In  the  previous  chapter  we  pointed  out  that  all 
study  of  objective  reality  assumes  the  fact  of  law  and 
system,  or  a  universal  adjustment  of  each  to  all  in  a 
common  scheme  of  order.  Here  we  next  point  out 
that  all  study  assumes  that  this  system  is  an  in- 
telligible or  rational  one.  A  rational  cosmos  is  the 
implicit  assumption  of  objective  cognition.  The  im- 
plications of  this  fact  we  have  now  to  unfold. 

Common  sense  naturally  begins  with  the  supposi- 
tion that  a  world  of  material  things  exists  in  space 
and  time,  and  apart  from  any  intelligence  whatever. 
Before  criticism  has  taught  us  to  discriminate,  this 
view  seems  so  self-evident  that  any  question  of  it  is 
an  affront  to  good  sense,  and  a  mark  of  mental  frivol- 
ity. And  this  view,  when  a  stage  of  superficial 
reflection  has  been  reached,  readily  lends  itself  to 
atheistic  inferences.  In  this  stage  of  thought  the 
world,  or  nature,  is  always  on  the  point  of  declaring 
its  independence,  especially  when  written  with  an  ini- 
tial capital.  This  extra-mental  world  of  things 
and  forces,  however,  turns  out  upon  inquh-y  to  be 
an  extremely  questionable  hypothesis,  if  not  a  down- 
right contradiction. 

When  thought  becomes  critical,  it  appears  that  the 
basal  certainties  in  knowledge  are  not  the  ontological 
existence  of  material  and  mechanical  things,  but 
rather  the  coexistence  of  persons,  the  community  of 
intelligence  and  the  system  of  common  experience. 
And  these  are  not  given  as  speculative  deductions, 


128  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

but  as  unshakable  practical  certainties.  We  cannot 
live  intellectually  at  all  without  recognizing  other 
persons  than  ourselves,  and  without  assuming  that 
the  laws  of  intelligence  are  valid  for  all  alike,  and 
that  all  have  the  same  general  objects  in  experience. 
Solipsism  is  absurd  to  a  pitch  beyond  insanity.  The 
one  law  of  intelligence  for  all  is  the  supreme  condi- 
tion of  mutual  understanding  ;  and  the  community  of 
the  world  of  experience  is  only  less  necessary  for  the 
mental  life.  These  are  the  deepest  facts  and  presup- 
positions, and  they  involve  some  profound  mysteries ; 
but  they  cannot  be  questioned  without  immediate 
practical  absurdity.  And  they  never  are  questioned. 
The  skeptic  and  the  dogmatist,  the  idealist  and  the 
materialist,  alike  practically  agree  on  these  facts  and 
postulates.  What  lies  beyond  them  is  a  matter  of 
speculation  and  no  datum  of  experience.  Thus, 
whether  that  system  of  common  experience  is  to  be 
explained  by  a  system  of  material  and  mechanical 
bodies  in  space  and  time  is  a  speculative  problem,  and 
must  be  handed  over  to  speculation  for  solution. 
Hence,  the  mideniable  certainties  with  which  atheism 
begins  must  take  their  place  among  metaphysical 
hypotheses,  and  be  tested  accordingly.  Reflection  on 
this  point  will  do  much  to  remove  that  illusive  ap- 
pearance of  matter  of  fact  which  lends  a  certain 
plausibility  to  atheistic  reasoning.  It  will  also  show 
the  naive  character  of  that  naturalism  which  erects 
mathematical  and  mechanical  abstractions  into  the 
supreme  reality,  and  then  in  their  name  proceeds  to 
deny  all  the  realities  of  experience,  allowing  them,  if 
at  all,  only  as  "  epiphenomena  "  of  the  truly  real. 
The  history  of   speculative  thought  shows  no  more 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM  EPISTEMOLOGY  129 

remarkable  obsession.  Relief  is  found  by  observing 
that  experience  is  first  and  law-giving,  and  that  theo- 
ries which  make  no  place  for  it  are  thereby  ruled 
out. 

Again,  common  sense  begins  by  taking  knowledge 
as  well  as  things  for  granted.  In  the  beginnings  of 
mental  development  knowledge  is  not  even  a  problem. 
Things  are  there,  and  are  reflected  by  the  mind  as 
a  matter  of  course.  Of  the  complex  and  obscure 
processes  and  postulates  of  cognition,  spontaneous 
thought  has  no  suspicion.  Atheism  agrees  with  it 
in  this  respect,  and  thus  escapes  some  of  its  own  most 
grievous  difficulties  by  being  unconscious  of  them. 
But  epistemology  shows  that  the  existence  of  things 
is  by  no  means  the  same  as  our  knowledge  of  them. 
It  points  out  that  if  things  existed  precisely  as  they 
appear  to  us,  the  knowledge  of  them  could  arise 
only  as  the  mind  by  its  own  action  reproduces  the 
contents  of  things  for  thought.  Knowledge  is  noth- 
ing which  can  be  imported  ready-made  into  a  passive 
mind,  but  the  mind  must  actively  construct  knowledge 
within  itself.  In  conversation  no  ideas  pass  from  one 
mind  into  another,  but  each  mind  for  itself  constructs 
the  other's  thought,  and  only  thus  apprehends  and 
comprehends  it.  The  knowledge  is  indeed  objectively 
conditioned,  and  yet  each  mind  has  to  construct  it 
for  itself.  Of  course  such  personal  communion  pre- 
supposes that  both  minds  are  made  on  a  common  pat- 
tern, and  are  subject  to  the  same  laws.  Only  in  a 
figurative  sense  does  either  get  anything  from  the 
other ;  but  each  works  out  of  itself. 

This  expresses  the  fact  in  all  knowing.  To  know 
things  is  to  think  them ;  that  is,  to  form  thoughts 


130  THE  WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

which  truly  grasp  the  contents  or  meaning  of  the 
things.  The  thoughts  do  not  pass  ready-made  into 
the  mind ;  they  do  not  pass  into  the  mind  at  all ;  but 
upon  occasion  of  certain  action  upon  the  mind,  the 
mind  unfolds  within  itself  the  vision  and  knowledge 
of  the  world.  And  this  it  does,  according  to  the 
physiologist's  report,  without  pattern  or  copy,  and  in 
consequence  of  certain  nervous  changes,  of  which, 
moreover,  it  knows  nothing  directly,  and  commonly 
knows  nothing  whatever.  This  being  the  case,  it  is 
manifestly  idle  to  think  of  knowledge  as  impressed 
on  a  passive  mind,  or  as  carried  ready-made  into  the 
mind.  The  knowledge  originates  within;  and  the 
laws  and  forms  of  knowledge  must  primarily  be  laws 
and  forms  of  thought  itself.  In  a  very  real  sense  the 
mind  in  knowing  things  is  simply  manifesting  itself 
by  putting  its  own  laws  and  forms  into  and  upon  its 
experience. 

But  if  knowledge  is  to  be  valid,  thought  and  things 
must  have  the  same  laws.  Otherwise  there  would  be 
a  parallax  between  the  thoughts  built  up  by  the  mind 
and  the  things  which  are  supposed  to  exist  apart  from 
it.  Thought  can  only  speak  its  own  language,  and 
things  must  be  forever  unknowable  by  us  unless  they 
also  speak  thought  language ;  that  is,  unless  they 
are  cast  in  the  forms  and  molds  of  thought.  In  that 
case  we  have,  from  the  human  point  of  view,  a  dual- 
ism and  a  harmony  implicit  in  knowledge  for  which 
atheism  has  no  explanation.  We  are  at  a  complete 
deadlock  unless  we  assume  that  the  thing  world  is 
essentially  a  thought  world,  or  a  world  which  roots  in 
and  expresses  thought.  The  suggestion  that  things 
have  produced  thought  in  their  own  image  calls  for 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM  EPISTEMOLOGr  131 

no  consideration,  as  metaphysics  shows  that  there  is 
no  thoroughfare  in  that  direction. 

This  conclusion  must  stand,  even  on  the  supposition 
that  we  simply  apprehend  or  read  off  things  in  sense 
perception  without  modification.  But  most  of  our 
objective  knowing  is  not  reception  but  interpretation. 
The  world  as  it  is  for  sense  is  very  different  from  the 
world  as  it  is  for  thought.  In  looking  at  a  picture, 
the  colored  surfaces  and  outlines  are  in  the  sense,  the 
meaning  is  in  thought.  In  reading  a  book,  the  printed 
page  is  in  the  sense ;  the  signification  is  in  thought, 
and  only  in  thought.  One  who  does  not  know  how 
to  read  would  look  in  vain  for  meaning  in  a  book,  and 
in  vain  would  he  seek  to  help  his  failure  by  using 
eyeglasses.  Language  has  no  meaning  except  for  one 
who  furnishes  the  meaning  out  of  himself. 

The  same  is  true  also  for  our  knowledge  of  the 
world.  That  which  is  in  sense  is  very  different 
from  that  which  is  in  thought.  The  sense  world  is 
flitting,  fleeting,  discontinuous.  Epistemology  shows 
that  it  is  all  an  inarticulate,  phantasmagoric  flux  or 
dissolving  view  until  thought  brings  into  it  its  rational 
principles,  and  fixes  and  interprets  it.  The  sense 
world,  so  far  as  it  is  articulate,  or  anything  we  can 
talk  about,  is  already  a  thought  world.  Its  perma- 
nences and  identities  are  products  of  thought.  The 
complex  system  of  relations,  whereby  it  is  defined 
and  articulated,  is  a  thought  product  which  can  in  no 
way  be  given  to  sense.  The  far-reaching  inferences  of 
science,  whereby  our  spontaneous  thought  of  the 
world  is  so  profoundly  transformed,  are  something 
which  exists  for  neither  eye  nor  ear,  but  for  thought 
only.     The  sense  world  is  the  same  from  age  to  age, 


132  THE    WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

but  the  thought  world  grows  from  more  to  more. 
The  world  of  science  differs  from  the  world  of  sense 
as  widely  as  the  conceptions  of  the  astronomer  differ 
from  the  algebraic  signs  by  which  he  expresses  them. 
Thus  again  we  see  the  complex  thought  activity 
involved  in  knowledge.  If  the  thing  world  be  com- 
plete in  itself,  then  knowledge  involves  the  building 
up  of  a  thought  world  which  shall  be  the  double  of  the 
thing  world  and  rightly  reproduce  it  for  us ;  and  this 
thought  world  must  be  unfolded  within  thought  itself 
as  an  expression  of  the  rational  nature. 

The  problem  of  human  knowledge,  then,  involves 
(1)  a  knowable,  that  is  a  rational,  universe  ;  (2)  a  know- 
ing human  mind  ;  (3)  the  identity  of  the  categories  of 
human  thought  with  the  principles  of  cosmic  being ; 

(4)  such  an  adjustment  of  the  outer  to  the  inner  that 
the  mind,  reacting  according  to  its  own  nature  against 
external  stimulus,  shall  produce  in  itself  thoughts 
which  shall  truly  reproduce  the   objective  fact,  and 

(5)  an  identity  of  rational  nature  in  human  beings. 
If  human  reason  were  many,  and  not  one,  there  would 
be  an  end  to  thought.  These  implications  are  so 
involved  in  the  very  structure  of  knowledge  that  we 
take  them  for  granted  without  thought  of  their  sig- 
nificance ;  whereas  they  are  the  perennial  wonder  of 
existence. 

And  herein  is  a  marvelous  thing  for  any  one,  and 
especially  for  an  atheistic  speculator.  Things  which 
are  to  be  known  must  exist  in  intelligible,  that  is, 
rational,  order  and  relations.  The  world  as  we  grasp 
it  is  a  world  of  thought  relations ;  for  thought  can 
grasp  nothing  else.  Now  if  the  real  world  were  an 
expression  of  thought,  this  would  be  quite  intelligible. 


THE   ARGUMENT  FROM   EPISTEMOLOGY  133 

The  world  without  exists  through  a  mind  analogous 
to  the  mind  within.  Thus  the  thing  world  and  the 
thought  world  would  be  commensurable,  both  being 
founded  in  the  nature  of  reason.  Bat  on  the  atheistic 
scheme  the  thing  world  has  no  thought  whatever  in  it. 
It  just  exists  in  its  own  mechanical  way,  independent 
of  all  thought  and  the  negation  of  all  thought.  But 
in  that  case  there  is  no  way  to  thought  at  all,  and 
still  less  is  there  any  provision  for  knowledge.  A 
speech  made  up  of  inarticulate  noises  could  never  be 
understood,  because  there  is  in  it  no  thought  to 
understand.  Just  as  little  could  the  world  be  known, 
unless  there  were  thought  in  it  to  be  apprehended  by 
the  knower.  The  materialistic  fancy  that  things,  by 
being  very  small  and  very  numerous,  and  moving 
very  rapidly  in  some  mysterious  way,  could  generate 
knowledge  and  get  themselves  known,  is  set  aside  by 
the  rudiments  of  psychology  and  metaphysics.  Hence 
on  the  supposition  that  things  exist  in  the  most  real- 
istic fashion,  and  we  have  only  to  read  off  what  is 
there,  we  have  to  affirm  an  elaborate  dualism  and 
parallelism  of  human  thought  and  cosmic  thing  which 
remain  an  insoluble  mystery,  except  on  the  theistic 
doctrine  which  makes  things  expressions  of  thought. 
Both  psychology  and  epistemology  absolutely  refuse 
to  assimilate  thoughts  to  things ;  it  only  remains  to 
assimilate  things  to  thoughts  by  making  them  the 
products  or  expressions  of  thought. 

The  matter  becomes  still  more  complicated  when 
we  remember  how  much  of  knowledge  is  interpreta- 
tion, not  reception.  As  long  as  we  confuse  the  sense 
fact  with  the  thought  fact,  there  is  a  kind  of  plausi- 
bility in  the  fancy  that  the  sense  fact  may  be  passively 

THEISM 10 


134         THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  INTELLIGENT 

reflected  by  thought.  But  this  notion  disappears  as 
soon  as  we  note  the  incommensurability  between 
what  is  in  sense  and  what  is  in  thought.  To  recur 
to  the  ilkistration  of  language,  speech  apart  from 
meanings  is  mere  noise ;  and  noise  becomes  speech 
only  as  it  is  informed  with  meanings.  But  the 
meanings  are  not  in  the  sound  objectively  considered. 
The  sound  is  the  medium  for  conveying  meanings 
which  exist  only  for  the  minds  at  each  end.  Lan- 
guage must  begin  in  thought  if  it  is  to  end  in  thought. 
Any  one  can  see  the  impossibility  of  understanding 
noise,  and  also  the  impossibility  of  noise  generating 
understanding.  The  same  is  true  of  objective  knowl- 
edge. The  meaning  is  not  found  in  the  sense  fact 
at  all.  The  spatial  and  temporal  fact  in  itself  con- 
tains no  meaning,  but  is  simply  a  medium  for  express- 
ing a  meaning.  And  as  with  language,  so  with  the 
knowledge  of  nature.  There  is  no  interpreting  the 
process  unless  we  have  a  thinker  at  both  ends. 
Nature  is  speech,  not  existence.  If  nature  expresses 
the  thought  of  a  thinker  beyond  it,  it  is  quite  credible 
that  we  should  find  thought  in  it.  Otherwise  all  is 
opacity  and  darkness.  We  are  trying  to  understand 
noises  which  mean  nothing. 

The  Argument  from  Metaphysics 

We  have  had  frequent  occasion  in  this  chapter  to  refer 
to  the  realistic  notion  of  a  world  of  things  existing  by 
themselves  apart  from  all  thought,  as  a  prolific  source 
of  atheistic  fancies.  We  have  now  to  show  that  this 
notion  is  very  questionable.  Here  metaphysics  takes 
up  and  completes  the  argument  from  epistemology 
by  showing  that  the  self-existent  mechanical  world 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM  METAPHYSICS  135 

on  which  atheism  builds  is  a  product  of  superficial 
sense  thinking  which  understands  neither  itself  nor 
its  problem. 

If  we  allow  space  and  time  to  be  real  existences  of 
some  sort,  no  intelligible  world  can  exist  in  them 
without  the  work  of  thought.  The  intelligible  world, 
as  we  have  said,  is  a  world  of  thought  relations  and 
related  objects;  and  as  such  implies  intelligence  as 
the  condition  of  its  possibility.  As  the  world  of 
sense  qualities  exists  only  in  and  for  the  sensibility, 
so  the  world  of  relations  and  related  objects  exists 
only  in  and  for  thought,  and  not  in  space  and  time 
alone.  Or  the  intelligible  world  is  a  world  of  mean- 
ings and  thought  contents,  and  these  are  impossible 
except  with  reference  to  intelligence. 

To  the  uninitiated  this  will  have  a  somewhat  ideal- 
istic sound,  owing  to  a  natural  illusion.  Popular 
thought  is  rightly  convinced  that  knowledge  has 
objective  vaHdity,  and  it  confuses  this  conviction 
with  the  lumpish  existence  of  things  in  an  extra- 
mental  space  and  time,  as  it  knows  no  other  way  of 
securing  the  reality  of  the  things.  But  epistemology 
shows  that  the  ultimate  meaning  of  objectivity  is  the 
universality  of  the  object  in  our  common  experience, 
or  the  validity  of  our  conceptions  for  common  ex- 
perience. Such  objects  and  conceptions  are  real  or 
objective,  in  distinction  from  individual  illusions 
which  are  private  possessions,  and  hence  errors. 
But  this  universality  is  primarily  in  experience, 
and  on  reflection  it  is  plain  that  it  cannot  be 
anywhere  else.  It  is  not  a  question  of  the  validity 
or  truth  of  the  experience,  but  rather  of  its  con- 
tents and  location.     When  these  points  are  borne  in 


136  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  INTELLIGENT 

mind  it  will  not  seem  so  strange  when  we  say  that 
the  intelligible  world  cannot  exist  in  space  and  time. 

Illustrations  abound.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  speech, 
all  that  can  exist  in  space  and  time  is  noise,  succes- 
sively propagating  itself  across  spaces  in  time ;  but 
noise  is  not  speech.  Only  meanings  are  speech,  and 
meanings  are  not  in  space  or  time,  and  can  neither  be 
seen  nor  heard.  Meanings  exist  only  for  mind  and 
through  mind.  Again,  where  does  a  symphony  exist  ? 
Not  in  space  or  time,  but  only  in  mind.  Apart  from 
the  qualitative  transformation  of  vibration  into  sound 
by  the  sensibility,  the  symphony  can  exist  as  such  only 
through  the  unifying  and  relating  activity  of  conscious- 
ness. Apart  from  this  activity,  every  phase  of  the 
sound  would  lie  loose  and  unrelated,  each  one  in  its 
own  space  and  time,  and  nowhere  united  in  a  common 
consciousness.  The  symphony  would  nowhere  exist. 
All  that  can  take  place  in  the  most  realistic  space  and 
time  is  but  the  means  for  translating  the  symphony 
from  idea  to  act,  or  from  one  mind  to  another ;  but 
the  symphony  exists  as  anything  apprehensible  only 
in  and  through  thought.  The  place  of  music  is  in 
the  mind ;  and  music  is  an  impossibility  conceived  as 
existing  in  space  and  time. 

So  with  the  world  of  literature,  of  discourse,  of 
government  —  none  of  these  things  can  exist  extra- 
mentally  in  space  and  time.  The  world  of  discourse 
is  not  a  matter  of  ears  only  or  mainly,  but  rather  of 
thought.  The  volitional  interaction  of  moral  beings, 
which  is  the  essence  of  government,  can  never  be 
spatially  exhibited  ;  and  one  would  present  a  humor- 
ous spectacle  who  should  set  out  to  see  the  govern- 
ment with  his  physical  eyes.     Literature  also  does 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM  METAPHYSICS  137 

not  exist  in  libraries  but  only  in  and  for  minds.  It 
is  indeed  conceivable  that  some  person  of  posi- 
tivistic  tendencies  should  decide  that  meanings  are 
too  airy  and  impalpable  to  be  the  subject  of  science, 
and  should  insist  that  letters  and  their  groupings  are 
the  essence  of  literature.  Under  the  influence  of  this 
notion  he  might  make  elaborate  studies  of  the  various 
forms  of  the  letters  and  of  their  "  coexistences  and 
sequences,"  and  also  of  the  various  kinds  of  paper 
and  binding ;  and  this  he  might  proclaim  to  be  the 
scientific  method  of  literary  study.  But  literature  is 
not  a  matter  of  letters  or  paper  or  binding  after  all. 
In  like  manner  the  intelligible  world  exists  only  for 
and  through  thought.  All  that  takes  place  in  space 
or  time  is  at  best  only  the  movement  for  translating 
the  world  of  ideas  into  act  and  making  it  accessible 
to  finite  minds ;  but  in  itself,  and  apart  from  this 
teleological  function,  the  spatial  and  temporal  fact  is 
nothing  articulate  or  intelligible. 

Again,  we  may  reach  the  same  conclusion  by 
another  way.  Epistemology  shows  that  nothing  can 
exist  for  the  mind  except  through  fixed  and  timeless 
ideas.  Everything  as  occurring  passes  aw^ay  with  its 
date  and  can  by  no  possibility  recur.  The  temporal 
flow  is  ceaseless  and  admits  of  infinite  division.  Hence 
every  event  breaks  up  into  an  indefinite  number  of 
events  corresponding  to  the  temporal  division;  and 
each  infinitesimal  increment  vanishes  irrevocably  with 
its  temporal  instant.  If  this  were  all,  thought  and 
even  existence  would  be  impossible;  and  Kronos 
would  devour  both  his  offspring  and  himself.  But 
the  mind  grasps  and  fixes  the  temporal  flow  by  time- 
less ideas  which  give  the  abiding  meaning  of  which 


138  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

the  temporal  movement  is  the  bearer  or  expression. 
On  no  other  condition  can  we  escape  the  Heraclitic 
flux  and  the  complete  overthrow  of  knowledge.  But 
these  timeless  ideas,  as  such,  are  incapable  of  temporal 
existence.  They  represent  the  meaning,  the  rational 
contents,  but  they  are  a  purely  ideal  world.  And 
here  again  is  a  problem  which  demands  solution.  We 
might  say  that  the  ideas  are  arbitrary  impositions  of 
our  own,  and  have  no  essential  connection  with  reality ; 
but  this  would  not  long  command  assent.  It  would 
be  like  saying  that  we  have  ideas  in  connection  with 
another's  speech  or  writing,  but  we  have  no  reason 
for  thinking  that  he  had  ideas.  It  can  hardly  be  that 
ideas  are  necessary  for  the  expression  and  understand- 
ing of  things  to  which  they  are  essentially  unrelated ; 
neither  is  it  likely  that  things  essentially  unrelated  to 
ideas  can  ever  be  comprehended  through  ideas.  The 
only  alternative  to  these  impossible  views  is  to  say 
that  the  world  in  space  and  time  is  a  movement 
according  to  ideas  and  for  the  setting  forth  of  ideas 
behind  the  movement,  or  immanent  in  it.  As  such 
an  incarnation  of  thought,  it  is  intelligible  and  possi- 
ble ;  but  apart  from  thought,  as  a  thing  by  itself,  it 
is  neither  intelligible  nor  possible. 

Thus  we  see  once  more  that  the  intelligible  world  is  a 
thought  world,  and  exists  only  in  and  through  thought. 
It  may  be  manifested  under  the  form  of  space  and  time  ; 
but  it  cannot  exist  in  space  and  time  as  extra-mental 
realities,  any  more  than  the  world  of  music,  or  of  lit- 
erature, or  of  language. 

But  we  must  go  still  further  in  the  direction  of 
idealism,  and  point  out  that  space  and  time  themselves 
are  no  proper  existences  apart  from  mind,  but  only 


THE  ARGUMENT   FROM  METAPHYSICS  139 

forms  of  experience.  They  are  not  real  somewhats 
in  which  things  exist  or  events  run  off,  but  are  only 
general  forms  of  experience.  Metaphysics  shows  that 
when  they  are  made  more  than  this  they  become  ab- 
surd, and  make  existence  itself  impossible.  Thus  the 
endless  divisibility  of  space  and  the  mutual  external- 
ity of  all  its  parts  make  it  impossible  that  anything 
should  exist  as  an  ontological  reality  in  space. 
Everything  would  break  up  into  an  indefinite  plural- 
ity ;  and  all  unity,  and  thus  all  reality,  would  disap- 
pear. The  mutual  externality  of  successive  moments 
has  the  same  effect  in  time.  Nothing  that  really 
exists  in  succession  can  exist  at  all.  Time  itself 
cannot  exist.  For  only  the  present  can  exist,  and  the 
present  is  simply  the  plane  of  division  between  past 
and  future.  Hence  nothing  can  exist,  if  time  be 
ontological.  Metaphysics  shows  that  considerations 
of  this  kind  compel  us  to  reduce  space  and  time  to 
forms  of  experience  only.  Things  are  not  in  space 
and  time,  but  experience  has  the  spatial  and  temporal 
form.  The  spatial  and  temporal  laws  are  valid  for 
experience,  but  they  become  absurd  and  impossible 
when  they  are  abstracted  from  experience  and  made 
into  independent  existences. 

Thus  all  that  exists  in  space  and  time,  together 
with  space  and  time  themselves,  must  be  viewed  as 
having  only  phenomenal  existence,  that  is,  as  existing 
only  for  and  through  intelligence. 

Real  existence  must  be  conceived  either  under  the 
form  of  space  and  time,  or  under  the  form  of  con- 
scious intelligence.  There  is  no  third  possibility. 
But  on  analysis  all  spatial  and  temporal  being  becomes 
phenomenal.     As  spatial   it   can  have  no  unity;  as 


140  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  INTELLIGENT 

temporal  it  can  have  neither  unity,  identity,  nor 
permanence.  Such  unity,  identity,  and  permanence 
as  it  may  seem  to  have,  are  entirely  the  work  of  the 
intelligence  which  produces  or  apprehends  it.  It  has 
such  unity  as  any  spatial  or  temporal  measure  may 
have  —  a  unity  which  is  purely  formal,  and  is  imposed 
by  the  mind.  What  is  the  unity  of  a  minute,  or  a  mile, 
or  a  degree  of  the  circle  ?  Unless  there  be  something 
non-spatial  and  non-temporal,  nothing  whatever  can 
exist.  And  only  intelligence  meets  this  demand. 
Metaphysics  shows  that  active  intelligence  alone  fills 
out  the  true  notion  of  being,  unity,  identity,  and 
causality.  On  the  impersonal  and  mechanical  plane 
these  categories  all  vanish  or  contradict  themselves. 
The  spatial  and  temporal  disappear  in  the  dissolving 
view,  and  impersonal  causality  loses  itself  in  the 
infinite  regress,  and  finally  cancels  itself. 

Moreover,  causality  in  time  must  either  sink  to 
mere  sequence  in  which  the  notion  of  causality  dis- 
appears, or  else  fall  back  on  the  notion  of  potentiality 
to  keep  past  and  present  from  falling  asunder.  If 
there  be  no  dynamic  connection  between  them,  we 
fall  into  a  groundless  becoming  and  reason  perishes. 
Logic  also  demands  that  the  past  which  is  to  explain 
the  present  shall  in  some  way  contain  the  present. 
But  we  cannot  carry  the  present  bodily  and  actually 
into  the  past,  for  that  would  confound  all  distinctions. 
Hence  the  notion  of  potentiality ;  the  present  was 
potential  in  the  past.  But  this  notion  also  is  empty 
of  any  real  meaning  on  the  impersonal  plane.  What 
a  metaphysical  potentiality,  in  distinction  from  a 
metaphysical  actuality,  might  be,  cannot  be  told.  On 
the  personal  plane  it  refers  to  the  possible  determina- 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM  METAPHYSICS  141 

tions  of  free  intelligence,  and  here  it  means  some- 
thing; but  on  the  impersonal  plane  it  is  simply  the 
recognition  of  a  problem  to  which  it  gives  only  a 
verbal  solution.  The  real  solution  must  be  sought 
in  free  intelligence.  Such  are  some  of  the  puzzles 
which  emerge  when  we  think  under  temporal  con- 
ditions. 

Thus  the  metaphysical  apparatus  of  sense  thought, 
on   which   atheism    depends,    disappears    altogether. 
Its  alleged  foundations  all  turn  out  to  imply  mind 
as  their  presupposition,  or    to  exist  only  under  the 
form  of  living  intelligence.     Of  course  the  categories 
which  sense  thought  employs  are  all  formally  neces- 
sary ;  the  mistake  lies  in  supposing  that  they  can  be 
realized  in  the  sense  form.     The  conviction  that  there 
must  be  reality,  unity,  identity,  and  causality  is  correct, 
but  it  does  not  of  itself  decide  the  form  under  which 
they   are  possible.     Reflection  shows  that   they  are 
possible    only  under   the  form  of  intelligence  or  in 
relation  to  intelligence.     When  we  conceive  the  world 
as  having  intelligible  meaning  we  come  down  to  a 
supreme  intelhgence,  not  only  as  its  source,  but  as 
that  without  which  it  would  be  not  merely  impossible 
but  absurd  and  meaningless.     A  world  of  meanings 
presupposes   mind.      A    system    of  relations  implies 
intelligence  as  its  source  and  seat.     When  we  con- 
ceive the  world  in  its  causality,  we  are  brought  down 
to  active  intelligence  by  which  it    exists    and   from 
which  it  forever  proceeds.      The  world  has  its  form 
and  meaning  in  the  divine  thought,  and  its  reality  in 
the  divine  will. 

In  a  previous  paragraph  we  have  pointed  out  that 
the  basal  certainties  of  knowledge  are  not  the  onto- 


142  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  INTELLIGENT 

logical  existence  of  material  and  mechanical  things, 
but  rather  the  coexistence  of  persons,  the  community 
of  intelligence,  and  the  system  of  common  experience. 
We  are  now  better  able  to  appreciate  this  fact.  This 
system  of  experience  which  is  there  for  all  of  us  is 
itself  a  function  of  intelligence  and  no  extra-mental 
fact.  And  it  is  this  system  of  experience,  and  the 
coexistent  minds  which  share  in  it,  that  philosophy 
has  to  interpret.  And  in  both  the  experience  and 
the  interpretation,  thought  remains  within  the  intel- 
lectual sphere.  Thought  can  neither  reach  nor  use 
things  lying  beyond  thought  and  unrelated  to  thought ; 
and  if  we  seem  to  reach  such  things  it  is  only  by  mis- 
taking the  common  to  all  in  experience  for  a  fact  un- 
related to  intelligence,  or  by  abstracting  the  categories 
from  experience,  in  which  alone  they  have  meaning, 
and  projecting  them  as  extra-mental  facts.  As  such 
they  contradict  themselves  as  soon  as  reflection  begins ; 
and  the  perennial  antinomies  of  realism  emerge.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  refer  the  world  of  intelligible 
experience  and  intelligent  spirits  to  intelligence  as  their 
source,  our  thought  system  remains  homogeneous  with 
itself  throughout,  and  we  escape  the  chronic  contra- 
dictions which  haunt,  in  spite  of  all  exorcisms,  every 
realistic  system  of  the  impersonal  and  mechanical 
type.  As  soon  as  realism  is  seen  to  be,  not  experi- 
ence, but  an  interpretation  of  experience,  its  untena- 
bility  becomes  manifest. 

For  the  sake  of  warding  off  misunderstanding,  so  far 
as  possible,  we  present  the  argument  again  in  brief  out- 
line. Of  course  it  does  not  commend  itself  to  the  natural 
man  nor  even  to  the  natural  theist,  because  of  sundry 
easy  misconceptions.     Both  alike  are  sure  that  the 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM  METAPHYSICS  143 

world  of  facts  which  they  perceive  is  independent  of 
their  own  intelligence,  and  of  their  neighbors'  intelli- 
gence. This  world  did  not  begin  when  they  first 
became  aware  of  it,  nor  did  it  grow  with  their  grow- 
ing knowledge,  nor  will  it  vanish  with  their  conscious- 
ness of  it.  This  fact,  which  is  admitted  by  all  except 
some  lively  person  who  takes  pleasure  in  airing  con- 
ceits and  paradoxes,  is  supposed  by  the  natural  man 
to  show  that  the  universe  which  exists  apart  from 
our  intelligence  exists  apart  from  all  intelligence. 
The  natural  theist,  of  course,  would  insist  that  the 
universe  began  in  intelligence,  but  he  would  also  in- 
sist that  it  now  exists  external  to  all  intelligence. 
The  atheist  would  claim  that  the  universe  is  now, 
and  always  has  been,  external  to  intelligence.  Both 
alike  would  be  sure  that  the  meaning  of  this  ex- 
ternality is  sun-clear,  and  that  its  reality  is  self- 
evident. 

But  there  is  a  great  difference  between  existing 
apart  from  our  intelligence,  and  existing  apart  from 
all  intelligence.  The  world  of  sense  qualities  may 
exist  apart  from  the  sensibility  of  A  or  B,  but  it  can- 
not exist  apart  from  all  sensibility.  The  world  of 
literature  also  may  exist  apart  from  the  intelligence  of 
few  or  many,  but  it  exists  nevertheless  only  for  and  in 
intelligence.  Now  the  universe  as  we  know  it  is  essen- 
tially a  vast  system  of  relations  under  the  various  cate- 
gories of  the  intellect ;  and  such  a  universe  would  have 
neither  meaning  nor  existence  apart  from  intelligence. 
It  does  not  avail  against  this  conclusion  to  say  that, 
besides  the  relations,  there  are  real  things  in  rela- 
tions ;  for  these  things  themselves  are  defined  and 
constituted  by  their  relations,  so  that  their  existence 


144  THE   WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT 

apart  from  a  constitutive  intelligence  becomes  an 
absurdity.  If,  with  Locke,  we  declare  that  relations 
are  the  work  of  the  mind,  and  then  attempt  to  find 
some  unrelated  reality  in  the  object  which  can  exist 
apart  from  mind,  our  quest  is  soon  seen  to  be  bootless 
and  hopeless.  In  that  case  we  should  have  to  admit 
that  the  real  in  itself  is  unknowable,  and  that  the 
real  as  known  exists  only  in  and  for  intelligence. 
But  as  this  intelligence  in  and  for  which  the  universe 
exists  is  not  ours,  there  must  be  a  cosmic  intelligence 
as  its  abiding  condition,  and  in  reference  to  which 
alone  the  affirmation  of  a  universe  has  any  meaning. 

Since  the  time  of  Kant  it  has  been  clear  to  those 
who  could  estimate  his  work  that  we  can  never  know 
anything  outside  of  the  thought  sphere.  Mind  and 
the  products  of  mind  comprise  the  whole  sphere  of  the 
knowable.  This  Kant  made  plain  once  for  all.  What- 
ever lies  within  the  range  of  knowledge  must  be  either 
mind  or  a  mental  product.  But  Kant  had  not  com- 
pletely emancipated  himself  from  the  assumptions  of 
uncritical  realism,  and  admitted  a  reality  beyond  the 
thought  sphere,  which  he  rightly  pronounced  unknow- 
able. It  was  reserved  for  later  philosophers  to  point 
out  that  this  extra-mental  reality  is  just  as  unaffirm- 
able  as  it  is  unknowable.  The  affirmation  itself  was 
seen  to  be  empty,  so  that  it  affirmed  nothing.  Thus 
all  possible  knowledge  and  affirmation  fell  back  into 
the  thought  sphere  again. 

Two  points  Kant  felt  compelled  to  secure  :  first,  the 
constructive  action  of  the  mind  in  knowledge,  so  that 
knowledge  is  primarily  an  expression  of  the  mental 
nature  rather  than  of  the  object ;  and  secondly,  the 
objective  reality  of  something  independent  of  us  and 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM  METAPHYSICS  145 

our  thinking.  These  two  points  Kant  never  succeeded 
in  properly  adjusting  to  each  other.  When  he  thought 
of  the  constructive  mental  activity  involved  in  knowl- 
edge, Kant  tended  to  make  all  objects  only  represen- 
tations in  us  ;  that  is,  purely  subjective  and  human, 
if  not  individualistic.  When  he  thought  of  the  inde- 
pendent reality  he  maintained  some  sort  of  transcen- 
dental something  which  he  refused  to  let  us  know  or 
even  to  think,  as  it  lay  outside  of  the  range  of  thought. 
In  this  way  arose  the  continuous  contradiction  which 
runs  through  Kant's  exposition.  And  we  can  escape 
the  contradiction  and  save  the  truth  of  the  system 
only  by  giving  up  the  extra-mental  things  altogether, 
and  making  the  thing  world  the  expression  of  a 
thouo;ht  world  behind  it  or  immanent  in  it;  which 
thought  world,  again,  is  the  expression  of  a  supreme 
intelligence  which  founds  and  coordinates  both  the 
thing  world  and  the  world  of  finite  spirits.  In  this 
way  things  are  at  once  independent  of  om*  thought 
and  commensurate  with  thought.  They  are  not  illu- 
sions of  the  individual ;  and  yet,  as  the  products  and 
expressions  of  thought,  they  lie  within  the  thought 
sphere.  Thus  we  escape  the  impossibilities  of  crude 
realism,  and  also  the  intellectual  scandal  of  the  un- 
knowable things  in  themselves.  And  this  is  possible 
only  on  the  plane  of  idealistic  theism.  The  dualism 
of  our  human  knowing  is  founded  and  transcended  in 
a  monism  of  the  infinite,  the  source  of  both  the  finite 
spirit  and  the  cosmic  order. 

But  this  does  not  imply  that  the  world  is  merely 
a  conception  without  other  reality.  The  world  is  not 
merely  an  idea,  it  is  also  a  deed.  The  contents  of  the 
world  are  given  in  the  idea,  but  the  world  becomes 


146  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   INTELLIGENT 

real  only  as  it  passes  into  act.  It  is  not  merely  a 
conception  in  the  divine  understanding,  it  is  also  a 
form  of  divine  activity.  Both,  factors  are  needed  to 
express  our  full  conviction  with  regard  to  the  world. 
It  is  not  a  lumpish  existence  out  of  all  essential  rela- 
tion to  thought ;  for  it  is  simply  thought  made  con- 
crete. Neither  is  it  a  passive  conception  in  an  inert 
mind ;  it  is  rather  a  forthgoing  of  energy  according 
to  rational  ideas.  Thus  it  is  at  once  real  and  rational, 
and  being  the  work  of  intelligence,  it  is  forever  open 
to  the  comprehension  of  intelligence.  Our  thought  of 
the  world  has  two  poles.  When  we  approach  the 
world  from  the  standpoint  of  meaning,  we  come 
down  to  the  divine  idea.  When  we  approach  it  from 
the  side  of  causality,  we  come  down  to  the  divine 
will. 

To  this  result  epistemology  and  metaphysics  must 
come ;  to  this  they  are  fast  coming.  Both  of  these 
sciences  when  they  understand  themselves  must  be 
theistic.  The  trustworthiness  of  reason  and  the 
validity  of  knowledge  can  be  maintained  only  on  a 
theistic  basis.  Any  scheme  of  mechanical  necessity 
makes  shipwreck  on  the  problem  of  error ;  and  no 
such  scheme  knows  any  way  of  deducing  or  evolving 
valid  knowledge.  Free  intelligence  in  the  world- 
ground  and  in  the  finite  knower  is  the  only  solution 
of  the  problem  which  really  solves  it.  And  since 
the  trustworthiness  of  reason  and  the  validity  of 
knowledge  are  the  presupposition  of  all  science  and 
philosophy,  we  must  say  that  God  as  free  and  intelli- 
gent is  the  postulate  of  both  science  and  philosophy. 
If  these  are  possible,  it  can  be  only  on  a  theistic  basis. 

In  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  we  treated  of  the 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM   METAPHYSICS  147 

inductive  argument  for  affirming  purpose.  We  now 
see  that  a  theoretical  and  speculative  argument  of 
wider  range  is  possible.  We  have  seen  the  teleologi- 
cal  character  of  our  fundamental  postulates  as  related 
to  the  self-realization  and  self-preservation  of  the  mind 
itself.  We  have  also  seen  the  universality  of  the  te- 
leological  craving,  and  the  impossibility  of  satisfying 
it  by  any  impersonal  mechanism.  We  have  further 
seen  that  reason  can  reach  no  equilibrium  in  episte- 
mology  and  metaphysics  until  it  rises  to  the  conception 
of  intelligent  and  purposive  causality  as  the  supreme 
category  of  reality.  On  the  impersonal  plane  thought 
is  in  unstable  equilibrium,  and  is  sure  to  fall  into  con- 
tradiction with  itself.  The  categories  vanish  or  cancel 
themselves.  But  some  intellectual  range  and  flexibil- 
ity are  needed  for  the  appreciation  of  such  an  argu- 
ment ;  although  it  is  the  best  argument  when 
understood.  The  inductive  argument  at  best  has  the 
disadvantage  of  resting  on  picked  facts ;  while  great 
masses  of  facts  seem  neutral,  if  not  opposed  to  it. 
This  gives  the  impression  that  purpose  in  any  case 
applies  to  only  a  few  things,  and  the  surmise  is  not 
far  away  that  it  does  not  apply  to  anything.  Such 
argument  is  effective  rather  as  illustration  than  as 
proof.  But  the  argument  has  a  very  different  stand- 
ing when  it  is  seen  that  purpose,  as  the  essential  form 
of  intellectual  action,  enters  into  the  very  structure  of 
reason  and  knowledge.  Thus  the  necessity  of  tele- 
ology is  theoretically  established ;  and  experience  has 
only  the  function  of  tracing  and  illustrating  it. 

Of  course  this  epistemological  and  metaphysical 
argument  is  highly  abstract  and  can  never  find  favor 
except  in  speculative  circles.     It  is  valuable  as  show- 


148  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  INTELLIGENT 

ing  theism,  or  a  cosmic  intelligence  to  be  a  necessary 
implication  of  the  essential  structure  of  thought  and 
knowledge.  From  this  standpoint  atheism  would 
appear  as  the  crude  misunderstanding  of  a  mind  not 
yet  in  full  possession  of  itself,  but  rather  in  hopeless 
bondage  to  the  senses  and  their  spontaneous  preju- 
dices. It  vanishes  of  itself  as  soon  as  it  is  brought 
into  relation  to  the  general  problem  of  knowledge. 
Then  its  superficiality  and  self-destructive  character 
become  apparent.     Atheism  is  j)hilosophic  illiteracy. 

Thus  the  arguments  from  induction  and  from  epis- 
temology  and  metaphysics  agree  in  enforcing  the 
claim  of  theism.  If  we  suppose  the  world  is  founded 
in  intelligence,  we  find  the  facts  in  their  great  outlines 
agreeing  thereto.  There  is  a  rational  work  according 
to  rational  methods,  for  intelligible  ends.  To  be  sure, 
our  knowledge  is  limited,  but,  so  far  as  we  can  under- 
stand, we  find  the  marks  of  transcendent  wisdom.  In 
such  a  case  it  is  not  hard  to  believe  that  a  larger 
knowledge  would  make  this  more  and  more  apparent ; 
just  as  we  believe  that  a  deeper  insight  would  reveal 
the  reign  of  law  in  realms  apparently  lawless. 

If  we  next  make  the  opposite  assumption,  that  the 
world  is  founded  in  non-intelligence,  we  find  nothing 
that  we  should  expect.  We  find  a  non-rational 
power  doing  a  rational  work.  An  unconscious  power 
produces  consciousness.  Non-intelligence  produces 
intelligence.  Necessity  produces  freedom  or  at  least 
the  illusion  of  freedom.  The  non-purposive  works 
apparently  for  purpose.  The  unexpected  meets  us  at 
every  turn.  Such  is  the  atheistic  account  of  things. 
The  light  that  is  in  it  is  darkness. 

There   is  no  need  to  pursue  these  considerations. 


THE   ARGUMENT   FROM  METAPHYSICS  149 

It  seems  plain  that  the  belief  in  a  free  and  intelligent 
ground  of  things  is  as  well  founded  as  any  objective 
belief'  whatever,  and  that  this  belief  is  one  which 
enters  so  intimately  into  our  mental  life  that  philoso- 
phy and  science,  and  even  rationality  itself  stand  or 
fall  with  it.  For  these  reasons  we  hold  that  the  uni- 
verse is  founded  in  intelligence.  The  conception  of 
necessary  mechanical  agency  as  first  and  fundamental 
leads  to  no  true  insight,  and  ends  in  hopeless  mental 
collapse.  Self -directing  rational  agency  is  the  only 
principle  that  gives  any  light,  or  that  can  be  made 
basal  without  immediate  self-stultification. 

On  all  these  accounts  the  intelligence  of  the  world- 
ground  is  affirmed. 


11 


CHAPTER   III 

THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   PERSONAL 

The  direct  argument  for  the  intelligence  of  the 
world-ground  is  conclusive  ;  and  unless  counter-argu- 
ment can  be  found,  the  conclusion  must  be  allowed  to 
stand.  But  there  is  a  very  general  agreement  among 
speculators  that  such  argument  exists,  and  of  such 
force  withal  as  greatly  to  weaken,  if  not  to  over- 
throw, the  theistic  conclusion.  In  particular  the 
objection  is  made  that  personality,  and  hence  intelli- 
gence, cannot  be  attributed  to  an  absolute  and  infinite 
being ;  as  these  notions  are  distinctly  incompatible. 
While,  then,  we  are  shut  up  on  the  one  side  to  the 
belief  in  an  intelligent,  and  hence  personal,  world- 
ground,  we  are  shut  out  on  the  other  by  the  contra- 
dictory character  of  the  conception.  This  might  be 
called  the  antinomy  of  the  theistic  argument.  Appeal, 
then,  is  taken  from  the  judgment  in  favor  of  theism, 
and  the  case  must  be  further  argued. 

The  arguments  now  to  be  considered  are  not  rea- 
sons for  atheism  but  rather  objections  to  theism ;  and 
their  bearing  is  more  agnostic  than  atheistic.  That 
atheism  has  no  rational  standing  is  plain,  but  is  theism, 
when  closely  considered,  much  better  off  ?  It  may  be 
that  its  advantages  are  only  superficial,  and  that  over- 
whelming difficulties,  which  make  theism  also  unten- 

160 


THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   PERSONAL  151 

able,  appear  on  profounder  reflection.  There  is  some 
warrant  for  these  suggestions.  Popular  theistic  thought 
is  crude  in  conception  and  cruder  still  in  expression ; 
and  its  anthropomorphism  readily  lends  itself  to  criti- 
cism. The  limitations  of  the  finite  are  thoughtlessly 
transferred  to  the  infinite.  Hasty  and  over-confident 
interpretations  of  the  divine  purposes  scandalize  more 
careful  thought.  Such  facts  have  produced  a  variety 
of  objections  of  some  plausibility  and  currency.  These 
we  proceed  to  consider. 

We  have  argued  that  there  is  no  explaining  the 
order  of  the  world  without  intelligence,  and  the  re- 
joinder is  made  that  there  is  no  explaining  it  with 
intelligence.  The  enormous  complexity  of  the  cosmic 
order  is  described,  and  we  are  asked  if  we  can  con- 
ceive that  all  this  is  carried  on  by  intelligence.  This 
objection,  though  urged  by  one  who  is  said  to  be  a 
great  philosophical  pillar,  is  simply  an  appeal  to  the 
weakness  of  our  imagination.  Of  course  we  cannot 
picture  the  process  in  detail,  or  represent  to  ourselves 
how  the  infinite  mind  can  conduct  the  ceaseless  and 
infinitely  complex  processes  of  natm-e  without  weari- 
ness or  confusion.  To  do  that  we  must  ourselves  be 
equal  to  the  task.  But  if  it  be  hard  to  see  how  intel- 
ligence could  do  it,  it  is  at  least  equally  hard  to  see 
how  non-intelligence  could  do  it.  For  us  the  alterna- 
tive must  always  lie  between  the  two,  with  the  ad- 
vantage ever  in  favor  of  the  former.  For  when  we 
ascribe  to  the  world-ground  omnipotence  and  omnis- 
cience, we  make  at  least  a  formal  provision  for  the 
case.  We  can  see  that  such  a  being  would  be  ade- 
quate to  the  task,  and  we  are  under  no  obligation 
to  tell  how  he  would  get  on  with  it.      That  is  his 


152  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   PERSONAL 

own  affair.  But  with  the  assertion  of  the  world- 
ground  as  non-intelligent,  we  fail  to  make  even  this 
formal  provision,  and  the  facts  remain  opaque  and 
unintelligible.  This,  apart  from  the  claim  of  episte- 
mology  that  the  facts  themselves  are  non-existent 
and  impossible  apart  from  intelligence. 

But  the  further  question  may  be  raised  whether  all 
the  objections  to  mechanical  explanation  as  logically 
empty  do  not  lie  equally  against  explanation  by  intel- 
ligence. Must  we  not  carry  all  effects  into  the  intel- 
ligent cause  as  well  as  into  the  mechanical  cause; 
and  is  not  the  result  equally  tautological  in  either 
case  ?  This  would  indeed  be  true  if  intelligence  were 
mechanically  conceived  and  subjected  to  the  imper- 
sonal principle  of  the  sufficient  reason.  On  that  view 
intelligence  itself  would  become  a  part  of  the  univer- 
sal mechanism,  and  thought  would  collapse.  We 
should  have  to  posit  an  inscrutable  sub-conscious 
mechanism  within  intelligence,  and  the  infinite  regress 
would  swallow  us  up.  But  in  truth  intelligence  is 
intelligence  only  as  free;  and  explanation  in  any 
fundamental  sense  consists  in  exhibiting  facts  as  the 
work  of  intelligence.  We  do  not  carry  the  facts  into 
intelligence  in  any  spatial  or  dynamic  sense ;  we  refer 
them  to  intelligence  as  their  source.  And  when 
we  can  thus  refer  them,  or  can  find  intelligence 
expressed  in  them,  we  regard  them  as  explained 
and  are  satisfied.  We  have  here  a  relation  that 
can  be  expressed  in  no  other  terms,  and  that  can  be 
known  only  in  experience.  To  attempt  to  trace  the 
facts  into  intelligence  in  any  other  sense  is  unintelli- 
gible in  the  first  place,  and  finally  ends  in  the  abyss 
of  the  infinite  regress.     Free  intelHgence  is  the  only 


THE   WORLD-GKOUND  AS   PERSONAL  153 

true  explanation  of  anything,  and  the  explanation 
consists  entirely  in  viewing  the  fact  as  the  work  of 
intelligence.  But  intelligence  itself  is  never  to  be 
explained;  it  is  rather  the  principle  of  all  explana- 
tion. It  explaius  other  things,  but  it  accepts  itself. 
It  knows  itself  not  by  deduction  from  something 
more  ultimate,  nor  by  reduction  to  something 
more  ultimate,  but  by  the  living  experience  of  itself. 
Here  experience  is  the  only  test  of  both  reality  and 
possibility.  The  thing  is  possible  because  it  is  a  fact. 
How  mind  can  be  and  work  there  is  no  telling,  and 
for  the  simple  and  sufficient  reason  that  there  is  no 
how  in  the  case.  The  ultimate  fact,  whatever  it  may 
be,  simply  is,  and  we  only  contradict  ourselves  when 
we  seek  to  refer  it  to  something  else.  But  mind  can 
be  and  work,  and  the  intelligible  order  of  things  re- 
sults. "Whether  we  are  better  satisfied,  or  have  more 
insight  into  the  nature  and  genesis  of  events,  when 
we  trace  them  to  their  origin  in  living  intelligence, 
than  when  we  leave  them  phases  of  a  mechanical 
movement,  is  simply  a  question  of  fact  which  admits 
of  little  doubt. 

We  have  also  said  that  the  world-ground  must  be 
intelligent  or  non-intelligent.  This  also  has  been  dis- 
puted on  the  ground  that  intelligence  and  non-intelli- 
gence do  not  form  a  complete  disjunction,  so  that 
there  may  be  a  third  something,  higher  than  either 
and  transcendental  to  both.  Is  it  not  possible, 
indeed,  considering  our  littleness  and  brevity,  is  it 
not  probable,  that  there  may  be  something  as  much 
higher  than  intelligence  as  intelligence  is  higher  than 
mechanism  ? 

This  claim  has  often  been  set  forth  as  something 


154  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   PERSONAL 

especially  profound,  and  as  vacating  both  theism  and 
atheism.  The  true  explanation  of  the  cosmos  is  to  be 
found  in  neither  intelligence  nor  non-intelligence,  but 
in  the  inscrutable  transcendental.  This  doctrine  has 
a  swelling  sound,  but  in  its  obvious  sense  it  is  empty 
of  the  slightest  substance.  The  speculative  fancy 
has  been  prolific  in  the  production  of  words  for  its 
expression,  but  they  are  purely  logical  sound  and 
fury,  signifying  nothing.  For  this  transcendental 
somewhat  is  not  a  thought  but  a  phrase.  It  exists 
solely  by  the  grace  of  language,  which  has  the 
unfortunate  property  of  making  it  possible  to  talk 
without  saying  anything.  To  appeal  to  it  is  not  to 
explain,  but  to  abandon  explanation.  Explanation 
must  always  be  in  intelligible  terms ;  and  as  in  our 
thought  the  intelligent  and  the  non-intelligent  com- 
prise all  existence,  any  true  explanation  must  be 
in  terms  of  one  or  the  other.  X  Y  Z  may  be  a 
very  profound  truth  in  the  realm  of  the  inscrutable, 
but  in  the  realm  of  intelligence  it  is  only  a  meaning- 
less group  of  letters. 

As  usual,  however,with  these  objections,  there  is  an 
ambiguity  here  which  makes  possible  a  permissible 
meaning,  but  one  which  reduces  the  objection  to  a 
commonplace.  Our  thought  contains  two  elements  : 
a  certain  rational  content  or  insight,  and  a  variety  of 
processes  by  which  this  insight  is  reached.  The 
former  is  the  universal  and  objective  element  of 
thought,  the  latter  may  be  formal  and  relative  to  us. 
Thus  in  geometry  the  universal  element  consists  in 
the  propositions,  which  may  be  true  for  all  intelli- 
gence. The  formal  element  consists  in  the  forms  of 
proof  and  ways  of  approaching  the  problems.     This 


THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   PERSONAL  155 

element  is  relative  to  ourselves,  and  can  lay  no 
claim  to  universality.  If  now  by  intelligence  we 
mean  our  methods  of  procedure,  the  devices  of  our 
discursive  reason,  the  shifts  of  our  imperfect  insight, 
there  may  well  be  something  higher  than  intelligence. 
The  community  and  universality  of  intelligence  or  of 
reason  do  not  consist  in  methods  or  processes,  but 
in  the  rational  contents.  But  this  conception  does 
not  give  us  something  above  intelligence  as  the  power 
of  rational  insight,  but  only  above  the  human  limita- 
tions of  intelligence.  And  this  claim  is  no  novelty, 
for  it  has  long  been  maintained  by  theism.  The 
Supreme  Person  has  generally  been  regarded  as 
intuitive,  in  distinction  from  the  discursiveness  of  the 
human  reason. 

But  admitting  the  intelligence  of  the  world-ground, 
its  personality,  it  is  said,  does  not  follow.  Many 
have  held  that  the  world-ground  is  intelligent  and 
rational  but  not  personal.  This  view  has  found 
expression  in  many  poetical,  or  rather  imaginative 
utterances  of  pantheism.  These  have  some  attrac- 
tion for  the  fancy,  but  most  of  them  offer  nothing  to 
the  intellect.  ,  Their  warrant,  such  as  it  is,  lies  partly 
in  popular  anthropomorphism  and  partly  in  misunder- 
stood speculative  principles. 

Some  have  proposed  to  conceive  the  world-ground 
as  a  double-faced  substance ;  on  the  one  side  exten- 
sion and  form,  and  on  the  other  side  life  and  reason. 
These  two  sides  constitute  the  reality  of  the  outer 
and  inner  worlds  respectively.  Here  the  implicit  aim 
is  to  escape  the  dualism  of  crude  realistic  thought  by 
bringing  the  world  of  thought  and  the  world  of  things 
together  as  modes  of  one  substance. 


156  THE  WORLD-GROUND   AS  PERSONAL 

This  conception  finds  expression  in  Spinoza  and  in 
many  modern  monistic  systems,  but  it  is  equally  a 
failure  in  all.  It  is  based  upon  the  antiquated  notion 
of  substance  as  extended  stuff,  and  upon  the  fictitious 
abstraction  "  Thought."  No  one  has  ever  succeeded 
in  forming  any  conception  of  what  a  double-faced  sub- 
stance might  mean.  The  imagination,  indeed,  masters 
the  problem  without  difiiculty.  A  thing  is  conceived 
with  two  sides,  and  one  side  is  called  thought;  but 
this  performance  is  not  finally  satisfactory.  Again 
the  relation  of  the  two  faces,  the  physical  and  the 
mental,  is  a  problem  that  has  not  received  its  solu- 
tion. If  the  two  go  along  in  complete  indepen- 
dence, there  is  nothing  in  the  physical  world,  on 
the  one  hand,  to  suggest  thought ;  and  there  is  noth- 
ing in  thought,  on  the  other  hand,  to  suggest  the 
physical  world.  An  outright  denial  of  the  latter 
would  be  the  immediate  result.  The  relation  of  the 
two  faces,  thought  and  extension,  to  the  thoughts 
and  extended  things  subsumed  under  them  is  left 
equally  obscure.  There  is  no  way  of  passing  from 
thought  and  extension  in  general  to  particular  thoughts 
and  things,  except  by  the  fallacy  of  the  universal. 
In  short,  this  doctrine  must  retreat  into  the  afiirma- 
tion  of  a  transcendental  something  above  thought 
and  extension ;  and  this  is  only  the  well-known 
phrase  to  which  there  is  no  corresponding  thought. 
It  belongs  to  the  picturings  of  the  imagination 
rather  than  to  the  conceptions  of  the  under- 
standing. 

Insight  into  the  emptiness  of  the  doctrine  of  a 
transcendental  X,  and  into  the  impossibility  of 
founding  the  system  in  simple  material  existence,  has 


THE   WORLD-GROUND  AS  PERSONAL  157 

led  many  to  give  another  form  to  their  non-theistic 
views.  The  world-ground  has  been  called  pure  will, 
unconscious  intelligence,  impersonal  reason,  imper- 
sonal spirit,  universal  life,  etc.  But  these  too  are 
empty  phrases,  obtained  by  unlawful  abstraction. 
For  Schopenhauer  the  world-ground  is  pure  will 
without  intellect  or  personality.  But  pure  will  is 
nothing.  Will  itself,  except  as  a  function  of  a  con- 
scious and  intelligent  spirit,  has  no  meaning.  When 
the  conscious  perception  of  ends  and  the  conscious 
determination  of  self  according  to  those  ends  are 
dropped,  there  is  nothing  remaining  that  deserves  to 
be  called  will.  We  may  befog  ourselves  with  words, 
but  the  conception  of  a  blind  and  necessary  force  is 
all  that  remains.  The  sole  advantage  of  the  psycho- 
logical term  is  that,  by  force  of  association,  it  is 
easier  to  overlook  the  purely  mechanical  nature  of 
the  doctrine  and  to  fancy  we  have  transcended 
mechanism. 

Unconscious  intelligence  is  an  oft-recurring  notion 
in  speculation.  The  anima  7imndi  of  the  Platonic 
physics  and  the  plastic  principle  of  Cudworth  are 
examples.  This  conception  has  often  found  a  place 
in  theistic  systems  from  a  desire,  first,  to  recognize 
something  higher  than  corpuscular  mechanics  in  the 
world  of  life,  and,  secondly,  to  free  God  from  the 
onerous  duty  of  administering  the  details  of  the  uni- 
verse. Cudworth's  plastic  force  has  a  "  drowsy, 
unawakened,  or  astonished  cogitation."  "  Whereas 
human  artists  are  often  to  seek  and  at  a  loss,  and 
therefore  consult  and  deliberate,  as  also  upon  second 
thoughts  mend  their  former  work,  nature,  on  the  con- 
trary, is  never  to  seek  what  to  do,  nor  at  a  stand," 


158  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   PERSONAL 

"it  never  consults  nor  deliberates,  never  repents 
nor  goes  about,  as  it  were,  on  second  thoughts,  to  alter 
and  mend  its  former  course."  At  the  same  time  this 
nature  is  no  rival  to  God,  but  simply  a  subordinate, 
commissioned  to  look  after  the  execution  of  what  God 
has  decreed. 

Hartmann,  in  his  "  Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious," 
has  extended  this  notion  of  unconscious  intelligence 
to  the  world-ground  itself.  Against  atheism  he  af- 
firms its  intelligence ;  against  theism  he  affirms 
its  unconsciousness.  The  lack  of  consciousness  is 
declared  to  be  an  advantage ;  and  many  things  are 
said  about  the  "  clairvoyance  "  of  the  absolute  as  it 
moves  unerringly  to  its  unconscious  goal.  But  this 
is  only  rhetorical  ambiguity.  Consciousness  has  a 
social  use  which  makes  it  the  equivalent  of  embar- 
rassment. In  habitual  activities  also  we  often  say 
we  are  unconscious,  when  all  that  is  meant  is  that  we 
act  without  analytic  reflection  upon  our  work.  Such 
reflection  again  would  often  be  a  hindrance.  But  all 
this  is  irrelevant  to  the  psychological  use  of  the  term 
as  the  antithesis  of  non-consciousness.  In  this  sense 
we  must  declare  the  phrase,  unconscious  intelligence, 
a  contradiction.  Only  one  clear  thought  can  be 
joined  to  it,  namely,  that  of  blind  forces  which  are 
not  intelligent  at  all,  but  which,  nevertheless,  work 
to  produce  intelligible  results. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  phrase,  impersonal  reason. 
Reason  itself  is  a  pure  abstraction  which  is  realized 
only  in  conscious  spirits ;  and  when  we  abstract  from 
these  all  that  constitutes  them  conscious  persons  there 
is  nothing  intelligible  left.  By  impersonal  reason 
also  we  could  only  mean  a  blind  force  which  is  not 


THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   PERSONAL  159 

reason,  but  which  is  adjusted  to  the  production  of 
rational  results.  In  this  sense  any  machine  has 
impersonal  reason. 

As  with  Schopenhauer's  pure  will,  so  with  uncon- 
scious intelligence  and  impersonal  reason,  it  is  simply 
the  use  of  psj^chological  terms  with  their  associations 
that  leads  us  to  fancy  we  have  advanced  beyond 
mechanical  atheism. 

Instinct  is  the  standing  illustration  of  unconscious 
intelligence  and  impersonal  reason,  but  it  fails  to 
illustrate.  For  in  the  first  place  no  one  knows 
what  instinct  is.  It  is  no  positive  conception  what- 
ever, but  rather  the  union  of  two  negations.  It  is 
not  conscious  intelligence,  on  the  one  hand,  and  it 
is  not  mere  mechanism,  on  the  other.  If  we  ask 
what  it  is,  we  get  no  answer.  If  we  ask  for  some 
proof  that  it  exists  at  all,  we  still  get  no  answer. 
The  real  problem  is  to  explain  the  so-called  instinctive 
acts  of  the  lower  animals,  and  there  is  no  explanation 
in  referring  them  to  something  we  know  not  what. 
Here  as  elsewhere  we  have  only  the  two  principles  of 
intelligence  or  mechanism  by  which  to  account  for 
the  facts.  If,  then,  instinctive  acts  are  not  performed 
with  purpose  and  consciousness,  they  are  not  outcomes 
of  intelligence  at  all,  but  of  a  mechanical  necessity 
which  mimics  intelligence.  This  necessity  may  lie 
in  the  constitution  of  the  agent,  or  in  its  physical 
structure,  or  in  the  relations  of  both  to  surround- 
ings ;  but  in  any  case  there  is  no  intelligence  in 
play,  unless  it  be  the  intelligence  of  the  Creator 
upon  which  the  necessity  itself  depends.  On  this 
view  the  so-called  instinctive  acts  would  be  simply 
the  resultant  of  the  highly  complex  adaptation  of 


160  THE   WORLD-GROUND  AS   PERSONAL 

the    creature    to    its    environment.      Instinct    itself 
would  be  nothing. 

To  a  mind  which  has  not  learned  that  all  fruitful 
thinking  must  be  in  intelligible  terms,  this  must  seem 
very  dogmatic.  Who  can  fix  the  limits  of  the  awful 
Possible  ?  The  answer  is  that  our  affair  is  not  with 
the  awful  Possible,  but  with  the  much  humbler  prob- 
lem of  finding  that  conception  of  the  world-ground 
which  will  make  the  universe  most  intelligible  to  us. 
And  for  this  sane  state  of  mind,  intelligence  and  rea- 
son are  such  only  as  they  are  guided  by  ends ;  and 
a  guidance  by  ends  means  nothing  except  as  those 
ends  are  present  in  consciousness  as  ideal  aims.  When 
this  is  not  the  case,  we  have  neither  reason  nor  intelli- 
gence, but  only  necessary  agency  which  may  mimic 
rational  activity. 

The  meaning  of  the  previous  doctrines  may  be 
summed  up  in  the  notion  of  an  impersonal  spirit, 
which  is  the  ground  of  all  existence,  and  which  comes 
to  consciousness  only  in  finite  spirits.  But  this,  too, 
is  more  easily  said  than  understood.  In  fact  it  is 
simply  atheism  under  another  name.  What  the  athe- 
ist calls  persistent  force  or  the  fundamental  reality, 
is  here  called  impersonal  spirit ;  but  the  meaning  is 
in  both  cases  the  same.  Both  alike  understand  by 
the  terms  that  blind  and  necessary  reality  which 
underlies  all  phenomena,  and  which,  in  its  necessary 
on-goings,  brings  to  life  and  death.  But  as  the  new 
phrase  implies  the  old  thing,  we  need  not  consider 
it  further.  We  conclude  that  if  the  world-ground  be 
intelligent  and  rational,  it  must  also  be  conscious  and 
personal. 

And  this  brings  us  to  the  alleged  antinomy  of 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  PERSONAL  161 

theistic  thought.  These  theistic  predicates  of  con- 
sciousness, intelligence,  and  personality,  are  appar- 
ently incompatible  with  the  absoluteness  and  infinity 
of  the  world-ground  on  which  speculation  insists. 
The  former  involve  finitude  and  otherness  and  can 
never  be  combined  with  the  latter  without  mutual 
destruction. 

In  such  straits  the  first  thing  to  do  is  to  define 
our  terms.  Intelligence  has  been  defined  as  an 
adjustment  of  inner  relations  to  outer  relations,  thus 
making  it  a  developing  and  finite  thing.  In  this 
sense  of  course  intelligence  could  not  be  affirmed  of 
an  infinite  and  absolute  being.  But  intelligence  as 
the  power  to  know,  which  is  the  real  gist  and  essence 
of  the  matter,  might  well  be  thus  affirmed.  This 
power  to  know  is  not  a  limitation  but  a  perfection.  The 
inability  to  know  would  be  the  real  limitation  and 
imperfection.  When,  then,  intelligence  is  denied  of 
the  world-ground  on  the  score  of  the  latter's  abso- 
luteness, we  assent  if  by  intelligence  we  mean  the 
partisan  definition  of  a  philosophical  sect  as  the  ad- 
justment of  inner  relations  to  outer  relations  ;  but  we 
demur  if  by  intelligence  be  meant  the  simple  power 
to  know. 

In  affirming  personality  also,  we  must  distinguish 
it  from  corporeality  and  from  form  of  any  sort.  Pop- 
ular religious  thought  always  seeks  to  picture  its  con- 
ceptions, and  popular  religious  speech  always  falls 
back  on  spatial  and  corporeal  elements  as  aids  to 
expression.  Hence  there  will  always  be  a  need  of 
wise  pedagogical  counsel  to  restrain  the  undue  anthro- 
pomorphism of  uncritical  thinking;  and  the  critics 
themselves  have  not  yet  outgrown  the  need.     For  a 


162  THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  PERSONAL 

large  part  of  their  objections  are  directed  against  a 
crude  anthropomorphism  of  speech  without  penetra- 
ting to  the  essential  meaning.  The  confusion  of  per- 
sonality with  corporeality  underlies  the  traditional 
criticism,  dating  back  to  Xenophanes,  that  speculat- 
ing cattle  would  infer  a  God  like  themselves.  Oxen, 
buffaloes,  and  even  watches  have  been  used  to  illus- 
trate this  profoimd  objection.  Yet  if  a  speculative 
watch  should  conclude,  not  to  springs,  levers,  and 
escapements,  but  to  intelligence  in  its  maker,  it  would 
not  seem  to  be  very  far  astray.  By  personality,  then, 
we  mean  only  self-knowledge  and  self-control.  Where 
these  are  present  we  have  personal  being ;  where  they 
are  absent  the  being  is  impersonal.  Selfhood,  self- 
knowledge  and  self- direction  are  the  essence  of  per- 
sonality; and  these  have  no  implication  of  corporeality 
I  or  dependent  limitation. 

In  like  manner  the  terms  absolute  and  infinite  need 
definition.  Some  of  the  most  extraordinary  verbal- 
isms in  the  history  of  philosophy  are  found  in  con- 
nection with  these  terms.  Thus  it  has  been  maintained 
that  the  world-ground  is  no  object  of  thought  what- 
ever, and  hence  cannot  be  thought  of  as  personal  or 
impersonal,  as  intelligent  or  non-intelligent.  The 
reason  is  found  in  the  mutual  contradictions  alleged 
to  exist  between  the  necessary  attributes  of  the  fun- 
damental being.  Thus  we  must  regard  it  as  self- 
centered,  and  hence  absolute;  as  unlimited  by  anything 
beyond  itself,  and  hence  infinite ;  and  as  world-ground, 
that  is,  as  first  cause.  But  while  we  are  shut  up  by 
thought  to  these  admissions,  we  are  equally  shut  out 
from  them  by  their  mutual  contradiction.  For  the 
first  cause,  as  such,  exists  only  in  relation  to  the  effect. 


THE  WORLD-GROUND   AS  PERSONAL  163 

If  it  had  no  effect,  it  would  not  be  cause.  Hence  the 
first  cause  is  necessarily  related  to  its  effect;  and 
hence  it  cannot  be  absolute ;  for  the  absolute  exists 
out  of  all  relations.  The  absolute  cannot  be  a  cause, 
and  the  cause  cannot  be  absolute.  Nor  can  we  help 
ourselves  by  the  idea  of  time,  as  if  the  world-ground 
first  existed  as  absolute,  and  then  became  a  cause ; 
for  the  other  notion  of  the  infinite  bars  our  way. 
That  which  passes  into  new  modes  of  existence  either 
surpasses  or  sinks  below  itself,  and  in  either  case  can- 
not be  infinite,  for  the  infinite  must  always  comprise 
all  possible  modes  of  existence.  Hence  we  have  in 
these  necessary  attributes  a  disheartening,  and  even 
sickening,  contradiction  which  shatters  all  our  pre- 
tended knowledge. 

If  this  argument  had  not  passed  for  important,  we 
should  refer  to  it  only  with  expressions  of  apology. 
In  itself  it  is  mainly  a  play  on  words.  Etymologi- 
cally  the  above  meanings  may  be  tortured  out  of  the 
terms.  The  infinite  may  be  taken  as  the  quantitative 
all ;  the  absolute  may  be  taken  as  the  unrelated ; 
and  then  the  conclusions  follow.  The  infinite  as 
quantitative  all  must,  of  course, be  all-embracing.  Out- 
side of  the  all  there  can  be  nothing ;  and  if  the  all 
must  comprehend  all  possible  modes  of  existence  at 
all  times,  it  cannot  change;  and  the  universe  is 
brought  to  the  rigid  monotony  of  the  Eleatics.  It  is 
equally  easy  to  show  that  the  absolute  cannot  be 
related  when  we  define  it  as  the  unrelated.  But  all 
this  wisdom  disappears  when  we  remember  the 
philosophical  meaning  of  the  terms.  Both  absolute 
and  infinite  mean  only  the  independent  ground  of 
things.     Relative  existence  is  that  which  exists  only 


164  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   PERSONAL 

in  relation  to  other  things.  Both  the  ground  and 
form  of  its  existence  are  bound  up  in  its  relations. 
Such  relations  are  restrictions,  and  imply  dependence. 
But  absoluteness  denies  this  restriction  and  depend- 
ence. The  absolute  may  exist  in  relations,  provided 
those  relations  are  freely  posited  by  itself,  and  are 
not  forced  upon  it  from  without.  The  infinite,  again, 
is  not  the  quantitative  all.  This  "  all "  is  purely  a 
mental  product  which  represents  nothing  apart  from 
our  thought.  The  world-ground  is  called  infinite, 
because  it  is  believed  to  be  the  independent  somce  of 
the  finite  and  its  limitations,  yet  without  being  bound 
by  them  except  in  the  sense  of  logical  consistency. 
But  in  this  sense  the  notions  of  the  absolute  and 
infinite  are  so  far  from  incompatible  that  they  mutu- 
ally imply  each  other,  or  are  but  diiferent  aspects  of 
the  same  thing.  The  infinite  would  not  be  infinite  if 
it  were  not  absolute ;  and  neither  infinite  nor  abso- 
lute would  be  anything  if  it  were  not  a  cause. 

Here,  then,  we  have  an  absolute  and  independent 
being,  the  source  of  all  finite  things,  and  of  all  power 
and  knowledge.  Now  that  the  ability  to  know  itself 
and  what  it  is  doing  should  be  denied  to  this  source 
of  all  power  and  knowledge  is  a  denial  so  amazing  as 
to  require  the  best  reasons  to  support  it.  It  is  really 
one  of  the  most  extraordinary  inversions  in  specula- 
tion, and  a  striking  example  of  the  havoc  which  can 
be  wrought  by  using  words  without  attending  to 
their  meaning. 

And  first  it  is  said  that  all  consciousness  involves 
the  distinction  of  subject  and  object,  and  hence  is 
impossible  to  an  isolated  and  single  being.  It  is, 
then,   incompatible   with   both   the    infinity   of    the 


THE  WORLD-GROUND   AS   PERSONAL  165 

world-ground  and  with  its  singleness.  As  infinite  it 
can  have  nothing  beyond  itself,  and  as  only  it  can 
have  no  object.  But  this  claim  mistakes  a  mental 
form  for  an  ontological  distinction.  The  object  in 
all  consciousness  is  always  only  our  presentations,  and 
not  something  ontologically  diverse  from  the  mind 
itself.  These  presentations  may  stand  for  things, 
but  consciousness  extends  only  to  the  presentations. 
In  self -consciousness  this  is  manifestly  the  case.  Here 
consciousness  is  a  consciousness  of  our  own  states, 
thoughts,  etc.,  as  our  own.  The  Infinite,  then,  need 
not  have  something  other  than  himself  as  his  object, 
but  may  find  the  object  in  his  own  activities,  cosmic 
or  otherwise. 

This  fact  contains  the  answer  to  another  form  of 
objection.  The  ego  and  non-ego  are  said  to  be  two 
correlative  notions,  neither  of  which  has  any  meaning 
apart  from  the  other.  Hence  the  conception  of  the 
self  can  arise  only  as  the  conception  of  the  not-self 
arises  with  it ;  and  hence,  again,  self-consciousness 
is  possible  only  for  finite  beings  who  are  limited 
by  a  not-self. 

It  is  only  with  effort  that  one  can  believe  the  first 
part  of  this  claim  to  be  seriously  made.  Two  notions 
whose  meaning  consists  in  denying  each  other  are 
pure  negations  without  any  positive  content.  Thus, 
A  is  not-^,  and  B  is  not-^  ;  and  hence  A  is  not-not- 
A,  and  B  is  not-not-^.  We  end  where  we  began. 
To  make  any  sense  one  of  the  notions  must  have  a 
positive  meaning  independent  of  the  other.  And  in 
the  case  of  ego  and  the  non-ego,  it  is  plain  which  is 
the  positive  notion.  The  ego  is  the  immediately 
experienced  self,  and  the  non-ego  is  originally  only 

THEISM 12 


166  THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  PERSONAL 

the  sum  of  mental  presentations,  or  that  which 
the  ego  sets  over  against  itself  in  consciousness  as 
its  object.  Secondarily,  the  non-ego  comes  to  mean 
whatever  is  excluded  from  the  conscious  self.  Each 
person  sets  all  his  objects,  whether  persons  or  things, 
over  against  himself,  and  they  constitute  the  non-ego 
for  him.  By  overlooking  this  ambiguity,  some  spec- 
ulators have  proved  a  rich  variety  of  truths.  Ideal- 
ism has  been  confounded  by  pointing  out  that 
consciousness  demands  an  object  as  well  as  a  subject, 
and  thus  the  reality  of  matter  has  been  solidly  estab- 
lished. Consciousness  demands  a  non-ego,  and  is  not 
matter  preeminently  a  non-ego  ! 

The  further  claim  that  the  conception  of  self  can 
arise  only  as  the  conception  of  a  not-self  accompanies 
it  is  but  a  repetition  of  the  preceding  objection  con- 
cerning the  ego  and  non-ego.  Consciousness  does 
involve  the  coexistence  of  these  conceptions  as  the 
form  under  which  consciousness  arises,  but  not  as 
things  ontologically  diverse.  The  distinction  of  sub- 
ject and  object,  on  which  consciousness  depends,  is 
Vonly  a  mental  function,  and  not  an  ontological  distinc- 
tion. The  possibility  of  personality  or  self-conscious- 
ness in  no  way  depends  on  the  existence  of  a 
substantial  not-self,  bvit  only  on  the  ability  of  the 
subject  to  grasp  its  states,  thoughts,  etc.,  as  its  own. 
It  is,  indeed,  true  that  om-  consciousness  begins,  and 
that  it  is  conditioned  by  the  activity  of  something  not 
ourselves ;  but  it  does  not  lie  in  the  notion  of  con- 
sciousness that  it  must  begin,  or  that  it  must  be 
aroused  from  without.  An  eternal,  unbegun  self  is  as 
possible  as  an  eternal,  unbegim  not-self.  Eternal 
consciousness  is  no  more  difficult  than  eternal  uncon- 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  PERSONAL  167 

sciousness;  and  withal,  if  unconsciousness  had  ever 
been  absolute  there  is  no  way  of  reaching  conscious- 
ness. In  addition,  all  the  skeptical  difficulties  which 
attend  that  view  crowd  upon  us.  Hence  to  the  ques- 
tion. What  is  the  object  of  the  Infinite's  conscious- 
ness ?  the  answer  is,  The  Infinite  himself,  his  thoughts, 
states,  etc.  To  the  question.  When  did  this  con- 
sciousness begin?  the  answer  is.  Never.  To  the 
question.  On  what  does  this  consciousness  depend?, 
the  answer  is.  On  the  Infinite's  own  power  to 
know. 

On  all  these  accounts  we  regard  the  objections  to 
the  personality  of  the  world-ground  as  resting  on  a 
very  superficial  psychology.  So  far  as  they  are  not 
verbal,  they  arise  from  taking  the  limitations  of 
hiunan  consciousness  as  essential  to  consciousness  in 
general.  In  fact  we  must  reverse  the  common  specu- 
lative dogma  on  this  point,  and  declare  that  proper 
personality  is  possible  only  to  the  Absolute.  The 
very  objections  urged  against  the  personality  of  the 
Absolute  show  the  incompleteness  of  human  personal- 
ity. Thus  it  is  said,  truly  enough,  that  we  are  condi- 
tioned by  something  not  ourselves.  The  outer  world 
is  an  important  factor  in  our  mental  life.  It  controls 
us  far  more  than  we  do  it.  But  this  is  a  limitation 
of  our  personality  rather  than  its  source.  Our  person- 
ality would  be  heightened  rather  than  diminished,  if  we 
were  self-determinant  in  this  respect.  Again,  in  our 
inner  life  we  find  similar  limitations.  We  cannot 
always  control  our  ideas.  They  often  seem  to  be 
occurrences  in  us  rather  than  our  own  doing.  The 
past  vanishes  beyond  recall ;  and  often  in  the  present 
we  are  more  passive  than  active.     But  these,  also,  are 


168  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   PERSONAL 

limitations  of  our  personality.  We  should  be  much 
more  truly  persons  if  we  were  absolutely  determinant 
of  all  our  states.  But  we  have  seen  that  all  finite 
things  have  the  ground  of  their  existence,  not  in 
themselves,  but  in  the  Infinite,  and  that  they  owe 
their  peculiar  nature  to  their  mutual  relations  and  to 
the  plan  of  the  whole.  Hence,  in  the  finite  conscious- 
ness, there  will  always  be  a  foreign  element,  an 
external  compulsion,  a  passivity  as  well  as  activity,  a 
dependence  on  something  not  ourselves,  and  a  corre- 
sponding subjection.  Hence  in  us  personality  will 
always  be  incomplete.  The  absolute  knowledge  and 
self-possession  which  are  necessary  to  perfect  personal- 
ity can  be  found  only  in  the  absolute  and  infinite 
being  upon  whom  all  things  depend.  In  his  pure 
self-determination  and  perfect  self-possession  only  do 
we  find  the  conditions  of  complete  personality ;  and 
of  this  our  finite  personality  can  never  be  more  than 
the  feeblest  and  faintest  image. 

In  addition  to  these  psychological  misunderstandings, 
a  logical  aberration  is  also  latent  in  the  attempts  to 
trace  the  personal  to  the  impersonal.  The  law  of  the 
sufficient  reason,  when  uncritically  handled,  is  al- 
ways tempting  us  to  explain  the  explanation,  thus 
committing  us  to  the  infinite  regress.  Under  this 
illusion  we  try  to  get  behind  intelligence,  or  to 
exhibit  it  as  something  welling  up  from  impersonal 
depths  beneath  it.  This  is  fictitious.  When  we 
have  reached  intelligence  the  regress  must  end. 
Further  inquiry  must  concern  the  purpose  of  intelli- 
gence. When  we  look  for  something  beneath  intelli- 
gence, we  merely  leave  the  supreme  and  self-sufficient 


THE  world-grou:nd  as  personal         169 

category  of  personality  for  the  lower  mechanical  cate- 
gories, which  are  possible  only  in  and  through  intel- 
ligence. The  law  of  the  sufficient  reason  is  a  most 
excellent  principle ;  but  of  itself  it  does  not  tell  us 
what  can  be  a  sufficient  reason.  Reflection  shows 
that  only  living  intelligence  can  be  a  sufficient  reason  ; 
and  logic  forbids  us  to  ask  a  sufficient  reason  for  a 
sufficient  reason.  Intelligence,  as  we  have  said,  ex- 
plains other  things  as  its  own  work,  and  accepts 
itself 

Furthermore,  metaphysics  shows  the  contradiction 
inherent  in  the  notion  of  impersonal  existence.  Con- 
scious thought  is  seen  to  be  the  supreme  condition  of 
all  existence.  The  reconciliation  of  change  and  iden- 
tity, without  which  both  thought  and  being  perish,  is 
found  only  in  conscious  thought  The  rescue  of  reality 
from  fatal  dispersion  through  the  infinite  divisibility 
of  space  and  time  is  possible  only  through  conscious 
thought.  On  the  impersonal  plane  all  the  categories 
either  vanish  or  deny  themselves.  The  universe  of 
experience  has  no  meaning  or  possibility  apart  from 
conscious  intelligence  as  its  abiding  source  or  seat. 
Thus  once  more  we  are  compelled  to  reverse  the  spec- 
ulative dogma  that  personality  is  second  and  not  first, 
and  say  that  living,  personal  intelligence  is  the  only 
possible  first. 

All  this  we  may  hold  with  firm  conviction.  At 
the  same  time  we  must  recognize  that  a  true  feeling 
underlies  many  of  these  objections,  and  guard  our- 
selves against  a  superficial  anthropomorphism  in  our 
theistic  doctrine.  First  of  all  we  must  beware  of 
hasty  and  over-confident  interpretations  of  the  design 
in  things.     Epistemology  compels  us  to  affirm  final- 


170  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   PERSONAL 

ity  as  the  essential  form  of  cosmic  causality,  but  this 
does  not  imply  that  we  can  always  trace  this  finality. 
On  the  contrary,  experience  shows  that  we  are  largely 
unable  to  trace  the  purpose  in  cosmic  arrangements 
and  events.  In  such  cases  we  must  content  ourselves 
with  finding  the  laws  of  coexistence  and  sequence,  and 
must  wait  for  further  insight.  Again,  in  a  complex 
system  the  essential  purpose  can  be  known  only  from 
a  knowledge  of  the  whole  ;  and  in  that  case  it  is  easy 
to  mistake  partial  purposes  for  finalities,  or  to  make 
some  relative  convenience  of  our  own  a  standard  of 
judgment.  It  is  well  known  that  not  a  little  of  the 
prejudice  against  final  causes  is  due  to  the  absurdities 
into  which  men  have  fallen  in  their  interpretation. 
We  are  in  this  matter  where  the  intelligent  Christian 
is  with  reference  to  the  belief  in  a  divine  guidance 
of  our  lives.  It  is  something  believed  in,  but  also 
something  which  can  be  only  very  imperfectly  traced. 
In  both  cases,  also,  too  exact  and  extended  specification 
is  likely  to  lead  to  intellectual  scandal. 

Further,  we  must  bear  in  mind  the  distinction 
made  in  the  last  chapter  between  the  purpose  of 
things  and  the  way  in  which  they  come  about  as 
events  in  space  and  time.  Failure  to  regard  this  dis- 
tinction is  the  great  source  of  the  aversion  of  science 
to  teleology.  Thus  two  distinct  inquiries,  both  neces- 
sary for  our  complete  mental  satisfaction,  are  confused, 
and  needless  hostility  results. 

And  finally  we  must  beware  of  easy  anthropo- 
morphism in  our  thought  of  the  infinite  mind.  Of 
course  we  can  think  at  all  only  as  we  assimilate  that 
mind  to  our  own ;  but  a  little  reflection  warns  us 
against  transferring  our  finite  peculiarities  and  limita- 


THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   PERSONAL  171 

tions  without  careful  inspection.  A  thought  life  so 
different  from  ours  eludes  any  but  the  vaguest  appre- 
hension on  our  part.  Its  unchanging  fullness  yet 
without  monotony,  the  structure  of  the  absolute  rea- 
son also  which  determines  the  eternal  contents  of  the 
divine  thought,  the  timeless  and  absolute  self-posses- 
sion—  how  mysterious  all  this  is,  how  impenetrable 
to  our  profoundest  reflection.  We  can  see  that  these 
affirmations  must  be  made,  but  we  also  see  that  in  a 
sense  they  must  always  lie  beyond  us.  Here  we  reach 
a  point  where  the  speculation  of  philosophy  must  give 
place  to  the  worship  and  adoration  of  religion. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  THE  WORLD- 
GROUND 

Our  speculative  conception  of  the  world-ground 
begins  to  approximate  to  the  religious  conception 
of  God.  A  great  variety  of  influences,  instinctive, 
speculative,  and  ethical,  have  led  the  human  mind  to 
build  up  the  conception  of  a  personal  and  intelligent 
God ;  and  this  view,  when  criticised,  not  only  proves 
able  to  maintain  itself,  but  also  appears  as  a  demand 
and  implication  of  reason  itself.  The  race,  however, 
has  not  contented  itself  with  this  bare  affirmation, 
but,  by  an  intellectual  labor  extending  over  centuries, 
has  sought  to  determine  more  closely  the  content  of 
its  theistic  thought.  These  determinations  fall  into 
two  classes,  metaphysical  and  ethical.  The  former 
aim  to  tell  what  God  is  by  virtue  of  his  position  as 
first  cause,  and  the  second  relate  to  his  character. 
Or  the  former  refer  to  the  divine  nature,  the  latter  to 
the  divine  will.  Beyond  this  distinction,  the  various 
classifications  of  the  divine  attributes  in  which  dog- 
matic theology  abounds  have  no  significance  for  either 
speculative  or  religious  thought.  We  pass  now  to 
consider  the  leading  metaphysical  attributes  as  belong- 
ing to  the  world-ground.  The  result  will  be  to  show 
a  still  closer  approximation  of  religious  and  specula- 

172 


UNITY  173 

tive  thought.     We  begin  also  to  use  the  terms,  God 
and  world-ground,  as  interchangeable. 

Unity 

The  unity  of  the  world-ground  is  the  first  of  these 
metaphysical  attributes;  and  the  necessity  of  its 
affirmation  is  found  in  a  study  of  interaction  But 
necessary  as  it  is,  its  meaning  is  not  always  clearly 
grasped.  We  need,  then,  to  inquire  of  metaphysics 
what  is  meant  by  the  unity  of  being  in  general. 

In  afiirming  unity  of  a  thing  the  primal  aim  is  to 
deny  composition  and  divisibility.  A  compound  is 
not  a  thing  but  an  aggregate.  The  reality  is  the 
component  factors.  The  thought  of  a  compound  is 
impossible  without  the  assumption  of  units ;  and  if 
these  are  compounds,  we  must  assume  other  units ;  and 
so  on  until  we  come  to  ultimate  and  uncompounded 
units.  These  are  the  true  realities.  Hence,  the 
divisible  is  never  a  proper  thing,  but  a  sum  or  a 
crowd.  When,  then,  we  say  that  a  thing  is  a  unit, 
we  mean  first  of  all  that  it  is  not  compounded,  and 
does  not  admit  of  division.  Hence  the  doctrine  of 
the  unity  of  the  world-ground  is  first  of  all  a  denial 
of  composition  and  divisibility.  There  can  be  neither 
unity  nor  plurality  in  any  scheme  that  admits  of 
infinite  divisibility ;  for  instance,  in  any  scheme  that 
affirms  the  substantial  reality  of  space  and  time. 

Unity  has  sometimes  been  taken  to  mean  simpli- 
city, or  the  opposite  of  complexity  and  variety. 
Herbart  especially  has  identified  them,  and  has  de- 
clared that  unity  of  the  subject  is  incompatible  with 
plurality   of   attributes.     The   same  view  has  often 


174  METAPHYSICAL    ATTRIBUTES 

appeared  in  treating  of  the  divine  unity.  This  has 
been  conceived  as  pure  simplicity;  and  thus  the 
divine  being  has  been  reduced  to  a  rigid  and  lifeless 
stare.  This  view  brings  thought  to  a  standstill ;  for 
the  one,  conceived  as  pure  simplicity,  leads  to  nothing 
and  explains  nothing.  It  contains  no  ground  of 
differentiation  and  progress.  So,  then,  there  is  a 
very  general  agreement  that  the  unity  of  the  world- 
ground  must  contain  some  provision  for  manifoldness 
and  complexity. 

The  history  of  thought  shows  a  curious  uncertainty 
at  this  point.  On  the  one  hand,  there  has  been  a 
universal  demand  for  unity  with  a  very  general  failure 
to  reach  it.  And  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  unity  has 
been  reached,  there  has  been  quite  as  general  an 
inability  to  make  any  use  of  it.  This  is  a  necessary 
result  of  thinking  only  under  mechanical  conditions. 
In  such  thinking,  when  we  begin  with  a  plurality,  we 
never  escape  it,  for  mechanical  necessity  cannot 
differentiate  itself.  If  we  trace  the  plurality  to  some 
one  being,  we  are  forced  to  carry  the  plurality  im- 
plicitly into  the  unity,  as  there  is  no  way  of  mechani- 
cally deducing  plurality  from  unity.  But  in  that  case, 
though  we  confidently  talk  about  unity,  we  are  quite 
unable  to  tell  in  what  the  unity  of  such  a  being  con- 
sists. If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  assume  the  unity, 
we  are  unable  to  take  one  step  toward  plurality. 
The  all-embracing  unity  refuses  to  differentiate  or  to 
move  at  all. 

This  puzzle  can  be  solved  only  by  leaving  the 
mechanical  realm  for  that  of  free  intellect.  The 
free  and  conscious  self  is  the  only  real  unity  of  which 
we  have  any  knowledge,  and  reflection  shows  that  it 


UNITY  175 

is  the  only  thing  which  can  be  a  true  unity.  All 
other  unities  are  formal,  and  have  only  a  mental 
existence.  Space  and  time  contain  no  unity ;  and 
spatial  and  temporal  existence  disappears  in  infinite 
divisibility.  But  free  intelligence  by  its  originating 
activity  can  posit  plurality  distinct  from  its  own 
unity,  and  by  its  self-consciousness  can  maintain 
its  unity  and  identity  over  against  the  changing 
plurality.  Here  the  one  is  manifold  without  being 
many.  Here  unity  gives  birth  to  plurality  without 
destroying  itself.  Here  the  identical  changes  and 
yet  abides.  But  this  perennial  wonder  is  possible 
only  on  the  plane  of  free  and  self-conscious  intelli- 
gence. For  mechanical  thinking  the  problem  admits 
only  of  verbal  solutions. 

We  see,  then,  that  while  it  is  easy  to  talk  of  unity, 
it  is  by  no  means  so  easy  to  reach  it.  Abstract  reflec- 
tion reveals  the  difficulty  of  the  notion  ;  only  personal 
experience  of  living  intelligence  presents  any  real 
unity  and  solves  the  problem. 

So  much  for  the  metaphysics  of  unity.  Probably, 
however,  the  thought  most  generally  connected  with 
the  divine  unity  is  not  so  much  that  God  is  one 
as  that  God  is  only.  Hence  the  doctrine  has  been 
always  monotheism,  and  not  heno theism.  The  his- 
toric influences  which  have  led  to  this  monotheistic 
faith  are  manifold ;  and  its  speculative  necessity  is 
stringent.  The  thought  of  many  gods,  each  of  which 
should  live  in  a  world  by  himself,  or  rather,  in  a  uni- 
verse of  his  own,  is  a  pure  fancy  due  to  the  abstract- 
ing and  hypostasizing  tendency  of  the  mind.  If 
they  should  meet  and  interact  in  a  common  universe, 
they  would  necessarily  become  finite  and  conditioned 


176  METAPHYSICAL   ATTRIBUTES 

beings  in  mutual  interaction,  and  hence  not  independ- 
ent and  self -existent.  The  discussion  of  the  unity 
of  the  world-ground  has  shown  that  all  things  which 
are  bound  up  in  a  scheme  of  interaction  must  have 
their  existence  in  some  one  being  on  which  they 
depend.  This  being  founds  the  system,  and  all  that 
is  in  the  system  flows  from  it.  But  we  are  able  to 
form  general  notions,  and  then  to  conceive  an  indefinite 
number  of  members  of  the  class.  We  do  the  same 
with  the  universe  and  the  fundamental  being.  We 
form  the  notions,  and  then  fancy  that  there  may  be 
other  universes  and  other  fundamental  realities.  But 
plainly  such  fancies  are  mental  fictions.  The  actual 
universe,  whereby  we  mean  the  total  system  of  the 
finite,  must  be  referred  to  the  one  world-ground. 
The  imaginary  systems  need  nothing  for  their  expla- 
nation beyond  the  somewhat  unclear  mind  that  forms 
them  and  mistakes  them  for  realities.  If  one  should 
ask  how  we  know  that  there  may  not  be  something 
entirely  independent  of  our  system  and  totally  un- 
related to  it,  the  answer  would  be  that  our  business 
is  with  the  actual  universe,  and  does  not  include  the 
disproof  of  chimeras.  This  only  may  be  allowed. 
If  by  universe  we  mean  the  system  of  sense-perceptions 
in  an  idealistic  sense,  the  one  world-ground  may 
maintain  a  series  of  such  systems.  In  this  sense  a 
number  of  universes  would  be  possible,  but  the  unity 
and  singleness  of  the  fundamental  reality  would  still 
be  necessary. 

This  fact  has  often  been  disregarded  in  speculation. 
Not  a  few  have  been  pleased  to  regard  space,  time, 
and  God  as  mutually  independent  existences,  or 
rather  to  make  space  and  time  into  preexistent  ne- 


UNCHANGEABILITY  177 

cessities  to  which  God  himself  must  submit.  How 
these  independent  and  unrelated  existences  could  be 
brought  into  mutual  relations  is  a  problem  left  un- 
solved. Such  notions  spring  from  a  very  superficial 
metaphysics. 

The  unity  of  the  w^orld-ground  means,  then,  not 
only  that  it  is  uncompounded,  indivisible,  and  with- 
out distinction  of  parts,  but  also  that  there  is  but  one 
such  fundamental  existence. 

Unchangeability 

A  second  attribute  is  that  of  unchangeability. 
This  attribute  has  often  been  verbally  interpreted 
with  the  result  of  reducing  existence  to  a  fixed  rigid- 
ity from  which  all  life  and  movement  are  excluded. 
The  Eleatics  made  being  one  and  changeless,  and 
were  then  utterly  unable  to  account  for  the  world  of 
plurality  and  change.  A  similar  mistake  often  appears 
in  speculative  theology.  It  has  sometimes  so  empha- 
sized the  unchangeability  as  to  lose  the  living  personal 
God  altogether. 

This  misconception  has  its  main  root  in  the  sense 
metaphysics  of  spontaneous  thought.  This  assumes 
that  substance  in  general  is  changeless,  and  that 
change  falls  among  the  activities  and  properties.  But 
a  little  reflection  shows  that  an  absolutely  rigid  sub- 
stance cannot  explain  the  changing  activities  of  the 
thing.  For  every  change  in  the  activity  or  the  mani- 
festation, we  must  affirm  a  corresponding  change  in 
the  thing  itself.  Changes  among  things  must  depend 
upon  changes  in  things.  What  is  true  of  all  agents 
is  true  of  God  or  the  world-ground.     God,  as  a  rigid 


178  METAPHYSICAL   ATTRIBUTES 

sameness  of  existence,  would  contain  no  explanation 
of  the  advancing  cosmic  movement,  and  would  admit 
of  no  change  in  action  and  knowledge.  In  truth,  as 
metaphysics  shows,  the  changelessness  of  a  being  con- 
sists not  in  such  an  ontological  rigidity  of  fixed  mo- 
notony of  being,  but  rather  in  the  constancy  and 
continuity  of  the  law  which  rules  its  several  states 
and  changes.  The  unchangeability  of  God  means 
\.-  only  the  constancy  and  continuity  of  the  divine  nature 
which  exists  through  all  the  divine  acts  as  their  law 
and  source.  Metaphysics  further  shows  that  if  we 
insist  upon  having  some  abiding  and  identical  prin- 
ciple superior  to  change  and  constant  in  change,  it 
can  be  found  only  in  personality.  And  here  it  does 
not  consist  in  any  rigid  core  of  being,  but  rather  in 
the  extraordinary  power  of  self-consciousness,  whereby 
the  being  distinguishes  itself  from  its  states,  and  con- 
stitutes itself  identical  and  abiding.  Where  this  is 
lacking,  there  may  be  a  continuity  of  process,  but 
nothing  more.  The  unchangeability  is  purely  formal, 
as  when  a  given  note  is  constantly  produced  ;  and 
this  formal  unchangeability  is  possible  only  through 
the  unchanging  self. 

In  the  solution  of  this  problem  also  we  are  thrown 
back  again  on  experience.  Thought  must  reach  the 
changeless  or  perish.  But  on  the  impersonal  plane 
and  under  the  law  of  the  sufficient  reason,  thought 
can  never  reach  the  changeless,  but  abides  in  the 
eternal  flow  and  infinite  regress.  This  law  compels 
us  to  find  the  consequent  in  the  antecedent.  If 
change  here,  then  change  there.  If  plurality  here, 
then  plurality  there.  The  problem  can  never  be 
solved    on   the  mechanical  plane,   but   only  on   the 


OMNIPRESENCE  179 

plane  of  free  personality  and  in  terms  of  living 
experience.  The  changelessness  we  need  is  not  the 
rigidity  of  a  logical  category  but  the  self-identity 
and  self-equality  of  intelligence.  Both  change  and 
changelessness  in  the  concrete  have  to  be  interpreted 
with  reference  to  self -consciousness.  Abstract  defini- 
tions and  temporal  coordinates  only  distort  the  prob- 
lem or  make  it  fictitious. 

So  much  for  the  metaphysics  of  unchangeability. 
But  in  truth  many  things  are  gathered  up  in  this 
attribute.  Religious  thought,  as  distinct  from  theo- 
logical thought,  has  generally  meant  something  dis- 
tinct from  the  metaphysical  formula.  One  aim  has 
been  to  affirm  the  independence  and  eternity  of  God 
in  opposition  to  the  dependence  and  brevity  of  man. 
Again,  the  predicate  has  often  been  made  to  mean 
the  ethical  constancy  of  the  divine  activity,  and  to 
exclude  all  arbitrariness  and  caprice  from  the  divine 
purposes.  In  this  last  sense  the  attribute  passes  from 
the  metaphysical  into  the  ethical  realm,  and  eludes 
any  metaphysical  deduction  or  justification. 

Omnipresence 

A  third  attribute  is  that  of  omnipresence.  This 
concerns  God's  relation  to  space.  By  crude  thought 
this  is  often  understood  as  implying  extension  of  the 
subject.  Space  is  supposed  to  exist  as  infinite  room, 
which  is  then  filled  out  with  a  boundless  bulk ; 
and  this  is  omnipresence.  This  view  is  speculatively 
untenable,  and  is  incompatible  with  the  unity  of  the 
world-ground.  Nothing  that  exists  extended  in  space 
can  be  a  unit ;  for  in  every  such  being  it  will  always 


180  METAPHYSICAL   ATTRIBUTES 

be  possible  to  distinguish  different  parts  which  are 
either  actually  separate,  or  are  held  apart  and  together 
only  by  the  forces  in  them.  In  the  latter  case  the 
body  disappears  into  an  aggregate  of  different  forces, 
and  in  both  cases  its  unity  disappears.  No  more  can 
such  a  thing  be  omnipresent  in  space.  It  can  only 
be  present  in  space  part  for  part,  or  volume  for 
volume,  and  hence  there  is  no  proper  omnipresence. 
Omnipresence  is  real  only  as  the  entire  being  is 
present  at  any  and  every  point ;  as  the  entire  mind 
is  present  in  each  and  all  its  thoughts. 

Speculatively,  then,  the  doctrine  of  omnipresence 
must  take  another  form,  and  one  mainly  negative. 
We  are  able  to  act  directly  upon  only  a  few  things. 
These  are  said  to  be  present  to  us.  In  other  cases 
we  can  act  only  through  media.  These  are  said  to 
be  absent.  If  the  interaction  were  equally  direct  and 
immediate  in  all  cases,  there  would  be  no  ground  for 
the  distinction  of  present  and  absent.  Thus  space 
appears  to  us  as  a  limitation,  although  space  is  really 
but  the  form  under  which  our  dynamic  limitations 
appear.  Omnipresence  means  a  denial  of  these  limi- 
tations. Immediate  action  means  presence;  imme- 
diate action  which  extends  to  all  things  means 
omnipresence.  God,  or  the  world-ground,  therefore, 
as  immanent  in  all  things,  is  omnipresent.  If,  then, 
he  wills  to  act  upon  anything,  he  has  not  to  cross  any 
distance,  long  or  short,  to  reach  it,  and  he  is  not 
compelled  to  use  media;  but  his  activity  is  rather 
immediately  and  completely  present.  Conversely,  if 
the  finite  wishes  to  act  upon  God,  say  by  prayer, 
neither  the  prayer  nor  the  person  need  go  wandering 
about  to  reach  and  find  God ;  for  we  live  and  have 


ETERNITY  181 

our  being  in  him ;  and  he  is  an  ever-present  power 
in  us.  Only  in  this  sense,  which  denies  that  space  is 
a  limitation  or  barrier  for  God,  is  the  doctrine  of 
omnipresence  tenable.  This  view  is  made  all  the 
more  necessary  from  the  claim  of  metaphysics  that 
space  is  no  ontological  reality,  and  has  only  a  mental 
existence. 

In  estimating  this  result  we  must  notice  that  our 
spatial  judgments  are  double.  Some  refer  to  the 
pure  space  intuition,  as  in  geometry,  and  others  refer 
to  our  own  organic  relations  and  limitations.  The 
former  may  be  viewed  as  universal,  and  they  imply 
no  extension  of  the  subject.  The  thought  of  space 
is  not  spatial  in  the  sense  of  being  extended,  any 
more  than  the  thought  of  the  square  has  four  corners 
to  it.  The  other  class  of  spatial  judgments  is  purely 
relative  to  us,  and  might  have  no  significance  for 
changed  organic  and  d3/'namic  conditions.  When  we 
speak  of  "  annihilating  space  "  we  are  dealing  with 
relations  of  this  class.  Space  in  this  sense  would  not 
exist  for  a  being  on  whom  all  things  immediately 
depend. 

Eternity 

The  attribute  of  eternity  concerns  God's  relations 
to  time.  It  has  a  variety  of  meanings.  The  first 
and  lowest  is  that  of  unbegun  and  endless  duration  of 
existence.  If  time  be  an  ontological  fact,  the  world- 
ground  must  be  eternal  in  this  sense,  for  void  time 
could  never  have  produced  anything.  There  is,  too, 
a  certain  aesthetic  value  in  the  thought  of  endless 
duration  which  is  not  unworthy  of  the  Infinite.     But 

THEISM 13 


182  METAPHYSICAL   ATTRIBUTES 

in  general,  religious  thinkers  have  been  unwilling  to 
identify  the  divine  eternity  with  endless  duration, 
but  have  rather  sought  to  place  it  in  opposition  to  all 
time,  as  denoting  an  existence  above  and  beyond  all 
temporal  limits  and  conditions.  This  is  an  attempt 
to  conceive  the  divine  relation  to  time  like  the  divine 
relation  to  space,  as  a  superior  and  transcendental  one. 

The  common  thought  of  the  matter  is  that  time 
exists  as  a  boundless  form,  which  God  fills  out  with 
his  duration,  just  as  in  the  common  thought  he  fills 
out  space  with  his  extension ;  but  this  is  metaphysi- 
cally as  untenable  in  one  case  as  in  the  other.  Meta- 
physics shows  that  time  itself  is  no  independent 
reality  which  conditions  change  or  in  which  change 
occurs.  Such  a  view  would  violate  the  necessary 
unity  of  the  world-ground  and  make  all  existence 
whatever  unpossible.  Still  this  claim  alone  does  not 
decide  that  the  world-ground  is  superior  to  time ;  for 
while  time  disappears  as  existence  it  may  still  remain 
as  law,  so  that  the  temporal  form  is  a  necessity  even 
of  the  basal  reality. 

The  shortest  way  out  is  to  call  the  world-ground 
the  unconditioned,  and  then  to  deduce  from  this 
attribute  its  superiority  to  all  conditions,  temporal  or 
otherwise.  But  this  notion  of  the  unconditioned  is 
a  somewhat  vague  one,  and  cannot  be  used  without 
scrutiny.  Thought  can  positively  affirm  an  uncondi-' 
tioned  being  only  in  the  sense  of  a  being  which  does 
not  depend  on  other  beings  ;  but  such  a  being  might 
still  have  profound  internal  limitations.  The  world- 
ground  is,  indeed,  unconditioned  by  anything  beyond 
itself ;  but  it  must  be  conditioned  by  its  own  nature 
in  any  case,  and  the  question  arises  whether  this  con- 


ETERNITY  183 

ditioning  involves  temporal  sequence  in  the  infinite 
life  itself. 

To  maintain  the  affirmative  here  would  involve  us 
in  the  gravest  speculative  difficulties.  We  should 
have  to  hold  that  the  world-ground  is  subject  to  a 
law  of  development  and  comes  only  gradually  to 
itself,  or  rather  that  there  is  some  constitutional 
necessity  in  the  world-ground  which  forbids  it  always 
to  be  in  full  possession  of  itself.  In  fact  we  should 
have  to  limit  to  the  extent  of  this  necessity  that  free 
and  self-centered  cause  which  reason  demands  as  the 
only  adequate  world-ground.  Moreover,  epistemology 
shows  that  there  is  a  certain  timeless  element  in  all 
consciousness.  To  admit  real  succession  into  con- 
sciousness would  make  thought  impossible.  The 
knowledge  of  the  changing  must  be  changeless,  and 
the  knowledge  of  time  must  be  timeless.  Further- 
more, metaphysics  shows  that  the  temporal  relation 
is  essentially  a  relation  in  and  to  self-consciousness.  It 
is  not  an  unvarying  and  absolute  quality  of  events,  but 
is  relative  to  the  range  of  consciousness  itself.  Time 
cannot  be  measured  by  or '  referred  to  any  extra-men- 
tal fact  whatever,  but  must  be  dealt  with  purely  as  a 
relation  in  consciousness.  We  do  not  have  experience 
in  time  as  something  independent  of  mind,  but  expe- 
rience has  the  temporal  form ;  and  this  is  largely  an 
expression  of  our  finitude  and  limitation.  Indeed,  the 
temporal  judgment  is  so  largely  relative  to  our  present 
conditions  that  we  can  easily  conceive  it  indefinitely 
modified  by  changing  them.  Thus  if  the  periodicities 
of  day  and  night,  summer  and  winter,  rest  and  labor, 
youth  and  age  were  removed,  not  much  would  be  left 
of  our  temporal  measiu-es  and  judgments. 


184  METAPHYSICAL   ATTRIBUTES 

Bearing  these  facts  in  mind,  we  may  view  the  rela- 
tion of  the  world-ground  to  time  as  follows  :  First, 
there  are  certain  features  in  our  relation  to  time 
which  cannot  be  affirmed  of  the  world-ground.  Thus 
we  are  subject  to  slow  development ;  we  come  gradu- 
ally to  self-possession ;  we  grow  old  and  pass  away. 
This  we  express  by  saying  that  we  are  subject  to 
temporal  limits  and  conditions.  In  none  of  these 
respects  can  the  unconditioned  world-ground  be  sub- 
ject to  time,  but  must  rather  be  non- temporal.  A 
being  which  is  in  full  possession  of  itself,  so  that  it 
does  not  come  to  itself  successively,  but  forever  is 
what  it  wills  to  be,  is  not  in  time  so  far  as  itself  is 
concerned.  Such  a  being  would  have  a  changeless 
knowledge  and  a  changeless  life.  It  would  be  with- 
out memory  and  expectation,  yet  in  the  absolute 
enjoyment  of  itself.  For  such  a  being  the  present 
alone  would  exist ;  its  now  would  be  eternal,  and  its 
name,  I  Am.  For  us  the  unconditioned  world-ground, 
or  God,  is  such  a  being ;  and  he  is  not  to  be  viewed 
as  conditioned  by  time  with  regard  to  his  own  self- 
consciousness  and  self-possession.  But  only  in  the 
self-centered  and  self-equivalent  personality  can  we 
transcend  the  conditions  and  the  sphere  of  tune. 
God  in  himself,  then,  is  not  only  the  eternal  or  ever- 
enduring  ;  he  is  also  the  non-temporal,  or  that  which 
transcends  temporal  limits  and  conditions. 

This  is  easily  admitted  for  God  as  the  absolute 
person,  but  a  difficulty  arises  when  we  consider  him 
as  the  founder  and  conductor  of  the  world-process. 
This  fact  seems  to  bring  God  into  a  new  relation  to 
time.  This  process  is  a  developing,  changing  one, 
and  hence  is  essentially  temporal.     Hence  the  divine 


ETERNITY  185 

activity  therein  is  also  essentially  temporal.  The 
divine  knowledge  of  the  system  in  its  possibilities  may 
be  non-temporal,  but  the  divine  agency  in  and  knowl- 
edge of  the  actual  system  must  be  temporal,  because 
the  system  is  temporal.  There  is  succession  in  the 
process  and  there  must  be  succession  in  the  realizing 
will.  A  changeless  knowledge  of  an  ideal  is  possible ; 
but  a  changeless  knowledge  of  a  changing  thing  looks 
like  a  contradiction.  Unchangeability  and  non-tem- 
porality, then,  would  seem  to  apply  to  God  only  in 
his  relation  to  himself.  They  apply  to  his  knowledge 
only  as  related  to  himself  or  to  the  possible  or  to  his 
purposes. 

This  seems  perfectly  clear  at  first  sight,  but  grows 
cloudy  on  reflection.  If  the  world-process  is  to  be  in 
time  in  any  sense  it  must  be  in  time  for  some  one. 
Its  temporality  has  no  meaning  in  itself  or  for  itself, 
being  essentially  only  a  relation  in  consciousness. 
Epistemology  refuses  to  allow  us  to  subordinate  con- 
sciousness to  change  or  to  carry  any  ontological 
change  into  consciousness.  Consciousness  itself  is  the 
fixed  background  on  which  change  is  projected  and 
without  which  it  is  nothing.  When  from  supposed 
real  changes  we  reason  backward  by  the  law  of  the 
sufficient  reason,  thought  perishes  at  once,  either  in 
the  Heraclitic  flux  or  in  the  infinite  regress.  To 
escape  this  result  all  change  must  be  referred  to  the 
changeless,  that  is,  to  the  non-temporal ;  and  all 
temporal  measures  and  relations  must  be  found,  not  in 
thought  itself,  but  in  the  order  of  objects  which 
thought  constitutes.  Of  course,  this  is  impossible  on 
the  impersonal  plane.  The  problem  of  change  and 
changelessness,  of  time  and  non-temporality,  which  is 


186  METAPHYSICAL   ATTRIBUTES 

one  of  thought's  deepest  problems,  finds  its  sohition 
only  on  the  basis  of  free  intelligence  and  theistic 
idealism.  Abstract  thought  with  its  abstract  cate- 
gories can  do  nothing;  we  must  fall  back  on  tran- 
scendental empiricism,  and  interpret  our  terms  by  the 
living  experience  of  intelligence.  The  self-identity  or 
self-equality  of  intelligence  is  the  only  real  changeless- 
ness  of  which  we  have  experience ;  and  it  is  the  only 
one  which  meets  this  case.  All  else  is  abstract  fiction. 
The  net  result  is  this  :  We  borrow  from  meta- 
physics the  conviction  that  in  any  case  time  is  no 
form  of  existence  but  only  of  experience ;  and  that 
it  is  essentially  a  relation  in  self-consciousness  which 
varies  with  our  finite  conditions.  There  is  a  large 
element  of  relativity  in  our  temporal  judgments  which 
may  not  be  transferred  to  God,  being  valid  only 
for  ourselves.  Further,  the  temporal  relation  must 
always  be  sought  among  the  works  of  intelligence, 
and  never  within  intelligence  itself.  Hence  the  abso- 
lute intelligence  and  will  must  lie  beyond  all  tem- 
poral limits  and  conditions  as  their  source,  but  never 
included  in  them. 

Omniscience 

In  interpreting  omniscience,  etymologizing  has  too 
often  taken  the  place  of  philosophizing,  and  specula- 
tors have  sought  to  determine  the  content  of  the  idea 
by  analyzing  the  word.  But  this  process  is  delusive. 
No  idea  can  be  understood  by  studying  the  composi- 
tion of  the  word,  but  only  by  reflecting  upon  the  way 
in  which  the  idea  is  reached.  In  the  largest  sense  of 
the  word  omniscience  means  a  knowledge  of  all  things 


OMNISCIENCE  187 

and  of  all  events,  past,  present,  and  future,  necessary 
and  free  alike.  But  we  cannot  affirm  that  this  is 
possible  on  the  sole  strength  of  etymology.  We  must 
rather  inquire  whether  this  stretching  of  omniscience 
is  not  as  untenable  as  the  similar  stretching  of  omnip- 
otence, when  it  is  made  to  affirm  the  possibility  of 
the  contradictory.  All  allow  that  the  contradictory 
is  impossible  ;  and  hence  we  are  not  at  liberty  to  in- 
clude contradiction  in  our  conception  of  the  divine 
attributes.  As  omnipotence  must  be  limited  to  the 
doable,  so  omniscience  must  be  limited  to  the  know- 
able.  If,  then,  there  be  anything  essentially  unknow- 
able, it  must  lie  beyond  even  omniscience. 

In  advance  of  reflection  it  is  a  possible  supposition 
that  intelligence  plays  only  a  coordinate,  if  not  second- 
ary, part  in  the  world-ground.  Our  own  knowledge 
reaches  only  a  small  part  of  what  takes  place  within 
us,  and  the  rest  is  shrouded  in  mystery.  It  is  con- 
ceivable that,  in  like  mamier,  there  should  be  in  the 
world-ground  a  double  realm,  one  part  of  which  is 
hidden  from  the  scrutiny  and  control  of  intelligence. 

This  view  results  partly  from  an  anthropomorphic 
transference  of  our  limitations  to  the  absolute  being 
and  partly  from  picture  thinking.  It  is  the  double- 
faced  somewhat  over  again.  It  is  so  destitute  of  pos- 
itive grounds  as  to  be  quite  gratuitous.  If  extended 
to  cosmic  action  it  would  deprive  us  of  the  control 
of  free  intellect,  which  we  have  found  necessary  for 
understanding  the  cosmic  order.  Moreover,  reflection 
shows  that  this  view  would  end  in  an  impossible  dual- 
ism. Absolute  personality  must  be  absolute  self- 
knowledge  and  self-control.  This  only  will  meet  the 
ideal  of  reason  in  the  case,  and  in  the  lack  of  positive 


188  METAPHYSICAL   ATTRIBUTES 

objection  reason  will  always  affirm  it.  The  sole  per- 
missible inquiry  is  how  far  the  notion  of  omniscience 
is  self-consistent. 

A  preliminary  scruple  exists  concerning  the  divine 
knowledge  of  those  forms  of  finite  experience  which 
cannot  be  ascribed  to  the  Infinite.  The  totality  of 
physical  experiences  seems  to  belong  only  to  the 
finite ;  how,  then,  can  the  Infinite  comprehend  them? 
The  work  of  our  understanding  in  these  cases  con- 
sists entirely  in  classifying  and  naming ;  the  thing 
itself  is  realized  only  in  immediate  experience.  To 
press  this  difficulty  would  make  an  impassable  gulf 
between  the  finite  and  the  Infinite ;  and  to  solve  it  is 
beyond  us,  except  in  a  formal  way.  If  we  are  not 
willing  to  ascribe  these  experiences,  as  of  physical 
pains,  to  God,  and  are  also  unwilling  to  deny  him 
knowledge  of  the  same,  we  must  allow  that  there  are 
modes  of  the  divine  knowing  which  we  cannot  com- 
prehend. The  contents  of  a  sense  that  we  do  not 
possess  are  utterly  unknowable  to  us,  and  yet  by 
hj^othesis  the  Infinite  comprehends  the  finite  experi- 
ence without  participation  therein.  The  mystery  in- 
volved in  this  assumption  has  led  to  many  surmises 
in  both  theology  and  philosophy.  A  crude  pantheism 
has  thought  to  solve  the  problem  by  declaring  that 
our  experience  is  really  God's  ;  but  this  only  con- 
founds all  distinctions.  The  psychology  and  episte- 
mology  of  the  Infinite  have  their  obscurities. 

But  for  popular  thought  the  chief  difficulty  in 
omniscience  concerns  the  foreknowledge  of  free 
choices.  The  past  and  present  may  be  conceived 
to  lie  open  to  omniscience.  The  possible  also  may  be 
fully   known.     The   free    creature   can    do   nothing 


OMNISCIENCE  189 

that  was  not  foreseen  as  possible.  Here,  then,  is  a 
realm  forever  free  from  all  enlargement  and  surprise. 
Here  the  parting  of  the  ways  begins.  A  free  act  by 
its  nature  is  a  new  beginning,  and  hence  is  not  repre- 
sented before  its  occurrence  by  anything  that  must 
lead  to  it.  Hence  a  free  act,  until  performed,  is  only 
a  possibility,  and  not  a  fact.  But  knowledge  must 
grasp  the  fact  as  it  is,  and  hence,  it  is  held,  the  act 
can  be  foreknown  only  as  possible,  and  never  as 
actual.  Being  only  a  possibility  antecedently  to  its 
occurrence,  it  must  be  known  as  such.  On  the  other 
side  it  is  held  that,  though  only  a  possibility  in  itself, 
it  may  yet  be  known  as  one  which  will  surely  be 
realized.  The  knowledge  in  this  case  does  not  com- 
pel the  fact,  but  foresees  it,  and  leaves  the  fact  as  free 
as  if  unforeseen. 

Upon  the  possibility  of  such  foreknowledge  opinions 
still  differ.  Some  have  asserted  foreknowledge  and 
denied  freedom ;  others  have  asserted  freedom  and 
denied  foreknowledge  ;  and  still  others  have  affirmed 
both.  Both  of  the  former  classes  agree  in  viewing 
freedom  and  foreknowledge  as  incompatible,  and 
differ  only  as  to  which  member  of  the  antithesis  they 
reject. 

The  difficulty  in  the  last  view  is  this  :  By  definition 
a  free  act  is  an  absolute  beginning,  and  as  such  is 
not  represented  by  anything  before  its  occurrence. 
We  trace  it  to  a  specific  volition,  and  beyond  that 
it  has  neither  existence  nor  representation.  But 
knowledge  of  a  future  event  always  supposes  present 
grounds  of  knowing ;  and  in  the  case  of  a  free  act 
there  are  no  such  grounds.  Hence  a  foreknowledge 
of  a  free  act  is  a  knowledge  without  assignable  grounds 


190  METAPHYSICAL   ATTRIBUTES 

of  knowing.  On  the  assumption  of  a  real  time  it  is 
hard  to  find  a  way  out  of  this  difficulty.  Indeed, 
there  would  be  no  way  out  unless  we  assume  that 
God  has  modes  of  knowing  which  are  inscrutable  to  us. 
A  foreknowledge  of  freedom  cannot  be  proved  to  be 
a  contradiction ;  and  on  the  other  hand  it  cannot  be 
construed  in  its  possibility. 

All  this  on  the  supposition  of  a  single,  all-condi- 
tioning time.  On  our  own  view  of  the  ideality  and 
relativity  of  time  the  problem  vanishes  in  its  tradi- 
tional form,  and  nothing  remains  but  the  general 
mystery  which  shrouds  for  us  the  epistemology  of  the 
Infinite  and  the  existence  of  the  finite. 

Omnipotence 

This  predicate  implies  what  we  have  before  assumed 
from  metaphysics,  that  the  world-gromid  is  not  a 
substance,  but  an  agent ;  not  a  stuff,  but  a  cause ; 
and  the  general  aim  has  been  to  affirm  the  absolute- 
ness or  unconditionedness  of  the  world-ground. 

Two  tendencies  appear  in  the  common  view  of  the 
matter.  One  is  to  view  God  as  able  to  do  the  doable 
but  as  limited  by  some  necessities,  probably  self- 
existent  and  eternal,  which  cannot  be  transcended. 
This  view  has  not  satisfied  either  religious  feeling  or 
speculative  thought,  as  involving  an  untenable  sub- 
ordination of  God.  The  result  has  been  to  suggest 
the  opposite  view,  according  to  which  God  is  lifted 
above  all  limits  and  is  able  to  do  all  things,  the 
impossible  as  well  as  the  possible.  But  if  the  former 
view  seemed  tame,  the  latter  seems  to  be  utter  non- 
sense and  the  death  of  reason  itself. 


OMNIPOTENCE  191 

Probably  no  one  who  believes  in  God  at  all  would 
find  any  difficulty  with  his  omnipotence  in  contingent 
matters.  Accordingly,  those  who  have  affirmed  limi- 
tation of  power  have  commonly  done  so  on  the  basis 
of  some  necessity  of  reason  or  eternal  truth.  These, 
it  is  assumed,  can  never  be  violated  by  any  power 
whatever,  and  these  impose  limitations  on  all  power, 
human  or  divine.  The  question  of  divine  limitation, 
then,  really  concerns  God's  relation  to  these  neces- 
sities of  reason,  or  eternal  truths.  Is  he  conditioned 
by  them  or  superior  to  them?  We  shall  need  to 
move  warily  and  with  great  circumspection  to  escape 
falling  a  prey  to  the  abstractions  that  swarm  in  this 
region. 

In  speaking  of  the  unity  of  the  world-ground  we 
pointed  out  that  it  is  incompatible  with  any  plurality 
of  fundamental  being.  Hence  it  follows  that  truth 
and  necessity  themselves  must  in  some  way  be  founded 
in  the  world-ground.  If  we  should  assume  a  realm 
of  truth  to  exist  apart  from  being,  it  could  have  no 
effect  in  being  unless  we  should  further  assume  an 
interaction  between  it  and  being.  But  this  would 
make  truth  a  thing,  and  would  compel  the  assumption 
of  another  being  deeper  than  both  truth  and  reality  to 
mediate  their  interaction.  At  this  point  we  fall  an 
easy  prey  to  our  own  abstractions.  A  law  of  nature 
is  never  the  antecedent,  but  the  consequence  of 
reality.  The  real  is  first  and  only,  and  being  what  it 
is,  its  laws  result  as  a  consequence,  or,  rather,  are  but 
expressions  of  what  the  things  are.  Yet  so  easily  do 
we  mistake  abstractions  for  things  that,  after  we  have 
gathered  the  laws  from  the  things,  we  at  once  proceed 
to  regard  the  things  as  the  subjects,  if  not  the  prod- 


192  METAPHYSICAL   ATTRIBUTES 

ucts,  of  the  laws  they  found.  Then  we  speak  of  the 
reign  of  law ;  and  thus  by  a  double  abstraction  law  is 
made  to  appear  as  a  real  sovereign  apart  from  and 
above  things,  and  as  the  expression  of  some  fathom- 
less necessity.  Of  com-se,  when  reality  appears  it  has 
nothing  to  do  but  to  fall  into  the  forms  which  the 
sovereign  laws  prescribe.  Thus  the  cause  is  made 
subject  to  its  own  effects,  and  reality  is  explained  as 
the  result  of  its  own  consequences.  The  inverted 
nature  of  the  thought  is  manifest.  Natural  laws  are 
the  consequences  of  reality,  and  never  its  grounds  or 
anything  apart  from  it. 

The  same  is  true  for  truth.  Rational  truth,  as  dis- 
tinct from  truth  of  contingent  fact,  is  never  anything 
more  than  an  expression  of  the  necessary  relations  of 
ideas,  or  of  the  way  in  which  reason  universally  pro- 
ceeds. As  such,  it  is  nothing  apart  from  the  mind  or 
antecedent  to  it,  but  is  simply  an  expression  of  the 
mental  nature.  But  we  overlook  this  and  abstract  a 
set  of  principles  which  we  call  eternal  truths,  and 
erect  into  a  series  of  fathomless  necessities  to  which 
being  can  do  nothing  but  submit.  The  fictitious 
nature  of  this  procedure  is  apparent.  There  is  no 
realm  of  truth  apart  from  the  world-ground  ;  and  we 
must  look  in  this  being  for  the  foundation  of  truth 
itself,  and  of  all  those  principles  whereby  the  distinc- 
tions of  true  and  false,  consistent  and  contradictory, 
possible  and  impossible,  themselves  exist.  In  a  sys- 
tem in  which  these  distinctions  are  already  foimded, 
they  would  be  valid  for  all  new  events,  not,  however, 
as  abstract  necessities,  but  as  actual  laws  of  a  real 
system. 

It  is  partly  oversight  of  this  distinction  which  leads 


OMNIPOTENCE  193 

US  to  think  that  these  prmciples  precede  reality.  They 
do,  indeed,  precede  specific  events  and  condition  them, 
and  hence  we  fancy  that  they  precede  reality  in  gen- 
eral. A  further  fancy  completes  the  illusion.  When 
one  speaks  of  truth  as  valid  even  in  the  void,  he  fails 
to  see  that  his  conception  of  the  void  is  only  a  con- 
ception, and  that  he  himself  is  present  with  all  his 
ideas  and  laws  of  thought.  And  when  along  with 
his  conception  of  the  void  he  has  other  conceptions, 
and  finds  that  the  customary  relations  between  them 
continue  to  exist,  he  fancies  that  he  has  truly  con- 
ceived the  void  and  has  found  that  the  laws  of 
thought  would  be  valid  if  all  reality  should  vanish. 
But  the  illusion  is  patent.  The  whole  art  of  finding 
what  would  be  true  in  the  void  consists  in  asking 
what  is  now  true  for  the  thinking  mind.  The  true 
void  would  be  the  undistinguishable  nothing  ;  and 
the  ideal  distinctions  of  truth  and  error  would  have 
no  meaning,  to  say  nothing  of  application.  Hence 
we  conclude  that  truth  is  not  independent  of  the 
world-ground,  but  is  in  some  way  founded  therein 
and  dependent  thereon.  The  notion  of  an  independ- 
ent realm  of  self-sufficient,  all-conditioning  truth  may 
be  set  aside  with  all  conviction. 

This  dependence  may  be  conceived  in  two  ways. 
Truth  may  be  viewed  as  founded  in  the  nature  of  the 
world-ground,  or  as  a  creature  of  volition.  The 
latter  view  has  often  appeared  in  theology,  but  is 
inconsistent  with  itself.  The  statement  that  God  is 
arbitrary  with  regard  to  truth,  that  he  can  make  or 
unmake  it,  assumes  that  truth  exists  and  has  a  mean- 
ing apart  from  the  divine  volition.  For  why  should 
the  product  of  the  creative  act  be  called  truth  rather 


194  METAPHYSICAL   ATTRIBUTES 

than  error,  unless  it  agree  with  certain  fixed  stand- 
ards of  truth  with  which  error  disagrees  ?  Hence  all 
such  statements  as  that  God  can  make  the  true  false, 
or  the  possible  impossible,  imply  that  the  standard  of 
both  exists  independently  of  volition ;  and  God  is 
merely  allowed  to  transfer  objects  back  and  forth 
across  limits  which  are  fixed  in  themselves. 

The  inconsistency  of  the  negative  form  of  statement 
is  equally  manifest.  In  order  that  truth  shall  be 
unmade  or  broken,  it  must  first  exist  as  truth.  If 
any  proposition  that  is  to  be  broken  were  not  in 
itself  true,  there  would  be  no  truth  to  break.  A 
proposition  that  is  false  cannot  be  made  false,  for  it 
is  false  already.  Hence,  to  make  truth  the  creature 
of  volition  either  denies  truth  altogether,  or  else  it 
breaks  down  through  its  own  self-contradiction.  But 
the  aim  of  those  who  have  held  this  view  has  never 
been  to  deny  truth,  but  rather  to  exalt  the  absolute 
and  unconditioned  independence  of  God.  The  spec- 
ulators who  have  argued  in  this  way  have  commonly 
meant  well,  but  have  had  no  clear  insight  into  the 
nature  of  the  problem. 

So,  then,  we  object  to  the  statement  either  that 
God  makes  truth  or  that  he  recognizes  it  as  something 
independent  of  himself.  He  is  rather  its  source  and 
foundation  ;  and  it,  in  turn,  is  the  fixed  mode  of  his 
procedure.  We  may  view  rational  principles  as  con- 
sequences or  expressions  of  the  divine  nature,  or  as 
fundamental  laws  of  the  divine  activity.  Both 
phrases  have  the  same  meaning. 

Many  have  objected  to  ascribing  a  nature  of  any 
kind  to  God  as  the  source  of  the  divine  manifesta- 
tion.    They  have  found  in  such  a  notion  a  limitation, 


OMNIPOTENCE  195 

and  have  held  that  God,  as  absolute,  must  give  him- 
self his  own  natm-e.  There  must  be  nothing  consti- 
tutional with  God,  but  all  that  he  is  must  be  a  product 
of  his  absolute  will.  In  himself  God  has  been  styled 
"  the  abyss,"  "  the  silence,"  "  the  super-essential,"  and 
many  other  verbal  vacuities.  This  is  due  partly  to 
a  misunderstanding  of  the  term  nature,  and  partly 
to  an  overstrained  conception  of  absoluteness.  We 
notice  first  the  misunderstanding. 

We  finite  beings  are  subject  to  development,  and 
view  our  nature  as  the  mysterious  source  of  the 
movement.  Again,  we  inherit  much,  and  we  often 
sum  up  our  inherited  peculiarities  as  our  nature.  This 
nature,  too,  frequently  appears  as  a  limitation  from 
which  we  would  gladly  escape.  Thus  a  split  arises 
in  the  soul.  The  free  spirit  has  to  struggle  against  a 
power  which  seems  to  be  not  of  itself  —  an  old  man 
of  the  sea,  or  a  body  of  death.  In  this  sense  a  nature 
cannot  be  ascribed  to  an  absolute  being.  Such  a 
nature  is  essentially  a  limitation,  and  can  belong  only 
to  the  conditioned  and  finite. 

But  a  nature  in  the  sense  of  a  fixed  law  of  activity 
or  mode  of  manifestation  involves  no  such  limitation. 
This  is  best  seen  in  a  concrete  case.  Thinking,  we 
say,  is  governed  by  the  laws  of  thought.  But  these 
laws  are  not  anything  either  out  of  the  mind  or  in 
the  mind.  We  feel  them  neither  as  an  external  yoke 
nor  as  an  internal  limitation.  The  reason  is  that 
they  are  essentially  only  modes  of  thought  activity, 
and  are  reached  as  formal  laws  by  abstraction  from 
the  process  of  thinking.  The  basal  fact  is  a  thought 
activity,  and  reflexion  shows  that  this  has  certain 
forms.     These  are  next   erected   into  laws  and   im- 


196  METAPHYSICAL   ATTRIBUTES 

posed  on  the  mind;  and  then  the  fancy  arises  that 
they  are  Hmitations  and  hindrances  to  knowledge. 
In  fact,  however,  they  do  not  rule  intellect,  but 
only  express  what  intellect  is.  Nor  is  the  mind 
ever  so  conscious  of  itself  as  self-guiding  and  self- 
controlled  as  when  conducting  a  clear  process  of 
thought.  It  would  be  a  strange  proposition  to  free 
the  mind  and  enlarge  knowledge  by  annulling  the 
laws  of  thought. 

This  brings  us  to  the  overstraining  mentioned.  To 
deny  a  nature  to  God  in  the  sense  just  described  would 
be  to  cancel  his  existence  altogether.  For  whatever  is 
must  be  something,  must  be  an  agent,  and  must  have  a 
definite  law  of  action.  Without  this  the  thought  van- 
ishes, and  only  a  mental  vacuum  remains.  This  may 
indeed  be  filled  up  with  words,  but  it  acquires  no  sub- 
stance thereby.  To  regard  this  definite  law  as  a  lim- 
itation is  to  make  being  itself  a  limitation.  In  that 
case  we  find  true  absoluteness  only  in  pure  indefinite- 
ness  and  emptiness,  and  then  there  is  no  way  back  to 
definite  existence  again.  Once  in  such  a  void,  thought 
would  remain  there.  This  overstraining  of  absolute- 
ness defeats  itself.  It  cancels  the  absolute  as  a 
reality,  and  leads  to  the  attempt  to  construct  both 
the  universe  and  the  living  God  out  of  nothing.  But 
when  we  say  that  the  nature  of  a  thing  is  a  law,  we 
must  not  think  of  the  law  as  a  thing  in  the  thing,  or 
even  as  ruling  the  thing.  The  thing  itself  is  all ;  and 
the  law  is  only  an  expression  of  what  the  thing  is,  or 
of  the  way  in  which  it  proceeds. 

Here,  as  elsewhere,  we  must  avoid  abstractions  and 
must  fall  back  on  experience  for  the  concrete  mean- 
ing of  our  terms.     If  we  consult  the  dictionary  only. 


OMNIPOTENCE  197 

we  may  easily  persuade  ourselves  that  fixity  and 
freedom  are  incompatible ;  but  if  we  consult  experi- 
ence, we  shall  find  that  we  cannot  dispense  with  either. 
To  give  freedom  any  significance  it  must  be  based  on 
uniformity  or  fixity ;  and  to  give  this  fixity  any  value 
it  must  be  allied  with  freedom.  Pure  necessity 
cancels  reason.  Pure  arbitrariness  cancels  reason. 
It  is  only  in  the  union  of  fixity  and  freedom  that  the 
rational  life  is  possible ;  or  rather  it  is  only  as  the 
rational  life  has  these  opposite  aspects  that  it  exists. 
They  are  not  preexistent  factors  out  of  which  the 
rational  life  is  made ;  they  are  only  antithetical 
aspects  of  the  rational  life  ;  and  this  is  the  essential 
and  only  reality  in  the  case. 

Has,  then,  the  divine  will  nothing  to  do  with  the 
divine  existence?  Does  God  find  himself  given  to 
himself  as  an  object,  or  is  he,  rather,  his  own  cause  ? 
The  answer  must  be  both  yes  and  no.  The  question 
really  assiunes  that  God  as  knowing  and  willing  is 
subsequent  to  himself  as  existing.  Of  course  there  is 
no  temporal  sequence,  but  only  a  logical  one.  God 
does  not  exist  and  then  act,  but  exists  only  in  and 
through  his  act.  And  this  act,  though  not  arbitrary, 
is  also  not  necessary ;  or  though  necessary,  it  is  also 
free.  What  this  apparent  contradiction  means  is  this  : 
Freedom  and  necessity  are  contradictory  only  as 
formal  ideas,  and  are  not  mutually  exclusive  as 
determinations  of  being.  Indeed,  both  ideas  are 
at  bottom  abstractions  from  opposite  sides  of  per- 
sonal existence.  We  find  an  element  of  uniformity 
and  fixity  in  our  life,  and  this  gives  us  the  only  posi- 
tive idea  of  necessity  that  we  possess.  We  find 
also  a  certain  element  of  self-determination,  and  this 

THEISM 14 


198  METAPHYSICAL   ATTRIBUTES 

is  our  idea  of  freedom.  Reality,  then,  shows  these 
formally  opposite  ideas  united  in  actual  existence, 
and  reflection  shows  that  both  are  necessary  to  rational 
existence. 

We  have  an  illustration  both  of  the  meaning  and 
of  the  possibility  of  this  union  in  our  own  hfe.  The 
laws  of  thought  are  inviolable  m  the  nature  of  reason. 
Volition  can  do  nothing  with  them  in  the  way  of 
overthrow.  And  yet,  though  absolute  and  secure 
from  all  reversal,  they  do  not  of  themselves  secm-e 
obedience.  The  human  soul  does  not  become  a 
rational  soul  by  virtue  of  the  law  of  reason  alone ; 
there  is  needed,  in  addition,  an  act  of  corresponding 
self-determination  by  the  free  spirit.  Hence,  while 
there  is  a  necessity  in  the  soul,  it  becomes  controlling 
only  through  freedom;  and  we  may  say  that  every 
one  must  constitute  himself  a  rational  soul.  How 
this  can  be  is  inconstruable,  but  none  the  less  is  it 
a  fact.  We  come  to  oiu-  full  existence  only  through 
our  own  act.  What  is  true  for  ourselves  in  a  limited 
degree,  we  may  regard  as  absolutely  true  for  God. 
At  every  point  the  absolute  will  must  be  present  to 
give  validity  and  reality  to  the  otherwise  powerless 
necessities  of  the  divine  being.  In  this  sense  we 
may  say,  with  Spinoza,  that  God  is  the  cause  of  him- 
self. He  incessantly  constitutes  himself  the  rational 
and  absolute  spirit.  God  is  absolute  will  or  absolute 
agent,  forever  determining  himself  according  to  ra- 
tional and  eternal  principles. 


CHAPTER   V 

GOD  AND  THE  WORLD 

Thus  far  we  have  considered  mainly  the  attributes 
of  God  in  himself ;  we  have  now  to  consider  his  cos- 
mical  relations.  Of  course  it  is  not  our  aim  to  tell 
how  God  produces  the  world,  or  how  the  world 
depends  on  him,  but  only  to  find  what  general  thought 
we  must  form  of  their  mutual  relations.  By  the 
world,  here,  we  mean  all  finite  existence.  Two  gen-  • 
eral  classes  of  views  exist :  theistic  and  pantheistic. 
Pantheism  makes  the  world  either  a  part  of  God  or  a 
necessary  consequence  of  the  divine  nature.  Theism 
holds  that  the  world  is  a  free  act  and  creation  by 
God.     We  consider  pantheism  first. 

Pantheism 

The  view  that  the  world  is  a  part  of  God  is  the 
common  factor  in  all  theories  of  emanation,  ancient 
and  modern.  As  the  waves  are  a  part  of  the  ocean, 
or,  better  still,  as  each  finite  space  or  time  is  a  part 
of  the  one  infinite  space  or  time,  so  each  finite  thing 
is  a  part  or  phase  of  the  one  infinite  existence.  In 
each  of  these  views  God  is  regarded  as  world-substance 
rather  than  first  cause ;  and  this  substance  is  con- 
ceived as  a  kind  of  plastic  stuff  or  raw  material 
which,   like   clay,   can   be   variously   fashioned,  and 

199 


200  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

which  is  at  least  partly  exhausted  in  its  products. 
Sometimes  the  view  is  less  coarse,  and  God  is  con- 
ceived as  the  background  of  the  world,  something  as 
space  is  the  infinite  background  and  possibility  of  the 
figures  in  it.  Sometimes  God  is  said  to  produce  or 
emit  the  world  from  himself,  or  by  a  process  of  self- 
diremption  to  pass  from  his  own  unity  into  the  plu- 
rality of  cosmic  existence.  The  finite,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  a  part,  or  mode,  or  emanation  of  the  infinite, 
and  shares  in  the  infinite  substance.  Whether  the 
world  is  eternal  is  not  decided.  Some  will  have  it  to 
be  an  eternal  part  and  factor  of  God,  while  others 
think  of  it  as  made  out  of  God. 

All  views  of  this  class  are  products  of  the  imagina- 
tion, and  result  from  the  attempt  to  picture  that 
which  is  essentially  unpicturable.  When  we  try  to 
conceive  the  origin  of  the  world,  we  are  tempted  to 
form  the  fancy  of  some  back-lying  plastic  substance 
of  which  the  world  is  made,  and  then  the  imagination 
is  satisfied.  Either  we  refer  the  world  to  some  pre- 
existent  stuff,  or  we  regard  it  as  preexisting  itself  in 
some  potential  form.  Then  its  production  becomes 
either  the  working  over  of  a  given  stuff  or  a  letting 
loose  of  potentialities.  Our  own  relation  to  the  cosmic 
reality  confirms  us  in  this  tendency  to  solve  the  prob- 
lem by  picturing  rather  than  thinking.  We  are 
hmited  to  the  modification  of  given  material ;  and 
this  anthropomorphic  limitation  easily  passes  with  the 
uncritical  for  a  necessary  law. 

Views  of  this  class  are  as  obnoxious  to  reason  as 
they  are  dear  to  the  irrational  fancy.  Metaphysics 
shows  that  reality  is  never  a  stuff,  but  an  agent. 
Nor   does   an   agent   have   any   substance    in   itself 


PANTHEISM  201 

whereby  it  exists,  but  by  virtue  of  its  activity  it  is 
able  to  assert  itself  as  a  determining  factor  in  exist- 
ence, and  thus  only  does  it  acquire  any  claim  to  be 
considered  real.  To  explain  the  universe  we  need  not 
a  substance,  but  an  agent ;  not  substantiality,  but 
causality.  The  latter  expresses  all  the  meaning  of 
the  former,  and  is  free  from  misleading  sense-implica- 
tions. Metaphysics  further  shows  that  every  agent 
is  a  unit,  uncompounded  and  indivisible.  God,  then, 
is  not  the  infinite  stuff  or  substance,  but  the  infinite 
cause  or  agent,  one  and  indivisible.  From  this  point 
all  the  previous  views  of  the  relation  of  God  to  the 
world  disappear  of  themselves.  He  has  no  parts  and 
is  not  a  smn.  Hence  the  world  is  no  part  of  God, 
nor  an  emanation  from  him,  nor  a  sharer  in  the  divine 
substance ;  for  all  these  views  imply  the  divisibility 
of  God  and  also  his  stuff-like  nature.  His  necessary 
unity  forbids  all  attempts  to  identify  him  with  the 
world,  either  totally  or  partially.  If  the  finite  be 
anything  real,  or  more  than  phenomenal,  it  must  be 
viewed,  not  as  produced  from  God,  but  as  produced 
by  God  ;  that  is,  as  created.  Only  creation  can  rec- 
oncile the  substantial  reality  of  the  finite  with  the 
unity  of  the  infinite.  For  the  finite,  if  real,  is  an 
agent,  and  as  such  it  cannot  be  made  out  of  any- 
thing, but  is  posited  by  the  infinite. 

Similar  objections  lie  against  all  views  which  speak 
of  the  world  as  a  mode  of  God.  This  phrase,  in  its 
common  use,  is  allied  to  the  imagination,  and  is  based 
on  the  notion  of  a  passive  and  extended  substance.  The 
thought  commonly  joined  with  it  is  that  each  thing 
is  a  particular  and  separate  part  of  the  infinite,  as 
each  wave  is  not  a  phase  of  the  entire  sea,  but  only 


202  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

of  the  part  comprised  in  the  wave  itself.  But  meta- 
physics further  shows  that  the  unity  of  being  is  com- 
patible with  plurality  of  attributes  only  as  each  is  an 
attribute  of  the  whole  thing.  Any  conception  of 
diverse  states  which  are  states  of  only  a  part  of  the 
thing  would  destroy  its  unity.  The  entire  being 
must  be  present  in  each  state ;  and  this  cannot  be  so 
long  as  the  notion  of  quantity  is  applied  to  the  prob- 
lem. The  only  way  in  which  a  being  can  be  con- 
ceived as  entire  in  every  mode,  is  by  dropping  all 
quantitative  and  spatial  conceptions  and  viewing  the 
being  as  an  agent,  and  the  modes  as  forms  of  its 
activity.  If,  then,  finite  things  are  modes  of  the  in- 
finite, this  can  only  mean  that  they  are  acts  of  the 
infinite,  or  modes  of  agency. 

Another  conception  of  this  relation  has  been  ven- 
tured, based  on  the  relation  of  the  universal  to  the 
particulars  subsumed  under  it,  and  more  especially  on 
the  relation  of  the  universal  reason  to  the  individual 
mind.  As  reason  is  the  same  in  all,  and  as  no  one 
can  claim  a  monopoly  of  it,  but  only  a  participation 
in  it,  we  may  say  that  the  universal  reason  is  the 
reality,  and  that  the  finite  mind  exists  only  in  and 
through  it  as  one  of  its  phases  or  manifestations. 
But  this  is  only  an  echo  of  the  scholastic  realism. 
Class  terms  denote  no  possible  existence,  and  have 
reality  only  in  the  specific  existences  from  which  they 
are  abstracted. 

This  relation  of  the  world  to  God  cannot  be  pic- 
tured ;  it  must  be  thought.  The  quantitative  and 
spatial  conceptions  with  which  the  imagination  deals 
are  ruled  out,  both  by  the  unity  of  the  basal  reality 
and  by  the  ideality  of  spatial  relations.     We  cannot 


PANTHEISM  203 

trace  the  world  into  God ;  we  must  be  content  with 
tracing  it  to  hira.  The  existence  of  the  world  in  God 
means  simply  its  continuous  dependence  on  him. 
To  find  the  world  in  God  in  any  discriminable  onto- 
logical  form,  such  as  Schelling's  "  dark  nature-ground," 
would  cancel  his  necessary  unity.  The  experienced 
relation  of  active  intelligence  to  its  products  is  the  only 
solution  of  this  problem.  As  we  have  before  said, 
the  attempt  to  trace  the  works  of  intelligence  into 
intelligence  in  any  substantial  sense  is  to  make  ship- 
wreck of  reason.  We  refer  them  to  intelligence  as 
their  cause.  The  possibility  of  such  causation  we 
experience.     Beyond  this,  thought  cannot  go. 

Two  conceptions  of  the  finite  are  logically  possible. 
First,  we  may  regard  it  as  only  a  mode  of  the  divine 
activity  and  without  any  proper  thinghood.  Secondly, 
we  may  view  it  as  a  proper  thing,  not  only  as  an  act 
of  God,  but  as  a  substantial  product.  The  former 
conception  is  illustrated  by  the  relation  of  thoughts 
to  the  mind.  These  are  not  modes  of  mind,  but 
mental  acts.  They  are  not  made  out  of  anything, 
but  the  thinking  mind  gives  them  existence.  At  the 
same  time,  they  are  not  things  in  the  mind,  but  exist 
only  in  and  through  the  act  which  creates  them. 

The  decision  between  these  views  can  be  reached 
only  as  we  find,  in  the  finite,  things  which  can  know 
themselves  as  things.  At  first  sight,  indeed,  things 
and  substances  appear  to  be  given  in  immediate  per- 
ception; but  epistemology  shows  that  the  objects  of 
perception  are  primarily  never  more  than  our  own 
conceptions  and  representations  which  have  been 
objectified  under  the  forms  of  space  and  time,  sub- 
stance  and   attribute,   cause    and   effect,  etc.     They 


204  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

represent  only  the  way  in  which  the  mind  reacts 
against  a  series  of  incitements  from  without.  Meta- 
physics further  shows  that  the  independent  fact  is 
totally  unlike  the  appearance ;  and  when  these  con- 
siderations are  followed  out,  we  reach  the  insight  that 
true  substantial  existence,  in  distinction  from  phe- 
nomenal existence,  can  be  predicated  only  of  persons. 
Only  selfhood  serves  to  mark  off  the  finite  from  the 
infinite,  and  only  the  finite  spirit  attains  to  substan- 
tial otherness  to  the  infinite.  The  impersonal  finite 
has  only  such  otherness  as  a  thought  or  act  has  to  its 
subject. 

This  is  the  view  of  the  physical  system  to  which 
speculative  thought  is  fast  coming.  Thought  begins, 
indeed,  with  the  conviction  that  all  things  are  sub- 
stantially there ;  but  the  more  we  study  them,  the 
more  they  vanish  into  law  and  process  without  any 
proper  thinghood  beyond  continuity,  uniformity,  and 
universality.  Nor  does  it  avail  anything  against  the 
conclusion  to  say  that  the  world-ground  may  posit 
impersonal  agents  as  well  as  personal  ones ;  for  the 
notion  of  the  impersonal  finite  vanishes  upon  analy- 
sis into  phenomenality.  Identity,  unity,  causality, 
substantiality  are  possible  only  under  the  personal 
form.  On  all  these  accounts  the  impersonal  can  only 
be  viewed  as  dependent  phenomenon,  or  process  of  an 
energy  not  its  own. 

This  view  does  not  commend  itself  to  spontaneous 
thought,  and  is  questioned  by  many  in  the  name  of 
common  sense.  The  objections  commonly  rest  upon 
misapprehension.  Our  sense-experience  puts  us  in 
connection  with  a  system  of  things.  Concerning  this 
system,  we  may  ask  whether  it  depends  on  us,  as  the 


PANTHEISM  205 

illusions  of  the  madman  depend  on  his  distempered 
mind,  or  whether  it  is  independent  of  us  and  our  per- 
ception. The  common  conception  of  idealism  is  that 
it  affirms  the  former  view.  This  is  one  of  the 
chronic  misconceptions  for  which,  when  once  estab- 
lished, there  seems  to  be  no  exorcism.  No  rational 
idealist,  however,  has  ever  held  such  a  view.  He 
believes,  as  much  as  any  one,  that  the  system  of 
experience  is  no  product  of  our  own,  and  that  it 
exists  for  all.  He  only  raises  the  question  what  this 
system  may  be  in  its  essential  nature.  The  realist 
proposes  the  conception  of  a  brute  existence  as  ex- 
pressing its  ultimate  nature ;  but  the  idealist  has  no 
difficulty  in  showing  that  such  a  conception  is  only 
the  realist's  theory,  and  not  a  fact  of  immediate 
experience,  and  that  this  theory,  moreover,  is  quite 
unable  to  do  the  work  assigned  it.  And  the  realist 
himself  is  compelled  to  relax  his  theory  when  he 
comes  to  consider  the  relation  of  God  and  the  world. 
Of  course  the  imagination  has  no  difficulty  in  con- 
struing this  relation  as  a  spatial  one  —  as  one  of 
mutual  inclusion  and  exclusion  —  but  not  much 
reflection  is  needed  to  show  the  impossibility  of  such 
a  view  or  the  contradictions  involved  in  it.  The 
most  striking  advantages  of  the  realistic  view  for  the 
imagination  become  its  chief  embarrassments  for 
reflective  thought.  In  fact,  that  view  is  the  unsus- 
pected source  of  most  of  the  metaphysical  difficulties 
under  which  theology  labors.  The  real  space  with 
its  real  matter  and  force  forever  tends  to  make  the 
mechanical  and  materialistic  conception  law-giving 
for  all  existence,  and  thus  to  make  any  other  concep- 
tion impossible.     Realism  may  not  be  atheism,  but  it 


206  GOD  AND  THE  WORLD 

is  certainly  one  great  source  of  atheism.  Its  things 
and  forces  are  continually  threatening  to  set  up  for 
themselves,  and  in  unclear  minds  of  irreligious  turn 
they  often  do  it. 

In  any  case  the  world  of  finite  spirits  must  be 
viewed  as  created.  It  is  not  made  out  of  preexistent 
stuff  but  caused  to  be.  Creation  means  to  posit  some- 
thing in  existence  which,  apart  from  the  creative 
act,  would  not  be.  Concerning  it  two  consistent 
questions  may  be  asked :  Who  is  the  agent  ?  How 
is  it  possible  ?  To  the  first  question  the  answer  is, 
God.  To  the  second  there  is  no  rational  answer  in 
the  sense  of  a  rationale  of  the  process. 

Besides  these  consistent  questions,  various  incon- 
sistent ones  are  asked,  as,  for  instance :  What  is  the 
world  made  "  out  of  "  ?  The  common  answer  is,  out 
of  nothing.  Both  question  and  answer  are  worthy 
of  each  other.  Both  are  haunted  by  the  notion  of 
a  preexistent  stuff,  and,  to  complete  the  absurdity, 
the  answer  suggests  nothing  as  that  stuff;  as  if  by 
some  process  God  fashioned  the  nothing  into  some- 
thing. The  oldsaw,  from  nothing  nothing  comes,  is  also 
played  off  against  creation,  but  without  effect.  The 
truth  therein  is  merely  that  nothing  can  ever  pro- 
duce, or  be  formed  into  anything.  But  theism  does 
not  teach  that  nothing  produces  something,  but  rather 
that  God,  the  all-powerful,  has  caused  the  world  to 
exist.  No  more  does  theism  hold  that  God  took  a 
mass  of  nothing  and  made  something  out  of  it,  but 
rather  that  he  caused  a  new  existence  to  begin,  and 
that,  too,  in  such  a  way  that  he  was  no  less  after 
creation  than  before.     God  neither  made  the  world 


PANTHEISM  207 

from  nothing  as  a  raw  material,  nor  from  himself. 
Both  notions  are  absurd,  but  he  caused  that  to  be 
which  apart  from  his  activity  had  no  existence. 
Recalling  the  ideality  of  time,  we  may  say  that 
creation  means  simply  the  dependence  of  things  on 
the  divine  activity  for  such  existence  as  they  have, 
and  their  exclusion  from  any  quantitative  sharing 
in  the  divine  substance.  Of  course  such  a  relation 
is  mysterious ;  but  the  alternative  view  is  a  con- 
tradiction of  thought  itself.  Creation  is  the  only 
conception  which  reconciles  the  unity  of  God  with 
the  existence  of  the  finite.  Perhaps,  too,  we  need 
not  be  especially  troubled  at  the  mystery,  as  mystery 
is  omnipresent;  and  besides,  creation  is  not  our 
affair. 

Some  speculators  have  sought  relief  from  the 
mystery  of  creation  in  the  claim  that  the  world  was 
not  made  from  nothing,  but  from  the  potentialities 
of  the  divine  nature.  The  only  intelligible  meaning 
of  this  view  is  that  the  world  existed  as  a  conception 
in  the  divine  thought  before  it  became  real.  This 
conceptual  existence  constituted  its  potentiality,  but 
this  in  no  way  shows  how  that  which  existed  as 
conception  was  posited  in  reality.  For  the  rest,  the 
claim  in  question  is  only  a  form  of  words  of  learned 
sound  but  without  meaning. 

The  world,  then,  depends  on  God,  but  not  as  a 
mode  or  part  of  the  divine  substance.  Such  concep- 
tions are  excluded  by  the  divine  unity  and  by  the 
identification  of  substantiality  with  causality.  The 
pantheism,  then,  that  would  make  the  world  a  part 
of  God,  or  would  construe  the  relation  under  the 
category  of  quantity,  or  of  whole  and  part,  is  untenable. 


208  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

We  now  consider  the  pantheism  that  views  the 
world  as  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  divine  nature. 
This  view  also  admits  of  a  double  interpretation 
according  to  our  thought  of  being  in  general.  We 
may  regard  the  world  as  a  logical  implication  of  the 
divine  nature  or  as  a  dynamic  resultant.  In  one  view 
God  is  the  all-conditioning  premise  and  the  world  is 
the  implied  conclusion.  Here  the  relation  is  logical 
and  static,  and  the  view  might  be  called  static  pan- 
theism. Or  God  might  be  viewed  as  the  all-condi- 
tioning causality  necessarily  manifesting  itself  in  the 
world  of  things.  Here  the  relation  is  dynamic,  and 
the  view  might  be  called  d3mamic  pantheism.  In 
this  view  the  infinite  is  forever  energizing  according 
to  certain  laws,  and  producing  thereby  a  great  variety 
of  products.  But  these  laws  are  throughout  expres- 
sions of  its  nature  and  admit  of  no  change.  The 
world-order  is  the  divine  nature,  and,  conversely,  the 
divine  nature  is  the  world-order.  Hence  pantheists 
of  this  order  have  always  been  the  stoutest  opponents 
of  miracles,  for  miracles  imply  a  will  apart  from  and 
above  nature.  If  the  world-order  were  really  the 
divine  nature,  then,  of  course,  God  could  not  depart 
from  that  order  without  denying  himself.  This  con- 
viction is  further  strengthened  by  the  natural  tendency 
of  the  untaught  mind  to  mistake  the  uniformities 
of  experience  for  necessities  of  being ;  and  thus  the 
world-order  is  finally  established  as  necessarily  invari- 
able, the  mind  not  recognizing  its  own  shadow.  This 
is  the  view  which  underlies  all  schemes  of  philosophic 
evolution,  and  a  large  part  of  current  scientific  specu- 
lation, or  rather  speculation  on  the  supposed  basis  of 
scientific  facts  and  principles.    While  static  pantheism 


PANTHEISM  209 

says,  In  the  beginning  was  the  eternal  substance  or 
the  eternal  reason  coexisting  changelessly  with  all  its 
implications ;  dynamic  pantheism  says,  In  the  begin- 
ning was  force,  necessary  and  persistent,  and  by  its 
inherent  necessity  forever  generating  law  and  system. 
When  this  view  is  combined  with  the  impersonality 
and  unconsciousness  of  the  world-ground,  it  becomes 
identical  with  vulgar  atheism.  The  world-ground  is 
simply  the  unitary  principle  and  basal  reality  of  the 
cosmos,  and  is  exhausted  in  its  cosmic  manifestation. 
There  is  immanence  without  transcendence  ;  and  God 
and  the  world  are  but  opposite  aspects  of  the  same 
thing.  The  world  considered  in  its  ground  is  God ; 
and  God  considered  in  his  manifested  nature  is  the 
world. 

Static  pantheism  is  an  untenable  abstraction  which, 
if  allowed,  would  bring  tlie  universe  to  a  standstill 
and  load  thought  with  illusion.  It  would  give  us 
a  rigid  and  resting  being  from  which  all  time  and 
change  would  be  excluded,  and  which  could  in  no 
way  be  connected  with  our  changing  experience.  If 
we  should  call  that  experience  delusion,  the  delusion 
itself  would  be  as  unaccountable  as  the  fact.  On  this 
rock  Eleatic  philosophy  was  wrecked,  and  here,  too, 
Spinoza's  system  went  to  pieces.  And  this  must  be 
the  case  with  any  view  which  makes  the  relation  of 
God  to  the  world  one  of  logical  implication.  For 
logic  knows  no  time,  and  the  conclusion  must  coexist 
with  the  premises.  If  then  the  world  as  existing  were 
a  logical  implication  of  the  divine  being,  it  and  all  its 
factors  would  be  eternal.  There  would  be  no  room 
for  change,  but  all  things  would  rigidly  coexist.     In 


210  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

this  view,  also,  finite  minds  with  all  their  contents 
would  be  necessary  and  eternal ;  and  as  error  and 
evil  are  a  manifest  part  of  those  contents,  it  follows 
that  they  likewise  are  necessary  and  eternal.  Hence 
we  should  have  to  assume  a  factor  of  unreason  and 
evil  in  God  himself ;  and  by  this  time  the  collapse  of 
thought  would  be  complete. 

The  truth,  then,  in  pantheism,  if  there  be  any,  lies 
in  dynamic  pantheism.  But  this  view  is  also  unten- 
able for  the  following  reasons  :  — 

1.  It  is  unclear.  The  dynamic  implication  which 
is  other  than  logical  is  quite  unintelligible  except  as 
free  volitional  activity.  Again,  the  view  provides 
only  for  the  world-order  and  does  not  recognize  its 
details.  But  the  world-order,  as  a  system  of  general 
laws,  accounts  for  no  specific  fact  whatever.  We 
must  refer,  then,  not  only  the  world-order  to  the 
divine  nature,  but  also  the  cosmic  details.  And 
since  these  are  incessantly  shifting,  the  divine  nature, 
which  is  their  ground,  must  also  be  shifting,  and 
hence  a  temporal  thing.  Thereby  the  infinite  is 
degraded  to  a  temporal  existence  and  its  absoluteness 
disappears ;  for  only  the  self-determining  can  be 
absolute. 

The  very  general  oversight  of  this  difficulty  is  due 
to  the  fallacy  of  the  universal.  It  has  been  thought 
that  the  system  of  the  world  as  a  whole  might  result 
from  the  divine  nature  without  taking  account  of  its 
details;  but  this  is  impossible  when  we  think  con- 
cretely. Then  we  are  compelled  to  carry  all  com- 
plexity and  multiplicity  into  their  ground,  which  thus 
becomes  complex  and  multiform  itself.  The  same 
fallacy  has  concealed  the  degradation  of  the  divine 


PANTHEISM  211 

which  is  involved  in  pantheism.  Few  would  care  to 
carry  bodily  into  God  the  great  mass  of  opaque,  in- 
significant, sinister  details  which  bulk  so  large  in  ex- 
perience ;  but  we  easily  hide  them  behind  the  thought 
of  the  world-order  or  system  of  law.  This  system 
in  turn  seems  to  be  an  adequate  and  worthy  expres- 
sion of  the  divine  nature ;  and  the  unseemly  and 
embarrassing  features  of  concrete  experience  drop 
from  our  thought  altogether.  This  illusion  the  critic 
must  not  fail  to  point  out. 

2.  Self-determination  being  denied,  we  must  find 
some  ground  for  the  changing  activity  of  the  infinite ; 
and  this  must  be  found  in  some  mechanism  in  the 
infinite  whereby  its  states  interact  and  determine  the 
outcome.  But  of  such  metaphysical  mechanism  we 
can  form  no  conception  whatever;  and  the  view,  if 
carried  out,  would  cancel  the  unity  of  the  infinite 
altogether.  We  might  continue  to  speak  of  unity, 
but  we  should  be  quite  unable  to  find  it,  or  to  tell  in 
what  it  consisted.  We  should  remain  in  the  midst 
of  an  interacting  many  with  no  possibility  of  reach- 
ing any  basal  one.  As  we  have  already  pointed  out, 
the  free  and  conscious  self  is  the  only  real  unity  of 
which  we  have  any  knowledge,  and  reflection  shows 
that  it  is  the  only  thing  which  can  be  a  true  unity. 
This  type  of  pantheism  would  necessarily  pass  over 
into  atheism. 

3.  We  have  seen  that  the  alleged  necessity  of 
natural  laws  and  products  is  purely  hypothetical. 
No  reflection  upon  necessary  truth  shows  the  present 
order  to  be  a  necessary  implication  in  any  respect. 
Metaphysical  necessity  is  a  purely  negative  idea  to 
which  no   positive  conception   or   experience   corre- 


212  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

spends ;  and  so  far  as  rational  necessity  is  concerned, 
the  world  and  all  its  details  are  contingent. 

4.  We  have  further  seen  that  everj^  system  of 
necessity  overturns  reason  itself.  Freedom  is  a 
necessary  implication  of  rationality. 

On  all  these  grounds  we  hold  that  God  is  free  in 
his  relation  to  the  world,  and  that  the  world,  though 
conditioned  by  the  divine  nature,  is  no  necessary 
product  thereof,  but  rather  rests  upon  the  divine 
will.  To  carry  the  world  into  God  is  to  carry  time 
and  evolution  into  God :  and  the  notion  of  an  evolv- 
ing, developing  God  does  not  commend  itself  to 
speculative  thought.  Again,  to  carry  the  actual 
world  into  God  with  all  its  antitheses  of  good  and 
evil,  and  its  boundless  wastes  of  insignificance  and 
imperfection,  would  be  to  degrade  the  theistic  idea 
to  about  the  level  of  the  Platonic  demiurge.  Every- 
thing would  be  divine  but  God. 

And  if  one  should  ask.  How  much  better  off  are  we 
on  the  theistic  view,  seeing  that  these  things  must 
in  some  sense  be  referred  to  God  ?  the  answer  would 
be  this.  We  are  much  better  off  in  being  able  to 
maintain  the  divine  absoluteness  and  perfection, 
which  is  impossible  to  pantheism.  Moreover,  the 
seeming  evils  and  imperfections  of  the  world  being 
founded  in  purpose  and  freedom,  and  not  in  an  in- 
tractable necessity,  we  are  permitted  to  hope  for 
their  removal  or  transformation  in  the  completion  of 
the  divine  plan.  This  would  not  be  possible  in  a 
system  where  all  things  happen  by  an  opaque  neces- 
sity, and  where  nothing  is  the  outcome  of  proper 
prevision  and  purpose. 

If,  then,  we  ask  how  the  world  comes  to  be,  we 


PANTHEISM  213 

have  to  refer  the  conception  of  the  world  to  the 
divine  thought ;  and  any  inquiry  into  the  origin  and 
possibihty  of  this  conception  is  futile.  Such  inquiry 
applies  the  principle  of  the  sufficient  reason  to  thought 
itself  rather  than  to  its  products,  and  always  begins 
and  ends  in  confusion.  If  we  next  ask  how  this  con- 
ception came  to  be  realized,  we  refer  it  not  to  any 
necessity  of  the  divine  nature,  but  to  the  free  will  of 
the  Creator.  If  we  further  ask  why  this  conception 
was  realized,  we  may  assume  some  worthy  purpose, 
some  supreme  good  to  be  reached  thereby.  If,  finally, 
we  ask  how  this  supreme  good  implies  the  actual 
world  for  its  realization,  we  must  be  content  to  wait 
for  an  answer. 

In  concluding  that  God  is  free  in  his  relation  to  the 
world,  we  abandon  all  hope  of  a  speculative  deduction 
of  creation.  Such  hope  has  often  been  entertained, 
and  numberless  attempts  have  been  made  to  realize  it. 
Inasmuch  as  we  conclude  from  the  world  to  God,  it  is 
said,  we  must  be  able  to  conclude  from  God  to  the 
world.  Sometimes  the  matter  has  been  made  very 
easy  by  defining  creation  as  essential  to  the  divine 
nature;  and  then  the  conclusion  has  been  drawn  that 
God  without  the  world  would  be  a  contradiction.  In 
addition  to  being  failures,  these  attempts  spring  from 
a  speculative  lust  for  understanding  and  construing, 
which  fails  to  grasp  the  conditions  of  understanding. 
In  this  respect  they  are  on  a  par  with  the  infantile 
wisdom  which  asks.  Who  made  God?  We  must  refer 
the  concrete  system  to  intelligence  as  its  source,  but 
we  can  never  deduce  it  from  intelligence  as  a  neces- 
sary implication. 

This  conclusion  applies  to  the  entire  system  of  the 

THEISM 15 


214  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

finite,  whether  physical  or  spiritual.  It  affirms  the 
freedom  and  absoluteness  of  God  in  creation,  but  it  is 
quite  compatible  with  the  complete  dependence,  and 
even  phenomenality  of  the  creature.  In  that  case, 
however,  creation  produces  no  real  otherness  to  God, 
and  vanishes  into  a  species  of  ambiguous  meditation 
on  the  Creator's  part.  With  this  result  we  are  all  at 
sea  again.  The  finite  becomes  an  unaccountable  illu- 
sion, which  defies  all  understanding.  We  must,  then, 
make  an  effort  to  secure  some  substantiality  for  the 
finite  spirit.  Having  shown  that  God  is  free  in  his 
relation  to  the  world,  we  must  next  show  that  the 
finite  spirit  has  some  reality  over  against  God. 

The  great  difficulty  here  lies  in  the  necessary  de- 
pendence of  the  finite.  In  studying  interaction,  we 
have  seen  that  all  finite  things  are  comprehended  in 
an  order  of  dependence,  and  it  is  very  easy  to  use 
this  fact  for  dissolving  away  our  personality  and 
responsibility  unless  we  look  well  to  our  goings.  A 
passage  is  borrowed  from  the  author's  "  Metaphysics," 
in  elucidation  of  the  point :  — 

"A  more  subtle  source  of  error  concerning  this 
matter  lies  in  the  necessary  dependence  of  the  finite. 
The  finite  is  dependent  on  the  infinite,  and  is  also  a 
member  of  a  system  to  which  it  is  continually  subject. 
The  result  is  that  the  finite  spirit  has  only  a  limited  and 
relative  existence  at  best.  As  compared  with  the  in- 
finite, it  has  only  a  partial  and  incomplete  existence. 
In  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word,  only  the  infinite 
exists ;  all  else  is  relatively  phenomenal  and  non- 
existent. 

''By  thinking  along  this  line  in  an  abstract  way  it 
is  easy  to  come  to  this  conclusion;  and  every  reader 


PANTHEISM  215 

acquainted  with  the  history  of  speculation  will  recall 
how  often  men  have  stumbled  into  pantheism  at  this 
point.  Nor  is  it  easy  to  escape  this  conclusion  so 
long  as  we  dwell  on  the  abstract  categories  of  finite 
and  infinite,  dependent  and  independent,  phenomenal 
and  real,  existence  and  nonexistence.  The  truth  is 
we  have  no  insight  into  these  categories  that  will 
enable  us  to  decide  what  is  concretely  possible  in  this 
case.  We  have  to  fall  back  on  experience,  and  in- 
terpret the  categories  by  experience,  instead  of  de- 
termining experience  by  the  categories.  Any  other 
method  is  illusory  and  the  prolific  source  of  illusions. 
"  Adopting  this  method,  we  discover  that,  while  we 
cannot  tell  how  the  finite  can  be,  it  nevertheless  is. 
The  finite  may  not  exist  in  the  full  sense  of  the 
infinite,  but  for  all  that,  in  a  small  way,  it  is  able 
to  act  and  is  acted  upon.  In  the  sense  of  self- 
sufficiency  there  is  but  one  substance,  as  Spinoza 
said ;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  all  other  things  are 
only  powerless  shadows,  for  there  are  a  great  many 
substances  that  can  act  and  be  acted  upon.  It 
matters  little  what  we  call  these,  provided  we  bear 
this  fact  in  mind.  They  are  not  substances,  if  sub- 
stance means  self-sufficiency.  They  are  substances, 
if  substance  means  the  subject  of  action  and  passion. 
If,  then,  we  bear  our  meaning  carefully  in  mind,  we 
may  say  that  only  the  infinite  exists  or  truly  is,  that 
the  finite  has  only  partial,  relative,  incomplete,  non- 
existent existence  ;  and  there  would  be  a  sort  of  truth 
in  the  saying.  But  these  utterances  are  so  easily  mis- 
understood that  they  should  be  reserved  for  esoteric 
use,  and  frugality  is  to  be  recommended  even  there. 
In  these  operations  we  must  proceed  antiseptically, 


216  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

and  sterilize  our  verbal  instruments  by  careful  defini- 
tion before  we  begin. 

"  Now  when  we  consider  life  at  all  reflectively,  we 
come  upon  two  facts.  First,  we  have  thoughts  and 
feelings  and  volitions ;  and  these  are  our  own.  We 
also  have  a  measure  of  self-control  or  the  power  of 
self -direction.  Here,  then,  in  experience  we  find  a 
certain  selfhood  and  a  relative  independence.  This 
fact  constitutes  us  real  persons,  or  rather  it  is  the 
meaning  of  our  personality.  The  second  fact  is  that 
we  cannot  regard  this  life  as  self-sufficient  and  inde- 
pendent. How  the  life  is  possible  we  do  not  know ; 
we  only  know  that  it  is.  How  the  two  facts  are  put 
together  is  altogether  beyond  us.  We  only  know 
that  we  cannot  interpret  life  without  admitting  both, 
and  that  to  deny  either  lands  us  in  contradiction  and 
nonsense.  It  is  no  doubt  fine,  and  in  some  sense  it 
is  correct,  to  say  that  God  is  in  all  things ;  but  when 
it  comes  to  saying  that  God  is  all  things  and  that  all 
forms  of  thought  and  feeling  and  conduct  are  his, 
then  reason  simply  commits  suicide.  God  thinks  and 
feels  in  what  we  call  our  thinking  and  feeling ;  and 
hence  he  blunders  in  our  blundering  and  is  stupid  in 
our  stupidity.  He  contradicts  himself  also  with  the 
utmost  freedom ;  for  a  deal  of  his  thinking  does  not 
hang  together  from  one  person  to  another,  or  from  one 
day  to  another  in  the  same  person.  Error,  folly,  and 
sin  are  all  made  divine ;  and  reason  and  conscience 
as  having  authority  vanish.  The  only  thing  that 
is  not  divine  in  this  scheme  is  God ;  and  he  vanishes 
into  a  congeries  of  contradictions  and  basenesses. 

"For  note   the  purely  logical   difficulties   in   the 
notion,  not  to  press  the  problem  of  evil  and  error 


PANTHEISM  217 

just  referred  to.  Suppose  the  difficulty  overcome 
which  is  involved  in  the  inalienability  of  personal 
experience,  so  that  our  thoughts  and  life  might  be 
ascribed  to  God  as  consciously  his.  What  is  God's 
relation  as  thinking  our  thoughts  to  God  as  thinking 
the  absolute  thought  ?  Does  he  become  limited,  con- 
fused, and  blind  in  finite  experience,  and  does  he  at 
the  same  time  have  absolute  insight  in  his  infinite 
life  ?  Does  he  lose  himself  in  the  finite  so  as  not  to 
know  what  and  who  he  is ;  or  does  he  perhaps  exhaust 
himself  in  the  finite,  so  that  the  finite  is  all  there 
is  ?  But  if  all  the  while  he  has  perfect  knowledge 
of  himself  as  one  and  infinite,  how  does  this  illusion 
of  the  finite  arise  at  all  in  that  perfect  unity  and 
perfect  light  ?  There  is  no  answer  to  these  questions, 
so  long  as  the  infinite  is  supposed  to  play  both  sides 
of  the  game.  We  have  a  series  of  unaccountable 
illusions  and  an  infinite  playing  hide-and-seek  with 
itself  in  a  most  grotesque  metaphysical  fuddlement. 
The  notion  of  creation  may  be  difficult,  but  it  saves 
us  from  such  dreary  stuff  as  this.  How  the  infinite 
can  posit  the  finite,  and  thus  make  the  possibility  of 
a  moral  order,  is  certainly  beyond  us ;  but  the  alter- 
native is  a  lapse  into  hopeless  irrationality.  We  can 
make  nothing  of  either  God  or  the  world  on  such  a 
pantheistic  basis.  Accordingly,  we  find  writers  who 
incline  to  this  way  of  thinking  in  uncertain  vacilla- 
tion between  some  "  Eternal  Consciousness  "  and  our 
human  consciousness  and  without  any  definite  and 
consistent  thought  concerning  their  mutual  relation, 
but  only  vague  and  showy  phrases."  ^ 

We  conclude,  then,  that  pantheism  in  whatever 

^"Metaphysics"  (revised  edition),  p.  100  ff. 


218  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

form  is  untenable.  Both  its  doctrine  of  God  and  its 
doctrine  of  man  are  equally  obnoxious  to  criticism. 
It  is  equally  fatal  to  reason  to  subject  God  to  necessity, 
and  to  reduce  man  to  a  phantom  of  the  infinite. 
Indeed  this  doctrine  is  less  a  matter  of  thought  than 
of  vague  feeling.  In  a  time  of  mechanical  deism 
and  religious  anthropomorphism,  pantheism  naturally 
arises  as  a  reaction.  In  a  time  of  overdone  mecha- 
nism and  materialism  it  is  welcomed  as  a  relief.  In 
a  time  when  the  Living  God  has  retreated  into  a 
distant  past  and  disappeared  below  the  horizon, 
pantheism  seems  an  advance.  But  this  is  a  mistake. 
What  is  really  needed  is,  not  a  God  who  blocks  exist- 
ence by  absorbing  all  things  into  himself,  but  the 
living  and  immanent  God  in  whom  we  live  and  move 
and  have  our  being,  and  whose  tender  mercies  are 
over  all  his  works ;  a  God  also  in  whom  revelation 
and  mystery  mingle,  who  comes  near  enough  for  love, 
and  rises  high  enough  for  awe  and  voiceless  adora- 
tion. It  is  only  a  mind  subject  to  verbal  illusions 
that  can  find  any  help  or  inspiration  in  pantheism 
proper.  India  and  the  Indian  pantheon  reveal  the 
essential  meaning  of  pantheism. 

We  pass  now  to  the  theistic  conception  of  the  rela- 
tion of  God  to  the  world. 

In  this  view  the  world  depends  on  the  divine  will. 
In  estimating  this  result,  care  must  be  taken  not  to 
apply  to  the  divine  willing  the  limitations  of  the 
human.  As  in  human  consciousness  there  are  many 
features  that  are  not  essential  to  consciousness,  and 
that  arise  from  our  limitations,  so  in  human  willing 
there  are  many  featiu-es   that  are  not  essential  to 


THEISM  219 

willing,  and  that  result  from  our  finiteness.  Since 
we  get  our  objects  of  volition  gradually  and  by  experi- 
ence, we  tend  to  think  of  will  as  a  momentary  activity 
which  comes  into  our  life  now  and  then,  but  which,  for 
the  most  part,  is  quiescent.  In  this  way  we  come  to 
think  of  an  act  of  will  as  having  nothing  to  do  with  the 
maintenance  of  a  fixed  state,  but  only  as  producing  a 
change ;  or  if  it  should  look  to  the  preservation  of  a 
given  state,  it  would  only  be  as  that  state  might  be 
threatened  by  something  external.  And  so,  finally,  it 
comes  to  pass  that  we  think  of  willing  as  something 
necessarily  temporal  or  beginning.  When,  then,  we 
speak  of  the  world  as  depending  on  the  divine  will,  the 
imagination  finds  it  difficult  to  grasp  this  thought  with- 
out assuming  an  empty  time  before  its  origination. 

But  these  features  of  human  willing  are  not  to  be 
transferred  to  God  without  inspection.  To  begin 
with,  willing  does  not  necessarily  imply  beginning. 
In  studying  the  divine  omnipotence  w^e  saw  that 
God's  will  in  reference  to  himself  must  be  eternal ; 
that  is,  it  is  as  unbegun  as  God,  being  but  that  free 
self-determination  whereby  God  is  God.  It  is  only  in 
relation  to  the  world  that  God's  will  can  be  temporal ; 
and  here,  too,  there  is  an  essential  difference.  We 
come  only  gradually  to  a  knowledge  of  our  aims ; 
but  this  cannot  be  affirmed  of  God.  We  have  seen 
that  in  his  absolute  self-knowledge  and  self-possession 
God  has  neither  past  nor  future.  Hence  the  ideals  of 
the  divine  will  are  also  eternal  in  the  divine  thought. 
The  will  to  create,  however,  is  differently  regarded. 
Some  view  it  as  an  eternal  predicate  of  God,  and 
others  view  it  as  a  temporal  predicate. 

Still  another  distinction  between  our  will  and  the 


220  GOD   AND   THP:   world 

creative  will  must  be  noticed.  With  us  to  will  is  not 
necessarily  to  fulfill ;  and  thus  we  come  to  think  that 
in  addition  to  the  will  there  must  also  be  a  special 
activity  of  realization.  Some  have  carried  this  con- 
ception over  to  God,  and  have  affirmed  the  will  to 
create  to  be  eternal,  while  the  execution  is  temporal. 
But  this  view  confounds  intention  with  will,  and  for 
the  rest  is  false.  This  feature  of  our  willing  is  due 
altogether  to  our  finiteness.  Our  willing,  in  fact, 
extends  only  to  our  mental  states,  and  is  not  absolute 
even  there.  For  the  production  of  effects  in  the  outer 
world  we  depend  on  something  not  ourselves ;  and  as 
this  is  not  always  subservient  to  us,  we  come  to  dis- 
tinguish between  volition  and  realization.  Again,  we 
find  that  we  cannot  always  control  our  thoughts, 
because  they  are  partly  due  to  external  causes ;  and 
in  the  struggle  which  thus  arises  we  find  additional 
ground  for  distinguishing  the  will  and  the  realization. 
Finally,  our  control  of  the  body  is  attended  by  many 
feelings  of  strain  and  effort,  and  these  we  carry  into 
the  idea  of  will  itself,  where  it  by  no  means  belongs. 
These  feelings  are  effects  of  muscular  tension  resulting 
from  our  will,  but  they  are  no  part  of  the  will  itself. 
None  of  these  elements  can  be  transferred  to  God. 
He  is  unconditioned  by  anything  beyond  himself. 
He  is  absolutely  self-determining,  and  with  him  wil- 
ling must  be  identical  with  realization. 

On  the  realistic  doctrine  of  time  two  views  are 
held  of  the  will  to  create,  some  making  it  an  eternal 
and  others  only  a  temporal  predicate  of  God.  We 
devote  a  word  to  these  before  passing  to  the  idealistic 
conception. 


ETERNAL   CREATION  221 

Of  the  two  views  the  one  which  makes  creation 
only  a  temporal  predicate  is  the  more  easily  realized 
by  the  imagination.  By  its  affirmation  of  an  empty 
time  before  the  creative  act,  that  act  is  made  to 
appear  more  like  an  act  than  an  eternal  doing  would 
be,  and  at  the  same  time  the  view  marks  off 
creation  as  an  act  of  will  more  clearly  from  the 
opposite  doctrine,  which  makes  creation  a  necessary 
consequence  of  the  divine  nature.  This,  however,  is 
only  an  aid  to  the  imagination.  If  the  Creator  be  free, 
he  is  eternally  free.  He  did  not  first  exist  and  then 
become  free,  but  his  freedom  is  coexistent  with  him- 
self ;  and  hence  his  free  doing  may  coexist  with  him- 
self. There  is  nothing  in  the  notion  of  eternal  crea- 
tion which  is  incompatible  with  divine  freedom  or 
with  the  absolute  dependence  of  the  world  on  the 
divine  will.  The  notion  of  a  temporal  creation  has 
the  disadvantage  also  of  raising  certain  troublesome 
questions,  such  as.  What  was  God  doing  in  the 
eternity  before  creation  ?  or.  Why  did  creation  take 
place  when  it  did,  and  not  at  some  other  time  ?  We 
cannot  fill  up  this  time  with  a  divine  self-evolution, 
as  if  God  were  gradually  coming  to  himself  and  get- 
ing  ready  to  create,  for  this  would  cancel  his  abso- 
luteness and  reduce  him  to  a  temporal  being.  Some 
of  the  more  naive  speculators  have  thought  to  fill 
up  the  time  before  creation  by  a  series  of  previous 
creations  —  a  suggestion  which  shows  more  appreci- 
ation of  the  difficulty  of  the  problem  than  of  the 
required  solution.  It  seems,  then,  that  no  reason  for 
delay  can  be  found  in  God,  and  certainly  none  can 
be  found  in  time  itself,  since  one  moment  of  absolute 
time  is  like  any  other ;  and  hence,  finally,  it  seems 


222  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

that  a  temporal  creation  must  be  an  act  of  pure 
arbitrariness.  On  all  these  accounts  many  theolo- 
gians have  declared  for  an  eternal  creation,  and  have 
further  declared  creation  to  mean  not  temporal  origi- 
nation, but  simply  and  only  the  dependence  of  the 
world  on  God. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  claim  is  made  that  eternal 
creation  is  a  contradiction.  On  the  supposition  of  a 
real  time  this  cannot  be  maintained.  The  claim  is 
that  the  world  must  have  had  a  beginning  in  time, 
while  the  arguments  employed  prove  with  equal 
cogency  that  time  itself  must  have  had  a  beginning. 
This  is  the  case  even  with  Kant,  whose  famous  anti- 
nomy is  no  more  efficient  against  the  eternity  of  the 
world  than  it  is  against  the  eternity  of  time.  Bat  no 
one  who  admits  an  infinite  past  time  can  find  any 
good  reason  for  denying  that  something  may  alwa3^s 
have  been  happening  in  it.  Every  believer  in  neces- 
sity must  hold  that  something  has  always  been  going 
on ;  and  every  theist  must  allow  that  something  may 
always  have  been  going  on.  There  is  no  a  priori 
reason  in  theism  for  denying  that  the  cosmic  process 
may  be  coeternal  with  God. 

The  difficulties  commonly  urged  depend  on  the 
contradiction  said  to  inhere  in  the  notion  of  an 
infinite  elapsed  time.  But  this  arises  from  overlook- 
ing the  sense  in  which  past  time  is  said  to  be  infinite. 
This  infinity  means  simply  that  past  time  cannot  be 
exhausted  by  any  finite  regress.  Past  time  is  infi- 
nite just  as  space  in  any  direction  is  infinite.  In  the 
former  case  no  regress  will  find  a  beginning,  just  as 
in  the  latter  case  no  progress  will  find  an  end.  If, 
now,  time  were  anything  capable  of   real  objective 


ETERNAL   CREATION  223 

existence,  its  past  infinity,  in  the  sense  described, 
would  oiler  no  difficulty  to  thought ;  indeed,  it  would 
rather  seem  to  be  a  necessary  affirmation.  Such 
difficulty  as  might  arise  would  be  due  to  confounding 
thought  and  imagination.  The  imagination  cannot 
represent  either  space  or  time  as  unlimited,  but 
thought  cannot  conceive  either  as  limited.  But 
with  infinite  time  and  the  eternal  God  as  data,  there 
seems  to  be  no  reason  for  denying  the  possibility  of  a 
cosmic  process  extending  throughout  the  infinite 
time. 

Some  further  objections  are  offered,  based  on  the 
nature  of  number.  Number  is  necessarily  finite,  and 
hence  anything  to  which  number  applies  must  be 
finite  also.  But  number  applies  to  time  as  its  meas- 
ure, and  hence  time  must  be  finite,  and  hence  must 
have  a  beginning.  Such  argument,  however,  puzzles 
rather  than  convinces.  To  begin  with,  the  necessary 
finiteness  of  number  means  only  that  any  number 
whatever  admits  of  increase.  But  it  is  entirely  com- 
patible with  this  finitude  that  the  number  should  not 
admit  of  exhaustion  in  any  finite  time.  If  we  sup- 
pose time  to  be  real  and  infinite,  then  in  the  past 
time  a  definite  number  of  units  have  passed  away; 
but  that  number  does  not  admit  of  expression  in  finite 
terms.  It  is  constantly  growing,  to  be  sure,  because 
time  is  constantly  passing.  In  no  other  sense  need  it 
be  finite.  If  it  be  said  that  the  very  nature  of  a 
series  demands  a  beginning,  as  there  can  be  no  second 
without  a  first,  we  need  to  consider  whether  such 
application  of  number  to  the  boundless  continuum  of 
time  is  not  as  relative  to  ourselves  as  its  similar  appli- 
cation to  space.     For  our  apprehension  we  have  to 


224  GOD   AND  THE   WORLD 

set  up  axes  of  reference  in  both  cases ;  but  we  are  not 
able  to  say  that  the  fact  itself  depends  upon  those 
devices  by  which  we  conceive  it.  The  celestial  hori- 
zon and  equator  do  not  make  the  motions  and  posi- 
tions which  they  enable  us  to  grasp  and  measure. 
The  argument  from  number  proves  the  finitude  of 
space  quite  as  cogently  as  that  of  time.  For  at  any 
point  whatever  the  adjacent  mile  in  any  direction  is 
the  last  mile,  the  nth.  mile,  therefore,  of  the  distance 
extending  indefinitely  in  that  direction.  And  as  there 
can  be  no  second  without  a  first,  it  follows  that  dis- 
tance itself  begins  and  that  extension  is  finite  in  all 
directions — which  is  more  than  a  believer  in  infinite 
space  cares  to  have  proved. 

But  if  we  allow  that  time  is  infinite,  and  claim 
only  that  the  cosmic  process  in  time  must  be  finite, 
we  fall  into  a  curious  antinomy.  On  the  one  hand, 
it  seems  clear  that  the  Eternal  God  may  always  have 
been  doing  something ;  but  on  the  other  hand,  owing 
to  the  potency  of  number,  God  must  wait  for  the 
past  eternity  to  elapse  before  he  can  do  anything. 
This  certainly  is  a  very  bizarre  result ;  and  it  cannot 
be  escaped  by  any  reflections  on  the  necessary  fini- 
tude of  a  series,  or  the  impossibility  of  making  an 
infinite  by  the  summation  of  finites. 

The  real  solution  of  this  puzzle  lies  in  the  ideality 
of  time.  The  denial  of  any  ontological  time  compels 
us  to  limit  temporal  relations  to  the  cosmic  move- 
ment, without  extending  them  to  the  Creator.  In 
his  absolute,  self-related  existence,  God  is  timeless. 
Hence  he  did  not  create  at  a  certain  point  of  absolute 
time,  but  he  created,  and  thus  gave  both  the  world 
and   time   their  existence.     If,   then,   we   view  the 


THE   WORLD   AND   TIME  225 

world  as  begun,  it  is  strictly  absurd  to  ask  when  or 
at  what  moment  of  the  eternal  flow  of  time  did  God 
create.  There  is  no  such  flow ;  and  hence  creation 
did  not  take  place  at  any  moment.  In  the  begin- 
ning God  created,  for  creation  was  the  beginning 
even  of  time  itself.  We  need  not  concern  ourselves, 
then,  with  what  God  was  doing  in  the  long  eternity 
before  creation;  for  there  was  no  such  eternity. 
There  was  simply  the  self -existent,  self-possessing, 
timeless  God,  whose  name  is  I  Am,  and  whose  being 
is  without  temporal  ebb  and  flow.  Temporal  terms 
have  meaning  only  within  the  cosmic  process  itself, 
and  are  altogether  empty  when  applied  to  the  abso- 
lute God.  Our  thought  leads  not  to  an  absolute 
existence  temporally  before  the  world,  but  rather  to 
an  absolute  existence  independent  of  the  world.  The 
priority  is  logical,  not  temporal. 

And  within  the  cosmic  process  itself  temporal 
relations  are  but  the  form  under  which  we  represent 
the  unpicturable  dynamic  relations  among  the  things 
and  phases  of  that  process.  Here  we  must  recall 
what  was  said  of  the  relativity  of  the  temporal 
judgment.  It  is  no  absolute  property  of  the  cosmic 
movement  so  that  it  can  be  defined  by  itself  without 
reference  to  self-consciousness.  The  present,  which 
is  the  origin  of  all  temporal  judgments,  is  purely  a 
relation  in  self-consciousness  ;  and  its  extent  depends 
on  the  range  of  our  powers.  Hence  we  cannot  be  too 
careful  in  extending  our  time  measures  and  estimates 
to  God. 

The  phenomenality  of  space  and  time  does  indeed 
vacate  many  of  these  questions  about  the  relation  of 
the  world  to  space  and  time,  but  it  may  be  urged 


226  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

that  after  all  it  leaves  the  question  as  to  the  infini- 
tude of  the  world  in  space  and  time  unanswered. 
For  the  world  appears  under  the  spatial  and  temporal 
form,  and  thus  the  question  as  to  its  extent  is  still  in 
order.  This  is  indeed  the  case,  but  the  problem  is 
greatly  modified.  With  an  ontological  space  and 
time,  the  mind  is  equally  puzzled  whether  it  regards 
them  as  finite  or  infinite.  But  this  puzzle  disappears 
from  the  idealistic  view.  On  this  theory  the  only 
infinitude  is  the  fact  that  the  laws  of  spatial  and 
temporal  synthesis  admit  of  no  exhaustion.  They 
are,  then,  potentially  infinite,  like  the  numerical 
series.  The  infinitude  of  the  latter  makes  us  no 
trouble,  and  that  of  the  former  is 'equally  harmless. 
When  it  comes  to  applying  these  laws  to  experience, 
we  are  in  the  same  case  with  regard  to  all  three 
infinitudes.  We  have  no  a  priori  ground  for  affirming 
a  concrete  infinitude  of  space  or  time  or  number; 
and  we  have  no  ground  in  experience  for  affirming 
a  completed  or  final  finitude.  On  this  point  experi- 
ence is  the  only  source  of  knowledge.  The  mind, 
then,  has  not  to  maintain  both  sides  of  a  contradic- 
tion, but  is  unable  to  reach  a  positive  decision  either 
way.  And  the  need  of  reaching  such  decision 
vanishes  when  time  and  space  are  seen  to  be  only 
phenomenal.  Their  assumed  ontological  character 
is  the  source  of  our  antinomies  and  logical  woes.  In 
this  matter,  with  Kant,  we  replace  the  "  either,  or  "  of 
dogmatic  realism,  by  the  "  neither,  nor  "  of  criticism. 

The  world  was  produced  by  the  divine  will,  but 
this  does  not  determine  its  present  relation  to  that 
will.     Concerning  this  there  are  two  extreme  views 


DEISM  227 

and  an  indefinite  number  of  intermediate  ones.  One 
extreme,  deism,  regards  the  world  as  needing  only 
to  be  created,  being  able  to  exist  thereafter  entirely 
on  its  own  account.  The  other  extreme  finds  so 
little  substantiality  in  the  world  as  to  regard  its 
continued  existence  as  a  perpetual  creation.  Between 
these  extremes  lie  the  views  which,  against  deism, 
maintain  an  activity  of  conservation  distinct  from 
that  of  creation,  and  which,  on  the  other  hand,  refuse 
to  identify  creation  and  conservation.  All  of  these 
views  commonly  assume  the  reality  of  time  as  a 
something  during,  or  through,   which  things  exist. 

The  deistic  view  sets  up  nature  as  existing  at  pres- 
ent in  its  own  right,  while  God  appears  as  an  absentee 
and  without  administrative  occupation  so  far  as  nature 
is  concerned.  He  created  the  world,  and  thereafter  it 
got  on  by  itself.  He  is  needed,  then,  only  as  first 
cause  or  prime  mover,  and  has  no  further  function. 

The  impossibility  of  this  conception  has  already 
appeared.  In  treating  of  interaction  we  saw  that  all 
interaction  of  the  many  is  really  an  immanent  action 
in  the  One.  In  the  physical  system  no  finite  thing 
or  phenomenon  has  any  metaphysical  or  other  rights 
of  its  own,  whereby  it  becomes  an  obstacle  or  barrier 
in  any  sense  to  God.  Both  laws  and  things  exist  or 
change  solely  because  of  the  demands  of  the  divine 
plan.  If  this  calls  for  fixedness,  they  are  fixed ;  if  it 
calls  for  change,  they  change.  They  have  in  them- 
selves no  ground  of  existence  so  as  to  be  a  limit  for 
God  ;  because  they  are  nothing  but  the  divine  purpose 
flowing  forth  into  realization.  If  natural  agents  en- 
dure, it  is  not  because  of  an  inherent  right  to  existence, 
but  because  the  creative  will  constantly  upholds  them. 


228  GOD  AND  THE   WORLD 

If  in  the  cosmic  movement  the  same  forces  constantly 
appear  working  according  to  the  same  laws,  this  is 
not  because  of  some  eternal  persistence  of  force  and 
law,  but  because  it  lies  in  the  divine  plan  to  work  in 
fixed  forms  and  methods  for  the  production  of  effects. 
In  a  word,  the  continuity  of  natural  processes  upon 
which  physical  science  is  based  may  be  admitted  as  a 
fact ;  not,  however,  as  a  fact  which  accounts  for  itself 
or  which  rests  upon  some  metaphysical  necessity,  but 
rather  as  a  fact  which  depends  at  every  moment  upon 
the  divine  will,  and  which  only  expresses  the  consist- 
ency of  the  divine  methods.  As  against  deism,  then, 
we  hold  that  the  world  is  no  self-centered  reality,  inde- 
pendent of  God,  but  is  simply  the  form  in  which  the 
divine  purpose  realizes  itself.  It  has  no  laws  of  its 
own  which  oppose  a  bar  to  the  divine  purpose,  but 
all  its  laws  and  ongoings  are  only  the  expression  of 
that  purpose.  In  our  dealing  with  nature  we  have 
to  accommodate  ourselves  to  its  laws,  but  with  God 
the  purpose  is  original,  the  laws  are  its  consequence. 
Hence  the  system  of  law  is  itself  absolutely  sensitive 
to  the  divine  piu-pose,  so  that  what  that  purpose 
demands  finds  immediate  expression  and  reahzation, 
not  in  spite  of  the  system,  but  in  and  through  the 
system. 

The  view  that  identifies  conservation  with  per- 
petual creation  has  no  difficulty  when  applied  to  the 
physical  system.  Here  form  and  law  are  the  only 
fixed  elements  we  can  find ;  and  metaphysics  makes 
it  doubtful  whether  there  can  be  others.  In  that  case 
the  physical  order  becomes  simply  a  process  which 
exists  only  in  its  perpetual  ongoing.  It  has  the  iden- 
tity of  a  musical  note,  and,  like  such  a  note,  it  exists 


CONTINUAL   CREATION  229 

only  on  condition  of  being  incessantly  and  continu- 
ously reproduced.  But  we  cannot  apply  this  view  to 
the  world  of  spirits  without  losing  ourselves  in  utterly 
unmanageable  difficulties,  at  least  on  the  realistic 
theory  of  time.  The  identity  of  the  phenomenal  pro- 
cess exists  only  for  the  beholder ;  and  to  reduce  the 
finite  spirit  to  such  process  would  cancel  its  selfhood 
altogether  and  make  thought  impossible. 

We  seem,  then,  shut  up  to  distinguish  creation  from 
preservation  ;  and  the  nature  of  this  distinction  eludes 
all  apprehension.  We  affirm  something  whose  nature 
and  method  are  utterly  opaque  to  our  thought.  The 
only  relief,  such  as  it  is,  lies  in  falling  back  on  the 
ideality  of  time.  We  replace  the  notions  of  creation 
and  conservation  by  the  notion  of  dependence  on  the 
divine  will.  The  mystery  of  this  fact  we  have  seen 
in  treating  of  pantheism,  and  we  have  also  seen  that 
thought  cannot  move  without  affirming  at  once  the 
dependence  and  the  relative  independence  of  the 
finite  spirit.  On  the  possibility  of  such  a  relation 
thought  cannot  pronounce ;  it  can  only  wait  for  ex- 
perience to  reveal  the  fact.  The  puzzle  about  the 
identity  of  the  dependent  has  the  same  solution.  The 
identical  spirit  has  not  to  maintain  its  identity  across 
different  times,  but  only  to  identify  itself  in  experi- 
ence. This  self-identification  is  the  real  and  only 
meaning  of  concrete  identity ;  and  it  is  to  be  judged 
or  measured  by  nothing  else.  Experience  is  the  only 
test  of  meaning  and  possibility  in  this  matter.  The 
abstract  categories  of  time,  continuity,  and  identity 
do  not  go  before  and  make  experience  possible ;  but 
experience  is  the  basal  fact  from  which  these  cate- 
gories get  all  their  meaning  and  by  which  they  are 

THEISM 16 


230  GOD  AND   THE   WORLD 

to  be  tested.     Apart  from  this  experience  they  are 
self -canceling  abstractions. 

If  the  physical  system  only  were  concerned,  nothing 
more  need  be  added  about  the  relation  of  the  world 
to  God.  He  is  its  creator  and  conserver,  and  we 
should  add  nothing  in  calling  him  its  ruler  or  gov- 
ernor. Even  realism  regards  the  world  of  things  as 
receiving  its  law  from  God,  and  as  unable  in  any  way 
to  depart  from  it.  Such  things  need  no  government ; 
or,  rather,  government  has  no  meaning  when  applied 
to  them.  We  can  speak  of  government  only  where 
there  are  beings  which  by  a  certain  independence 
threaten  to  withdraw  themselves  from  the  general 
plan  which  the  ruler  aims  to  realize.  We  find  the 
proper  subjects  of  a  divine  government  only  in  finite 
spirits ;  as  only  these  have  that  relative  independence 
over  against  God  which  the  idea  of  government 
demands. 

The  notion  of  a  divine  government,  then,  implies 
free  spirits  as  its  subjects.  But  freedom  in  itself  is  a 
means  only  and  not  an  end.  Apart  from  some  good 
which  can  be  realized  only  by  freedom,  a  free  world 
is  no  better  than  a  necessary  one.  Hence  the  notion 
of  a  world-government  acquires  rational  meaning  only 
as  some  supreme  good  exists  which  is  to  be  the  out- 
come of  creation,  and  which,  therefore,  gives  the  law 
for  all  personal  activity.  A  world-government  im- 
plies a  world-goal  which,  in  turn,  implies  a  world- 
law.  A  cosmic  movement  without  direction  and  aim 
could  not  be  the  outcome  of  a  self-respecting  intelli- 
gence. 

What,  then,  is  that  great  end  which  all  free  beings 


WORLD-GOAL  231 

should  serve  ?  Nature  shows  us  numberless  particu- 
lar ends,  but  none  of  these  have  supreme  worth,  and 
most  of  them  have  no  assignable  worth.  So  far  as 
observation  goes,  the  ends  realized  in  nature  are  gen- 
erally so  insignificant  that  they  seem  to  add  nothing 
to  the  perfection  of  the  world,  and  in  many  cases 
they  even  appear  as  blemishes.  Observation  dis- 
covers no  supreme  end.  The  cosmos  as  a  whole  does 
not  seem  to  set  very  definitely  in  any  direction,  and 
presents  a  drifting  movement  rather  than  a  fixed 
course.  Nor  can  we  find  the  aim  of  the  cosmic 
movement  in  any  development  of  the  world-groimd, 
as  that  would  reduce  it  to  a  temporal  existence. 
But  if  we  insist  on  having  a  world-goal,  we  can  find 
a  sufficient  one  only  in  the  moral  realm.  A  commu- 
nity of  moral  persons,  obeying  moral  law  and  enjoy- 
ing moral  blessedness,  is  the  only  end  that  could 
excuse  creation  or  make  it  worth  while.  Hence  the 
notion  of  a  moral  government  leads  at  once  to  the 
ethical  realm,  and  implies  notions  foreign  to  meta- 
physics. If  one  has  not  these  notions  there  can  be 
no  question  of  such  a  government,  and  theistic  phi- 
losophy closes  with  considering  the  causal  relation  of 
God  to  the  world. 

The  conception  of  creation  as  a  free  act  and  not 
as  a  necessary  evolution  of  the  divine  nature,  for- 
bids all  attempts  to  identify  the  world  with  God, 
or  to  establish  any  equational  relation  between  them. 
The  relation  of  a  mind  to  its  thoughts,  or  of  an 
agent  to  his  deeds  can  be  understood  only  in  expe- 
rience; it  can  never  be  expressed  in  quantitative 
and  equational  terms.  But  apart  from  this  chronic 
illusion,   speculative    thought    has    been   prolific   of 


232  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

attempts  to  understand  the  manner  and  motive  of 
creation.  A  superficial  type  of  speculation  has  sought 
to  explain  the  manner  by  a  great  variety  of  cosmogo- 
nies, some  of  which  are  still  in  fashion.  None  of 
these  have  either  religious  or  speculative  significance. 
They  relate  only  to  the  transforming  and  combining 
of  given  material,  and  say  nothing  concerning  its 
origination.  For  understanding  the  origin  of  the 
creative  act,  we  have  only  the  analogy  of  our  own 
experience,  according  to  which  we  first  form  concep- 
tions and  then  realize  them.  Hence  the  divine 
understanding  has  been  distinguished  from  the  divine 
will,  and  a  kind  of  division  of  labor  has  been  made 
between  them.  The  understanding  furnishes  the  con- 
ception of  all  possibilities,  and  from  these  the  divine 
wisdom  chooses  the  best  for  realization  by  the  divine 
will.  Many  scruples  have  been  raised  concerning 
this  distinction,  on  the  ground  that  in  God  knowing 
and  willing  must  be  identical;  but  this  identity  is 
secured  only  by  defining  each  term  so  as  to  include 
the  other.  In  both  cases,  however,  we  have  to  leave 
out  those  featm^es  of  our  knowing  and  willing  which 
arise  from  our  limitations.  In  general  the  identifica- 
of  knowing  and  willing  in  God  confounds  synchro- 
nism with  identity.  In  knowing  that  looks  towards 
doing  there  is  no  assignable  reason  why  the  doing 
should  be  postponed,  and  thus  we  are  led  to  view 
them  as  contemporaneous.  But  knowing  and  will- 
ing as  mental  functions  remain  as  distinct  as  ever. 
Besides,  God's  knowledge  extends  to  the  evil  as  well 
as  the  good ;  does  he  therefore  will  the  evil  ? 

Concerning  the  motive  of  creation,  pure  speculation 
can  say  nothing  positive.     It  can  only  point  out  that 


MAN   AND  NATURE  233 

if  the  divine  absoluteness  is  to  be  maintained,  this 
motive  must  not  lie  in  any  lack  or  imperfection  of 
the  Creator.  For  positive  suggestion  we  must  have 
recourse  to  our  moral  and  religious  nature;  and  this 
refuses  to  be  satisfied  with  any  lower  motive  than 
ethical  love.  This  fact,  together  with  the  positive 
teachings  of  Christianity,  has  led  to  many  attempts 
to  deduce  the  system  as  an  outcome  of  love;  but  the 
success  has  been  very  slight.  We  are  so  little  able  to 
tell  a  priori  what  that  love  implies  that  we  cannot 
even  adjust  a  large  part  of  actual  experience  to  the 
conception  of  any  kind  of  love,  ethical  or  otherwise. 
It  only  remains  that  we  believe  in  love  as  the  source 
of  creation  and  the  essence  of  the  divine  nature,  with- 
out being  in  any  way  able  to  fix  its  implications. 

If  only  a  world  of  things  were  concerned,  as  we 
have  said,  nothing  more  need  be  added  concerning 
God's  relation  to  it.  Such  a  world  would  never  go 
astray,  as  it  would  be  incapable  of  any  action  or  reac- 
tion on  its  own  account.  But  the  reference  to  a 
divine  government  of  the  world,  with  its  implication 
of  free  subjects,  raises  some  further  questions.  For 
the  complete  clearing  up  of  our  thought,  we  must 
consider  the  relation  of  these  free  subjects  to  the 
system  of  which  they  form  a  part.  Or,  since  men 
are  the  only  subjects  of  this  kind  of  whom  we  have 
experience,  we  must  study  the  relation  of  man  to  the 
system. 

Of  course  in  the  deepest  sense  man  belongs  to  the 
system.  He  is  not  to  be  understood  apart  from  the 
system,  nor  is  the  system  to  be  understood  apart  from 
him.  God's  fundamental  plan  must  include  all  things, 
coexistent  and  sequent  alike,  in  one  inter-related  order. 


234  GOD    AND   THE   WORLD 

and  cannot  be  viewed  as  a  congeries  of  things  thrown 
together  without  essential  connection,  or  added  on  to 
some  crude  beginning  as  a  series  of  afterthoughts. 
The  popular  view  on  this  general  subject  is  an  incon- 
sistent compound  of  instinct  and  superficial  reflection, 
but  a  study  of  it  will  help  us  to  a  better  one. 

Spontaneous  thought  distinguishes  man  from  na- 
ture, but  for  obvious  reasons  nature  is  conceived  as 
physical  nature,  and  this  bulks  so  large  as  to  threaten 
to  absorb  all  existence.  Of  the  existence  of  this 
nature  and  of  its  material  and  dynamic  character 
there  is  no  doubt  whatever.  With  this  unquestioned 
datum,  as  soon  as  reflection  begins,  the  query  arises 
where  nature  ends.  Then  it  is  discovered  that  man 
himself  in  his  physical  being  certainly  belongs  to 
nature,  and  the  surmise  is  soon  reached  that  nature 
is  all-explaining  and  all-embracing.  This  surmise  is 
strengthened  by  extending  the  term  nature  to  include 
the  whole  system  of  law,  while  the  physical  sense  of 
the  term  is  unwittingly  retained,  and  soon  it  passes 
for  established  that  nature  is  all.  Further,  the  tem- 
poral order  is  supposed  to  be  ontological,  and  the 
early  phases  of  cosmic  manifestation  are  assumed  to 
be  the  true  realities  by  which  all  later  phases  are 
produced,  and  in  comparison  with  which  the  later 
phases  are  unsubstantial  and  transitory.  Life  and 
mind,  as  late  products,  M'^ere  evolved  from  lower  reah- 
ties  more  substantial  than  they.  In  this  way  mechan- 
ism, determinism,  materialism,  and  atheism  are  born 
or  extend  their  claims. 

This  illusion  springs  up  naturally  on  the  plane  of 
sense  metaphysics.  There  is  no  suspicion  of  the  phe- 
nomenality  of  all  impersonal  existence ;  and  the  mate- 


MAN   AND  NATURE  235 

rial  and  mechanical  scheme  emerges  as  a  matter  of 
com:se.  There  is  likewise  no  suspicion  of  the  impossi- 
bility of  mechanically  evolving  anything  which  is  not 
implicit  in  the  antecedents ;  and  thus  it  seems  easy 
to  get  life  and  mind  from  the  essentially  lifeless  and 
non-intelligent.  There  is  equally  no  suspicion  of  the 
fact  that  an  evolving  thing  can  never  be  defined  or 
expressed  by  that  which  it  momentarily  is,  but  only 
by  all  that  which  it  is  to  become  ;  and  hence  the  true 
realities  are  supposed  to  be  the  first  and  lowest,  and 
all  else  is  their  passing  product.  But  a  profounder 
metaphysics  dispels  the  illusion.  This  self-running 
nature  is  an  idol  of  the  sense  den.  The  only  defini- 
tion of  physical  nature  that  criticism  can  allow  is 
the  sum-total  of  spatial  phenomena  and  their  laws. 
This  nature  is  throughout  effect,  and  contains  no 
causality  and  no  necessity  in  it.  The  causality  pro- 
duces the  phenomena,  but  lies  beyond  them.  And 
the  only  definition  of  nature  in  general,  or  of  nature 
in  its  most  extended  sense,  is  the  sum-total  and  sys- 
tem of  all  phenomena  that  are  subject  to  law.  And 
even  this  definition  is  largely  relative  to  ourselves. 
For  the  existence  of  laws,  except  as  formal  and  subjec- 
tive, may  be  questioned.  There  is  not  first  a  system 
of  general  laws  into  which  effects  are  afterward  in- 
terjected,  but  there  is  the  actual  system  of  reality, 
upheld  and  maintained  by  the  immanent  God.  For 
our  thought  this  system  admits  of  being  analyzed 
into  universal  laws  on  the  one  hand  and  particular 
effects  on  the  other ;  but  in  fact  this  is  only  a  logical 
separation.  The  effects  are  no  more  consequences  of 
the  law^s  than  the  laws  are  consequences  of  the  effects. 
The  analyses  and  devices  of  discursive  thought  do  not 


236  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

give  us  reality  in  its  actual  existence,  but  only  a  for- 
mal equivalent  for  purposes  of  our  calculation.  But 
from  our  human  standpoint  it  is  necessary  to  distin- 
guish the  general  order  of  law  from  the  concrete 
facts. 

And  here  we  must  once  more  remind  ourselves  that 
in  concrete  matters  experience  has  absolute  right  of 
way.  Nature,  science,  categories,  dogmatic  intu- 
itions, and  all  the  rest  of  the  family  of  abstractions 
must  submit  to  this  test.  The  aim  of  thought  is  to 
interpret  experience,  and  all  schemes  which  conflict 
with  experience  are  to  be  peremptorily  set  aside.  Now 
the  only  nature  which  will  meet  this  demand  is  one 
which  fulfills  two  requirements.  First,  it  must  be  a 
system  of  discernible  order  which  can  be  depended  on. 
Secondly,  it  must  admit  of  some  modification  from 
human  vohtion.  Without  the  first  feature  we  should 
have  chaos  rather  than  a  world  ;  and  our  intelligence 
could  never  begin.  Without  the  second  feature  the 
natural  order  would  be  closed  against  us ;  and  so  far 
as  action  goes  we  should  not  be  in  the  world  at  all. 
This  is  the  nature  found  in  experience,  and  the  only 
nature  found  in  experience.  That  other  ''  Nature," 
whose  final  cause  and  highest  law  are  to  keep  i  M  V^ 
a  constant  quantity,  is  a  fiction  born  of  a  romantic 
devotion  to  abstractions,  aided  and  abetted  by  an 
exhaustive  ignorance  of  the  elementary  principles 
and  results  of  philosophical  criticism.  That  is  the 
"Nature"  which  forbids  us  to  think  that  thought 
and  purpose  and  will  have  anything  to  do  even  with 
the  direction  of  our  own  bodies,  lest  continuity  or 
something  else  supremely  important  be  interfered 
with.      All  superstitions  tend  to  wreck  intelligence. 


MAN   AND  NATURE  237 

Combining  all  these  results  we  reach  this  conclusion. 
There  is  no  self-running  system  of  physical  nature, 
but  there  is  an  order  of  phenomenal  law  which  is 
independent  of  us.  Moreover,  there  is  an  order  of 
concomitant  variation  between  that  order  and  our- 
selves, so  that  each  has  significance  for  the  other. 
We  are  able  to  act  so  as  to  produce  changes  and  even 
permanent  modifications  in  that  order.  It  is  perpetu- 
ally taking  on  new  forms  which  are  not  results  of 
the  antecedent  states  of  the  physical  system,  but 
which  have  their  source  in  human  volition.  A  great 
many  features  of  the  physical  world  are  not  to  be 
traced  to  the  star  dust,  but  to  human  will  which  has 
impressed  itself  upon  its  environment.  Enormous 
changes  in  the  flora  and  fauna  of  the  earth,  and  even 
in  climate  and  rainfall  are  to  be  thus  traced,  while 
natural  forces  are  at  work  in  human  service  in  a 
most  exemplary  manner.  This  will,  however,  breaks 
no  natural  laws,  but  realizes  itself  through  the  laws. 
As  soon  as  the  volitional  impulse  is  given,  the  effect 
enters  into  the  great  web  of  law  and  is  carried  out 
by  the  same.  We  can  choose  to  will  or  not  to  will, 
but  we  cannot  choose  the  effects  of  our  willing. 
They  depend  on  the  power  not  ourselves  which 
founds  and  maintains  the  natural  order.  The  same 
relation  exists  in  the  case  of  those  laws  that  enter 
into  our  own  constitution.  Here  also  we  find  laws 
that  we  do  not  make  and  cannot  abrogate.  Here 
also  our  success  depends  on  obedience ;  and  here  also 
we  can  will  the  deed,  but  we  cannot  will  away  its 
consequences.  Thus  to  a  considerable  extent  we 
make  ourselves;  and  to  some  extent  we  make  our 
world. 


238  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

Thus  the  world  becomes  flexible,  at  once  the  abode 
of  law  and  the  servant  of  intelligence.  It  has  the 
order  which  both  reason  and  practical  life  demand, 
and  also  the  pliability  which  is  equally  necessary,  if 
we  are  to  live  in  the  world  at  all.  The  continuity  of 
this  world  does  not  consist  in  a  rigid  changelessness 
of  existence ;  for  as  phenomenal  it  has  no  continuity 
in  itself  whatever.  Its  continuity  consists  in  the 
subordination  of  all  phenomena  to  the  same  laws. 
Phenomena  come  and  go ;  but  all  phenomena,  new 
and  old  alike,  are  comprehended  in  the  same  scheme 
of  law  and  relation.  This  fact  constitutes  the  unity, 
uniformity,  and  continuity  of  the  system.  From  the 
phenomenal  standpoint,  nature  has,  and  can  have,  no 
other  uniformity  and  continuity.  And  this  continuity 
in  no  way  conflicts  with  the  complete  pliability  of 
the  system  to  free  intelligence,  which  may  be  found 
in  it,  or  be  in  interaction  with  it.  The  laws  of  the 
system  are  no  independent  necessities  by  which 
the  action  of  God  is  bound ;  they  are  rather  the 
rules  according  to  which  he  proceeds.  Neither  are 
they  anything  that  opposes  a  rigid  bar  to  finite  free- 
dom ;  they  are  rather  the  conditions  of  any  effective 
use  of  freedom.  Nature  itself  is  only  a  general  term 
for  the  established  order  of  procedure;  and  a  natiu-al 
event  is  one  in  which  familiar  processes  can  be 
traced,  or  which  can  be  connected  with  other  events 
according  to  general  rules.  But  all  events  root  in  the 
divine  activity,  and  are  alike  supernatural  as  to  their 
causation. 

This  result  suggests  a  means  of  conceiving  the 
method  of  the  divine  government.  It  is  manifest 
that  our  mental  and  moral  sanity  demands  an  order 


GOD   IN  THE   WORLD  239 

of  law  on  which  we  can  depend.  On  no  other  con- 
dition could  reason  or  conscience  be  secure.  But  this 
order  is  not  the  rigid,  self-executing  thing  which  the 
deists  supposed  it  to  be.  We  must  indeed  work  out 
our  own  salvation,  but  it  is  God  who  worketh  in  us 
nevertheless.  We  replace  the  absentee  God  of  deism 
by  the  immanent  God  of  enlightened  theism.  If, 
then,  things  go  on  in  the  familiar  routine,  it  is  simply 
because,  in  the  divine  plan,  that  routine  is  the  best 
thing.  Nothing  is  done  because  law  demands  it,  but 
because  the  divine  purpose  demands  it;  and  the 
divine  will  is  as  present  and  as  active  in  the  most 
familiar  thing  as  it  would  be  in  any  miracle.  But 
this  is  entirely  compatible  with  the  maintenance  of 
phenomenal  law.  For  as  human  volition  is  contin- 
uously playing  through  natural  law,  and  realizing  its 
purposes  thereby,  so  we  may  well  believe  that  what 
is  possible  with  man  may  be  possible  with  God.  God, 
then,  may  be  present  in  human  history,  guiding  the 
world,  raising  up  leaders,  giving  direction  to  public 
thought,  purifying  the  receptive  and  willing  heart, 
answering  prayer  according  to  his  wisdom,  and 
scourging  public  and  private  wickedness ;  yet  with- 
out in  any  way  breaking  through  the  fixed  phenom- 
enal order.  It  is  in  this  way  that  we  may  conceive 
how  the  divine  government  may  coexist  with  fixed 
laws.  God's  immanence  in  the  law  renders  unnec- 
essary any  interference  from  a  realm  beyond  the  law. 
Here  some  deistically-minded  reader  may  demiu* 
that  this  result  is  valid  only  for  a  superficial  view  of 
the  subject.  Our  lack  of  knowledge,  he  may  say, 
permits  us  to  surmise  a  purpose ;  but  if  we  knew  all, 
we  should  see  that  all  events  follow  rigorously  from 


240  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

tiieir  antecedents,  and  that  therefore  everything  is  nat- 
ural, and  no  purpose  or  government  is  needed  in  the 
case. 

This  is  another  echo  from  a  sense  metaphysics 
which  criticism  has  set  aside.  Without  doubt,  if  we 
knew  all  the  antecedents  of  an  event,  even  of  a  mir- 
acle, we  should  find  it  explained;  but  this  tells  us 
little  unless  we  are  also  told  what  the  "all"  is  that 
we  need  to  know.  There  is  here  a  tacit  assumption 
that  if  we  knew  all  the  finite  antecedents  in  space 
and  time,  we  should  need  no  other  explanation,  and 
along  with  this  is  the  further  assumption  that  these 
antecedents  were  not  determined  to  the  effect  by  any 
purpose  whatever.  But  in  fact,  as  metaphysics  shows, 
we  cannot  trace,  either  phenomenally  or  metaphysi- 
cally, the  antecedent  into  the  consequent.  We  see  an 
order  of  succession,  but  the  inner  connection  eludes  us. 
Nature  is  never  so  completely  expressed  in  the  spatial 
fact,  that  by  simple  deduction  from  that  fact  we  could 
logically  deduce  all  future  phases.  Such  a  deduction 
would  break  down  over  the  sunplest  qualitative 
change,  if  it  were  quantitatively  possible.  In  every 
system  the  dynamism  is  invisible;  and  the  dynamic 
changes  are  perpetually  producing  departures  from 
any  purely  kinematic  deduction.  Unless  we  unite  the 
laws  of  the  hidden  dynamism  with  the  kinematic 
deduction,  the  latter  will  show  constant  breaks  of 
continuity.  No  system,  then,  can  view  nature  as 
fully  expressed  in  the  visible  spatial  fact,  but  all  alike 
must  assume  a  world  of  invisible  power.  But  meta- 
physics further  shows  that  this  world  of  power  is 
volitional  and  intelligent,  so  that  the  whole  finite 
system  must  at  last  be  referred  to  the  supreme  will 


THEISM   AND   SCIENCE  241 

and  purpose  for  all  of  its  factors  and  changes.  That 
purpose  and  that  will  are  the  "all"  which  we  should 
need  to  know  for  the  real  and  final  understanding  of 
anything.  Without  doubt,  if  we  knew  this  "all  "  we 
should  find  all  things  explained.  For  no  intelligent 
theist  can  suppose  that  even  miracles  are  wrought  at 
random,  or  that  any  effect  is  produced  without  refer- 
ence to  the  final  cause  of  the  whole. 

And  if  it  be  further  objected  that  then  science  has 
no  sure  foundation,  the  answer  must  be  that  science 
can  have  no  surer  foundation  than  the  divine  will 
and  purpose.  Except  as  it  begs  the  question,  neces- 
sity is  no  foundation  whatever ;  for  a  necessity  incom- 
patible with  change  would  block  the  universe ;  and 
change  once  admitted  into  necessity,  no  one  can  tell 
how  far  it  may  go,  or  what  becomes  of  the  necessity 
itself.  On  the  impersonal  plane,  under  the  law  of 
the  sufficient  reason,  a  necessity  of  change  means  a 
changing  necessity ;  and  that  means  a  multitude  of 
necessities,  which  in  turn  leads  to  the  endless  disper- 
sion of  thought,  so  that  no  unitary  and  abiding  prin- 
ciple whatever  can  be  found.  Everything,  necessity 
and  all,  is  drawn  into  the  universal  flow. 

But  on  the  theistic  basis  science  remains  possible 
as  a  sane  inquiry  into  the  orders  of  being  and  hap- 
pening revealed  in  experience,  and  as  such  it  may 
have  great  practical  value.  This  is  the  teleological 
conception  of  science,  which  more  and  more  appears 
as  the  result  of  critical  reflection.  Science  itself  is 
not  there  for  its  own  sake,  but  for  the  sake  of  what 
it  can  help  us  to.  Of  course  on  this  view  we  must 
beware  of  making  these  discovered  uniformities  into 
fathomless    necessities,    or   of    giving   them    infinite 


242  GOD   AXD   THE   WORLD 

validity  in  space  and  time.  They  are  practical  prin- 
ciples, not  speculative ;  and,  like  all  such  principles, 
they  must  be  confined  in  our  affirmation  to  a  "  reason- 
able degree  of  extension  to  adjacent  cases."  Moreover, 
this  science  always  remains  on  the  surface  and  does 
not  go  beyond  phenomena.  The  question  of  causality 
and  inner  connection  belongs  to  philosophy.  Such 
practical  science  is  possible  and  valuable.  But  when 
it  becomes  "Science"  and  begins  to  talk  of  the 
infinities  and  the  eternities  and  the  "iron  chain  of 
necessity,"  it  is  no  longer  science  but  dogmatic 
metaphysics  which  understands  neither  itself  nor  its 
problems. 

Due  reflection  on  these  points  will  go  far  to  remove 
that  artificial  hostility  between  science  and  religion 
which  has  been  such  an  infestation  of  popular 
thought.  It  will  also  do  much  to  remove  that  false 
antithesis  of  the  natural  and  supernatural  which  is 
an  axiom  with  popular  thought,  both  religious  and 
irreligious.  The  false  natural  of  mechanical  thought 
will  vanish,  and  along  with  it  will  go  the  equally 
false  supernatural  which  finds  God  only  in  signs  and 
wonders.  Both  alike  root  in  a  mechanical  and  onto- 
logical  conception  of  nature  and  the  fallacy  of  the 
universal.  Because  of  the  former,  nature  is  perpetu- 
ally setting  up  as  a  rival  of  God,  and  each  extension 
of  the  realm  of  law  is  an  encroachment  upon  the 
realm  of  God.  Because  of  the  latter,  God,  if  allowed 
at  all,  is  supposed  to  have  made  only  a  system  of 
things  in  general,  and  to  be  concerned  only  with  the 
maintenance  of  general  laws.  Details  and  particulars 
are  supposed  to  result  from  the  laws  in  some  unspeci- 
fied way,  yet  so  as  not  to  have  been  in  the  divine 


THEISM   AND   SCIENCE  243 

thought  and  purpose.     Then  follow  difficulties  about 
special  providences,  answers  to  prayer,  etc. 

All  of  this  is  an  illusion  resulting  from  the  fallacy 
of  the  universal.  There  is  no  system  of  things  in 
general,  or  of  unrelated  general  laws.  There  is  only 
the  actual  system  of  reality ;  and  the  divine  thought 
and  activity  which  produce  this  actual  system  must 
be  as  manifold  and  special  as  the  facts  themselves. 
The  simplicity  of  the  class  term  does  not  remove  the 
complexity  and  plurality  of  the  individuals  comprised 
under  it ;  and  for  each  of  these  special  facts,  there 
must  be  correspondingly  special  thoughts  and  acts. 
We  may  not  be  able  to  discern  the  purpose  in  details, 
and  may  reduce  them  to  some  familiar  rule  of  experi- 
ence without  further  speculation ;  but  if  there  be  pur- 
pose in  anything,  there  is  purpose  in  everything.  We 
must  not  allow  the  fallacy  of  the  universal  with  its 
verbal  simplifications  to  hide  the  fact.  At  the  same 
time  we  must  be  on  our  guard  against  dogmatic  and 
confident  interpretations  of  the  purpose  in  events. 
We  maintain  the  fact  of  a  purpose  in  all  things,  but 
reserve  the  right  to  criticise  any  specific  interpreta- 
tion. For  the  full  expression  of  our  thought  in  this 
matter  we  have  to  maintain  a  supernatural  natural ; 
that  is,  a  natural  which  roots  in  a  divine  causality 
beyond  it ;  and  also  a  natural  supernatural,  that  is,  a 
divine  causality  which  proceeds  by  orderly  methods. 
In  such  a  view,  events  are  supernatural  in  their  caus- 
ality and  natural  in  the  order  of  their  happening ; 
and  a  so-called  special  providence  would  be  simply  an 
event  in  which  the  divine  purpose  and  causality, 
which  are  in  all  things,  could  be  more  clearly  traced 
than  in  familiar  matters. 


244  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

When,  then,  some  ecclesiastical  champion  of  the 
traditional  type  gets  excited  over  what  he  calls  "  bald 
naturalism"  and  stigmatizes  it  as  "an  abyss  of 
Satan,"  he  should  consider  whether  there  is  not  a 
"  bald  supernaturalism  "  which  is  equally  obnoxious 
to  criticism.  And  when  his  fit  companion  piece,  the 
noisy  unbeliever  by  profession,  announces  a  purely 
naturalistic  interpretation  of  all  religious  phenomena, 
he  should  be  required  to  show  that  there  is  any  such 
nature  as  he  assumes.  This  inquiry,  if  followed  up, 
could  hardly  fail  to  prove  illuminating  to  both  of 
these  Boanergistic  champions.  Without  doubt  there 
has  been  a  deal  of  naturalism  which  was  "  bald  "  and 
even  worse.  Such  is  the  naturalism  which  assumes 
that  there  is  a  blind  mechanical  system  called  Nature, 
which  does  a  great  variety  of  unintended  things  on 
its  own  account,  so  that  they  represent  no  divine 
thought  or  purpose,  but  are  merely  by-products  of 
the  mechanism.  But  when  this  fiction  is  eliminated, 
and  the  divine  causality  is  discerned  in  all  things, 
the  natural  becomes  simply  the  familiar  and  orderly 
expression  of  a  purposive  causality  beyond  it.  This 
insight  enables  us  to  dispense  with  both  sorts  of 
"  baldness,"  that  of  the  natural  and  that  of  the  super- 
natural, and  leaves  us  free  to  trace  the  order  of  ex- 
perience, so  far  as  we  may,  in  all  events ;  and  that 
without  any  fear  of  seeing  them  set  up  for  themselves 
in  mechanical  self-sufficiency. 

In  leaving  this  subject  of  the  relation  of  God  to 
the  world,  a  word  must  be  devoted  to  a  traditional 
verbalism.  Is  God,  it  may  be  asked,  immanent  or 
transcendent  ?  and  we  may  even  be  instructed  that 
thought    can    never   transcend    the    universe.      We 


IMMANENCE   AND   TRANSCENDENCE  245 

might  reply  by  asking  for  a  definition  of  the  terms. 
It  would  be  absm-d  to  take  them  spatially,  as  if  im- 
manent meant  mside  and  transcendent  outside  —  a 
fancy,  however,  which  seems  to  underlie  not  a  few 
utterances  on  this  subject.  The  One  cannot  be  con- 
ceived as  the  sum  of  the  many,  nor  as  the  stuff  out 
of  which  the  many  are  made,  neither  does  it  depend 
on  the  many ;  but,  conversely,  the  many  depend  on 
it.  In  this  sense  the  One  is  transcendent.  Again, 
the  many  are  not  spatially  outside  of  the  One,  nor  a 
pendulous  appendage  of  the  One ;  but  the  One  is  the 
ever-present  power  in  and  through  which  the  many 
exist.  In  this  sense  the  One  is  immanent.  In  any 
other  sense  the  terms  are  words  without  any  meaning. 
The  alleged  impossibility  of  transcending  the  uni- 
verse is  another  form  of  the  same  verbalism.  In  the 
sense  defined  we  nmst  transcend  it ;  in  any  other 
sense  there  is  no  need  of  transcending  it.  In  modern 
thought  substantiality  has  been  replaced  or  defined 
by  causality.  A  world-substance,  as  distinguished 
from  a  world-cause,  is  a  product  of  the  imagination 
and  vanishes  before  criticism.  For  the  explanation 
of  the  system  we  need  a  cause  which  shall  not  be 
this,  that,  or  the  other  thing,  but  an  omnipresent 
agent  by  which  all  things  exist.  This  agent  may  be 
called  anything,  first  cause,  absolute,  infinite,  world- 
ground,  or  even  universe,  if  only  we  keep  the  mean- 
ing in  mind ;  and  the  meaning  is  that  power  not 
ourselves,  nor  any  other  finite  thing,  by  which  all 
things  exist.  If  we  choose  we  may  unite  this  agent 
and  all  its  cosmic  products  into  the  one  thought  of 
the  universe ;  and  we  may  then  loudly  proclaim  the 
impossibility  of  transcending  the  universe ;  but  this 

THEISM 17 


246  GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

procedure  will  hardly  tend  to  clearness,  as  the  term 
"universe  is  generally  restricted  to  mean  the  system 
of  finite  things  and  manifestations.  Still,  if  any  one 
finds  pleasure  in  teaching  that  thought  is  limited  to 
the  universe,  when  the  universe  is  taken  as  the  total- 
ity of  being,  it  would  be  hard-hearted,  indeed,  to 
deny  him  this  satisfaction. 

As  commonly  used,  the  conceptions  of  immanence 
and  transcendence  are  products  of  picture  thinking. 
There  is  a  desire  to  bring  God  into  intimate  relations 
to  the  world,  and  immanence  is  the  word  which 
meets  the  demand.  But  this  is  so  carelessly  used  as 
to  look  toward  a  pantheistic  dissolution  of  all  things 
in  an  indistinguishable  haze.  Or  there  is  a  desire 
to  escape  this  result  and  vindicate  some  existence  for 
the  finite ;  and  then  transcendence  is  the  word.  But 
this  is  apt  to  be  interpreted  as  a  spatial  separation, 
and  the  result  is  to  exclude  God  from  the  world  alto- 
gether after  getting  it  started.  We  escape  this  re- 
sult only  by  noting  the  true  meaning  of  our  terms 
and  by  carefully  excluding  all  spatial  and  quantita- 
tive interpretation.  We  also  need  to  bear  in  mind 
that  this  metaphysical  immanence  has  no  moral  sig- 
nificance. It  is  simply  the  dependence  of  all  finite 
things  on  God,  and  involves  no  spiritual  likeness  or 
nearness.  We  may  all  live  and  move  and  have  our 
being  in  God,  without  any  spiritual  sympathy.  It  is 
no  uncommon  thing  to  find  persons,  whose  heads 
have  been  a  little  heated  by  the  new  wine  of  specu- 
lation, using  this  metaphysical  immanence  as  imply- 
ing moral  and  spiritual  character.  But  within  this 
universal  dependence  of  all  things  on  God  lie  all  the 
distinctions  of  finite  things  and  all  the  various  grades 


IMMANENCE   AND   TRANSCENDENCE  247 

and  antitheses  of  character.  Moral  sympathy  and 
fellowship  are  quite  another  matter,  and  cannot  be 
reached  by  speculation. 

There  is  another  back-lying  thought  which  may 
be  hinted  at  by  this  antithesis  of  immanence  and 
transcendence,  although  it  is  not  expressed  by  it. 
This  concerns  the  question  whether  God  is  dependent 
on  the  world  for  self-possession,  and  whether  he  be 
fully  expressed  and  exhausted  in  the  world,  or 
whether,  apart  from  the  real  world,  there  are  infin- 
ite possibilities  in  the  divine  nature.  The  first  part 
of  the  question  must  be  answered  in  the  negative. 
God's  absoluteness  excludes  any  thought  of  depend- 
ence on  the  world  or  of  any  implication  with  the 
world  in  a  pantheistic  sense.  The  rest  of  the  ques- 
tion is  of  uncertain  meaning.  If  the  "  real  world  " 
means  the  momentarily  existing  system,  that  world 
does  not  exist  at  all.  If  it  means  all  that  has  been, 
is,  and  will  be,  reason  can  give  no  answer ;  and  prac- 
tical life  needs  none.  The  question  becomes  an  aca- 
demic and  barren  abstraction. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  ETHICAL 

The  attributes  thus  far  considered  are  purely  meta- 
physical and  concern  only  the  understanding.  They 
are  such  properties  as  the  speculative  intellect  must 
affirm  in  dealing  with  the  problem  of  the  universe  and 
its  ground.  If  we  should  stop  here,  however,  we  should 
not  attain  to  any  properly  religious  conception,  but 
only  to  the  last  term  of  metaphysical  speculation.  A 
good  example  of  this  is  furnished  by  Aristotle,  with 
whom  the  idea  of  God  has  a  purely  metaphysical 
function  and  significance.  God  appears  as  prime 
mover,  as  self-moved,  as  the  primal  reason,  etc.,  but 
not  as  the  object  of  love  and  trust  and  worship. 

But  the  human  mind  in  general,  not  content 
with  a  metaphysical  conception  of  God,  has  rather 
demanded  a  religious  one.  And  the  latter  concep- 
tion has  always  been  first  and  not  second.  The 
metaphysical  thought  instead  of  being  the  foun- 
dation upon  which  the  religious  thought  was  built, 
has  rather  been  reached  by  later  analysis  as  an  im- 
plication of  the  religious  conception.  The  race  has 
been  universally  religious,  but  only  moderately  meta- 
physical. 

We  must  note,  then,  as  a  matter  of  logic  and  as  a 
fact  of  history,  that  we  have  not  yet  reached  the  God 
of  religion.     As  a  matter  of  logic,  plainly  not ;  for 

248 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  ETHICAL  249 

these  metaphysical  attributes  of  the  world-ground 
are  ethically  barren.  They  furnish  the  possibility  of 
an  ethical  nature,  but  they  do  not  imply  it  as  a  ne- 
cessity. As  a  fact  of  history,  also,  systems  have 
existed  and  still  exist,  that  maintain  a  supreme 
reason  and  will  in  the  world-ground  but  deny 
its  moral  quality.  Sometimes  moral  indifference  is 
affirmed,  as  with  the  gods  of  Epicurus ;  and  some- 
times morality  is  viewed  as  a  purely  human  product, 
a  somewhat  adventitious  episode  of  biological  evolu- 
tion. In  that  case,  of  course,  morality  has  no  sig- 
nificance for  God,  and  is  not  to  be  extended  beyond 
human  relations.  It  is  a  psychological  incident 
rather  than  a  cosmic  law.  This  view  is  not  unknown 
in  philosophy,  ancient  and  modern,  and  finds  an  echo 
in  not  a  little  literature.  These  facts  admonish  us 
that  much  remains  to  be  done  before  we  can  affirm 
the  world-ground  to  be  truly  ethical. 

From  the  religious  standpoint,  then,  in  distinction 
from  the  metaphysical,  the  important  attributes  con- 
cern the  divine  character,  or  ethical  nature.  We 
have  now  to  consider  the  ground  of  their  affirma- 
tion. 

If  we  accept  the  mental  ideal  of  a  perfect  being  as 
the  ground  of  the  universe,  the  question  is  settled  at 
once.  Moral  qualities  are  the  highest.  The  true 
the  beautiful  and  the  good,  love  goodness  and  right- 
eousness —  these  are  the  only  things  that  have  abso- 
lute sacredness  and  unconditional  worth.  The  thought 
of  a  perfect  being  in  which  these  qualities  should  be 
lacking,  or  present  in  only  an  imperfect  degree,  would 
be  an  intellectual,  aesthetic,  and  moral  absurdity  of 
the  first  magnitude.     But  this  demand  for  faith  in 


250  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

the  ideal  when  thus  baldly  made  is  apt  to  stagger  us, 
and  we  prefer  to  reach  the  result  in  somewhat  ob- 
scure manner.  When  we  are  told  that  the  problem 
of  knowledge  demands  the  assumption  of  a  universe 
transparent  to  our  reason,  so  that  what  the  laws  of 
our  thought  demand  the  universe  cannot  fail  to  ful- 
fill, we  are  staggered  and  have  many  doubts  and 
scruples.  So  large  an  assumption  is  not  to  be  made 
without  due  wariness  and  circumspection.  But  we 
make  the  assumption  piecemeal  without  a  single 
critical  qualm.  In  the  actual  study  of  nature,  in 
dealing  with  specific  problems,  we  assume  the  prin- 
ciple in  question  as  a  matter  of  course.  It  is  only 
when  stated  in  its  abstract  universality  that  it  appalls 
us.  It  is  so  with  the  larger  ideal  of  the  perfect 
being.  We  assume  it  implicitly  and  upon  occasion, 
but  we  do  not  like  to  have  it  brought  out  in  sharp 
abstract  statement.  Here,  then,  is  a  psychological 
limitation  of  the  average  mind  which  must  be  re- 
garded. We  shall  find  it  interesting,  however,  to 
note  the  way  in  which  the  ideal  determines  our  rea- 
soning. 

There  is  no  way  of  speculative  deduction ;  for  the 
metaphysical  attributes  of  the  world-ground,  as  we 
have  said,  are  ethically  barren.  We  must,  then, 
either  have  immediate  faith  in  our  ideal  of  the  per- 
fect being  or  else  appeal  to  experience  to  prove  that 
the  world-ground  proceeds  according  to  ethical  prin- 
ciples.    Our  actual  procedure  is  a  mixture  of  both. 

The  empirical  argument  for  the  moral  character  of 
the  world-ground  is  derived  from  our  moral  nature,  the 
structure  of  society,  and  the  course  of  history.  The 
two  first  are  held  to  point  to  a  moral  author,  and  the 


THE   EMPIRICAL   ARGUMENT  251 

last  reveals  a  power  not  ourselves,  making  for  right- 
eousness, and  hence  moral. 

Our  moral  nature  may  be  considered  in  two  ways, 
first,  as  an  effect  to  be  explained,  and  secondly,  in  its 
immediate  implications.  The  first  problem,  then,  is 
to  account  for  the  existence  of  our  moral  nature. 

The  readiest  solution  is  that  this  moral  nature  has 
a  moral  author.  He  that  formed  the  eye,  shall  not 
he  see  ?  He  that  giveth  man  knowledge,  shall  not 
he  know  ?  So  also.  He  that  implanted  in  man  an 
unalterable  reverence  for  righteousness,  shall  not  he 
himself  be  righteous  ? 

This  inference  is  so  spontaneous  and  immediate 
that  it  is  seldom  questioned  where  the  moral  interest 
is  strong  and  thought  is  clear.  For  of  course  there 
can  be  no  question  about  the  knowledge  of  moral  dis- 
tinctions by  the  Creator.  Such  a  doubt  would  imply 
that  some  knowledge  is  impossible  or  non-existent  to 
the  source  of  all  knowledge.  The  question,  then,  can 
only  concern  God's  recognition  of  these  distinctions 
in  his  action.  And  here,  if  we  allow  the  real 
validity  of  moral  distinctions  and  the  supreme  value 
of  the  moral  will,  we  cannot  deny  the  moral  will  to 
God,  without  making  him  inferior  to  man  in  the 
highest  things.  Such  a  view  would  be  so  complete 
an  inversion  of  our  rational  ideals,  that  it  would  tend 
strongly  toward  atheism. 

A  great  deal  of  ingenuity  has  been  expended  in 
trying  to  evade  the  conclusion  from  the  moral  effect 
to  a  moral  cause.  Much  of  this  has  been  irrelevant, 
and  all  of  it  has  been  unsuccessful.  As  there  is  no 
known  way  of  deducing  intelligence  from  non-intelli- 
gence, so  there  is  no  known  way  of  deducing  the 


252  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  ETHICAL 

moral  from  the  non-moral ;  except  of  course,  by  the 
easy,  but  unsatisfactory,  way  of  begging  the  question. 
The  irrelevance  mentioned  consists  in  the  fact  that 
a  large  part  of  this  discussion  has  concerned  itself 
with  the  inquiry  how  we  come  to  recognize  moral 
distinctions.  This  belongs  to  the  debate  between  the 
empirical  and  the  intuitional  school  of  morals,  and 
does  not  necessarily  touch  the  deeper  question  as  to 
the  reality  of  moral  distinctions.  The  confusion  is 
increased  by  the  further  fact  that  our  concrete  codes 
are  functions  of  experience  as  well  as  of  moral  insight, 
and  this  easily  leads  to  the  claim  that  experience  is 
their  only  source.  But  to  become  relevant  to  the 
subject  in  hand,  the  claim  must  be  made  that  moral 
ideas  are  purely  matters  of  opinion  and  prejudice,  so 
that,  in  fact,  there  is  neither  right  nor  wrong,  and 
that  one  thing  is  as  good  and  praiseworthy  as  another. 
Of  course  in  that  case  we  should  hardly  expect  God 
to  concern  himself  about  human  conventions  and 
prejudices.  Even  this  view  has  been  theoretically 
affirmed,  but  it  could  never  be  practically  maintained, 
because  of  the  sharp  contradiction  of  life  and  con- 
science. The  theorist  himself  could  never  maintain 
it  outside  of  the  closet.  As  soon  as  he  came  into 
contact  with  others,  he  found  himself  compelled  to 
affirm  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong,  at 
least  in  others'  treatment  of  himself.  Thus  the 
notion  was  seen  to  be  a  purely  academic  abstraction 
that  would  not  be  tolerated  in  practice.  Hence 
spontaneous  thought  has  generally  regarded  the  moral 
nature  in  man  as  pointing  to  a  moral  character  in 
God  as  its  only  sufficient  ground.  Speculation,  too, 
knows  of  no  better  account  to  give. 


THE   EMPIRICAL   ARGUMENT  253 

The  moral  nature,  we  said,  may  also  be  considered 
in  its  immediate  implications.  The  claim  has  been 
made  by  a  great  many  that  conscience  itself  immedi- 
ately testifies  to  a  moral  person  over  against  us  to 
whom  it  responds  and  to  whom  we  are  responsible. 
This  claim  can  hardly  be  maintained  in  its  literal 
form.  In  cases  of  high  religious  development  and 
sensibility  the  feeling  of  obligation  may  take  on  this 
personal  form.  Right  is  the  will  of  God ;  sin  is  sin 
against  God.  This  view  is  both  strongly  asserted 
and  warmly  disputed ;  and,  as  is  usual  in  such  cases, 
there  seems  to  be  some  truth  on  both  sides.  That 
conscience  carries  with  it  a  direct  assertion  of  God, 
the  judge  and  the  avenger,  can  hardly  be  pretended 
by  any  student  of  psychology ;  but  that  the  assertion 
of  a  supreme  judge  and  avenger  has  its  chief  roots  in 
the  moral  nature  cannot  well  be  denied.  The  sacred- 
ness  of  right,  the  sin  of  oppression  and  injustice,  the 
intolerable  nature  of  a  universe  in  which  justice  is 
not  regarded,  and  guilt  and  innocence  come  to  a  com- 
mon end  —  these  considerations  have  led  the  race 
to  posit  a  supreme  justice  and  righteousness  in  the 
heavens.  To  this  all  literature  bears  witness ;  and 
practically  these  reflections  are  potent  arguments. 
But  in  logic  they  are  not  arguments  at  all.  To 
one  who  assumes  nothing  concerning  the  universe,  one 
thing  is  no  more  surprising  than  another,  and  one 
thing  is  as  allowable  as  another.  If  we  do  not  assume 
that  the  universe  is  bound  to  be  moral,  we  cannot  be 
surprised  at  finding  it  non-moral.  If  we  do  not  as- 
sume that  our  interests  ought  to  be  considered  by  the 
world-ground,  we  ought  not  to  be  astonished  at  find- 
ing them  disregarded.      The  truth  is  that  in  argu- 


254  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

ments  of  this  sort  we  have  an  underlymg  assumption 
of  a  perfect  being,  and  of  the  supremacy  of  human 
and  moral  interests ;  and  this  gives  the  conchision  all 
its  force.  Suppose  justice  is  not  regarded,  what  does 
that  prove,  unless  we  have  assumed  that  justice  must 
be  regarded  ?  Suppose  the  universe  should  turn  out 
to  be  an  ugly  and  shabby  thing  without  moral  or 
aesthetic  value ;  who  knows  that  it  is  boimd  to  be  the 
seat  and  manifestation  of  the  true,  the  beautiful,  and 
the  good  ?  The  true  force  of  such  considerations  is 
not  logical ;  they  serve  rather  and  only  to  reveal  to 
us  the  distressing  and  intolerable  negations  involved 
in  certain  views.  Their  rejection  is  not  a  logical 
inference,  but  an  immediate  refusal  of  the  soul  to 
abdicate  its  own  nature  and  surrender  to  pessimism 
and  despair.  Hence  whatever  enriches  the  inner  life 
strengthens  the  appropriate  faith.  A  poem  like  "  In 
Memoriam,"  a  growing  affection,  a  strong  sense  of 
justice,  may  do  more  for  faith  than  acres  of  logic. 
But  this  insight  into  the  true  nature  of  the  argument 
need  not  prevent  us  from  yielding  to  it ;  for  we  have 
abundantly  seen  that  it  is  the  real  basis  of  our  whole 
mental  life. 

The  second  form  of  empirical  argument  is  drawn 
from  the  structure  of  life  and  society  and  the  course 
of  history.  These,  it  is  said,  reveal  moral  ideas  and  a 
moral  aim.  Life  itself  is  so  constructed  as  to  furnish 
a  constant  stimulus  in  moral  directions.  Both  nature 
and  experience  inculcate  with  the  utmost  strenuous- 
ness  the  virtues  of  industry,  prudence,  foresight,  self- 
control,  honesty,  truth,  and  helpfulness.  In  spite  of 
the  revised  version,  the  way  of  the  transgressor  con- 


THE   EMPIRICAL   ARGUMENT  255 

tinues  hard.  The  tendency  of  virtue  is  to  life,  while 
the  final  wages  of  sin  must  be  death.  Of  two  com- 
munities, equal  in  other  respects,  there  can  be  no 
question  that  the  virtuous  one  will  tend  to  survive 
and  the  vicious  one  will  tend  toward  destruction. 
When  all  allowance  has  been  made  for  failing  cases, 
the  nature  of  things  is  still  manifestly  on  the  side  of 
righteousness.  This  is  so  much  the  case  that  one 
school  of  moralists  has  claimed  that  the  virtues  are 
simply  the  great  utilities.  The  possibility  of  such  a 
claim  shows  the  ethical  framework  of  life.  And  it  is 
true  that  the  virtues  are  great  utilities ;  ethical  dis- 
pute could  arise  only  over  the  claim  that  utilities  are 
necessarily  virtues ;  and  even  then  the  debate  would 
turn  on  the  meaning  of  utility.  If  we  define  utility 
so  as  to  include  the  satisfaction  of  the  moral  nature, 
there  is  no  longer  any  ground  of  dispute. 

Society,  again,  in  its  organized  form  is  a  moral 
institution  with  moral  ends.  However  selfish  indi- 
viduals may  be,  they  cannot  live  together  without  a 
social  order  that  rests  on  moral  ideas.  And  when 
these  ideas  are  lacking,  and  injustice,  oppression,  and 
iniquity  are  enacted  by  law,  social  earthquakes  and 
volcanoes  begin  to  rock  society  to  its  foundations. 
The  elements  melt  with  fervent  heat,  and  the  heavens 
pass  away  with  a  great  noise.  Neither  man  nor  so- 
ciety can  escape  the  need  of  righteousness,  truthful- 
ness, honesty,  purity,  etc.  No  cunning,  no  power,  can 
forever  avail  against  the  truth.  No  strength  can  long 
support  a  lie.  The  wicked  may  have  great  power  and 
spread  himself  like  a  green  bay  tree,  but  he  passes 
away.  The  righteous  are  held  in  everlasting  remem- 
brance, but  the  name  of  the  wicked  rots.      When 


256  THE    WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

wickedness  is  committed  on  a  large  scale  by  nations 
the  result  is  even  more  marked.  No  lesson  is  more 
clearly  taught  by  history  than  that  righteousness  ex- 
alteth  a  nation  while  sin  is  a  reproach  to  any  people. 
Nations  rich  in  arts  and  sciences  have  perished,  or 
been  fearfully  punished,  because  of  evil-doing.  Op- 
pression, injustice,  sensuality,  have  dragged  nation 
after  nation  down  into  the  dust,  and  compelled  them 
to  drink  the  cup  of  a  bitter  and  terrible  retribution. 
The  one  truth,  it  is  said,  which  can  be  verified  con- 
cerning the  world-ground  is  that  it  makes  for  right- 
eousness. Out  of  the  clash  of  selfish  interests  a 
moral  system  emerges.  x\ltruism  is  rooted  deep  in 
life  itself,  and  glorifies  even  the  animal  impulses. 
Animalism  and  selfishness  are  made  to  contribute 
to  moral  progress,  and  thus,  across  the  confusion 
of  human  development,  we  discern  more  and  more 
clearly  a  moral  factor  immanent  in  the  process. 

These  empirical  arguments,  however,  while  they 
may  serve  to  illustrate  and  confirm  our  faith,  are 
plainly  not  its  source.  They  all  rest  upon  picked 
facts,  and  ignore  some  of  the  most  prominent  aspects 
of  experience.  This  explains  why  it  is  that  mere 
arguers  come  to  such  different  conclusions  in  this 
matter.  According  to  some  the  earth  is  full  of  the 
goodness  of  the  Lord,  while  others  see  only  rapine 
and  venom  and  failure  and  death. 

This  picking  and  choosing  appears  especially  in  the 
historical  argument.  Here  a  scanty  stream  of  prog- 
ress is  discovered ;  and  the  swamps  and  marshes  of  hu- 
manity through  which  it  finds  its  doubtful  way  are 
overlooked.  The  area  of  progress  is  limited,  while  the 
great  mass  of  humanity  seems  to  have  no  significance 


THE   HISTORICAL   ARGUMENT  257 

for  history  or  development,  and  to  have  no  principle  of 
movement  above  simple  animal  want.  Here  is  no  his- 
tory, no  progress,  no  ideas,  only  physical  cravings  and 
brute  instincts.  But  we  get  on  with  the  utmost  cheer- 
fulness by  letting  the  "race"  and  "man"  progress,  and 
by  ignoring  individuals  and  men.  Clearly,  we  need 
something  beside  these  facts  as  the  source  of  our 
faith.  As  in  the  world  we  find  marks  of  wisdom  but 
not  of  perfect  wisdom  ;  so  in  the  world  we  find  marks 
of  goodness  but  not  of  perfect  goodness.  In  both 
cases  we  pass  from  the  limited  wisdom  and  goodness 
which  we  find  to  the  perfect  wisdom  and  goodness  in 
which  we  believe,  only  by  force  of  our  faith  in  the 
perfect  and  complete  ideal.  Then,  having  thus 
gained  the  conceptions,  we  come  back  to  the  world  of 
experience  again  for  their  illustration.  And  the  facts 
which  from  a  logical  standpoint  make  a  poor  show 
as  proof  are  very  effective  as  illustration ;  and  this 
passes  for  proof.  It  does  indeed  produce  conviction ; 
but  the  true  nature  of  the  argument  should  not  be 
overlooked.  If  any  one  had  an  interest  in  maintain- 
ing the  opposite  hypothesis  of  unwisdom  and  evil 
in  the  world-ground,  much  might  be  said  for  it. 
The  great  mass  of  apparent  insignificance  and  all 
the  facts  of  evil  with  which  life  is  crowded  would 
lend  themselves  only  too  readily  to  illustrate  such  a 
view.  Of  course  a  purely  objective  procedure  would 
demand  that  we  take  all  the  facts  into  account  and 
strike  the  average.  Such  a  study  of  the  facts  would 
leave  us  in  great  uncertainty.  Over  against  the  good 
in  nature  we  should  put  the  evil ;  and  this  would 
hinder  the  affirmation  of  goodness.  But  over  against 
the  evil  we  should  put  the  good ;  and  this  would  not 


258  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

allow  us  to  affirm  a  fundamental  malignity.  Over 
against  the  wisdom  in  nature  we  should  put  the  mean- 
ingless aspects  of  existence,  the  cosmic  labor  which 
seems  to  end  in  nothing ;  and  these  would  leave  us  in 
doubt  whether  we  were  not  contemplating  the  work  of 
some  blind  demiurge  rather  than  of  supreme  wisdom. 
But  over  against  these  facts  we  should  put  the  ever- 
growing rational  wonder  of  the  universe ;  and  this 
would  drive  us  into  doubt  again.  The  outcome  would 
probably  be  the  affirmation  of  a  being  either  morally 
indiiferent,  or  morally  unperfect,  or  morally  good, 
but  limited  by  some  insuperable  necessity  which  for- 
bids anything  better  than  our  rather  shabby  universe. 

But  the  mind  is  not  satisfied  to  take  this  road.  It 
will  not  allow  its  ideals  to  collapse  without  some 
effort  to  save  them.  It  prefers  rather  to  maintain  its 
faith  in  the  ideal,  and  to  set  aside  the  conflicting  facts 
as  something  not  yet  understood,  but  which  to  perfect 
insight  would  fall  into  harmony.  This  assumption  is 
made  both  in  the  cognitive  and  the  moral  realm ;  and, 
so  far  as  logic  goes,  it  is  as  well  founded  in  one  realm 
as  in  the  other.  In  both  cases  our  procedure  is  not 
due  to  any  logical  compulsion ;  it  is  rather  an  act  of 
instinctive  self-defense  on  the  part  of  the  mind,  where- 
by it  seeks  to  save  its  life  from  destruction.  This 
implicit  teleology  of  life  leads  with  equal  necessity  to 
the  affirmation  of  a  Supreme  Reason  and  a  Supreme 
Righteousness. 

This  abstract  discussion  shows  that  we  are  in  the 
same  position  respecting  moral  ideas  in  the  world  as 
respecting  rational  ideas.  In  both  cases  the  ideas  in 
their  absolute  form  transcend  experience  and  rest 
upon  the  energy  of  life  itself.     In  both  cases,  also,  in 


LOGIC   AND  LIFE  259 

the  application  of  these  ideas  to  experience  we  are 
mihtant  rather  than  triumphant.  We  find  ilhistra- 
tions  of  our  faith,  but  no  proper  demonstration.  In 
the  physical  realm  disorder  and  unintelligihihty  dis- 
pute the  reign  of  law  and  intelligence.  In  the  moral 
realm,  also,  we  find  clouds  and  darkness  as  well  as 
the  throne  of  justice  and  judgment.  But  in  both 
realms  the  conviction  of  the  universality  of  the  intel- 
lectual and  the  moral  order  grows  with  the  deepening 
life  of  the  race.  Of  course  we  cannot  force  our  faith 
upon  an  unwilling  disputant,  but  we  may  be  fully 
persuaded  in  our  own  minds.  For  the  rest,  life  and 
the  siKvival  of  the  fittest  must  decide. 

Here  we  come  again  upon  the  fact  dwelt  upon  in 
the  Introduction,  that  the  deepest  things  are  not 
reached  by  formal  syllogizing  but  by  tlie  experience 
of  life  itself.  There  is  a  vast  deal  of  informal  and 
instinctive  inference  upon  which  life  necessarily  pro- 
ceeds, but  which  can  never  be  formally  stated  without 
seeming  to  weaken  it.  If  one  were  called  upon  to 
formally  justify  his  confidence  in  another,  he  would 
not  succeed.  The  formal  statements  would  seem  cold 
and  equivocal  alongside  of  the  confidence  of  friend- 
ship. And  in  all  reasoning  upon  reality  the  same 
thing  is  true.  There  is  an  element  of  immediacy 
back  of  all  inferential  conviction  which  logic  only 
very  imperfectly  reproduces.  We  may  need  the  logi- 
cal form  for  its  expression  and  impartation,  but  it  is 
not  reached  in  this  way.  It  is  intuition  or  instinct 
rather  than  ratiocination,  a  formulation  of  life  rather 
than  an  inference  of  logic. 

And  this  is  preeminently  the  case  in  dealing  with 
the  highest  and  deepest  things.     Here  the  whole  man 


260  THE    WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

enters  into  the  argument,  and  not  simply  the  under- 
standing as  an  isolated  faculty.  The  understanding 
is  only  an  instrument  for  manipulating  the  data  fur- 
nished by  experience;  and  when  the  experience  is 
lunited  or  lacking,  there  is  nothing  to  interpret  and 
really  no  problem.  No  logical  subtlety  would  enable  a 
man  to  judge  in  the  court  of  aesthetics,  who  was  lack- 
ing in  the  aesthetic  sense.  Such  an  one  would  likely 
decide  that  there  is  no  proof  that  the  Hottentot  Venus 
is  any  less  fair  than  the  Venus  of  Milo  ;  and  he  might 
even  boast  of  the  acumen  and  impartiality  of  his  deci- 
sion. In  like  manner  no  one  with  meager  moral  in- 
terests can  judge  of  the  theistic  argument  from  man's 
moral  nature.  To  such  an  one  it  must  seem  weak  or 
worthless,  however  it  may  appeal  to  others. 

Furthermore,  this  argument  can  never  be  rightly 
estimated  in  passive  contemplation,  but  only  in  moral 
action.  It  is  a  curious  fact  that  truths  which  bear 
on  practice  soon  grow  vague  and  uncertain  when 
abstracted  from  practice.  Thus  the  uniformity  of 
nature  as  an  abstract  proposition  admits  of  much 
academic  doubt ;  but  in  practice  it  rules  us  in  spite 
of  ourselves.  Our  deepest  affections  also  may  be 
quiescent,  and  even  seem  non-existent,  in  passive 
moments ;  but  the  need  of  action  reveals  them,  and 
reveals  them  in  their  otherwise  unsuspected  might. 
In  the  same  way  the  force  of  the  ethical  demand  for 
an  ethical  Creator  can  never  be  felt  from  mere  reflec- 
tion upon  psychological  abstractions,  but  only  from 
living  participation  in  the  moral  effort  and  struggle 
of  humanity.  Thus  and  thus  only  do  its  meaning 
and  profundity  dawn  upon  us.  To  the  one  who  meas- 
ures things  by  bulk,  the  starry  heavens  may  be  the 


LOGIC   AND   LIFE  261 

greatest  of  all  things,  and  the  only  thing  needing  ex- 
planation. To  the  morally  minded,  the  moral  realm 
is  more  wonderful  still.  To  him  the  historical  drama 
of  humanity  will  have  far  greater  significance  than  all 
the  revelations  of  astronomy.  But  unless  moral  prin- 
ciples live  in  the  speculator's  will,  they  will  have  little 
significance  for  his  contemplation. 

Finally,  in  all  arguments  which  root  in  life  itself 
the  matter  is  commonly  so  complex  as  to  elude 
definite  and  adequate  statement.  There  is  an  un- 
formulated activity  of  the  mind  in  such  cases  which 
is  the  real  gist  of  the  reasoning,  and  which  gives  the 
formulas  their  meaning.  This  meaning,  again,  is  not 
to  be  gathered  from  the  dictionary,  but  from  a  study 
of  the  whole  life  of  custom,  rite,  history,  and  litera- 
ture. If  we  would  know  what  men  really  think  on 
these  points,  we  must  not  sit  down  to  syllogize,  but 
must  go  out  into  the  open  field  of  the  world  and 
study  the  entire  movement  and  manifestation  of 
humanity.  Then  we  discern  humanity's  deathless 
faith  in  the  divine  righteousness  so  long  as  it  remains 
theistic  at  all.  Experience  is  held  to  testify  not  only 
to  a  cosmic  reason  but  also  to  a  cosmic  righteousness. 

But  it  is  plain  that  an  argument  of  this  sort  can 
never  be  adequately  tested  by  syllogistic  rules.  The 
underlying  fact  is  a  vital  process,  rather  than  a  log- 
ical one.  The  alleged  arguments  so  poorly  set  forth 
the  living  movement  of  conviction,  that  often  they 
seem  to  be  little  more  than  pretexts,  or  excuses,  for  a 
foregone  conclusion.  At  bottom  we  have  competing 
tendencies  in  life,  or  conflicting  theories  of  life ;  and 
the  living  man  has  to  judge  between  them.  And 
how  he  judges  will  depend  quite  as  much  upon  what 

THEISM 18 


262  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  ETHICAL 

he  is,  as  upon  his  facihty  in  the  four  syllogistic  fig- 
ures. What  syllogistic  procedure  would  harmonize 
Isaiah  with  a  prophet  of  modern  pessimism  ?  The  will 
and  the  man  himself  enter  too  deeply  into  the  faith 
or  unfaith  to  be  entirely  amenable  to  logic. 

But  if  we  allow  that  the  belief  in  the  divine  goodness 
is  not  gained  from  an  inductive  contemplation  of  ex- 
perience alone,  we  are  still  not  out  of  the  woods.  For 
while  experience  might  not  be  the  source  of  the  idea, 
it  might  well  serve  as  its  refutation.  The  a  priori  idea 
when  compared  with  the  facts  of  experience  might 
be  found  in  such  discord  with  them  that  it  must  be 
given  up.  And  the  claim  is  made  that  such  is  the 
case. 

This  question  is  greatly  complicated  by  the  prob- 
lem of  the  individual.  In  a  general  way  a  case  can 
be  inductively  made  out  for  a  moral  factor  in  the 
world-order.  We  can  point  out,  as  already  suggested, 
the  altruistic  factor  in  life,  the  moral  nature  in  man, 
the  way  in  which  even  the  selfishness  and  wickedness 
of  men  are  made  to  contribute  to  moral  development 
and  progress,  the  valuable  moral  auxiliaries  in  our 
sub-moral  life,  and  the  many  and  memorable  retribu- 
tions which  have  come  to  wrong-doing.  And  while 
we  consider  these  generalities  the  case  seems  clear. 
But  this  is  not  enough  in  itself.  The  individual 
does  not  exist  in  a  general  way,  but  has  his  own 
concrete  life  and  burdens.  A  righteousness  and  good- 
ness which  are  discernible  only  for  society  as  a  whole, 
or  in  the  course  of  generations,  may  leave  the  lot  of 
the  individual  as  dark  and  puzzling  as  ever.  A  gen- 
eral optimism  in  such  a  case  would  be  simply  a  claim 


OPTIMISM  AND   PESSIMISM  263 

that  things  look  well  at  a  distance,  while  the  fact 
would  be  ignored  that  things  look  wretched  enough 
on  closer  inspection.  It  may  be  something  to  believe 
that  righteousness  in  general  is  visible  in  dealing  with 
men  in  general,  but  after  all,  the  lot  of  the  individual, 
and  the  concrete  details  of  existence  may  be  such  as 
to  throw  us  back  into  doubt  again.  This  brings  us  to 
the  question  of  optimism  and  pessimism,  which  is  an 
essential  factor  in  this  problem  of  the  divine  goodness 
and  righteousness.  A  righteousness  which  is  not  a 
fundamental  goodness  is  a  barren  and  worthless  thing. 
After  our  previous  discussion,  it  is  clear  that  we 
have  no  hope  of  a  decisive  demonstration  in  this 
matter.  But  some  exposition  of  the  problem  is 
needed,  as  both  parties  have  done  not  a  little  fight- 
ing in  the  dark.  The  only  permissible  question  is 
not  whether  experience  proves  the  goodness  and 
righteousness  of  God,  but  whether  it  is  compatible 
with  faith  therein.  The  optimist  claims  that  we 
may  hold  fast  our  faith  in  the  face  of  all  the  facts ; 
and  the  pessimist  claims  that  our  optimistic  faith 
must  siu-ely  perish  when  confronted  with  the  dark 
realities  of  life  and  nature. 

Optimism  and  Pessimism 

There  are  two  types  of  both  optimism  and  pes- 
simism. One  is  based  on  the  facts  of  experience, 
and  the  other  is  inferred  from  our  general  world- 
view.  The  former  might  be  called  inductive  or 
experiential,  the  latter  inferential  optimism  and 
pessimism.  The  debate  commonly  begins  with  the 
former  and  ends  with  the  latter.  The  theist  seeks 
to  show  that  life  is  good,  but  when  pressed  with  the 


264  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

dark  and  sinister  aspects  of  existence  is  apt  to  fall 
back  on  faith  in  God  and  the  future.  Thus  his 
optimism  becomes  inferential  and  long  range.  The 
pessimist,  on  the  other  hand,  finds  life  a  not  unmixed 
evil ;  in  spite  of  himself  cheerfulness  will  come  creep- 
ing in  ;  and  then  he  falls  back  on  his  general  theory  of 
things  to  show  that  life  can  have  no  permanent  value. 
Thus  his  pessimism  also  becomes  inferential  and  long 
range.  For  the  sake  of  clearness  we  must  keep  the 
inductive  and  the  inferential  standpoints  distinct. 
We  might  remain  optimists  because  of  our  theistic 
hope,  or  become  pessimists  from  atheistic  despair. 
But  we  must  begin  with  experience. 

This  discussion  has  commonly  been  vitiated  by  an 
abstract  and  academic  treatment.  The  notions  of  per- 
fect power  and  perfect  goodness  have  been  abstractly 
shuffled,  and  the  traditional  antinomy  between  the 
divine  power  and  the  divine  benevolence  has  been 
developed.  We  cannot  maintain,  it  is  said,  that  God 
is  both  almighty  and  perfectly  good.  Whichever  attri- 
bute we  choose,  we  must  abandon  the  other. 

This  is  a  contention  which  is  perfectly  clear  only 
so  long  as  we  keep  it  abstract.  As  soon  as  we  apply 
it  to  the  actual  world,  either  it  becomes  doubtful,  or 
it  is  seen  to  be  so  vague  as  to  say  practically  nothing. 
As  an  abstract  thesis,  however,  the  optimist  has 
generally  admitted  it,  and  then  has  sought  to  rescue 
the  divine  goodness  by  saying  that  God  could  not 
help  the  evil  that  is  in  the  world.  This  has  been 
the  current  theodicy  since  the  time  of  Leibnitz.  A 
government  by  general  laws  necessarily  implies  indi- 
vidual hardship ;  yet  the  system  is  not  only  good  on 
the  whole,  it  is  also  the  best  possible.     The  eternal 


OPTIMISM  AND  PESSIMISM  265 

truths  of  reason  and  the  invincible  might  of  logical 
sequence  forbid  the  system  being  other  than  it  is. 
Of  course  particular  features  by  themselves  might  be 
improved;  but  nothing  exists  by  itself  or  for  itself 
alone.  Everything  is  bound  up  in  infinite  relations 
and  implications ;  and  when  these  are  considered,  it 
appears  that  nothing  could  be  changed  except  for 
the  worse. 

If  this  could  be  proved,  it  would  help  matters,  at 
least  so  far  as  the  divine  responsibility  is  concerned. 
If  the  non-existence  of  evil  involved  a  contradiction 
of  some  eternal  and  necessary  truth,  we  should  have 
to  put  up  with  it.  Unfortunately  this  claim  is  clearly 
applicable  only  to  the  problem  of  moral  evil,  con- 
sidered as  an  implied  possibility  of  a  free  system. 
But  that  the  non-existence  of  paia  in  its  present 
degree,  or  even  its  utter  absence,  involves  a  con- 
tradiction or  runs  counter  to  some  eternal  truth  is 
a  proposition  which  is  sadly  in  need  of  proof.  So 
far  as  rational  necessity,  the  only  necessity  of  which 
we  know  anything,  goes,  the  whole  order  of  the 
world,  for  good  or  evil,  is  purely  contingent.  What- 
ever good  purposes  toothache  and  neuralgia  and 
pestilence  and  fang  and  venom  and  parasites  may 
serve,  there  is  no  proof  that  any  eternal  truth  is  to 
blame  for  their  presence,  or  would  be  damaged  by 
their  absence.  These  facts  have  all  the  marks  of 
contingency,  not  of  necessity. 

The  traditional  optimist  has  made  himself  further 
confusion  by  his  notion  of  the  best  possible  system. 
It  is  argued,  abstractly  of  course,  that  if  God  did 
less  than  the  best,  his  goodness  would  be  imperfect, 
which  is  not  to  be  thought  of.     Hence  the  system 


266  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

is  the  best  possible.  But  this  too  is  either  a  con- 
tradiction or  a  futile  abstraction.  Taken  quantita- 
tively it  is  a  contradiction,  like  the  notion  of  a  largest 
possible  number.  Of  any  finite  system  whatever  the 
questions  would  be  possible,  why  thus  and  not  other- 
wise ?  Why  now  and  not  then  ?  Why  on  this  plane 
and  not  on  some  other  ?  Why  so  much  and  not  more 
or  less?  If  we  take  the  notion  qualitatively,  we  still 
cannot  escape  a  quantitative  reference ;  otherwise  we 
might  hold  that  a  universe  with  only  a  few  beings 
in  it  would  be  as  good  as  another  abounding  in  life 
and  happiness. 

Another  unclearness  in  the  notion  of  a  best  possible 
system  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  goodness  may  be 
instrumental;  in  which  case  its  goodness  would  lie 
in  its  fitness  for  its  work.  When  an  instrument 
corresponds  to  its  end  it  is  perfect.  In  this  sense  a 
very  imperfect  system,  absolutely  considered,  may  be 
perfectly  adapted  to  the  work  assigned  it.  Even  de- 
fects may  be  instrumental  perfections  ;  as  in  the  case 
of  the  eye,  where  the  shortcomings  of  the  normal  eye 
as  an  optical  instrument  are  positive  advantages  in 
it,  considered  as  an  eye.  In  like  manner  the  order 
of  things  might  be  highly  imperfect  as  an  end  in 
itself,  and  at  the  same  time  perfect  as  an  instrument 
for  the  development  of  a  race  in  character  and  intel- 
ligence. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  phrase,  best  possible  system, 
is  essentially  unclear,  and  in  its  obvious  meaning  is 
contradictory.  The  only  question  that  can  be  raised 
to  edification  is  whether  the  actual  system  be  com- 
patible w^ith  creative  goodness  or  not. 

The  optimist  has  fallen  a  prey  to  abstractions  in 


OPTIMISM   AND   PESSIMISM  267 

this  discussion ;  this  is  still  more  the  case  with  the 
pessimist.  In  addition  to  the  abstract  and  academic 
antinomy,  which  is  such  a  favorite  with  debating 
youths,  he  treats  the  problem  of  evil  itself  in  an 
abstract  and  hysterical  fashion.  In  particular  he 
tends  to  forget  that  pain  in  the  abstract  is  nothing, 
and  that  it  has  existence  only  as  felt  by  sensitive 
beings.  He  heaps  up  all  the  misery  of  all  beings, 
past,  present,  and  future,  and  forthwith  makes  a  sum 
so  great  as  to  hide  all  well-being  from  his  vision. 
Thus  he  resembles  the  man  who,  from  long  dwelling 
in  the  hospital,  should  heap  up  in  one  thought  all  the 
sickness  of  the  world,  and  should  become  so  impressed 
thereby  as  to  conclude  that  health  and  soundness 
nowhere  exist.  The  illusion  is  continued  by  attribut- 
ing to  other  men  the  distress  the  pessimist  would 
feel  in  their  position  and  condition.  He  asks  him- 
self how  he  would  feel  in  the  poverty,  ignorance,  and 
squalor  which  he  sees,  and  concludes  that  those  thus 
living  must  be  in  utter  misery.  Thus  he  commits 
what  might  be  called  the  fallacy  of  the  closet  philan- 
thropist. The  persons  thus  pitied  are  commonly 
having,  from  their  own  standpoint,  a  pretty  good 
time ;  and  the  great  trouble  with  them  is  rather  a 
lack  of  wants  than  a  lack  of  supply.  The  pessimistic 
illusion  is  completed  by  attributing  this  sum  of  pains 
to  the  abstraction,  man  ;  and  then  all  the  conditions  for 
profound  rhetorical  woe  are  fully  met.  But  if  we 
are  to  get  on  with  this  question  we  must  dismiss  this 
integral  of  abstract  pains  and  this  abstract  man  who 
suffers  them,  and  ask  for  living  men  to  come  forward 
and  testify.  The  abstract  man  cannot  be  miserable, 
but  only  concrete,  conscious  men.     The  declaration 


268  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

that  the  world  is  bad  must  mean,  then,  that  its  structure 
is  such  as  necessarily  to  make  life  miserable  and  not 
worth  living.  Thus  the  question  becomes  simply 
one  as  to  the  worth  of  life.  This  question  every  one 
must  decide  for  himself.  The  futility  of  argument  is 
apparent.  As  well  might  one  appeal  to  theory  to 
know  whether  he  enjoys  his  dinner. 

The  optimist  claims  that  the  system  is  good,  the 
pessimist  that  it  is  bad.  But  plainly  no  final  judg- 
ment can  be  reached  in  this  case  unless  we  have  a 
knowledge  of  the  system  as  a  whole,  and  especially 
a  knowledge  of  its  outcome.  How  far  we  are  from 
this  is  plain  upon  inspection.  Even  in  the  case  of 
the  human  world  the  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  life 
after  death  leaves  us  without  sufficient  data  for  an 
assured  judgment.  On  our  Christian  view  it  is  plain 
that  human  history  now  lies  mainly  in  the  invisible 
world.  The  vast  majority  of  the  race  are  there. 
The  inhabitants  of  the  earth  are  but  a  handful  to 
the  myriads  that  have  gone  over  to  the  majority. 
We  barely  begin  and  are  gone;  and  a  new  genera- 
tion takes  our  place.  Our  earth  is  little  more  than 
a  cold  frame  for  starting  the  plants,  which  are  soon 
transplanted  to  other  soil  and  skies.  Or  it  is  a  uni- 
versity which  has  only  undergraduates,  and  of  whose 
alumni  nothing  is  known.  Hence  the  rudimentary 
and  crude  character  of  all  things  human.  Hence, 
also,  it  is  very  doubtful  if  any  finished  condition  of 
things  will  ever  be  reached  upon  the  earth ;  for  the 
generations  begin  in  most  respects  at  the  beginning, 
and  cannot  get  far  in  the  time  allotted  to  them. 
But  however  this  may  be,  it  is  plain  that  no  judg- 


OPTIMISM  AND   PESSIMISM  269 

ment  on  the  worth  of  human  history  is  possible  unless 
we  know  what  is  going  on  behind  the  veil,  or  what 
the  alumni  are  doing.  A  careful  logic,  then,  would 
dismiss  the  case  on  the  ground  of  no  jurisdiction. 
But  as  the  litigants  insist  on  being  heard,  we  must 
follow  the  case  a  little  further. 

The  present  type  of  thought  in  the  speculative 
world  is  somewhat  favorable  to  optimism,  largely 
owing  to  a  reaction  of  cheerfulness,  rather  than  to 
any  better  argument.  The  current  notions  of  devel- 
opment, progress,  and  improvement  enable  the  opti- 
mist to  claim  that  everything  shows  a  tendency  to 
the  better.  The  universe  is  not  yet  complete,  but 
only  in  its  raw  beginnings  Meanwhile  we  see,  if 
not  a  finished  optimism,  at  least  a  decided  meliorism, 
and  meliorism  is  optimism.  He  calls,  therefore,  upon 
the  pessimist  to  master  the  significance  of  the  great 
law  of  evolution,  and  pending  this  mastery  to  hold 
his  peace.  The  pessimist  wants  to  know  why  things 
were  not  made  perfect  at  once ;  but  the  current  type 
of  thought  declines  the  question  as  a  survival  of  an  ob- 
solete mode  of  thought.  If  evolution  is  the  law  of  life, 
of  course  the  present  must  seem  imperfect  relative  to 
the  future, and  the  past  imperfect  relative  to  the  present. 

So  long  as  this  way  of  thinking  is  in  fashion,  the 
argument  will  be  accepted,  but  it  does  not  meet  the 
question  why  this  progress  might  not  have  been 
accomplished  at  less  cost  of  toil  and  struggle  and 
pain.  In  truth,  it  is  only  another  way  of  saying  that 
the  system  is  to  be  judged  only  in  its  outcome,  and 
the  outcome  is  assumed  to  be  good.  The  fancy  that 
evolution  in  any  way  diminishes  the  Creator's  respon- 
sibility for  evil  is  really  somewhat  infantile.     It  rests 


270  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  ETHICAL 

on  the  assumption  that  there  is  some  element  of 
chance  or  self-determination  in  the  system  whereby 
it  is  able  to  make  new  departures  on  its  own  account. 
But  in  a  mechanical  system  there  is  no  such  element, 
and  the  founder  is  responsible  for  the  outcome. 

Some  very  naive  work  has  been  done  in  evolution- 
ary theodicy.  Some  writers  who  would  not  hear  of 
the  world  as  the  creation  of  a  good  God  have  found 
their  difficulties  disappearing  before  an  evolution  phi- 
losophy. Just  why  the  world  is  less  a  crime  when 
slowly  produced  than  when  created  by  fiat  does  not 
at  once  appear,  provided  in  both  cases  that  the  future 
is  spanned  by  a  bow  of  promise.  Two  reasons  seem 
to  underlie  the  notion.  One  is  the  fancy  just  referred 
to,  that  the  system  itself  is  responsible,  and  that  it  is 
doing  its  best.  The  other  is  the  psychological  fact 
that  the  evils  which  we  think  spring  from  an  imper- 
sonal order  do  not  seem  so  exasperating  as  those 
which  are  due  to  purpose  and  are  a  personal  inflic- 
tion. The  former  may  be  hard  to  bear;  the  latter 
rouse  our  wrath,  or  at  least  compel  attention  and 
reflection.  Hence  the  curious  fact  that  many  who 
have  been  pessimists  from  a  theistic  standpoint  have 
been  helped  to  become  optimists  by  evolution.  But 
cheerfulness  is  so  desirable  that  one  is  glad  to  have  it 
reached  even  by  irregular  logic. 

It  is  also  worth  while  to  note  how  completely  the 
discussion  of  the  goodness  of  the  world  rests  upon 
the  assumed  supremacy  of  human  interests.  What 
is  meant  by  a  good  or  a  bad  universe  ?  Implicitly  our 
interests  furnish  the  standard.  That  universe  is  good 
which  conserves  our  interests,  and  that  is  bad  which 
ignores  them.    But  how  do  we  know  that  the  universe 


OPTIMISM   AND  PESSIMISM  271 

exists  for  us  ?  May  it  not  well  have  inscrutable  ends 
which  it  perfectly  realizes,  and  may  not  our  complaints 
be  like  those  of  a  nest  of  ants  who  should  first  assume 
that  the  universe  is  meant  to  be  an  ant-hill,  and 
should  then  condemn  it  for  its  unhappy  adjustment 
to  formic  interests  and  necessities  ?  Pessimism  is  the 
most  striking  illustration  possible  of  the  fact  that  the 
mind  is  bound  to  measure  the  universe  by  itself. 

Abstract  and  a  iwiori  discussions  of  this  subject  are 
manifestly  futile.  Reflections  on  the  best  possible 
universe,  the  infinite  gradations  of  being,  the  neces- 
sary subordination  of  all  finite  things  in  the  scale  of 
boundless  existence  are  both  theoretically  and  practi- 
cally barren.  The  question  so  far  as  we  can  deal  with 
it  is  one  of  experience  rather  than  of  argument.  It 
concerns  the  value  of  life  and  the  impression  which 
our  living  in  the  world  makes  upon  us,  or  rather  the 
impression  which  the  experience  of  the  race  has  made 
upon  it  respecting  the  goodness  of  God  and  the  value 
of  life.  This  is  a  matter  to  be  solved  not  by  logic,  nor 
even  by  verbal  testimony,  but  by  the  observation  of  life 
as  it  reveals  itself  in  its  great  historical  manifestations, 
social,  political,  ethical,  and  religious.  Testimony  alone 
in  such  a  matter  is  not  to  be  trusted,  because  thought 
itself  is  often  too  v^gue  or  elusive  to  find  exact 
utterance,  and  also  and  more  especially  because  esti- 
mates of  values  are  revealed  in  deed  rather  than  word. 
Deeds  reveal  men's  thoughts  better  than  words.  Words, 
then,  must  be  tested  by  comparison  with  the  unsophis- 
ticated revelations  of  life  in  action  and  literature  and 
institutions  and  religion  and  the  whole  sweep  of  human 
history. 

The  only  permissible  question,  we  have  said,   is 


272  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS  ETHICAL 

whether  the  facts  of  experience  are  compatible  with 
faith  in  God's  goodness  and  righteousness,  and  this 
question  admits  of  no  theoretical  solution.  We  may 
regard  both  the  optimism  and  the  pessimism  of  the 
eighteenth  centiu-y  as  antiquated.  The  problems  they 
raised  are  insoluble  in  the  form  in  which  they  raised 
them.  We  must  confine  ourselves  to  the  humbler 
task  of  interpreting  experience,  if  possible,  in  an  opti- 
mistic sense,  that  is,  in  a  sense  which  maintains  the 
worth  and  desirability  of  life.  Questions  why  every- 
thing is  not  different  or  why  anything  is  as  it  is,  we 
pass  by,  as  is  most  meet,  in  reverent  silence.  It  will 
suffice  for  our  purpose  if  we  can  show  a  moral  and 
beneficent  framework  in  the  system  of  experience. 
For  the  present  we  confine  ourselves  to  the  human 
world. 

From  this  standpoint  something  can  be  said  in 
justification  of  our  faith  in  the  righteousness  and 
goodness  of  God.  We  no  longer  seek  to  demonstrate 
but  to  illustrate.  As  theistic  arguments  in  general 
are  never  the  source  of  our  theistic  faith,  but  only 
reasons  for  a  faith  already  possessed,  so  optimistic 
arguments  are  never  the  source  of  our  optimistic 
faith,  but  only  reasons  for  a  faith  already  possessed. 
They  serve  mainly  to  remove  difficulties  in  the  way 
of  instinctive  conviction.  It  should  further  be  re- 
membered that  with  the  great  body  of  theists  our 
relation  to  God  is  a  personal  and  rehgious  one,  and 
this  fact  profoundly  modifies  our  mode  of  argument. 
In  all  personal  relations,  when  we  have  general  grounds 
of  confidence,  we  trust  where  we  do  not  understand, 
and  wait  for  further  knowledge.  We  judge  men  by 
their  deeds,  but  we  also  judge  deeds  by  their  men. 


OPTIMISM  AND  PESSIMISM  273 

The  act  of  personal  trust  on  which  society  depends, 
while  not  independent  of  induction,  can  by  no  means 
be  reached  by  a  simple  enumeration  of  particulars. 
There  is  something  in  it  which  is  beyond  inductive 
logic.     This,  which  is  a  law  in  our  relations  with  one 
another,  applies  equally  in  our  relations  to  God.    Our 
trust  here  is  also  not  independent  of  induction,  but  it 
includes  an  element  of  personal  confidence  of  which 
induction  can  give  no  account.     Having,  as  we  con- 
ceive, good  grounds  for  confidence  in  the  divine  good- 
ness and  righteousness,  we  trace  them  where  we  can, 
and  trust  God  for  the  rest.     The  religious  relation  it- 
self imphes  this  trust,  so  that  doubt  or  criticism  seems 
irreverent.      And   when   we    consider   the   enormous 
complexity  of  the  universe  and   also  its  illimitable 
extent,  and  remember  our  own  brief  life  and  scanty 
insight,  there  is  almost  an  air  of  grotesqueness  in  the 
thought  of  our  assuming  to  criticise  the  Creator  at 
all ;  as  if  he  should  apologize  to  us  for  not  having 
made  the  world  more  to  our  mind  and  liking,  or  more 
in  accordance  with  good  taste,  and  especially  for  not 
having  explained  himself  more  at  length  to  his  human 
critics.     Plainly  if  we  are  to  reach  faith  at  all  there 
must  be  some  shorter  and  surer  way  than  unaided 
induction  by  the  individual.     We  have  to  deal  with  a 
great  historical  product  of  humanity,  and  not  with  an 
inference  of  syllogizing  speculation. 

Having  made  all  these  provisos,  we  proceed  to 
study  experience.  And  it  must  be  admitted  that  the 
world  presents  at  first  sight  a  grim  and  astounding 
spectacle.  In  advance  of  knowledge,  our  theistic 
premise  of  a  God  all-wise,  almighty,  and  perfectly 
good  would  lead  us  to  expect  a  world  very  different 


274  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

from  this.  Passing  over  the  strange  features  of  the 
inorganic  world,  the  apparent  meaninglessness  of  so 
many  of  the  lower  orders  of  life,  the  fixed  institutions 
of  claws,  fangs,  and  venom,  and  confining  ourselves 
to  the  human  world,  we  are  filled  with  amazement 
and  astonishment  at  what  we  find.  Pain  and  death 
hold  universal  sway,  and  the  cry  of  the  mourner  goes 
up  unceasingly  unto  heaven.  Besides  these  fixed 
factors  of  evil,  famine  and  pestilence  have  always 
hung  on  the  heels  of  the  race  for  man's  destruction ; 
while  heredity  and  social  solidarity  have  been  in  age- 
long league  for  his  overthrow.  In  addition,  human 
history  presents  a  fearful  spectacle  on  its  own  account 
—  the  many  races,  their  ceaseless  wars  and  aliena- 
tions, their  mutual  slaughter.  How  wave  after  wave 
of  slaughter  has  rolled  again  and  again  over  the 
earth.  Confusion,  blood,  and  the  noise  of  conflict  are 
ever  about  us  as  we  trace  the  history  of  men.  Note, 
too,  the  degradation  of  most  races  and  the  scanty 
attainments  of  the  best.  How  men  have  wandered 
in  error  and  darkness.  How  their  minds  have  been 
blinded  by  ignorance  and  superstition.  How  they 
have  been  shut  in  by  massive  necessities  which  could 
not  be  escaped.  In  most  cases  there  has  been  no 
history  at  all,  but  only  an  aimless  and  resultless 
drift.  No  ideas,  no  outlook,  no  progress,  only  animal 
wants  and  instincts,  mostly  unsatisfied  —  this  sums 
up  the  history  of  the  vast  majority  of  human  beings 
who  have  lived,  or  who  live  this  day.  Plainly,  cos- 
mic ethics,  if  there  be  such  a  thing,  differs  sufficiently, 
both  positively  and  negatively,  from  human  ethics 
to  give  us  pause  in  our  speculation.  Positively :  for 
any  human  being  who  should  imitate  the  cosmos  in 


OPTIMISM   AND   PESSIMISM  275 

its  inflictions  would  be  killed  on  the  spot.  Negatively : 
for  any  human  being  who  should  imitate  the  cosmos 
in  its  apparent  indifference  to  our  pain  and  sorrow 
would  be  execrated  as  a  monster. 

This  is  not  an  indictment,  but  a  recital  of  admitted 
facts.  Disagreement  concerns  only  the  interpreta- 
tion. In  dealing  with  it  we  must  form  some  con- 
ception of  what  the  world  is  for  in  its  relation  to 
man.  If  the  sole  goods  of  life  are  pleasurable 
affections  of  the  passive  sensibility,  and  if  the  aim  is 
to  produce  them,  then  the  world  is  a  hopeless  failure. 
But  if  the  chief  and  lasting  goods  are  those  of  the 
active  nature,  conscious  self-development,  growing 
self-possession,  progress,  conquest,  the  successful  putting 
forth  of  energy  and  the  resulting  sense  of  larger  life,  the 
matter  takes  on  a  different  look.  Still  more  is  this 
the  case  if  the  aim  of  the  human  world  is  a  moral 
development  for  which  men  themselves  are  to  be 
largely  responsible,  working  out  their  own  salvation. 
In  such  a  view  the  goodness  of  the  world  would  be 
instrumental  and  not  a  finished  perfection  in  itself. 
It  would  consist  in  its  furnishing  the  conditions  of 
a  true  human  development,  and  in  the  possibility  of 
being  made  indefinitely  better. 

Moreover,  a  good  part  of  our  horror  at  the  facts 
recited  rests  upon  an  unpermissible  anthropomorphism. 
The  different  relation  of  the  Creator  to  his  work  from 
that  which  obtains  among  men  must  forbid  any  par- 
alleling of  cosmic  ethics  with  human  ethics,  except  in 
their  most  general  principles.  The  simple  fact  that 
death  is  the  law  of  life,  and  that  the  power  of  life  and 
death  is  not  in  our  hands,  widely  differentiates  them 
in  the  concrete.    A  Lisbon  earthquake  or  a  Galveston 


276  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

tidal  wave,  or  a  Mont  Pelee  eruption,  over  which  it 
is  easy  to  wax  hysterical,  really  has  no  more  theoret- 
ical significance  than  the  events  of  every  day.  The 
imagination  is  impressed  and  weak  nerves  are  shaken 
by  the  former.     This  is  the  only  difference. 

From  this  point  of  view  the  order  of  the  world  is 
not  so  utterly  dark  after  all.  The  imperfection  of  the 
physical  world  in  itself  is  its  perfection,  considered  as 
an  instrument  for  the  upbuilding  of  men.  A  world 
that  furnished  no  obstacle  to  man,  but  spontaneously 
supplied  all  his  wants  without  forethought  and  effort 
on  his  part,  would  be  both  paralyzing  and  intolerable. 
It  would  make  no  demand  upon  the  living  energies 
of  the  will,  and  furnish  no  field  for  self-realization. 
The  great  ordinance  of  work  is  obnoxious  only  to 
our  native  indolence.  As  men  are,  it  is  the  supreme 
condition  of  human  development.  The  only  demand 
we  can  rightly  make  is  that  the  system  shall  re- 
spond to  labor  with  adequate  returns.  The  physi- 
cal world  in  the  main  is  a  good  servant ;  but  if 
through  sloth  or  ignorance  we  allow  it  to  become  our 
master,  we  rightly  find  the  way  of  the  transgressor 
hard. 

Everywhere  man  is  made  responsible  for  himself. 
Neither  in  physical  nature  nor  in  human  nature  are 
we  presented  with  things  ready-made.  The  potentiali- 
ties are  there,  but  we  must  evoke  them.  Harvests  are 
waiting  to  grow,  but  in  default  of  our  industry  and 
prudence  and  forethought,  weeds  and  thorns  will 
usurp  their  place.  We  are  under  laws  which  lead  the 
willing  and  obedient,  but  drag  the  unwilling  and  dis- 
obedient. There  is  no  law  of  life  which  is  in  itself 
evil.     Whether  the  laws  shall  bring  bane  or  blessing 


OPTIMISM   AND   PESSIMISM  277 

depends  on  man  himself.  If  lie  insists  on  lying  down 
in  indolence  in  the  lap  of  nature,  he  is  soon  roughly 
shaken  out ;  but  if  he  bestirs  himself,  he  finds  nature 
going  his  way.  Even  our  general  weakness  and  the 
limitations  of  our  intellectual  powers  are  wise  provi- 
sions in  a  system  where  freedom  is  being  disciplined 
into  self-control.  Conceive  of  a  baby  in  character 
and  intelligence,  with  the  physical  force  of  a  man, 
or  a  body  of  savages  possessing  the  physical  energies 
of  a  civilized  state.  Even  a  few  anarchists  serve  to 
reveal  the  danger  of  undisciplined  power. 

The  chief  ills  under  which  man  suffers  are  the 
results  of  his  own  doing.  Even  our  physical  ills,  the 
physicians  say,  are  mostly  the  product  of  our  artificial 
and  improper  modes  of  living.  Few  bodies  are  en- 
gines of  torture  until  physiological  law  has  been  out- 
raged and  violated  either  by  the  person  himself  or  by 
his  ancestors.  The  law  of  heredity,  too,  —  that  fruit- 
ful source  of  frightful  ills,  —  is  in  its  natural  operation 
most  beautiful  and  beneficent.  With  no  law  of  the 
human  order  would  we  longer  refuse  to  part  if  men 
were  good  and  wise.  Human  sin  it  is  which  changes 
this  law  into  a  curse,  and  even  as  it  is,  the  law  works 
more  good  than  harm.  Otherwise  society  could  never 
improve.  And  so  with  the  law  of  social  unity  and 
solidarity.  Universal  community  of  interest  is  a  di- 
vine ideal,  and  there  could  be  no  worthy  moral  world 
without  it.  Absolute  self-dependence  would  make  the 
love-life  impossible,  and  reduce  society  to  an  atomistic 
egoism.  But  the  mutual  interdependence  which  soli- 
darity implies  makes  it  possible  that  it  should  be  the 
prolific  mother  of  woes.  In  a  world  of  folly  and  un- 
reason and  selfishness,  heredity  and  solidarity  league 

THEISM 19 


278  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

together  for  human  ruin ;  but  what  would  they  be  in 
a  world  of  love  and  wisdom  ? 

And  other  evils  are  often  vindicated  by  their  results. 
Man  as  he  is  can  be  made  perfect  only  through  struggle 
and  suffering.  Virtue  acquires  sturdiuess  only  from 
resisted  temptation,  and  power  grows  through  obstacle 
and  resistance.  The  higher  manifestations  of  char- 
acter spring  mainly  from  the  soil  of  sorrow.  If  we 
should  strike  out  from  human  history  the  heroic  and 
saintly  characters  which  have  been  made  perfect 
through  suffering,  all  that  is  noble  and  reverend  in  it 
would  depart.  If  we  should  strike  from  literature 
all  to  which  sorrow  and  loss  have  given  birth,  its 
inspiration  would  perish  forever.  Even  the  presence 
of  death  has  brought  a  solemn  tenderness  and  dignity 
into  human  affection  which  otherwise  had  been  im- 
possible. So  long  as  man  is  as  he  is,  none  of  the 
general  conditions  of  existence  could  be  changed 
without  disaster.  The  dark  things  also  have  their 
uses  in  the  moral  order.  Not  even  the  brevity  and 
uncertainty  of  life  could  be  dispensed  with  without 
moral  loss  to  the  individual ;  while  for  the  community 
the  brevity  of  individual  life  is  one  great  condition 
of  progress.  It  would  be  instructive  for  the  cosmic 
critic  to  see  how  many  general  improvements  in  the 
order  he  could  suggest  that  would  not  be  disastrous 
to  man's  best  development.  It  would  then  be  seen 
that  the  order  of  things  has  more  wisdom  in  it  than 
at  first  glance  appears.  The  order  of  the  world  is  not 
ill-suited  to  its  human  inhabitants. 

How  little  the  woes  of  life  depend  on  the  system, 
and  how  much  upon  human  sin  and  folly,  will  appear 
if  we  reflect  on  the  changes  that  would  result  if  men 


OPTIMISM   AND   PESSIMISM  279 

at  once  began  to  love  God  and  righteousness  with  all 
their  hearts,  and  their  neighbors  as  themselves.  This 
one  change  would  carry  with  it  the  immediate  ame- 
lioration of  all  our  woes,  and  the  speedy  removal  of 
most  of  them.  Wrong-doing  with  all  its  consequences 
would  cease.  All  the  social  energies  now  expended  in 
repressing  wrong-doing  would  be  free  for  the  positive 
service  of  the  community.  All  the  wealth  and  effort 
now  spent  in  ministering  to  the  vices  and  follies  of  men 
would  be  free  for  helpful  uses.  With  the  vanish- 
ing of  sin  and  folly,  there  would  be  an  end  of  all  the 
worst  distresses  of  the  soul.  There  would  likewise  be 
a  vanishing  of  most  diseases  and  an  indefinite  increase 
of  productive  efficiency.  This,  together  with  universal 
industry,  would  soon  make  the  race  rich  enough  to 
f  lu-nish  the  conditions  of  a  human  existence  to  all  its 
members.  Under  these  conditions  knowledge  would 
greatly  flourish,  and  the  treasures  of  knowledge  would 
soon  become  a  universal  possession.  Man's  control 
over  nature  would  be  indefinitely  extended ;  and 
disease  and  pain  would  be  correspondingly  eliminated. 
Nature  would  be  subordinated  to  human  service  ;  and 
man,  freed  from  breaking  drudgery,  would  have  time 
and  leisure  for  development  in  the  upper  ranges  of 
his  nature.  Art  and  the  arts  would  flourish.  The 
potentialities  of  beauty  with  which  the  earth  is  filled 
would  be  summoned  forth,  and  the  earth  would  become 
a  garden  of  the  Lord. 

In  the  social  realm  the  results  would  be  still  more 
blessed.  With  universal  good-will  there  would  be 
universal  peace.  If  differences  arose  they  could  be 
easily  adjusted  by  the  Golden  Rule.  All  envy,  wrath, 
malice,  evil  speaking,  and  evil  thinking  would  pass 


280  THE  WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

away.  All  vanity  and  contempt  and  superciliousness 
and  assumption,  prolific  sources  of  sorrow,  would  also 
disappear.  Inequalities  of  fortune  or  faculty  would 
produce  no  heartburnings  ;  for  the  strong  would  delight 
to  serve  and  bear  the  burdens  of  the  weak.  The  ills 
that  are  inherent  in  our  earthy  lot  would  be  lightened 
by  sympathy,  and,  so  far  as  possible,  shared.  Poverty, 
if  it  existed  at  all,  would  never  be  allowed  to  be 
crushing,  as  it  would  never  be  the  outcome  of  vice 
and  folly ;  and  there  would  be  no  want  unrelieved 
which  human  power  could  reach.  And  in  the  uni- 
versal atmosphere  of  sincerity  and  good  will  how 
would  friendship  flourish  and  all  souls  expand  in 
joyous  fellowship. 

All  that  stands  in  the  way  of  this  consummation 
is  man  himself.  There  is  no  inherent  intractability 
in  the  nature  of  things  which  forbids  it.  The  diffi- 
culty lies  solely  in  human  nature. 

Man  being  what  he  is,  we  can  find  good  reasons 
for  the  general  order  of  things  in  its  relation  to  man. 
A  moral  beneficence  and  wisdom  are  apparent.  Of 
course  we  can  ask  why  man  is  as  he  is,  why  some 
other  method  was  not  adopted,  but  such  questions  we 
have  long  since  learned  to  decline.  All  that  we  can 
hope  for  is  to  show  moral  and  beneficent  principles 
in  the  world  as  it  actually  is. 

This  problem,  we  have  said,  can  never  be  solved 
from  the  apriori  standpoint,  or  by  shuffling  the  abstract 
categories  of  infinite  power  and  goodness.  Except 
in  a  purely  formal  way,  we  cannot  decide  what  is 
compatible  with  goodness,  or  even  what  goodness  itself 
is.  Only  in  life  are  life's  values  revealed ;  and  only 
in  life  can  they  be  tested.     In  abstract  contemplation 


OPTIMISM   AND  PESSIMISM  281 

we  might  well  fancy  that  any  risk  or  strain  or  trial 
would  be  incompatible  with  infinite  benevolence, 
which  might  as  well  make  us  happy  at  once  and 
without  effort  on  our  part.  And  this  seems  to  be  the 
notion  which  haunts  the  academic  discussion  of  this 
topic ;  as  if  the  only  good  in  life  were  passive  pleasure, 
and  the  only  evil  passive  pain.  To  all  this  life  itself 
is  the  answer.  The  chief  and  lasting  goods  of  life  do 
not  lie  in  the  passive  sensibility,  but  in  activity  and 
the  development  of  the  upper  ranges  of  our  nature. 
The  mere  presence  of  pain  has  seldom  shaken  the 
faith  of  any  one  except  the  sleek  and  well-fed  specula- 
tor. The  couch  of  suffering  is  more  often  the  scene 
of  loving  trust  than  are  the  pillows  of  luxury  and  the 
chief  seats  at  feasts.  He  that  increaseth  knowledge 
increaseth  sorrow,  but  we  would  not  forego  the  knowl- 
edge to  escape  the  sorrow.  Love,  too,  has  its  keen 
and  insistent  pains,  but  who  would  be  loveless  on  that 
account?  Logic  and  a  mechanical  psychology  can 
do  nothing  with  facts  like  these ;  only  life  can  reveal 
them  and  remove  their  contradiction.  For  man  as 
moral  and  active,  as  we  have  said,  the  goodness  of 
the  world  consists  in  the  possibility  of  making  it  in- 
definitely better,  and  in  its  furnishing  the  conditions 
of  a  truly  human  development.  Persons  thus  minded 
and  devoted  to  the  betterment  of  the  world  are  gen- 
erally of  optimistic  temper ;  while  others  who  have 
lost  their  grip,  whose  energy  is  low,  who  are  living 
in  the  passive  rather  than  the  active  voice,  whose 
ideals  are  sub-moral,  and  who  wish  to  escape  respon- 
sibility and  live  on  others,  tend  to  become  pessimists. 
In  short,  theoretical  optimism  and  pessimism  are 
academic  abstractions  which  admit  of  no  edifying  dis- 


282  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

cussion.  Neither  a  finished  optimism  nor  a  final  pes- 
simism is  warranted  by  knowledge ;  but  experience 
shows  the  possibility  of  indefinite  meliorism,  and  with 
this  for  the  present  we  must  be  content.  Practical 
optimism  and  pessimism  belong  to  the  will  rather 
than  to  the  understanding.  The  former  means  health, 
hope,  energy ;  and  the  latter  means  disease,  despair, 
death. 

Thus  the  futility  of  theoretical  discussion  becomes 
still  more  apparent.  The  justification  of  the  world 
must  be  found  in  experience  rather  than  in  specula- 
tion, in  life  rather  than  in  the  closet.  If  we  find  life, 
with  its  furnishings  of  hopes  and  aspirations,  worth 
living,  that  must  be  the  end  of  all  discussion.  If  we 
find  the  things  we  most  rejoice  in  and  would  least  for- 
get are  the  struggles,  the  conquests,  the  sacrifices  we 
have  made,  there  is  no  need  for  their  further  justifi- 
cation. We  should  never  have  chosen  them  for  our- 
selves ;  but  on  no  account  would  we  forego  the  deeper 
and  more  abundant  life  which  has  been  reached 
through  them.  This,  however,  is  not  a  matter  for 
argument,  but  for  experience.  No  conclusion  can  be 
reached  which  can  be  forced  upon  unwilling  minds, 
but  each  one  for  himself  may  see  that  life  is  good. 
And  here  the  patient  must  minister  to  himself.  These 
general  considerations,  while  casting  much  light  on 
the  system  as  a  whole,  by  no  means  explain  all  the 
vicissitudes  of  the  individual  lot,  and  the  darker  phases 
of  history.  Here  sight  fails  us,  and  we  must  fall  back 
on  faith  and  some  sense  that  our  lives  are  in  the  hands 
of  him  that  made  us,  and  that  he  can  be  trusted 
though  we  do  not  understand. 

This  practical  solution  is  all  that  is  possible  to  us 


OPTIMISM  AND   PESSIMISM  283 

now.  It  may  even  be  all  that  we  could  at  present 
comprehend.  The  child  at  school  and  under  family 
discipline  has  no  experience  of  life's  values  which 
would  enable  him  to  understand  the  reason  of  the 
repressions  and  compulsions  which  shut  him  in  on 
every  side.  Only  mature  life  can  make  it  plain  to 
him.  Meanwhile  he  must  be  dealt  with  in  ways  that 
often  seem  hard  and  unloving  to  him.  We  also  may 
not  have  the  mental  and  moral  development  that  would 
enable  us  to  understand  the  explanation  if  it  were 
given.  Indeed,  considering  our  overestimate  of  the 
goods  of  sense  and  our  immaturity  and  scanty  insight 
in  higher  matters,  this  might  well  be  the  case.  In 
the  cognitive  world  many  practical  convictions  are 
so  important  that  they  are  not  left  to  reasoning,  but 
are  fixed  for  us  in  the  spontaneous  working  of  our 
intelligence.  In  the  moral  world  the  same  fact  ap- 
pears. Apart  from  reasoning,  life  is  optimistic  in  its 
structure  and  tendency.  This  especially  appears  in 
the  ebbing  of  the  pessimistic  tide  which  is  now  so 
marked  in  the  higher  speculative  circles.  Cheerful- 
ness has  returned;  and  professional  pessimism  is 
rapidly  passing  into  the  hands  of  rhetorical  convul- 
sionists,  who  are  no  longer  taken  seriously,  and  who 
do  not  even  take  themselves  seriously, 

God's  great  provision  for  maintaining  that  practi- 
cal optimism  without  which  life  could  not  go  on,  is 
found  in  the  inextinguishable  hopefulness  of  humanity. 
Anything  can  be  borne,  borne  bravely,  borne  with  a 
new  increment  of  life,  so  long  as  hope  remains.  And 
life  as  a  whole  will  always  have  an  optimistic  charac- 
ter, so  long  as  the  future  is  spanned  by  a  bow  of 
promise.     This  is  practical  optimism.     But  this  also 


284  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

is  not  without  its  ebb  and  flow.  Prophets  and  psalmists 
and  many,  many  saints  have  known  what  it  is  to  be 
assaulted  by  pessimistic  misgivings  concerning  the 
moral  goodness  of  God  and  the  worth  of  life.  The 
writer  of  the  book  of  Job  was  no  easy  optimist,  and 
the  author  of  the  Seventy-third  Psalm  was  disturbed 
at  the  prosperity  of  the  wicked.  And  what  happened 
then  happens  still.  Even  practical  optimism  is  still 
militant,  and  has  its  struggle  for  existence.  But  the 
faith  that  grows  from  more  to  more  in  the  individual 
soul,  and  that  strengthens  itself  from  generation  to 
generation  in  the  community,  is  that  we  are  in  our 
Father's  hands,  and  that,  having  brought  us  thus  far 
on  our  Godward  way,  he  may  well  be  trusted  to  finish 
the  work  he  has  begun.  As  long  as  this  faith  remains, 
men  will  go  on  singing  hymns,  praying  prayers,  and 
chanting  Te  Deums  in  the  face  of  the  grim  and  dis- 
quieting aspects  of  experience  ;  but  if  this  faith  should 
ever  permanently  perish,  there  would  be  an  end  of  all 
optimism  beyond  the  sluggish  content  of  thoughtless- 
ness. Earth  can  be  endured  and  justified  if  it  have 
relations  to  heaven.  If  there  be  a  promised  land,  and 
if  man  live  forever,  then  it  is  right  that  he  should 
wander  in  the  wilderness  until  he  has  fitted  himself 
to  enter  the  promised  land.  But  considered  as  a  final- 
ity the  visible  life  cannot  be  justified. 

Thus  we  see  that  while  optimism  must  begin  in  and 
with  experience,  it  cannot  complete  itself  without  ris- 
ing to  a  general  world-view,  and  thus  becoming  theo- 
retical and  inferential.  This  aspect  of  the  case  will 
be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter.  This  does  not  mean, 
however,  that  theory  will  ever  prove  the  goodness  of 
the  world,  but  only  that  without  certain  general  views 


OPTIMISM   AND   PESSIMISM  285 

of  things  our  native  optimism  must  fall  into  contra- 
diction with  itself. 

So  much  for  the  human  world.  In  the  animal  world 
the  problem  is  simply  one  of  pain.  Here  the  pains  of 
personality  would  seem  to  be  entirely  lacking.  These 
spring  from  the  power  of  looking  before  and  after,  from 
the  backward  look  of  memory  and  the  forecasting  of 
the  future,  from  our  affections  and  conscience  and  the 
implications  of  our  moral  nature.  If  these  were  away, 
our  physical  pains  would  be  small,  after  deducting 
those  which  we  bring  on  ourselves.  Where  these  are 
away,  as  in  the  case  of  the  lower  animals,  the  prob- 
lem is  not  so  dark  as  zoological  anthropomorphism 
would  have  us  believe.  The  extent  and  nature  of 
animal  pain  are  unknown.  A  multitude  of  facts 
indicate  that  even  the  more  highly  organized  animals 
are  far  less  sensitive  to  pain  than  men  are,  while  of 
the  sensibility  of  the  simple  organic  forms  we  have 
no  knowledge  whatever.  It  is  plain,  then,  that  this 
problem  is  entirely  beyond  us.  Inhuman  treatment 
of  the  animals  is  unpermissible,  for  our  own  sake  as 
well  as  theirs.  We  may  not  interfere  with  them  be- 
yond the  point  where  our  safety  and  convenience 
require  it.  But  no  practical  interest  demands  a  theo- 
retical explanation  of  the  forms  and  laws  of  animal 
life  as  a  whole.  In  our  utter  ignorance  of  its  inner 
significance,  we  should  first  lose  ourselves  in  zoologi- 
cal anthropomorphism,  and  probably  end  by  express- 
ing wonder  at  the  bad  taste  revealed  in  many  phases 
of  the  animal  creation. 

The  net  result  of  human  experience  is  faith  in  the 
moral  goodness  of  God.  The  problem  is  not  abstract 
and  academic,  but  concrete  and  historical.     This  faith, 


286  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

with  all  that  it  implies,  will  remain  until  human  na- 
ture changes,  or  experience  enters  into  a  contradictory 
phase.  The  facts,  logically  and  abstractly  considered, 
neither  compel  nor  forbid  this  faith.  They  permit  it, 
and  to  some  extent  illustrate  it ;  and  the  mind  with 
that  faith  in  the  perfect  which  underlies  all  its  opera- 
tions refuses  to  stop  short  of  the  highest. 

Speculative  theology  has  produced  elaborate  schemes 
of  the  ethical  attributes  as  well  as  of  the  metaphysical. 
Love,  mercy,  justice,  righteousness,  and  holiness  have 
been  set  up  as  separate  attributes ;  and  a  good  deal  of 
ingenuity  has  been  shown  in  adjusting  their  relations. 
Into  these  questions  we  have  no  need  to  enter.  The 
ethical  nature  of  God  is  sufficiently  determined  for 
all  religious,  and,  we  may  add,  for  all  speculative 
purposes,  as  being  holy  love.  These  factors  belong 
together.  Love  without  holiness  would  be  simply 
well-wishing  without  any  ethical  content;  and  holi- 
ness without  love  would  be  a  lifeless  negation. 

Love  needs  no  definition ;  but  the  notion  of  holi- 
ness is  not  so  clear.  Negatively,  holiness  implies  the 
absence  of  all  tendencies  to  evil  and  of  all  delight  in 
evil.  Positively,  it  involves  the  delight  in  and  devo- 
tion to  goodness.  The  knowledge  of  evil  must  exist 
in  the  divine  thought,  but  perfect  holiness  implies  that 
it  finds  no  echo  in  the  divine  sensibility  and  no  real- 
ization in  the  divine  will.  It  further  implies,  posi- 
tively, that  in  God  the  ideal  of  moral  perfection  is 
realized ;  and  this  ideal  involves  love  as  one  of  its 
chief  factors. 

In  determining  this  ideal  we  can  only  fall  back  upon 
the  immediate  testimony  of  the  moral  nature.     No 


ETHICS   AND   THE   ABSOLUTE  287 

legislation  can  make  anything  an  abiding  part  of  this 
ideal  unless  it  be  commanded  by  conscience ;  and 
nothing  can  be  allowed  to  enter  into  it  which  is  for- 
bidden by  conscience.  It  is  this  voice  of  conscience 
which  distinguishes  the  non-moral  good  and  evil  of 
simple  sensibility  from  the  moral  good  and  evil  of  the 
ethical  life. 

In  maintaining  the  absoluteness  of  God  as  a  moral 
bemg  a  curious  difficulty  arises  from  the  nature  of  the 
moral  life  itself.  This  life  implies  community  and 
has  no  meaning  for  the  absolutely  single  and  only. 
Love  without  an  object  is  nothing.  Justice  has  no 
meaning  except  between  persons.  Benevolence  is 
impossible  without  plurality  and  community.  Hence, 
if  we  conceive  God  as  single  and  alone,  we  must  say 
that,  as  such,  he  is  only  potentially  a  moral  being. 
To  pass  from  potential  to  actual  moral  existence  the 
Infinite  must  have  an  object,  and  to  pass  to  adequate 
moral  existence  the  Infinite  must  have  an  adequate 
object. 

Several  ways  out  of  this  difficulty  offer  themselves. 
First,  we  may  affirm  that  the  absolute  and  essential 
God  is  metaphysical  only  and  not  moral.  His  mo- 
rality is  but  an  incident  of  his  cosmic  activity,  and 
not  something  pertaining  to  his  own  essential  exis- 
tence. God's  metaphysical  existence  is  absolute,  but 
his  moral  life  is  relative  to  creation  and  has  no  mean- 
ing or  possibility  apart  from  it. 

The  immediate  implication  of  this  view  is  another, 
as  follows  :  God  is  not  absolute  and  self-sufficient  in 
his  ethical  life,  but  needs  the  presence  of  the  finite 
in  order  to  realize  his  own  ethical  potentialities  and 
attain   to   a   truly  moral  existence.     But  this   view 


288  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

either  makes  God  dependent  on  the  world  for  his 
own  complete  self-realization,  or  it  makes  the  cosmic 
activity  the  necessary  means  by  which  God  comes 
into  full  self-possession.  In  either  form  the  moral 
is  made  subordinate  to  the  metaphysical,  the  proper 
absoluteness  of  God  is  denied,  and  a  strong  tendency 
to  pantheism  appears.  When  the  view  is  made  to 
afhrm,  as  often  happens,  that  God  apart  from  the 
world  is  as  impossible  as  the  world  apart  from  God, 
we  have  pronounced  pantheism. 

The  third  view  aims  to  escape  these  difficulties  by 
providing  for  community  of  personal  life  in  the  divine 
unity  itself.  In  this  way  the  conditions  of  ethical 
life  are  found  within  the  divine  nature ;  and  the 
ethical  absoluteness  of  God  is  assured.  But  how  this 
community  in  unity  is  possible  is  one  of  the  deepest 
mysteries  of  speculation.  The  only  suggestion  of  solu- 
tion seems  to  lie  in  the  notion  of  necessary  creation. 
Such  creation  would  be  unbegun  and  endless,  and 
would  depend  on  the  divine  nature  and  not  on  the 
divine  will.  If  now  we  suppose  the  divine  nature  to 
be  such  that  the  essential  God  must  always  and 
eternally  produce  other  beings  than  himself,  those 
other  beings,  though  numerically  distinct  from  him- 
self, would  be  essential  implications  of  himself.  There 
would  be  at  once  a  numerical  plurality  and  an  organic 
unity.  Hence  pantheism,  while  viewing  God  and  the 
world  as  numerically  distinct,  has  always  maintained 
that  they  are  organically  and  essentially  one.  Such 
a  conception  can  in  no  way  be  discredited  by  a  verbal 
shuffling  of  formal  ideas  such  as  one  and  many,  unity 
and  plurality.  Formally  these  ideas  are  opposed  ;  but 
reality  has  ways  of  uniting  our  formal  oppositions  in 


ETHICS  AND   THE  ABSOLUTE  289 

indivisible  syntheses  which  our  formal  thought  can- 
not construe. 

But  we  have  already  seen  that  we  cannot  carry  the 
actual  world  of  finite  things  into  God  without  specu- 
lative disaster  and  shipwreck.  It  only  remains  to 
abandon  the  notion  of  a  necessary  creation  whereby 
God  forever  posits  community  for  himself,  or  else  to 
find  its  objects  apart  from  the  finite  system  as  per- 
sons coeternal  with  God  himself.  If  it  be  said  that 
this  is  polytheism,  the  answer  would  be  that  poly- 
theism implies  a  plurahty  of  mutually  independent 
beings.  If  it  be  said  that  these  dependent  personal- 
ities are  created,  the  answer  would  be  that  their  ex- 
istence does  not  depend  on  the  divine  will,  but  on  the 
divine  nature.  They  therefore  coexist  with  God; 
nor  could  God  exist  without  them.  If,  then,  in  pan- 
theism we  say  that  the  world  is  God,  what  can  we 
say  of  these  but  that  they  are  God,  at  once  numeri- 
cally distinct  and  organically  one  ?  If  creation  seems 
to  be  an  expression  implying  will,  we  may  exchange 
it  for  the  profoundly  subtle  terms  of  early  theological 
speculation,  and  speak  of  an  eternal  generation  and 
procession.  These  terms  throw  no  light  upon  the 
matter,  and  only  serve  to  mark  off  the  eternal  impli- 
cations of  the  divine  nature  from  the  free  determina- 
tions of  the  divine  will. 

We  allow  the  last  paragraph  to  stand  as  helping 
forward  the  thought,  but  it  is  plain  that  we  have  not 
yet  reached  its  best  expression.  Both  our  conception 
of  the  absolute  will  and  our  rejection  of  ontological 
necessities  forbid  so  sharp  a  separation  of  the  divine 
will  from  the  divine  nature  as  our  language  has 
implied.     The  thought  can  be  made  consistent  only 


290  THE   WORLD-GROUND   AS   ETHICAL 

by  distinguishing  a  double  willing  in  God,  that  by 
which  God  is  God,  and  that  by  which  the  system  of 
the  world  exists.  The  former  is  the  absolute  will, 
conditioned  by  the  divine,  nature  and  coeternal  with 
God.  It  is  logically  necessary  if  God  is  to  be  God. 
At  the  close  of  Chapter  IV  we  pointed  out  that  the 
absolute  will  must  ever  be  present  to  give  validity 
and  reality  to  the  otherwise  powerless  necessities  of 
the  divine  being,  so  that  the  divine  existence  as  any- 
thing realized  forever  roots  in  the  divine  will.  The 
will  does  not  make  or  alter  the  logic  of  the  divine 
nature,  but  it  realizes  it.  If  now  that  logic  implies 
that  God  in  order  to  be  the  ethically  absolute  God 
must  have  his  adequate  Other  and  Companion,  then 
the  will  by  which  God  is  God  implies  tlie  eternal 
generation  of  that  Other.  This  will  would  be  quite 
distinct  from  the  will  by  which  the  world  exists. 
The  latter  would  be  no  necessity  for  God's  self- 
realization. 

The  consideration  of  the  ethical  absoluteness  of 
God  has  led  us  into  speculations  which  suggest  the 
Christian  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  and  which  may 
explain  why  so  many  thinkers  have  insisted  on  hold- 
ing that  doctrine  in  spite  of  the  formal  opposition  of 
the  ideas  of  unity  and  trinity.  But  into  this  question 
we  have  no  call  to  enter.  In  any  case  speculation 
can  only  call  attention  to  difficulties  and  suggest  pos- 
sibilities without  being  able  to  say  anything  positive. 


CHAPTER   VII 

THEISM  AND   LIFE 

The  considerations  thus  far  dwelt  upon  are  chiefly 
such  as  address  themselves  to  man  as  a  contemplative 
being.  But  man  is  not  merely  nor  mainly  contempla- 
tion ;  he  is  also  will  and  action.  He  must,  then,  have 
something  to  work  for,  aims  to  realize,  and  ideas  by 
which  to  live.  In  real  life  the  center  of  gravity  of 
theistic  faith  lies  in  its  relation  to  these  aims  and 
ideals.  God  is  seen  to  be  that  without  which  our 
ideals  collapse  or  are  made  unattainable,  and  the 
springs  of  action  are  broken.  Hence  the  existence 
of  God  is  affirmed  not  on  speculative  or  theoretical 
grounds,  but  because  of  the  needs  of  practical  life. 
This  has  often  been  called  the  moral  argument  for 
the  divine  existence ;  a  better  name  would  be  the 
practical  argument. 

That  this  argument  has  no  demonstrative  value  is 
evident.  It  is  essentially  a  conclusion  from  what  we 
think  ought  to  be  to  what  is,  or  from  our  subjective 
interests  to  objective  fact ;  and  such  a  conclusion  is 
forever  invalid  in  logic.  It  becomes  valid  only  on  the 
assumption,  expressed  or  implicit,  that  what  our  nature 
calls  for,  reality  must,  in  one  form  or  another,  supply. 
Hence  Kant,  who  was  one  of  the  leading  expounders 
of  this  conception,  expressly  denied  its  speculative 
cogency.     On  the  contrary,  he  claimed  to  have  shown 

291 


292  THEISM   AND  LIFE 

that,  by  way  of  speculation,  neither  proof  nor  disproof 
is  possible ;  and  in  this  balance  of  the  speculative  rea- 
son practical  interests  may  be  allowed  to  turn  the 
scale.  All  that  can  be  done,  then,  is  to  show  that 
theism  is  a  demand  of  our  moral  nature,  a  necessity 
of  practical  life.  Whether  to  accept  this  subjective 
necessity  as  the  warrant  for  the  objective  fact  every 
one  must  decide  for  himself.  That  our  entire  mental 
life  rests  upon  such  an  acceptance  we  have  already 
abundantly  seen. 

The  moral  argument  has  often  been  mismanaged. 
Sometimes  it  is  put  forward  as  proof,  and  then  it  falls 
an  easy  prey  to  the  hostile  critic.  For  the  argument 
is  proof  only  in  the  sense  of  showing  that  our  human 
interests  can  be  conserved,  and  our  highest  life  main- 
tained, only  on  a  theistic  basis.  Such  argument  is 
practically  important  as  showing  the  practical  bear- 
ings of  the  question,  but  it  is  not  proof.  Again,  the 
discussion  has  often  taken  on  a  hedonistic  turn  and 
run  off  into  gross  selfishness,  by  the  side  of  which 
even  atheism  itself  might  seem  morally  superior.  We 
need,  then,  to  consider  the  relation  of  theism  and 
atheism  to  the  practical  life.  Of  course  the  inquiry 
concerns  solely  the  implications  of  the  theories  and 
not  the  characters  of  the  theorists.  Neither  theists 
nor  atheists,  but  theism  and  atheism,  are  the  subjects 
of  discussion.     We  begin  with  atheism. 

In  the  Introduction  we  pointed  out  that  a  large  part 
of  atheistic  discussion  has  been  devoted  to  picking 
flaws  in  theistic  argument,  rather  than  to  showing  any 
positive  adequacy  of  atheism  itself  to  solve  the  prob- 
lems of  the  world  and  life.  In  treating  of  epistemology 
we  further  pointed  out  that  atheism  has  picked  up  its 


ATHEISM  AND  MORAL  THEORY       293 

theory  of  knowledge  ready-made  on  the  plane  of  com- 
mon sense,  with  no  suspicion  of  the  complexity  of  the 
problem  and  especially  without  developing  a  doctrine 
of  knowledge  out  of  its  own  resources.  The  same 
naive  procedure  reappears  here.  Atheism  has  gener- 
ally borrowed  from  the  common  stock  of  moral  and 
practical  principles  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  has  given 
comparatively  little  attention  to  developing  such  prin- 
ciples for  itself.  But  a  theory  must  build  on  its  own 
foundations.  Atheism  is  quite  successful  in  making 
grimaces  at  theism ;  but  it  Ihnps  terribly  m  its  own 
account  of  things.  It  talks  fluently  about  science,  but 
when  it  is  compelled  to  frame  a  theory  of  knowledge, 
the  result  is  not  science,  but  hopeless  ignorance.  Simi- 
lar failure  meets  it  when  it  is  required  to  formulate 
a  theory  of  life  and  morals.  Its  strength  lies  in  its 
criticism  of  faith  rather  than  in  any  positive  recom- 
mendation of  its  own  unfaith.     This  we  now  show. 

A  peremptory  rejection  of  atheism  as  destructive  of 
all  moral  theory  might  not  be  unwarranted,  but  it 
would  fail  to  show  the  real  points  of  difficulty.  To 
do  this  we  need  to  analyze  the  problem  and  consider 
it  somewhat  in  detail. 

Any  working  system  of  ethics  involves  several  dis- 
tinct factors  —  a  set  of  formal  moral  judgments  re- 
specting right  and  wrong,  a  set  of  aims  or  ideals  to  be 
reahzed,  and  a  set  of  commands  to  be  obeyed.  In 
the  first  class  we  have  only  the  moral  form  of  con- 
duct ;  in  the  second  class  we  have  the  material  con- 
tents of  conduct ;  and  in  the  third  class  the  contents  of 
the  two  first  are  prescribed  as  duties.  The  perennial 
shortcoming  of  traditional  ethics  has  been  the  failure 
to  see  the  equal  necessity  of  all  of  these  factors.    The 

THEISM 20 


294  THEISM   AND   LIFE 

result  has  been  many  one-sided  systems  with  resulting 
war  and  confusion. 

What,  now,  is  the  bearing  of  atheism  upon  these 
several  factors  —  the  system  of  judgments,  the  sys- 
tem of  ideals,  and  the  system  of  duties?  We  con- 
sider the  last  first. 


Atheism  and  Duties 

In  discussing  this  question  we  must  consider  the 
automatism  involved  in  atheism.  This  implication, 
though  not  perhaps  strictly  necessary,  can  be  escaped 
only  by  admissions  fatal  to  all  thinking,  and  hence 
atheism  and  automatism  have  generally  been  united. 
When  we  begin,  then,  to  construct  a  system  of  duties, 
we  are  met  at  once  by  the  question  how  an  automaton 
can  have  duties.  To  this  question  there  is  no  answer. 
The  traditional  evasion  consists  in  saying  that  moral 
judgments,  hke  aesthetic  judgments,  are  independent 
of  the  question  of  freedom.  In  determining  what  is 
beautiful  or  ugly  we  take  no  account  of  freedom  or 
necessity,  and  the  same  is  true  in  determining  what 
is  right  or  wrong.  If  ethics  were  only  a  set  of  moral 
judgments,  this  claim  would  not  be  without  some 
foundation.  But  ethics  is  also  a  set  of  precepts  to  be 
obeyed,  and  obedience  is  reckoned  as  merit,  and  dis- 
obedience as  demerit ;  and  for  these  notions  the  con- 
ception of  freedom  is  absolutely  necessary. 

The  same  evasion  sometimes  takes  on  another  form, 
as  follows :  We  judge  persons  for  what  they  are,  no 
matter  how  they  became  so.  A  thing  which  is  ugly 
by  necessity  is  still  ugly,  and  a  person  who  is  wicked 
by  necessity  is  still  wicked.     It  is,  then,  a  mistake  to 


ATHEISM  AND   THE   MORAL  JUDGMENT  295 

claim  that  our  judgment  of  persons  is  in  any  way 
conditioned  by  belief  in  their  freedom. 

To  this  the  answer  is  that  our  judgments  of  per- 
sons are  from  a  double  standpoint,  that  of  perfection 
and  that  of  ability.  On  the  former  depend  judgments 
of  imperfection,  on  the  latter  depend  judgments  of 
guilt  or  innocence,  merit  or  demerit.  But  however 
imperfect  one  may  be,  he  cannot  be  responsible  for 
anything  that  transcends  his  ability.  So,  then,  in 
any  atheistic  system  the  question  must  still  remain, 
How  can  automata  have  duties  ? 

This  question  is  so  important  for  the  rationalizing 
of  atheistic  ethics,  that  it  is  much  to  be  wished  that 
the  universal  necessity,  or  some  of  its  subordinate 
phases,  might  be  brought  to  consider  it.  If  this  ques- 
tion were  once  answered,  it  would  next  be  in  order  to 
inquire  how  an  automaton  could  perform  its  duties  if 
necessity  set  in  another  direction,  or  how  it  could  help 
performing  them  if  necessity  set  that  way.  Another 
interesting  and  important  question  would  concern 
the  ground  of  the  moral  difference  between  the  sev- 
eral automata.  These  questions,  however,  are  not 
likely  to  receive  a  speedy  answer,  owing,  of  course,  to 
the  intractability  and  illogicality  of  the  cosmic  neces- 
sity in  general ;  and  we  shall  do  better  to  go  on  to  con- 
sider the  bearing  of  atheism  upon  ethics  as  a  system 
of  moral  judgments. 

Atheism  and  the  Moral  Judgment 

Our  formal  judgments  of  right  and  wrong  have  no 
direct  dependence  upon  theistic  faith.  It  is  at  this 
point  that  the  moral  argument  has  been  most  mis- 
managed.    How  can  the  obligation  of  justice,  truth. 


296  THEISM   AND   LIFE 

benevolence,  gratitude,  be  made  to  depend  even  on 
the  existence  of  God  ?  And  with  what  face  can  we 
pretend  that  atheism  would  make  these  virtues  less 
binding  than  they  are?  These  are  absolute  moral 
intuitions.  If  no  one  regarded  them,  they  would  still 
be  valid.  Certainly,  if  they  depend  at  all  on  theism, 
it  must  be  indirectly.  In  this  respect  our  moral 
judgments  are  like  our  judgments  of  true  and  false. 
The  rejection  of  theism  would  not  make  the  unjust 
just  any  more  than  it  would  make  the  false  true. 

This  seems  conclusive.  The  sturdiest  theist  would 
hardly  be  willing  to  admit  that  he  should  feel  free  to 
violate  all  the  obligations  of  truth  and  honor,  if  by 
some  stress  of  logic  he  found  himself  unable  longer  to 
maintain  his  theistic  faith.  But  while  this  seems  an 
end  of  all  discussion,  further  reflection  shows  that  in 
the  case  of  both  rational  and  moral  judgments  our 
nature  falls  into  discord  with  itself,  or  is  unable  to 
defend  itself  against  skepticism,  until  our  thought 
reaches  the  conception  of  God  as  supreme  reason  and 
holy  will.  Then  reason  and  conscience,  from  being 
psychological  facts  in  us,  become  universal  cosmic 
laws,  and  their  supremacy  is  assured.  But  so  long 
as  they  are  limited  to  human  and  terrestrial  mani- 
festation they  are  perpetually  open  to  the  skeptical 
surmise  that  after  all  they  may  only  be  our  way  of 
thinking,  and  hence  matters  of  opinion.  That  this 
conclusion  has  been  persistently  drawn  from  atheistic 
premises,  and  often  by  atheists  themselves,  is  a  matter 
of  history.  This  is  fiu-ther  strengthened  by  the  fact 
that  right  and  wrong,  if  distinct,  can  have  no  appli- 
cation to  actual  life  because  of  the  universal  automa- 
tism.    On  this  account  theorists  of  this  school  have 


ATHEISM  AND  THE  MORAL  JUDGMENT    297 

generally  tended  to  reduce  the  distinction  to  one  of 
utility  and  inutility.  This  distinction  plainly  exists ; 
and  by  and  by  we  remember  that  right  and  wrong 
are  other  names  for  the  same  thing.  Forthwith  we 
use  them,  and  thus  give  variety  to  our  terminology 
and  save  moral  distinctions  at  the  same  time. 

It  must,  then,  be  a  matter  of  sincere  gratification 
to  find  atheists  who  are  zealous  for  the  absoluteness 
of  moral  obligation,  but  their  name  is  not  legion  and 
their  protestations  show  a  good  disposition  rather  than 
logical  insight.  They  should  consider  the  skepticism 
involved  in  any  system  of  necessity,  and  remember 
that  in  such  a  scheme  one  view  is  as  good  as  another, 
as  long  as  it  lasts,  and  that  theism  is  a  product  of 
the  same  necessity  that  produces  atheism.  They 
should  further  consider  the  historical  fact  that  atheis- 
tic premises  have  so  often  been  offered  in  justification 
of  ethical  skepticism,  and  also  the  widespread  tendency 
in  pessimistic  quarters  to  ethical  agnosticism  if  not 
indifference.  If  logical  reasoning  be  possible  and 
obligatory,  these  facts  should  be  studied,  and  some 
way  of  avoiding  these  results  should  be  pointed  out. 
Atheism  must  justify  itself  from  its  own  premises 
and  on  its  own  principles,  if  it  is  to  be  a  rational 
theory  of  life.  Rebukes  of  selfishness  sound  humor- 
ous coming  from  a  theory  whose  ethics  is  commonly 
based  on  selfishness.  And  denunciations  of  any  belief 
or  deed  whatever  seem  strange  when  coming  from  a 
theory  that  views  all  belief  and  conduct  as  necessary. 
When  we  are  told  that  all  our  beliefs  are  produced 
by  the  unknown  cause,  we  cannot  escape  a  feehng  of 
confusion  at  hearing  that  theistic  beliefs  are  false, 
although  the  unknown  cause  has  produced  them  so 


298  THEISM   AND   LIFE 

freely.  Atheism,  then,  is  under  special  obligation, 
supposing  logical  reasoning  possible,  to  set  its  own 
house  in  the  true  order  of  logic  in  this  matter. 
Theism  has  its  puzzles,  no  doubt ;  but  before  abandon- 
ing it  we  must  make  sure  that  atheism  is  no  worse. 
Unfortunately,  as  we  have  said,  atheism  has  been 
so  busy  in  berating  theism  that  it  has  largely  for- 
gotten this  manifest  duty  of  developing  its  own 
solution  of  the  perennial  problems  of  thought  and 
hfe. 

A  consistent  atheism,  then,  cannot  defend  itself 
against  ethical  skepticism  any  more  than  against  spec- 
ulative skepticism  in  general.  But  there  is  no  need 
to  insist  upon  this  point ;  for  if  these  formal  princi- 
ples were  set  on  high  above  all  doubt,  we  should  still 
not  have  all  the  conditions  of  a  complete  moral  sys- 
tem. Such  a  system  involves,  not  only  these  formal 
principles,  but  also  a  set  of  extra-ethical  conceptions 
which  condition  their  application.  Of  these  the  most 
important  are  our  general  world-view,  our  conception 
of  life,  its  meaning  and  destiny,  our  conception  of  per- 
sonality also,  and  its  essential  sacredness.  These  ele- 
ments, however,  express  no  immediate  intuition  of 
conscience,  but  are  taken  from  our  general  theory  of 
things.  Yet  any  variation  in  these  elements  must 
lead  to  corresponding  variations  in  practice,  even  while 
the  formal  principles  remain  the  same. 

Illustrations  abound.  The  law  of  benevolence  may 
be  absolute  as  a  disposition,  but  its  practical  applica- 
tion is  limited  by  a  prudent  self-regard  on  the  one 
hand,  and  by  our  conception  of  the  nature  and  signifi- 
cance of  the  object  on  the  other.  This  appears  in  our 
treatment  of  the  cattle.     We  owe  them  good  will  in 


ATHEISM   AND   THJ:   MORAL   JUDGMENT  299 

general ;  but  it  is  conditioned  by  our  conception  of  the 
meaning  and  value  of  animal  life.  Hence  we  feel  free 
to  subordinate  the  animals  to  our  own  safety  or  health 
or  convenience.  Only  a  high  conception  of  humanity 
gives  sacredness  to  human  rights  and  incites  to  stren- 
uous effort  in  its  behalf.  The  golden  rule,  also,  must 
be  conditioned  by  some  conception  of  the  true  order 
and  dignity  of  life ;  otherwise  it  might  be  perfectly 
obeyed  in  a  world  of  sots  and  gluttons.  With  Plato's 
conception  of  the  relation  of  the  individual  to  society, 
Plato's  doctrine  of  infanticide  seems  correct  enough. 
With  Aristotle's  theory  of  man  and  his  destiny,  Aris- 
totle's theory  of  slavery  is  altogether  defensible.  From 
the  standpoint  of  the  ancient  ethnic  conceptions,  the 
accompanying  ethnic  morality  was  entirely  allowable. 
Apart  from  some  conception  of  the  sacredness  of  per- 
sonality, it  is  far  from  sure  that  the  redemption  of 
society  could  not  be  more  readily  reached  by  killing 
off  the  idle  and  mischievous  classes  than  by  philan- 
thropic effort  for  their  improvement.  And  we  often 
hear  it  shrewdly  surmised  that  Christian  philanthropy 
is  all  astray  in  its  care  for  the  weak,  the  diseased,  and 
the  helpless ;  and  that  it  would  be  not  only  cheaper,  a 
consideration  by  no  means  to  be  despised,  but  in  the 
end  better  and  more  humane,  to  let  the  survival  of  the 
fittest  have  its  beneficent  way.  Indeed,  the  surmise 
sometimes  passes  into  affirmation.  Christianity  has 
been  denounced  as  more  injurious  than  any  crime  in 
its  practical  sympathy  for  the  weak  and  defective.  Its 
"  slave  morality  "  is  declared  to  be  a  gigantic  conspir- 
acy on  the  part  of  the  ignoble  and  feeble  classes  to 
save  themselves  from  being  eliminated  from  the  social 
fabric.     And  from  the  standpoint  of  abstract  moral 


300  THEISM   AND   LIFE 

principles,  or  abstract  enthusiasm  for  humanity,  it 
might  be  hard  to  show  that  the  procedure  suggested 
would  not  be  justified  in  the  case  of  both  the  criminal 
and  the  useless  members  of  society.  The  objection 
does  not  lie  in  the  abstract  moral  nature,  but  rather 
in  the  philosophy  of  man  which  we  have  learned  from 
Christianity.  And  Christianity  itself  wrought  its  great 
moral  revolution,  not  by  introducing  new  moral  prin- 
ciples, but  by  revealing  new  conceptions  of  God  and 
man  and  their  mutual  relations.  By  making  all  men 
the  children  of  a  common  Father,  it  did  away  with  the 
earlier  ethnic  conceptions  and  the  barbarous  morality 
based  upon  them.  By  making  every  man  the  heir  of 
eternal  life,  it  gave  to  him  a  sacredness  which  he  could 
never  lose  and  which  might  never  be  ignored.  By 
making  the  moral  law  the  expression  of  a  Holy  Will, 
it  brought  that  law  out  of  its  impersonal  abstraction 
and  assured  its  ultimate  triumph.  Moral  principles 
may  be  what  they  were  before,  but  moral  practice  is 
forever  different.  Even  the  earth  itself  has  another 
look  when  it  has  a  heaven  above  it. 

These  illustrations  show  that  the  actual  guidance 
of  life  involves,  not  only  a  knowledge  of  formal  moral 
principles,  but  also  a  series  of  extra-moral  conceptions 
which  condition  their  application.  They  also  show 
how  impossible  it  is  to  construct  a  code  of  conduct 
which  shall  be  independent  of  our  general  theory  of 
things.  "We  may  be  perfectly  sure  that  any  great 
modification  of  oiu-  conceptions  concerning  the  mean- 
ing and  outcome  of  human  life  would,  sooner  or  later, 
reveal  itself  in  corresponding  changes  in  the  ethical 
code.  If  we  could  really  persuade  ourselves  that  men 
are  only  functions  of  the  viscera  and  will  vanish  with 


ATHEISM   AND   THE   MORAL  JUDGMENT  301 

the  viscera,  there  would   be   a   tendency   to   adjust 
ethics  to  the  visceral  standpoint. 

The  actual  working  code,  then,  as  a  rational  matter, 
depends  not  only  on  moral  intuitions,  but  also  on  our 
general  theory  of  things.  Oversight  of  this  fact  has 
been  the  perennial  weakness  of  the  intuitional  ethics. 
It  has  dreaded  to  take  the  aim  and  outcome  of  con- 
duct into  account  lest  it  fall  into  utilitarianism.  As 
a  result  it  has  had  to  fall  back  upon  purely  formal 
principles  which,  while  good  and  even  necessary  as  far 
as  they  go,  furnish  no  positive  guidance  for  practical 
life.  We  are  told  to  be  virtuous,  to  be  conscientious, 
to  act  from  right  motives,  and  to  act  so  that  the 
maxims  of  our  conduct  shall  be  fit  to  be  universal 
law.  But  this  only  concerns  the  form  of  conduct  and 
overlooks  the  fact  that  conduct  must  have  aims  beyond 
itself,  and  that  these  aims  must  be  in  harmony  with 
the  nature  of  things.  Besides,  it  is  narrow.  The 
moral  task  of  the  individual  by  no  means  consists 
solely  in  being  conscientious  or  even  virtuous,  but 
rather  and  chiefly  in  an  objective  realization  of  the 
good.  Mere  conscientiousness  is  the  narrowest  pos- 
sible conception  of  virtue,  and  the  lowest  possible  aim. 
A  worthy  moral  aim  can  be  found  only  in  the  thought 
of  a  kingdom  of  righteousness  and  blessedness  realized 
in  a  community  of  moral  persons.  But  no  one  can 
work  with  this  aim  without  implicitly  assuming  a 
higher  power  which  is  the  guarantee  of  the  possi- 
bility of  its  realization.  Without  assuming  the  per- 
manence and  final  triumph  of  the  moral  universe,  the 
continued  existence  of  the  moral  subject,  and  the 
possibility  of  continuous  approximation  to  the  moral 
ideal,  there  is  no  way  of  rationalizing  any  moral  code 


302  THEISM   AND   LIFE 

which  goes  beyond  mere  conscientiousness  and  the 
dictates  of  visible  prudence.  For  niorality  which 
transcends  these  humble  limits  we  must  have  recourse 
to  religion. 

Atheism  had  insuperable  difficulty  in  explaining 
how  automata  can  have  duties  in  any  moral  sense  of 
the  word.  It  has  similar  difficulty  in  developing  and 
defending  a  satisfactory  code  out  of  its  own  principles. 
In  a  world  produced  and  pervaded  by  Christian  con- 
ceptions it  may  get  on  with  borrowed  capital ;  but  it 
is  sorely  cramped  when  confined  to  its  own  resources. 
A  further  difficulty  emerges  when  treating  of  the 
moral  ideal.  For  a  working  system  of  ethics  must 
not  only  present  rules  for  piecemeal  and  routine  con- 
duct, but  must  also  furnish  some  ideal  for  life  as  a 
whole  which  shall  give  unity  and  completeness  to  our 
moral  system.     This  point  we  now  consider. 

Atheism  and  the  Moral  Ideal 

What  is  the  relation  of  atheism  to  the  ideals  of 
conduct,  or  what  ideals  can  atheism  consistently 
furnish  ? 

This  question  is  sufficiently  answered  by  a  moment's 
survey  of  life  from  the  standpoint  of  atheistic  theory. 
To  begin  with,  we  have  a  blind  power,  or  set  of 
powers,  perpetually  energizing  without  purpose  or 
plan,  without  self-knowledge  or  objective  knowledge, 
forever  weaving  and  forever  unweaving  because  of 
some  inscrutable  necessity.  The  outcome  is,  among 
innumerable  other  things,  a  serio-comic  procession  of 
"  cunning  casts  in  clay  "  in  all  forms  from  mollusk  to 
man.  No  one  of  these  forms  means  any  more  than 
any  other,  for  nothing  means  anything  in  this  theory. 


ATHEISM  AND   THE   MORAL   IDEAL  303 

A  procession  of  wax  figures  would  not  be  more  truly 
automatic  than  these  forms  are  in  all  respects.  When 
we  come  to  the  human  forms  we  find  a  curious  set  of 
illusions.  Most  of  them  necessarily  believe  in  a  God, 
whereas  there  is  no  God.  Most  of  them  necessarily 
believe  that  they  are  free,  whereas  they  are  not  free. 
Most  of  them  necessarily  believe  themselves  responsi- 
ble, whereas  no  one  and  nothing  is  responsible.  Most 
of  them  necessarily  believe  in  a  distinction  between 
right  and  wrong,  whereas  there  is  no  distinction. 
Most  of  them  necessarily  believe  in  duty,  whereas 
automata  cannot  have  duties,  or  cannot  perform 
them,  or  cannot  help  performing  them,  according  as 
necessity  determines.  All  of  them,  without  exception, 
necessarily  assume  the  possibility  of  logical  thought 
and  reasoning,  whereas  this  assumption  is  totally 
unfounded.  Further,  the  members  of  this  procession 
are  perpetually  falling  out,  and  that  is  the  end  of 
them  as  individuals.  For  a  time  the  melancholy 
order  is  kept  up  by  the  fundamental  unconsciousness 
through  the  incessant  reproduction  of  new  forms ; 
but  there  are  signs  that  the  process  itself  will  yet 
come  to  an  end,  and  leave  no  sign.  Such  is  the 
history,  meaning,  and  outcome  of  human  life  on 
atheistic  theory.  It  seems  needless  to  add  anything 
about  the  moral  ideals  of  atheism.  If  we  speak  of 
them  at  all,  it  is  only  by  a  fundamental  inconsistency, 
which,  however,  is  not  to  be  reckoned  to  ourselves, 
but  to  the  basal  necessity,  which  is  given  to  doing 
odd  things. 

This  leads  to  another  matter  which  is  implicit  in 
what  we  have  been  saying.  Ethics  is  not  a  matter 
of  the  closet  only,  but  of  life.     It  is  of  little  impor- 


304  THEISM   AND   LIFE 

tance  that  fine  theories  be  spun,  unless  they  be  put 
into  practice.  Ethics,  then,  must  not  only  dream 
about  ideals,  but  must  furnish  the  inspiration  and 
driving  force  which  will  lead  to  their  realization. 
We  consider  atheism  from  this  standpoint  also. 

Atheism  and  Moral  Inspiration 

In  this  matter  of  inspiration  we  touch  the  point  of 
chief  practical  difficulty  with  all  ethical  systems,  reli- 
gious and  non-religious  alike.  Long  ago  the  discov- 
ery was  made  that  it  is  easier  to  tell  men  what  to 
do  than  to  get  them  to  do  it.  When  we  come  to  close 
quarters  with  living  men  and  women,  the  problem 
takes  on  aspects  unknown  to  the  closet.  The  great 
practical  trouble,  apart  from  the  evil  will,  is  not  a 
lack  of  light,  but,  in  the  lower  ranges  of  life,  a  general 
insensibility  and  irresponsiveness  to  moral  ideas,  and, 
in  the  higher  ranges,  a  general  discouragement.  In 
the  lower  ranges  we  come  upon  man  the  animal,  lead- 
ing not  so  much  an  immoral  as  a  submoral  life,  one 
swayed  by  appetite  and  impulse,  and  molded  by  low 
traditions  and  base  environment,  a  life  of  prosaic  and 
sordid  externalism,  and  of  surpassing  mental  and 
moral  squalor.  In  the  upper  ranges  we  find  a  general 
discouragement  arising  from  the  disillusionizing  con- 
tact with  life,  a  doubt  whether  anything  really  worth 
while  is  attainable  under  the  conditions  of  our  exist- 
ence. We  can,  indeed,  live  in  peace  and  mutual  help- 
fulness with  our  neighbors  without  looking  beyond 
visible  existence ;  but  when  we  are  looking  for  some 
supreme  aim  which  shall  give  meaning  and  dignity 
to  life  and  make  it  worth  while  to  live,  forthwith 
we  begin  to  grope.     We  can  see  with  some  clearness 


ATHEISM   AND   MORAL  INSPIRATION  305 

what  ought  to  be,  but  we  are  not  so  sure  that  what 
ought  to  be  is.  Moral  ideals  are  fair,  no  doubt,  but 
it  is  not  so  clear  that  they  are  practicable.  Life  is 
short  and  rather  tedious.  The  great  cosmic  order  is 
not  manifestly  constructed  for  moral  ends.  It  seems 
mostly  indifferent  to  them,  and  at  times  even  opposed. 
It  only  remains  that  we  find  the  law  of  life  within 
the  sphere  of  visible  existence.  And  here,  too,  ideals  do 
not  count  for  much.  Virtue  within  the  limits  of  pru- 
dence is  wise,  but  an  abandon  of  goodness  is  hardly 
worldly  wise.  Upon  the  whole,  visible  life  seems  not 
over  favorable  to  ideals,  unless  it  be  the  modest  one 
of  not  being  righteous  overmuch.  One  could  indeed 
wish  it  were  otherwise,  that  virtue  were  at  home  in 
the  universe,  and  that  our  ideals  were  only  shadows 
of  the  glorious  reality.  But  what  avails  it  to  wish  ? 
It  is  not  so,  and  we  must  make  the  best  of  it. 

And  man  himself  in  the  concrete  is  a  disheartening 
object  of  contemplation.  To  what  a  hopeless  earthly 
lot  the  great  majority  of  men  are  condemned.  The 
coarse  features,  the  shambling  gait,  the  ascendant  ani- 
mal, the  brutalizing  effect  of  physical  drudgery  when 
unbalanced  by  some  mental  life,  are  all  apparent.  The 
inner  life  seems  not  to  go  beyond  a  dull  and  blurred 
mentality  with  some  stimulus  of  passion  and  coarse 
sensation.  And  really  not  much  can  be  done  about 
it.  Dead  generations  hold  men  in  a  fatal  grip.  The 
inertia  to  be  overcome  is  too  great ;  and  life  hurries 
so  swiftly  to  be  gone.  This  is  the  concrete  condition 
which  moral  theorists  have  to  meet  and  provide  for. 
They  must  furnish  some  inspiration  which  will  make 
weight  against  the  depressing  sordidness  of  actual 
existence  and  the  omnipresent  irony  of  death,  which 


306  THEISM   AND   LIFE 

mocks  at  wisdom,  strength,  and  beauty,  and  which  so 
soon  and  so  surely  blights  all  earthly  prospects  and 
blasts  all  earthly  hopes. 

To  meet  the  depressing  and  disheartening  influ- 
ences arising  from  such  considerations,  the  race  in 
its  higher  members  has  long  and  increasingly  had 
recourse  to  the  belief  in  God  and  the  future  life.  The 
world  cannot  be  made  rational  on  any  other  basis. 
This  visible  life  is  the  beginning  and  not  the  end. 
The  true  life  is  not  that  of  the  flesh,  but  that  of  the 
spirit.  The  true  and  abiding  universe  is  the  moral 
universe,  and  not  this  outward  order  of  phenomenal 
change.  Righteousness  is  at  the  heart  of  things. 
Hence  we  may  believe  in  its  final  triumph  and  in 
some  larger  life  we  shall  see  it.  The  Christian  theist 
would  add.  Love  also  is  at  the  heart  of  things.  The 
Creator,  the  great  God,  is  oiu-  unchangeable  and  al- 
mighty Friend,  and  he  is  causing  all  things,  however 
confused  and  untoward  they  may  seem,  to  work  to- 
gether for  our  highest  good.  Nothing,  whether  it  be 
things  present,  or  things  to  come,  or  life  or  death, 
can  pluck  us  out  of  his  hand  or  thwart  his  loving  will. 

Such  a  message,  if  accepted,  would  certainly  relieve 
matters  very  much.  It  would  bring  healing,  comfort, 
inspiration.  But  what  inspiration  has  atheism  to 
offer  ?  To  tell  men  that  they  are  automata  is  surely 
a  poor  preliminary  to  moral  exhortation.  To  assure 
them  that  their  conduct,  whatever  it  may  be,  is  only 
a  product  of  the  viscera,  might  well  puzzle  them  con- 
cerning the  ethics  of  responsibility,  but  could  hardly 
encourage  to  high  endeavor.  To  hint  that  conscience 
itself  is  only  a  psychological  fact  of  obscure  animal 
origin  does  not  tend  to  increase  its  authority.     To 


ATHEISM   AND  MORAL   INSPIRATION  307 

teach  men  that  death  ends  all  for  the  individual,  and 
by  and  by  will  end  all  for  the  race,  is  not  particularly 
inspiring.  The  woes  of  life  grow  no  less,  nor  less  keen, 
when  we.  learn  that  they  spring  from  nothing  and 
lead  to  nothing.  To  believe  that  even  they  work 
together  for  our  good  is  often  a  trial  of  faith ;  but 
they  are  no  more  easily  borne  when  we  learn  that 
they  are  only  the  blind  beating  of  a  storm. 

It  does  not  seem  necessary  to  add  anything  con- 
cerning atheism  as  a  source  of  moral  inspiration. 

The  difficulties  of  atheism  in  constructing  a  system 
of  ethics  may  be  summed  up  as  follows :  — 

First,  ethics  as  a  system  of  duties  is  absurd  in  a 
system  of  automatism.  The  attendant  ideas  of  obli- 
gation and  responsibility,  merit  and  demerit,  guilt 
and  innocence,  are  illusory  in  such  a  theory.  Sec- 
ondly, ethics  as  a  system  of  judgments  concerning 
right  and  wrong  is  in  unstable  equilibrium  in  atheistic 
theory.  For  atheism  has  no  way  of  escaping  the  skep- 
tical implications  of  all  systems  of  necessity.  The 
necessity  of  denying  proper  moral  differences  among 
persons  empties  our  moral  judgments  of  all  applica- 
tion to  practical  life.  Thirdly,  atheism  can  hold  out 
no  good  for  the  individual  or  for  the  race  but  anni- 
hilation. At  each  of  these  points  Christian  theism 
is  adequate.  By  affirming  a  free  Creator  and  free 
creatures  it  gives  moral  government  a  meaning.  By 
making  the  moral  nature  of  man  the  manifestation 
of  an  omnipotent  and  eternal  righteousness  which 
underlies  the  cosmos,  it  sets  our  moral  convictions 
above  all  doubt  and  overthrow.  Finally,  it  provides 
a  conception  of  man  and  his  destiny  that  gives  man 
a  worthy  task  and  an  inalienable    sacredness.     The 


308  THEISM   AND   LIFE 

mere  etiquette  of  conscientiousness  is  transformed  into 
loyal  devotion  to  the  law  and  kingdom  of  God.  We 
may,  then,  commit  ourselves  with  confidence  to  the 
highest  and  best  in  us,  in  the  conviction  that  it  will 
not  lead  us  astray.  We  set  aside  all  the  doubts  and 
scruples  and  hesitations  which  spring  out  of  the  con- 
fusion of  visible  existence,  in  the  faith  that  we  are 
now  the  children  of  God,  and  are  yet  to  be  like  him. 

The  only  elements  in  ethics  that  can  claim  to  be 
absolute  are  purely  formal,  and  furnish  only  a  nega- 
tive guidance  for  life.  All  working  theories  of  ethics 
must  transcend  these  formal  principles,  and  seek  for 
the  supreme  moral  aims  and  ideals  in  some  general 
theory  of  life  and  the  world.  Either  we  must  restrict 
our  ideals  to  those  attainable  in  our  present  life,  or 
we  must  enlarge  the  life  so  as  to  make  the  larger 
ideals  attainable  and  save  them  from  collapse.  The 
first  duty  of  even  a  theory  of  morals  is  to  be  rational ; 
and  it  can  never  be  rational  to  live  for  the  impossible. 
Our  conception  of  the  nature  and  destiny  of  a  being 
must  determine  our  conception  of  the  law  the  being 
ought  to  follow. 

Some  have  affected  to  find  an  unholy  selfishness  in 
this  claim,  and  have  even  dreaded  to  admit  a  future 
life  lest  the  purity  of  their  devotion  should  be  sullied. 
But  this  is  not  to  be  taken  seriously ;  it  is  one  of  the 
humors  of  polemics.  The  humor  especially  appears 
in  the  fact  that  these  good  people,  when  giving  an 
account  of  the  moral  nature,  generally  find  it  markedly 
earthy  and  egoistic.  In  this  respect  the  claim  seems 
to  be  about  on  a  par  with  the  delicate  feeling  of  the 
biblical  critic  who,  with  his  mouth  full  of  l^eef  or 
mutton,  professes   to   be   shocked  at  the  cruelty  to 


ATHEISM   AND  MORAL   INSPIRATION  309 

animals  involved  in  the  temple  sacrifices.  But, 
really,  duty  is  none  the  less  sacred  for  being  rational. 
The  denial  of  God  and  immortality  lends  no  new 
sacred ness  to  life,  no  new  tenderness  to  sorrow,  no 
higher  inspiration  to  duty,  no  special  sanctity  to 
death.  The  brothers  on  earth  can  suffer  no  serious 
damage  from  the  recognition  of  the  Father  in  heaven. 

The  feeling  that  underlies  the  objection,  so  far  as 
it  is  real  and  not  polemic,  rests  upon  an  inability  to 
distinguish  between  a  demand  that  we  be  paid  for 
our  virtue,  and  the  revolt  of  our  nature  against  a 
system  that  treats  good  and  bad  alike,  and  throws 
the  better  half  of  our  nature  back  upon  itself  as 
absurd  and  meaningless.  Neither  God  nor  the  future 
life  is  needed  to  pay  us  for  present  virtue,  but  rather 
as  the  conditions  without  which  our  nature  falls  into 
discord  with  itself  and  passes  on  to  pessimism  and 
despair.  We  need  them,  not  for  our  egoistic  satisfac- 
tion, but  to  save  the  rationality  of  the  system;  and 
we  believe  in  them  on  that  account.  Having  to  ven- 
ture beyond  knowledge  and  make  vast  and  far-reach- 
ing postulates  in  the  interest  of  the  understanding,  we 
do  the  same  thing  and  with  the  same  logical  right  in 
the  interest  of  life  and  conscience.  High  and  con- 
tinued effort  is  impossible  without  correspondingly 
high  and  abiding  hopes.  Moral  theory  which  looks  to 
form  only  and  ignores  ends  reduces  conduct  to  eti- 
quette. It  may  claim,  indeed,  to  be  sublime,  but  it 
misses  sublimity  by  just  one  fatal  step. 

The  generation  just  passed  made  abundant  experi- 
ment in  this  matter.  At  the  beginning  religion  was 
so  entangled  with  outgrown  science  that  conflicts 
between  religion  and  science  were  the  standing  order 

THEISM  —  21 


310  THEISM   AND  LIFE 

of  the  day.  Very  naturally  the  more  adventurous 
spirits  felt  relief  at  getting  clear  of  the  obsolete 
science,  which  they  falsely  supposed  was  a  part  of 
religion ;  and  for  a  time  it  was  generally  believed 
that  no  practical  interest  would  suffer.  We  had 
imloaded  the  superstitions,  it  was  thought ;  and  now 
humanity  would  surely  flourish.  But  this  naive  faith 
received  a  rude  shock  as  the  logic  of  the  situation 
worked  itself  out.  When  the  invisible  interfered 
with  the  rights  of  the  visible,  it  was  a  relief  to  be 
clear  of  it.  But  after  it  was  gone  it  began  to  dawn 
upon  us  that,  after  all,  the  invisible  had  a  place  and 
function  in  human  thought  and  life  which  had  been 
overlooked.  The  visible  alone  did  not  seem  adequate 
to  human  needs,  and  pessimism  began  to  invade. 
As  soon  as  the  attraction  of  novelty  was  gone,  the 
suspicion  arose  that  the  new  faith  was  likely  to 
bankrupt  humanity,  and  that  we  were  in  danger  of 
repeating  Frankenstein's  experience  with  his  home- 
made monster.  We  were  living,  it  was  said,  on  "  the 
perfume  of  an  empty  vase "  ;  and  doubt  was  raised 
whether  any  ideal  elements  of  human  life  could  be  re- 
tained without  again  having  recourse  to  the  vanished 
dreams. 

And  when  the  prophets  and  apostles  of  the  new 
views  were  required  to  show  what  they  could  do  for 
the  healing  and  help  of  humanity,  the  failure  was  more 
than  pathetic.  They  could  not  long  keep  up  their 
disciples'  courage  or  even  their  own.  Their  house 
was  left  unto  them  desolate.  Everything  human,  even 
virtue  and  altruism,  seemed  to  become  contemptible. 
The  roll  of  the  oblivious  ages  drowned  all  other  sounds. 
Moral  paralysis  set  in,  and  the  affections  themselves 


ATHEISM   AND   MORAL   INSPIRATION  311 

began  to  wither  at  thought  of  their  own  brevity  and 
bootlessness.  The  freedom  of  science  had  indeed  been 
won,  but  science,  too,  mattered  nothing  if  men  are  but 
"  cunning  casts  in  clay,"  and  are  cut  loose  from  reli- 
gion !  This  is  that  inferential  pessimism  mentioned 
in  the  last  chapter.  The  current  speculation  made  for 
despair,  and  despair  quickly  followed.  It  was  a  brief 
but  instructive  episode  in  the  history  of  belief,  and 
showed  conclusively  that  our  speculative  theories  are 
not  without  practical  bearing.  A  more  critical  phi- 
losophy, in  conjunction  with  the  reaction  of  life  itself, 
has  overthrown  the  speculative  doctrine  and  discharged 
the  resulting  pessimism. 

One  has  a  sense  of  the  humorous  in  noting  the  em- 
barrassment of  the  advanced  thinkers  of  that  time  in 
making  some  provision  for  the  religious  nature.  In 
the  lack  of  God  we  were  urged  to  worship  the  cos- 
mos ;  and  "  cosmic  emotion  "  w^as  put  forward  as  some- 
thing which  might  well  take  the  place  of  religion  — 
thus  coming  pretty  close  to  reversion  to  nature  wor- 
ship. Humanity,  also,  was  set  up  as  a  supreme  object 
of  worship,  and  endowed  with  many  extraordinary 
functions  and  attributes  —  an  echo  of  ancestor  wor- 
ship. The  Unknowable,  too,  had  its  altar,  and  was 
worshiped  with  much  emotion,  mainly  of  the  "cosmic" 
sort.  Mutual  buffetings  were  freely  exchanged  by  the 
apostles  and  disciples.  The  Unknowable  was  scoffed 
at  as  "  an  ever-present  conundrum  to  be  everlastingly 
given  up,"  or  as  "a  gigantic  soap-bubble,  not  burst, 
but  blown  thinner  and  thinner  till  it  has  become 
absolutely  imperceptible."  But  the  worshipers  of 
''Humanity"  fared  quite  as  badly  at  the  hands  of 
the  disciples  of  the  Unknowable,  who  did  not  fail  to 


312  THEISM   AND   LIFE 

point  out,  with  many  clever  sarcasms,  how  far  short 
of  an  adequate  and  inspiring  object  of  worship  his- 
torical humanity  falls.  As  death  ends  all  for  the  in- 
dividual, much  attention  was  devoted  to  proclaiming 
the  selfishness  of  the  desire  for  a  future  life  ;  but  many 
could  not  see  in  what  it  is  more  selfish  to  desire  to  live 
hereafter  than  it  is  to  desire  to  live  to-morrow.  To 
fill  up  the  gap  left  by  the  vanishing  of  the  immortal 
hope,  a  somewhat  blind  enthusiasm  for  progress  was 
invoked ;  but  many  again  could  find  little  meaning 
or  value  in  a  progress  whose  subjects  are  perpetually 
perishing.  In  his  confession  of  atheism,  "  The  Old 
Faith  and  the  New,"  Strauss  rebuked  Hartmann  for 
his  pessimism,  which  he  regarded  as  absiu-d  and  blas- 
phemous;  and  demanded  for  the  "universum"  the 
same  reverence  which  the  Christian  demands  for  God. 
Unfortunately,  in  another  passage,  Strauss  had  de- 
scribed the  helpless  position  of  man  in  the  face  of  the 
mechanism  of  natm-e,  not  certain  that  at  any  moment 
he  might  not  be  torn  to  pieces  or  ground  to  powder 
by  it.  This  gave  Hartmann  a  chance  to  reply,  "  It  is 
a  rather  strong,  or  rather  naive  claim,  that  we  should 
experience  a  sentiment  of  religious  piety  and  depend- 
ence for  a '  universum '  which  is  only  an  aggregate  of  all 
material  substances,  and  which  threatens  every  instant 
to  crush  us  between  the  wheels  and  teeth  of  its  pitiless 
mechanism."  Thus  the  advanced  religions  worried 
and  devoured  one  another  in  ways  that  combined 
amusement  and  instruction  for  the  bystanders. 

The  attitude  of  atheistic  speculation  toward  religion 
has  undergone  a  great  change  in  recent  years.  On 
that  theory,  this  means  that  the  basal  and  uncon- 
scious necessity  is  reacting  toward  theism  and  super- 


ATHEISM   AND  MORAL   INSPIRATION  313 

stition.  It  would  seem  to  have  a  most  unseemly  and 
unintelligible  hankering  after  religion  with  all  its 
absurdities.  But  at  all  events,  the  sturdy  brutalities 
of  the  eighteenth  century  are  out  of  date  in  intelli- 
gent circles.  The  ancient  claim  that  relig^ion  is  an 
adventitious  accretion  without  any  essential  founda- 
tion in  human  nature  is  obsolete.  The  religious 
nature  is  recognized  as  a  universal  human  fact,  which 
cannot  be  ignored.  The  natural  assumption  in  such 
a  case  would  be  that  the  objective  implications  of  this 
fact  should  be  recognized  as  real,  at  least  until  they 
are  positively  disproved.  Failing  to  do  this,  we  have 
an  instinct  without  an  object,  an  organ  without  a 
function,  a  demand  with  no  supply.  This  is  an  im- 
possible view  on  any  theory  of  knowledge,  and  espe- 
cially so  on  the  evolution  theory.  We  are  instructed 
that  mind  itself  is  an  adjustment  of  inner  relations  to 
outer  relations,  that  uniformities  of  experience  must 
produce  uniformities  of  thought,  and  that  natural 
selection  and  the  survival  of  the  fittest  must  tend  to 
bring  thought  hito  harmony  with  reality,  and  then, 
by  some  strange  freak  of  logic,  we  are  required  to 
believe  that  in  the  religious  thinking  of  men  there  has 
been  little  but  progressive  maladjustment  and  aliena- 
tion, and  the  survival  of  the  unfittest  and  falsest. 

This  is  the  position  of  the  religious  nature  in  mod- 
ern atheistic  systems.  They  cannot  get  along  with- 
out it,  and  they  are  utterly  at  a  loss  to  get  along 
with  it.  How  to  provide  for  religion  without  admit- 
ting its  objective  theistic  foundation,  is  a  problem  of 
exceeding  difficulty.  And  nothing  has  been  done  but 
to  talk  vaguely  of  cosmic  emotion,  altruism,  and  prog- 
ress.    But  emotion  with  no  basis  of  ideas  is  barren 


314  THEISM   AND   LIFE 

business.  Altruism  is  paralyzed  when  life  loses  its 
value ;  and  progress  is  a  doubtful  thing  when  its  sub- 
jects vanish  into  nothingness.  From  a  purely  induc- 
tive standpoint,  the  actual  man  is  a  poor  affair  at 
best,  and  it  is  doubtful  if  he  will  ever  amount  to 
much.  We  know  more  and  appear  better  than  past 
generations,  but  it  is  not  clear  that  character  is  much 
superior.  The  aesthetics  of  life  progress  and  material 
comfort  increases  ;  but  these  things  do  not  necessarily 
involve  a  corresponding  moral  progress.  And  any- 
how the  notion  of  indefinite  progress  for  humanity 
upon  the  earth  is  distinctly  forbidden  by  the  condi- 
tions of  physical  existence.  Both  progress  and  pos- 
terity bid  fair  to  come  to  an  end.  And  then  for  the 
race,  as  now  for  the  individual,  the  whole  meaning- 
less stir  of  existence  will  have  sunk  back  into  silence 
and  left  no  trace  or  sign.  And  this  is  the  end,  this 
the  outcome  of  the  "  high  intuition,"  this  the  result 
of  the  "  grand  progress  which  is  bearing  Humanity 
onward  to  a  higher  intelligence  and  a  nobler  charac- 
ter." In  such  a  view  there  is  no  healing  and  no  in- 
spiration. It  is  in  unstable  equilibrium  and  must 
either  return  toward  theism,  or  pass  on  to  pessimism 
and  despair. 

The  contention  of  this  chapter  was  not  that  God 
exists,  but  rather  that  theistic  faith  is  such  an  impli- 
cation of  our  moral  nature  and  practical  life  that 
atheism  must  tend  to  wreck  both  life  and  conscience. 
That  contention  has  been  established.  That  it  wrecks 
knowledge  and  science,  we  have  seen  in  previous  chap- 
ters. As  soon  as  atheism  is  required  to  develop  a 
theory  of  life  and  thought  and  knowledge  from  its 
own  resources,  further  argument  is  needless. 


CONCLUSION 

In  the  Introduction  it  was  pointed  out  that  thought 
demands  some  things,  forbids  some  things,  and  per- 
mits some  things.  The  first  class  must  be  accepted, 
for  it  consists  of  the  laws  and  categories  of  reason  and 
their  implications.  The  second  class  must  be  rejected, 
as  it  violates  the  nature  of  reason.  The  third  class 
belongs  to  the  great  realm  of  probability  and  practi- 
cal life.  In  this  realm  we  reach  conclusions,  not  by 
logical  demonstration,  but  by  a  weighing  of  probabili- 
ties, or  by  a  consideration  of  practical  needs,  or  by  a 
taking  for  granted  in  the  interest  of  ideal  tendencies. 
Our  fundamental  practical  beliefs  are  not  speculative 
deductions  from  formal  premises,  but  formulations  of 
life  itself ;  and  they  depend  for  their  evidence  mainly 
on  the  energy  of  the  life  they  formulate.  In  this 
realm  belief,  or  assent,  involves  an  element  of  voli- 
tion. Abstract  logic  leaves  us  in  uncertainty;  and 
the  living  self  with  all  its  furniture  of  interest  and 
instinctive  tendency  and  concrete  experience  comes  in 
to  overturn  the  speculative  equilibrium  and  precipitate 
the  conclusion. 

We  have  abundantly  seen  that  theistic  faith  has  its 
root  in  all  of  these  realms,  and  cannot  dispense  with 
any  of  them.  Each  contributes  something  of  value. 
The  speculative  intellect  necessarily  stops  short  of  the 
religious  idea  of  God,  but  it  gives  us  some  fundamental 
elements  of  the  conception.  It  is,  too,  of  the  highest 
service  in  outlining  the  general  form  which  the  theis- 

315 


316  CONCLUSION 

tic  conception  must  take  in  order  to  be  consistent  with 
itself  and  the  laws  of  thought.  Here  speculation  per- 
forms the  invaluable  negative  service  of  warding  oif  a 
multitude  of  misconceptions,  especially  of  a  pantheis- 
tic type,  which  have  been  morally  as  pernicious  in  his- 
tory as  they  are  speculatively  absurd.  But  a  mind 
with  only  cognitive  interests  would  find  no  occasion 
to  consider  more  than  the  metaphysical  attributes  of 
God.  The  demand  to  consider  God  as  having  ethical 
and  aesthetic  attributes  arises  not  from  the  pure  intel- 
lect, but  from  the  moral  and  aesthetic  nature.  Here 
the  understanding  has  only  the  negative  function  of 
maintaining  consistency  and  preventing  collision  with 
the  laws  of  thought.  The  positive  content  of  these 
attributes  cannot  be  learned  from  logic,  and  the  faith 
in  their  objective  reality  must  at  last  rest  on  our  im- 
mediate conviction  that  the  universe  is  no  more  the 
abode  of  the  true  than  it  is  of  the  beautiful  and  the 
good.  Indeed,  the  true  itself,  except  as  truth  of  fact, 
is  a  purely  ideal  element,  and  derives  all  its  signifi- 
cance from  its  connection  with  the  beautiful  and  the 
good.  For  truth  of  fact  has  only  a  utilitarian  value, 
apart  from  the  nature  of  the  fact  that  is  true.  If  the 
universe  were  only  a  set  of  facts,  —  such  as,  Water 
boils  at  100°  C,  —  it  would  have  nothing  in  it  to 
awaken  wonder,  enthusiasm,  and  reverence  ;  and  "  cos- 
mic emotion  "  would  be  quite  as  much  out  of  place  as 
religious  sentiment.  Such  a  universe  would  not  be 
worth  knowing,  and  scientific  interest  beyond  its  prac- 
tical bearing  would  soon  vanish  along  with  religion. 

Logically  considered,  our  entire  system  of  funda- 
mental belief  rests  upon  a  fallacy  of  the  form  known 
as  the  illicit  process ;  in  other  words,  our  conclusions 


CONCLUSION  317 

are  too  large  for  the  premises.  A  set  of  ideals  arise 
in  the  mind  under  the  stimulus  of  experience,  but  not 
as  transcripts  of  experience.  These  ideals  implicitly 
determine  our  mental  procedure,  and  they  do  it  all 
the  more  surely  because  we  are  generally  unconscious 
of  them.  Our  so-called  proofs  consist,  not  in  deduc- 
ing them  from  experience,  but  in  illustrating  them  by 
experience.  The  facts  which  make  against  the  ideal 
are  set  aside  as  problems  not  yet  understood.  In  this 
way  we  maintain  our  conception  of  a  rational  uni- 
verse, or«  of  a  God  of  perfect  wisdom  and  goodness. 
We  illustrate  by  picked  facts,  and  this  passes  for 
proof.  Of  course  it  is  not  proof,  but  only  an  illustra- 
tion of  preexisting  conceptions.  For  one  who  has  not 
the  conceptions  and  the  interests  expressed  in  them, 
the  argument  is  worthless. 

Logic,  then,  is  in  its  full  right  in  pointing  out  the 
non-demonstrative  character  of  these  arguments,  but 
it  is  miserably  narrow  when  it  fails  to  see  that  these 
undemonstrated  ideals  are  still  the  real  foundation  of 
our  mental  life.  Without  implicit  faith  in  them  no 
step  can  be  taken  in  any  field.  The  mind  as  a  whole, 
then,  is  in  its  full  right  when,  so  long  as  these  ideals 
are  not  positively  disproved,  it  accepts  them  on  its 
own  warrant  and  works  them  out  into  the  rich  and 
ever-growing  conquests  of  our  modern  life.  By  the 
side  of  this  great  faith  and  its  great  results  the  formal 
objections  of  formal  logic  sink  into  an  almost  despica- 
ble impertinence. 

Of  all  these  ideals  that  rule  our  life  theism  is  the 
sum  and  source.  The  cognitive  ideal  of  the  universe, 
as  a  manifestation  of  the  Supreme  Reason,  leads  to 
theism.     The  moral  ideal  of  the  universe,  as  a  mani- 


318  CONCLUSION 

festation  of  the  Supreme  Righteousness,  leads  to  the- 
ism. The  practical  ideal  of  a  "  far-off  divine  event  to 
which  the  whole  creation  moves  "  leads  to  theism.  In 
short,  while  theism  is  demonstrated  by  nothing,  it  is 
implicit  in  everything.  It  cannot  be  proved  without 
begging  the  question,  or  denied  without  ending  in 
absurdity. 

But  so  far  as  logic  goes  atheism  is  no  better  off. 
Rigor  and  vigor  methods,  we  have  seen,  are  fatal  to 
all  concrete  thinking.  To  assume  the  general  truth 
and  fairness  of  things  may  be  a  venture  beyond 
knowledge,  but  to  assume  their  essential  untruth 
and  unfairness  is  equally  so.  The  assumption  that 
sense  knowledge  is  the  only  real  knowledge,  which 
has  always  been  the  mainstay  of  atheism,  is  not  only 
not  proved,  but  is  demonstrably  false  in  the  sense 
in  which  it  is  commonly  taken.  The  undeniable 
things,  as  we  have  seen,  are  not  the  mechanical 
factors  of  atheistic  thinking,  but  the  coexistence  of 
persons,  the  common  law  of  intelligence,  and  the 
common  order  of  experience.  And  the  task  of  phi- 
losophy is  to  interpret  these  facts,  for  the  satisfaction 
of  our  total  nature.  As  soon  as  this  is  seen,  the 
impossibility  of  atheism  becomes  manifest.  It  makes 
a  great  many  flourishes  about  "  reason,"  "  science," 
"  progress,"  and  the  like,  in  melancholy  ignorance  of 
the  fact  that  it  has  made  all  these  impossible.  On 
the  one  hand,  there  is  a  complete  ignorance  of  all  the 
implications  of  valid  knowing,  and  on  the  other  a 
ludicrous  identification  of  itself  with  science.  Its 
theory  of  knowledge  is  picked  up  ready-made  among 
the  crudities  of  spontaneous  thought,  and  when  the 
self-destructive   implications  of   atheism  are  pointed 


CONCLUSION  319 

out,  instead  of  justifying  itself  from  its  own  premises, 
it  falls  back  on  thoughtless  common  sense,  which 
forthwith  rejects  the  implications.  Of  course  the 
question  is  not  whether  the  implications  be  true  or 
false,  but  whether  they  be  unplications.  This  point 
is  happily  ignored,  and  the  defense  is  complete.  Its 
crude  realism  is  found  to  be  equally  obnoxious  to 
criticism.  Its  mechanical  realities,  instead  of  being 
the  substantial  facts  of  existence,  are  found  to  be 
only  hypostasized  abstractions  that  have  no  existence 
apart  from  intelligence.  Its  interpretations  furnish 
no  insight.  It  must  proclaim  our  entire  nature  mis- 
leadiag.  The  universe  that  has  evolved  the  human 
mind  as  the  "  correspondence  of  inner  relations  to 
outer  relations"  has  produced  a  strange  non-corre- 
spondence here.  The  all-illuminating  formula,  It  is 
because  it  must  be,  sheds  only  a  feeble  light.  The 
conception  of  blind  power  working  for  apparent  ends, 
of  non-intelligence  producing  intelligence,  of  uncon- 
sciousness producing  consciousness,  of  necessity  pro- 
ducing ideas  of  freedom  and  duty,  —  this  conception  is 
not  a  transparent  one.  But  all  this  the  atheist  stead- 
fastly believes,  and  professes  to  be  supremely  logical 
and  rational  meanwhile. 

Considering  atheistic  procedure  as  a  whole,  an  ill- 
conditioned  mind  might  lose  patience  with  it ;  but 
there  is  no  occasion  for  warmth,  for  according  to  the 
theory  itself,  logical  thought  is  not  possible.  Thoughts 
come  and  go,  not  according  to  any  inherent  rationality, 
but  as  produced  by  necessity.  This  probably  contains 
the  explanation  of  some  of  the  extraordinary  logic  of 
atheistic  treatises.  Any  hiatus  between  premises  and 
conclusion  is  due  to  necessity.      Any  strange  back- 


320  CONCLUSION 

wardness  in  drawing  a  manifest  conclusion  has  the 
same  cause.  All  lapses  into  sentiment  just  when 
logic  is  called  for  are  equally  necessary.  Even  the 
mistakes  of  theism  and  the  hardness  and  uncircumci- 
sion  of  the  critical  heart  have  an  equally  solid  founda- 
tion. A  great  authority,  speaking  of  the  advanced 
thinker,  says,  "  He,  like  every  other  man,  may  prop- 
erly consider  himself  as  one  of  the  myriad  agencies 
through  whom  works  the  Unknown  Cause  ;  and  when 
the  Unknown  Cause  produces  in  him  a  certain  belief 
he  is  thereby  authorized  to  profess  and  act  out  that 
belief."  With  this  conclusion  the  limits  of  mental 
self-respect  are  transcended,  and  the  theory  breaks  up 
in  a  melancholy  farce.  The  theist  may  take  some 
comfort,  however,  in  remembering  that  his  faith  is  no 
homemade  fancy  of  his  own,  but  a  genuine  product 
of  the  Unknown  Cause,  and  he  is  thereby  authorized 
to  profess  and  act  it  out. 

No  more  need  be  said  about  atheism.  As  soon  as 
its  implications  are  understood,  it  disappears  of  itself. 
It  is  a  kind  of  intellectual  parasite  and  flourishes  on 
the  confusion  and  oversights  of  theism  rather  than 
through  any  force  of  its  own.  These  superficialities 
and  oversights  of  theism  have  been  the  chief  source 
of  atheistic  doubt.  This  fact  leads  us  to  gather  up 
some  points  which  should  be  borne  in  mind  in  recom- 
mending theism. 

1.  Our  fundamental  practical  beliefs  are  formula- 
tions of  life  rather  than  speculative  deductions ;  and 
their  evidence  must  be  found  mainly  in  the  energy 
of  the  life  that  produces  them,  and  in  their  har- 
mony with  life  and  one  another.  The  function  of 
the  understanding  with  regard  to  them  is  regulative 


CONCLUSION  321 

rather  than  constitutive.  It  formulates  and  system- 
atizes them;  it  cannot  demonstrate  or  deduce  them. 
Deduction  of  the  rigor  and  vigor  type  is  impossible  and 
absurd  in  our  human  conditions.  Thus  the  problem  of 
our  deepest  beliefs  is  seen  to  be  one  of  life  and  experience 
and  history,  rather  than  of  academic  reflection  alone. 

2.  We  should  note  the  complete  emptiness  of  all 
mechanical  or  impersonal  explanation.  The  necessary 
logical  equivalence  of  cause  and  effect  in  such  cases 
makes  progress  impossible  and  reduces  explanation 
to  tautology.  The  only  explanation  that  escapes 
this  futility  consists  in  exhibiting  the  facts  as  the 
work  of  intelligence.  Hence  in  explaining  the  world 
the  alternative  is  theism  or  nothing. 

3.  A  further  specification  of  this  fact  is  that  all 
philosophizing  on  the  impersonal  plane  must  lose 
itself  in  tautology  or  the  infinite  regress,  and  in 
either  case  comes  to  naught.  For  by  the  law  of  the 
sufficient  reason  and  the  logical  equivalence  of  cause 
and  effect,  we  are  shut  up  to  endless  repetition  of  the 
facts  with  which  we  start  without  any  possibility  of 
transcending  them.  Free  intelligence  is  the  only  so- 
lution of  this  contradiction. 

4.  The  previous  difficulty  was  logical.  Metaphys- 
ics further  claims  that  there  can  be  no  philosophizing 
on  the  impersonal  plane,  because  all  the  categories 
of  the  understanding,  when  impersonally  taken,  are 
only  forms  of  thought  without  contents.  They  can 
be  realized  and  made  intelligible  only  when  viewed 
as  forms  of  living  experience.  As  abstract  principles 
they  vanish.  Hence  in  cosmic  thinking,  the  alterna- 
tive is  theism  or  positivism.  Mechanical  naturalism 
is  a  pm-e  illusion. 


322  CONCLUSION 

5.  Not  every  theory  of  things  is  compatible  with 
the  validity  of  knowledge.  All  necessitarian  theories 
of  whatever  kind  inevitably  break  down  on  the  prob- 
lem of  error,  and  establish  the  truth  of  opposing  views 
as  well  as  their  own.  The  result  is  the  overthrow 
of  all  knowledge  and  science.  The  alternative  is  free- 
dom in  the  world-ground  and  in  the  finite  knower. 
This  point  is  especially  to  be  borne  in  mind,  because 
it  is  so  generally  undreamed  of.  At  present  in  the 
uninstructed  goodness  of  our  hearts,  we  show  the 
largest  hospitality  toward  all  theories  without  ever 
dreaming  of  inquiring  into  their  bearings  upon  the 
problem  of  knowledge.  If  any  critic  points  out  that 
a  given  theory  destroys  reason  and  thus  violates  the 
conditions  of  all  thinking,  such  is  our  good  nature 
that  we  conclude  the  consequences  of  the  theory  must 
be  aberrations  of  the  critic.  The  self -destructive  theory 
is  thus  enabled  to  reserve  all  its  strength  for  attack, 
and  falls  back  on  common  sense  to  defend  it  from 
itself.  This  solemn  folly  will  continue  until  it  is  rec- 
ognized that  the  problem  of  knowledge  is  a  real  one, 
and  one  which  cannot  be  finally  settled  by  the  crude 
assumptions  of  spontaneous  thought. 

6.  Any  tenable  theory  of  knowledge  must  bring 
the  world  of  things  within  the  sphere  of  thought ; 
and  this  can  be  done  only  by  rejecting  the  extra- 
mental  things  of  crude  realism  and  irreligious  natural- 
ism altogether,  and  making  the  world  the  incarnation 
of  the  thought  of  a  Supreme  Intelligence  immanent 
in  it.  But  this  Intelligence  is  not  to  be  viewed  as  an 
abstract  logical  mechanism  or  function  of  categories, 
but  as  a  Living  Will,  a  synthesis  at  once  of  knowledge 
and  power. 


CONCLUSION  323 

7.  We  must  regard  the  division  of  labor  between 
science  and  speculation.  The  former  traces  the  uni- 
formities of  order  in  experience,  the  latter  deals  with 
their  meaning  and  causation.  Both  inquiries  are 
necessary  to  the  full  satisfaction  of  the  mind  and  the 
complete  mastery  of  experience ;  and  they  cannot 
conflict  except  through  confusion.  Theism  is  con- 
tent to  affirm  a  divine  causality  in  the  world,  and 
leaves  it  to  science  to  discover  the  modes  of  its  opera- 
tion. 

When  these  points  are  duly  regarded,  atheism  will 
appear  in  its  crudity  and  baselessness ;  and  science 
and  religion  will  be  seen  to  have  their  common 
source  and  justification  in  theism. 

So  much  for  theism  as  a  doctrine.  As  argument 
goes  the  theist  has  no  occasion  to  be  ashamed  of  his 
faith.  The  changing  of  this  assent  of  the  intellect  to 
a  living  practical  conviction  is  a  matter  for  life  itself. 
The  chief  value  of  the  theoretical  argument  is  in 
removing  the  obstacles  to  belief  that  spring  up  in 
unclear  thought.  In  gaining  the  living  conviction 
the  individual  must  minister  to  himself.  Only  by 
faithful  living  in  the  service  of  the  highest  and  best 
things  can  this  conviction  be  won.  A  great  deal  of 
theistic  faith  is  in  the  stage  of  external  assent.  From 
the  form  of  human  development  it  must  begin  here ; 
and  then  the  task  of  the  individual  is  to  pass  from 
these  assents  and  verbal  hearsays  to  the  living  reali- 
zation of  the  truth.  This  transition  takes  time  and 
is  rarely  perfectly  made.  In  this  respect  theistic 
faith  itself  is  an  ideal  rather  than  a  fully  realized 
possession. 


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Date  Due 

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